Assessing Dynamics of Foreign Terrorist Fighters from Southeast Asia

By Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah

This article assesses the dynamics of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Southeast Asian (SEA) countries. It presents a new summary of SEA jihadist participation in overseas conflicts, showing that patterns of participation differ from global trends and vary across the region. Drawing on case studies from Indonesia, the article argues that the security threat posed by returning FTFs has also shifted over time: returnees from more recent conflicts, such as Syria and Yemen, have had less impact than those returning from Afghanistan and the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s. Many recent attacks by Indonesian terrorist cells have been enabled by Indonesian FTFs based abroad rather than by returnees. These findings should be considered when evaluating FTF repatriation policies in the current context.

Introduction

Recent developments in Syria have renewed global attention on foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). As camps and prisons previously holding Islamic State (IS)-linked detainees have been closed and their occupants transferred elsewhere, many suspected FTFs have found opportunities to escape detention and attempt to return home.[1] At the same time, new theatres of conflict have emerged in February 2026, following the outbreak of the United States (US)-Israel-Iran war and the escalation of hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[2] Against this backdrop, it is necessary to reassess the dynamics of FTF mobilisation: which conflicts have historically attracted foreign fighters, what roles they occupy in such conflicts and the impact they have on the threat landscape when they return to their home countries.

The term “foreign terrorist fighters”, as defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), refers to individuals who travel to conflict zones to plan, prepare, train for or perpetrate terrorist acts. The literature suggests that FTF mobilisation is often driven by a desire to “defend the ummah” (in response to perceived oppression of Muslims), to acquire combat skills and training, to migrate to an Islamically governed territory (hijrah), or by a combination of these. These motivations also influence the length of time spent abroad: those seeking training tend to stay for shorter periods, while those motivated by hijrah often have no plans to return.[3] Scholars have also examined the impact of returning foreign fighters; a 2013 study of Western FTFs found that only one in nine foreign fighters returned to conduct attacks in the West.[4]

There have been various attempts to map global patterns of FTF activity. In one study, Thomas Hegghammer identified 70 insurgencies and wars in the “Muslim world” between 1945 and 2010, 22 of which involved foreign fighters.[5] While this dataset is a commendable effort at mapping global foreign fighting linked to Muslim causes, it does not account for instances of jihadist foreign fighting in Southeast Asia (SEA). For example, there is evidence of Malaysians travelling to participate in the 1999-2002 Maluku sectarian conflict in Indonesia;[6] as well as Indonesians, Malaysians and Singaporeans travelling to the southern Philippines in the 1990s; neither case is reflected in the dataset.[7]

Other studies have analysed SEA jihadists’ travel to specific conflict zones, such as Afghanistan[8] or Syria.[9] Many others focus on analysing FTF involvement from individual countries.[10] However, these findings are rarely compared, leaving a gap in understanding whether the dynamics of FTF involvement are context specific or generally consistent across different societies.

Southeast Asian Participation as FTFs

This article presents a new summary of SEA participation in jihad-linked conflicts outside their home countries, drawing on a wide range of research articles, reports, court documents and media sources. The table below lists each documented instance of SEA foreign fighting linked to jihad, organised by the date of foreign fighter entry and the conflict period, followed by the location, the local parties to the conflict and details of foreign fighters involved. The dataset includes only participation in active conflict zones and excludes cases involving travel for terrorist training in non-conflict settings.

Table 1. Summary of Southeast Asian (SEA) Jihadists’ Involvement as Foreign Fighters

Source: Compiled by the author

Which Conflicts to Fight in?

As Table 1 shows, FTF participation among SEA jihadists varies considerably, with some conflicts attracting far more foreign fighters than others. Globally, the conflicts that drew the largest numbers of Muslim foreign fighters were Syria (2011), Afghanistan (1978) and Iraq (2003).[44] In the SEA context, however, the most significant theatres were Syria (2011), Afghanistan (1978) and the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines, which began in 1968. Notably, although an estimated 4,000-6,000 foreign fighters travelled to Iraq after the US invasion in 2003, there are no recorded cases of SEA jihadists doing so until the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and al-Sham.[45] Similarly, while both the Bosnia (1992) and Chechnya (1994) conflicts attracted hundreds of foreign fighters globally,[46] there were very few, if any, reported fighters from SEA.

Among SEA jihadists, Syria attracted the highest level of FTF participation. This can be attributed to the strong Islamic narrative associated with Syria, or “Sham”, as the final battleground, as well as the narrative of hijrah used by the Islamic State (IS) to attract Muslims to its self-declared caliphate. Former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader Abu Rusydan described Syria as an “area where victory was assured in prophecies”.[47] Yet although Yemen also features in end-of-the-world prophecies, only a small number of SEA jihadists became FTFs there. One reason is that local groups in Yemen were stricter with admitting FTFs. While Indonesian jihadists from Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS) were able to train with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), JI members struggled to establish contact with the group, despite being in Yemen during the same period as some of the JAT/JAS members.[48] JAT had forged ties with AQAP earlier, with its first contingent arriving in 2012, before deteriorating security conditions made travel from Sana’a to the AQAP camps more difficult.[49] By contrast, JI member Abdurrahman Yurisya[50] only arrived in Yemen in September 2013.[51] In addition, each JAT/JAS contingent to AQAP in Yemen included at least one Indonesian of Hadrami descent, which likely helped with trust-building.[52]

Interestingly, within the region, only Malaysians have been documented fighting in Somalia. At least one Malaysian jihadist was involved at various stages of the conflict, initially alongside the pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) group Al-Shabaab in 2009-2010, and later with IS-Somalia in 2025. While identifying the motivations for FTF participation in these individual conflicts is beyond the scope of this article, the evidence suggests that FTF mobilisation cannot be explained solely by jihadist narratives or geographical proximity.

One important factor is whether a conflict is driven by ethno-separatist or jihadist objectives, such as defending the ummah, joining a caliphate or global jihad. The Pattani insurgency in southern Thailand and the Myanmar conflict—both rooted in separatist causes—were discussed by jihadists as potential FTF destinations,[53] but did not manifest into active participation from other SEA nationals.[54] In both cases, local insurgent groups rejected FTFs motivated by global jihad.[55] Ultimately, acceptance by the host organisation is a key factor in determining FTF involvement. As in Thailand and Yemen, there have also been cases of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines rejecting the recruitment of Singaporean FTFs who travelled to Mindanao in 2000.[56]

Activities as FTFs

All the SEA FTF contingents conducted similar activities in their jihad abroad. In most cases, there is a stronger emphasis on receiving training—often mandated by the host organisation—than on taking up arms against the enemy. This training typically comprises both an ideological programme (tadrib or dauroh syar’iyah) and a military training course (tadrib askari or dauroh harbiyah).

The ideological component usually covers the host group’s doctrinal foundations including fiqh (jurisprudence), tawhid (oneness of God), loyalty (al-wala’ wal-bara’) and other aspects of jihadist thought. The military component involves instruction in basic military tactics and weapons handling, including the use of AK-47s, assault rifles, bazookas and grenades. Some FTFs received specialist training in bomb-making, whilst others were assigned less combat-focused roles, such as medical support and dakwah (proselytisation).[57] In Afghanistan, hardly any of the SEA FTFs engaged in direct hostilities against Soviet forces.[58] In Syria, although all pro-IS FTFs were asked upon entry on their preference to be a fighter, suicide bomber, or kamikaze attacker,[59] ultimately some of them only occupied border patrol or aid delivery roles.[60]

A key trend is the shift in FTF travel from being organisation-led to individual-led. While FTF contingents to Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Philippines in the 1990s and Syria were sent systematically by organisations,[61] mostly for training purposes, much of the travel in the past decade has had less organisational support. Instead, FTF travel was often initiated by individuals and facilitated by “horizontal peer-to-peer mobilisation”.[62] The lack of strong organisational support led to much lower numbers of FTF travel, as can be seen in the lower numbers of FTFs in the past decade, excluding Syria. Reflecting IS’s nature as a decentralised network, travel by SEAs to support pro-IS groups in Mindanao, Khorasan and Puntland were largely initiated by individuals.

Impact of Returning FTFs: Case Studies from Indonesia

When SEA nationals do become FTFs, what impact do they have on terrorist cells in their home countries? This section draws on case studies of Indonesian jihadist returnees to examine their influence on terrorist attacks and cell recruitment in Indonesia.

FTF Impact on Local Attacks and Plots

A primary security concern is the prospect of returning FTFs conducting attacks in their home countries. This was evident in the case of Indonesian returnees from Afghanistan, many of whom participated in violent jihad in the 1999-2002 Ambon/Maluku conflict and the 1998-2001 Poso conflict, as well as at least 12 other terror attacks in Indonesia.[63]

In contrast, FTF returnees from more recent conflicts have so far been linked to only one successful terrorist attack. Syrian returnee Syawaluddin Pakpahan, who trained for five months with the Free Syrian Army in 2013, carried out a stabbing attack against the police in Medan, Indonesia, in June 2017.[64] FTF returnees from Syria also reportedly planned a bombing using Wi-Fi signals—at the time described as the first of its kind in SEA—but the plot was foiled by the police.[65] Similarly, Yudi Lukito Kurniawan, a FTF who travelled to Yemen, planned a terror attack on his return; however, his plot to attack the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2015 was thwarted by the authorities.[66]

Beyond these cases, other Indonesian FTF returnees from Syria and Yemen have not been linked to attack plans. While there are oft-cited examples of attacks involving IS deportees, these were not carried out by individuals who had successfully travelled to conflict zones. For example, Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani Saleh, the duo who committed the 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing, were deportees who never made it into Syria.[67] Similarly, the 2018 Surabaya church attacks have been linked to a study group led by the pro-IS deportee Khalid Abubakar, who was deported from Turkey before reaching Syria.[68] Another IS-linked plot to bomb multiple government sites was planned by Anggi, a deportee from Hong Kong, not a returnee from the Syrian conflict.[69]

The distinction between successful and unsuccessful entry into conflict zones among FTF returnees is important, as it is often assumed that the primary risk posed by returning FTFs lies in their ability to apply combat skills acquired abroad. Yet, the more sophisticated attacks that have been linked to Syrian “FTFs” were not assisted by combat-experienced FTF returnees. Instead, local cells learnt tactics through digital communication and online bomb-making manuals provided by Syria-based individuals. Prominent examples include Bahrun Naim and Bahrumsyah, who channelled funds and instructions to Indonesia-based cells, including for the 2016 Thamrin attack and other failed bombing plots.[70] This suggests that, for prevention purposes, disrupting links between domestic cells and Syrian-based cells may be more effective than focusing solely on restricting FTFs from returning to Indonesia.

The limited number of attacks linked to more recent returnees may also be influenced by other factors, including fewer combat-experienced returnees, shifts in terrorist organisations’ priorities and more effective counterterrorism policing. Most jihadists who became FTFs in Syria have not returned. Wardhana and Putra estimate that 56 FTFs returned from Syria between 2012 and 2017,[71] although other sources estimate a higher number, citing “hundreds”, but many of these were individuals who failed to enter Syria.[72] In 2020, Indonesia introduced a moratorium on repatriation, further reducing the number of returnees from the Syrian conflict. While some returns continue to occur, hundreds of Indonesians still remain in Syria.[73]

The return of FTFs in the past decade also coincided with a shift in priorities among many terrorist organisations in Indonesia, notably moving away from violent attacks on Indonesian soil. JI’s shift away from plotting attacks began in 2009,[74] and none of its cadres sent for training in Syria under the Sasana programme have been linked to plots; JI then formally announced its disbandment in June 2024. Similarly, JAS has prioritised preserving its public image and engaging in broader political engagement, and few of its returnees have been involved in planning attacks, despite receiving combat skills and bomb-making training in Syria and Yemen.[75] Finally, effective policing from Indonesia’s counterterrorism unit, Densus 88—strengthened by the 2018 Anti-Terrorism Laws which widened Densus’ mandate to arrest terror suspects—has led to the disruption of many militant operations.

FTF Impact on Recruitment

A more consistent impact throughout different FTF contingents has been the role of some returnees in establishing new cells and recruiting members. This is because FTF experience often enhances an individual’s credibility and connections, enabling the recruitment of more individuals to the jihadist cause. Many Afghan returnees, for instance, became influential figures in Indonesian jihadist circles. Similarly, FTF returnees from the Philippines and Syria have played key roles in sustaining terrorist recruitment efforts. One such individual, a Mindanao returnee known as Abu Umar, established and led numerous cells in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku in the 2000s until his arrest in 2011. After his release in 2019, he went on to establish more than 14 new cells across West Java, Jakarta and Banten between 2021 and 2023.[76]

In other cases, FTF experience may not have necessarily enhanced an individual’s standing but instead emboldened them to take on a more active role. For example, Syrian returnee Helmi Alamudi facilitated the travel of several groups of Indonesians to Syria after his own return in April 2014.[77] Abdullah Al-Katiri, who trained with AQAP in Yemen between January and July 2014, went on to lead another FTF contingent there in December that year.[78] Some FTFs also move between conflict zones, joining different terrorist groups and further expanding the connections of SEA jihadists in the global terrorist network. Many Indonesian veterans of Afghanistan later travelled to Mindanao, and there are reports of Malaysian FTFs in Syria subsequently joining the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) in Afghanistan in 2021.[79]

These examples highlight the role of FTFs in sustaining militant networks, but it should be noted that these effects can occur even without their return. As seen in the cases of Bahrun Naim and Bahrumsyah, overseas operatives can direct cells from afar. Similarly, Malaysian FTF Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedy recruited at least 30 percent of IS-linked individuals from the country between 2013 and 2016—including one who committed the first IS-linked attack in Malaysia—without ever leaving Syria.[80] This suggests that while it is important to monitor possible recidivism in FTF returnees, it is equally important to disrupt the long-distance facilitation of terror cells by FTFs based abroad.

Conclusion

SEA jihadists have participated in a range of conflicts involving Muslim populations worldwide, but their involvement has varied by nationality, with certain conflicts attracting FTFs from some countries more than others. The impact of FTF returnees on the domestic threat landscape has also evolved. Early returnees from Afghanistan significantly reshaped Indonesia’s terrorism dynamics, using their connections and skills to strengthen organisation, fund advanced plots and proliferate terrorist cells across the country. By contrast, the influence of more recent returnees has been more limited, reflecting more effective policing and shifts in the strategies adopted by local jihadist organisations.

While concerns about returning FTFs bringing security threats may be warranted, they should be considered within the broader historical context of FTF mobilisation and returns, so that policy responses can effectively target vulnerabilities. Indonesia halted the repatriation of IS-affiliated individuals from Syria in 2020, largely due to concerns that FTF returnees would carry out attacks.[81] However, evidence from the past decade suggests that, with the exception of one, Indonesian FTF returnees from Syria have not used their overseas experience to enhance domestic attack capabilities. In fact, greater support was provided to local Indonesian cells by Syria-based FTFs who did not return.

A policy of careful repatriation—one which enables authorities to monitor, intervene, sentence and rehabilitate FTFs—may therefore contribute more effectively to preventing transnational terrorist coordination and future terror attacks. There have been some indications of a shift in this direction. In 2024, the Indonesian National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) stated that it is ready to receive returnees.[82] In November 2025, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the FTF repatriation policy will be “selective and gradual”.[83] However, despite confirmation that 182 Indonesian nationals had escaped from al-Hol camp in February 2026,[84] no formal announcements have been made to reinstate the repatriation of IS-linked individuals from Syria. The issue remains politically sensitive, and as the Prabowo administration focuses on navigating the US-Israel-Iran conflict,[85] FTF repatriation will likely remain a lower priority.

About the Author

Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She can be reached at [email protected].

Thumbnail photo by Tima Miroshnichenko on Pexels

Citations

[1] “Brussels Jihadi Detained on Her Return to Belgium,” VRT, February 11, 2026, https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2026/02/11/brussels-jihadi-detained-on-her-return-to-belgium/; Cason Ho, “Sydney Doctor Jamal Rifi Says IS-Linked Families in Syria Should Return,” ABC News, February 25, 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-02-25/sydney-doctor-helping-australian-isis-families-in-syria/106385212; Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Escapes from Islamic State Camps in Syria: Implications for Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, February 27, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/escapes-from-islamic-state-camps-in-syria-implications-for-southeast-asia/.

[2] Miranda Jeyaretnam, “Pakistan Declares ‘Open War’ with Afghanistan Amid Escalating Attacks: What to Know,” TIME, February 27, 2026, https://time.com/7381546/pakistan-afghanistan-taliban-war-strikes-attacks-border-clash-terrorism-explainer/.

[3] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Analysts Downplay Terrorism Threat to Southeast Asia Amid Batam Alert, Gaza Peace Deal,” The Straits Times, October 30, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/analysts-downplay-terrorism-threat-to-s-e-asia-amid-batam-alert-gaza-peace-deal/.

[4] Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice Between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 10.

[5] Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 35, no. 3 (2010-12): 92–4.

[6] Ahmad El-Muhammady, “Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families: Malaysian Experience,” ICCT Policy Brief, January 19, 2023: 2, https://icct.nl/publication/managing-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-and-their-families-malaysian-experience.

[7] Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 92–4.

[8] International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” ICG Asia Report no. 63 (2003).

[9] Shashi Jayakumar and Cameron Sumpter, “Southeast Asian Fighters from Islamic State Leaks: A Historical Snapshot,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 6 (2019): 58–71; Kirsten E. Schulze and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia,” Asian Security 15, no. 2 (2019): 24, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87249/.

[10] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict,” IPAC Report, no. 6 (2014); Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate: Mapping Malaysian Foreign Fighter Networks in Iraq and Syria from 2012–2019,” Terrorism and Political Violence 35, no. 7 (2023): 1502–35.

[11] Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah (NewSouth Publishing, 2013), 132.

[12] FTFs joining the Afghan conflict often entered via Pakistan and trained near the Afghan-Pakistan border.

[13] Cameron Sumpter, “Returning Indonesian Extremists: Unclear Intentions and Unprepared Responses,” ICCT Policy Brief, July 2018: 2, https://doi.org/10.19165/2018.2.05.

[14] International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah.”

[15] International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah.”

[16] Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, “Written Reply to Parliamentary Questions on the Implications on Security in Singapore and the Neighbouring Region Given the Situation in Afghanistan, by K. Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law,” September 14, 2021, https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/written-reply-to-pqs-on-the-implications-on-security-in-singapore-and-the-neighbouring-region-given-the-situation-in-afghanistan/.

[17] Zachary Abuza, “A Breakdown of Southern Thailand’s Insurgent Groups,” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 17 (2006), https://jamestown.org/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/.

[18] Greg Fealy and John Funston, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State (United States Agency for International Development, 2016), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2016/PBAAD863.pdf; “Bomb Organisers Fought in Afghanistan,” The Age, December 3, 2002, https://www.theage.com.au/national/bomb-organisers-fought-in-afghanistan-20021203-gduvii.html.

[19] An unknown number of Indonesians reached Bosnia. See International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” 23.

[20] El-Muhammady, “Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” 2.

[21] I Made Wisnu Wardhana and Bimoseno Pratama Putra, “The Impact of the Indonesian Jihadist Returnee: Case Study of Three Waves of Jihadist Returnees from 1985 to 2018,” preprint, September 2024: 5, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.23856.98564.

[22] Raul Dancel, “Eight Militants Killed in Philippine Assault on Mindanao Lair of Singaporean Terrorist,” The Straits Times, February 4, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/eight-militants-killed-in-philippine-assault-on-mindanao-lair-of-singaporean-terrorist.

[23] Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, “White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” January 1, 2003: 9, https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/government_records/docs/98800442-39b1-11e7-98bd-0050568939ad/Cmd.2of2003.pdf; Dancel, “Eight Militants Killed.”

[24] Fealy and Funston, Indonesian and Malaysian Support, 9.

[25] Mohd Mizan Mohammad Aslam, A Critical Study of Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, Its Wider Connections in the Region and the Implications of Radical Islam for the Stability of Southeast Asia (PhD diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 2009), 130.

[26] Halim bin Hussein, a Singaporean, reportedly joined jihad in Maluku in 2000. See International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” 9.

[27] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia,” IPAC Report no. 5 (2013): 9.

[28] Rueben Ananthan Santhana Dass, “Malaysia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 1 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/malaysia-3/.

[29] As IS’s scope of operations encompassed both Syrian and Iraqi territory, it is likely that many of those who went to join IS in Syria also went to Iraq; see Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,” IPAC Report, no. 13 (2014): 12–3.

[30] Estimates of IS fighters from Indonesia range widely. Of this figure, it is not clear how many were active fighters, as there is evidence that some Indonesian men who travelled to Syria refused to fight for IS and were subsequently detained; see Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Indonesian Group that Escaped ISIS Now in Iraq, but Cannot Fly Home Yet,” The Straits Times, August 11, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-family-that-escaped-isis-now-in-iraq-but-cannot-fly-home-yet; and Chaula Rininta Anindya, “The Deradicalisation Programme for Indonesian Deportees: A Vacuum in Coordination,” Journal for Deradicalization, no. 18 (2019): 217.

[31] Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “The Challenges of Repatriating Malaysian IS Fighters from Syria,” The Diplomat, February 24, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/the-challenges-of-repatriating-malaysian-is-fighters-from-syria/; El-Muhammady, “Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” 5.

[32] Muhammad Reza Lahaman Kiram is the only confirmed Filipino FTF in Syria. Kiram travelled to join IS Syria with his wife, though it is unclear if she also took on a combat role; see “Muhammad Reza Lahaman Kiram,” United Nations Security Council, accessed April 27, 2026, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/muhammed-reza-lahaman-kiram.

[33] Zachary Abuza, “Joining the New Caravan: ISIS and the Regeneration of Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 25, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3964534/joining-the-new-caravan-isis-and-the-regeneration-of-terrorism-in-southeast-asia/.

[34] Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Endri Sunaryo alias Endri alias Sunaryo alias Yusuf alias Luthfi Bin Ghojali,” Court Decision no. 121/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Utr (2024); Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Muhammad Taqiyuddin alias Abu Ayub bin Ahmad,” Court Decision no. 123/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Utr (2024).

[35] In July 2014, Isnilon Hapilon and 30 other fighters pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. It is not clear whether the FTFs who later became part of these pro-IS cells in Basilan had already been in the Philippines prior to the pledge. At least one individual, Wahyudin (aka Iron), travelled to the Philippines specifically for pro-IS purposes, unrelated to the earlier conflict in Mindanao; see Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia,” IPAC Report, no. 33 (2016): 6–13.

[36] The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), the Maute Group aka IS-Ranao and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) supported IS.

[37] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Pro-ISIS Groups,” 11; Noor Huda Ismail, Narasi Mematikan (PT Kreasi Prasasti Perdamaian, 2022), 122; Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Global Center on Cooperative Security, Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Returnees in Southeast Asia (2021), 21.

[38] Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and Global Center on Cooperative Security, Financing and Facilitation, 21–2.

[39] A Singaporean, Muhamad Ali Abdul Rahman (aka Muawiyah), was fighting in a Mindanao camp that served as a base for the pro-IS Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), though it is unclear whether he entered the Philippines after IS was established or had remained in the country since first arriving in Mindanao in the 1990s as a missionary. Muawiyah has also been associated with the MILF and the ASG; see Dancel, “Eight Militants Killed”; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Killing Marwan in Mindanao,” IPAC Report, no. 17 (2015).

[40] This part of the Afghanistan conflict is dated from 2016, when the US government reauthorised strikes in Afghanistan to target IS; see Charlie Savage, “Obama Relaxes Rules for Striking ISIS in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, January 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/asia/obama-relaxes-rules-for-striking-isis-in-afghanistan.html.

[41] The three known individuals who successfully joined ISKP in Afghanistan are Saifullah Chaniago, Bagiyo Saleh and Nadhiroh Nuraini. Azzam al Faruq (a five-year-old child of Bagiyo Saleh and Nadhiroh Nuraini) also travelled, but is not considered an FTF due to the unlikelihood that he took part in combat. At least 16 other Indonesians attempted to travel to Afghanistan between January and June 2019 but were arrested en route; see Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Learning from Extremists in West Sumatra,” IPAC Report, no. 62 (2020): 10–2.

[42] “Taleban Claims to Have Caught Two Malaysians Fighting for ISIS-Linked Militants in Kabul,” The Straits Times, August 28, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/taleban-claims-to-have-caught-two-malaysians-fighting-for-is-k-in-kabul.

[43] Dass, “Malaysia.”

[44] Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Bram Peeters, “Fickle Foreign Fighters? A Cross-Case Analysis of Seven Muslim Foreign Fighter Mobilisations (1980–2015),” ICCT Research Paper, October 2015: 5–6, https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/multimedia_in_the_media/ICCT-Duyvesteyn-Peeters-Fickle-Foreign-Fighters-October2015.pdf.

[45] As IS’s scope of operations encompassed both Syrian and Iraqi territory, it is probable that those who went to join IS in Syria also went to Iraq. However, there is only one documented case of an Indonesian travelling specifically to Iraq; see Muh Taufiqurrohman, “The Road to ISIS: How Indonesian Jihadists Travel to Iraq and Syria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, no. 4 (2015): 21.

[46] Duyvesteyn and Peeters, “Fickle Foreign Fighters?”

[47] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict.”

[48] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda in Yemen,” IPAC Report, no. 95 (2024): 10–11.

[49] JAT/JAS members trained with AQAP in Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen, and in Wadi bin Ali Valley in southern Yemen, near Seyoun Airport; see Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Endri Sunaryo”; Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Muhammad Taqiyuddin.”

[50] Also known as Abd Rahman (alias Deni).

[51] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda in Yemen.”

[52] Salim Mubarok Attamimi, of Hadrami descent, was in the first JAT contingent to AQAP, and Abdullah al-Katiri, also of Hadrami descent, travelled with the second and third JAT/JAS contingents to AQAP; see Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda in Yemen”; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia.”

[53] For calls to fight in Myanmar, see Mohd Nawab bin Mohd Osman and Aida Arosoaie, “Rohingya Radicalisation in Malaysia: Where’s the Evidence?” New Mandala, February 9, 2018, https://www.newmandala.org/rohingya-radicalisation-malaysia-wheres-evidence/.

[54] There are reports of JI members travelling to Narathiwat between 2000 and 2003 to procure arms and to go into hiding, but these individuals had “no active involvement in the violence”; see International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad”; Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Jani, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Conflict: Foreign Jihadi Brewing,” RSIS Commentary, no. 259 (2016), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CO16259.pdf.

[55] In September 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) issued a statement denying any links to global terrorist groups, including IS, AQ and LeT; see Osman and Arosoaie, “Rohingya Radicalisation”; and, for Thailand, Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Muslim Identity, Local Networks, and Transnational Islam in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces,” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 6 (2011): 1419.

[56] Singapore Government, “Government Press Statement: Update on Counter-Terrorism Investigations in Singapore,” January 14, 2004, https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/2004011404.htm.

[57] With AQAP in Yemen, Fatkhi Umar (alias Abu Ahmad al Indunisy) and Heru Siswanto were both placed in AQAP’s Medical Division, while Taqiyudin was assigned to the Dauroh Syari (Islamic training programme) division; see Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Endri Sunaryo”; Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Muhammad Taqiyuddin.”

[58] Jayakumar and Sumpter, “Southeast Asian Fighters,” 59.

[59] Jayakumar and Sumpter, “Southeast Asian Fighters,” 64.

[60] Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Endri Sunaryo”; Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Muhammad Taqiyuddin.”

[61] From Indonesia, the main organisations/networks sending members to foreign conflicts were Darul Islam (to Afghanistan), JI (to Afghanistan, Philippines, Syria) and the Aman Abdurrahman network/Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (to Syria). Several smaller Indonesian organisations also facilitated FTF travel to Syria, including JAT, Forum Aktivis Syariah Islam (FAKSI) and Firqah Abu Hamzah (FAH).

[62] Jayakumar and Sumpter, “Southeast Asian Fighters,” 67.

[63] The 12 attacks involving Afghan returnees are the 2000 Philippine Ambassador Residence bombing in Jakarta; the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in various locations; the 2001 Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta; the 2002 Bali bombing I and the 2005 Bali bombing II; the 2002 McDonald’s bombing in Makassar; the 2003 Soekarno–Hatta Airport bombing; the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta; the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta; and the 2009 Marriott Hotel and Ritz-Carlton bombings in Jakarta; see Wardhana and Putra, “The Impact of the Indonesian Jihadist Returnee”; International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” 33–5.

[64] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Ongoing Problem of Pro-ISIS Cells in Indonesia,” IPAC Report no. 56 (2019): 7.

[65] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Colin P. Clarke and Samuel Hodgson, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters from Southeast Asia: What Happens Next?” ICCT Perspective, February 17, 2020, https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-terrorist-fighters-southeast-asia-what-happens-next.

[66] “Indonesia Arrests Citizen Who Plotted Terror Attack on Singapore Exchange Building in 2014,” Channel NewsAsia, September 3, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-arrest-terrorist-plot-attack-singapore-exchange-4583521.

[67] Richard C. Paddock and Jason Gutierrez, “Indonesian Couple Carried Out Philippines Cathedral Bombing, Police Say,” The New York Times, July 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/world/asia/philippines-bombing-deportees-isis.html.

[68] Quinton Temby, “Terrorism in Indonesia After ‘Islamic State’,” Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 3 (2020): 12.

[69] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Husband and Wife Face Death Penalty on Terror Charges in Indonesia,” The Straits Times, March 12, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/husband-and-wife-face-death-penalty-on-terror-charges-in-indonesia.

[70] Muhammad Ikhsan Mahar, “Menjamurnya Sel-sel Kecil NIIS,” Kompas, February 18, 2016, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/02/18/17035591/Menjamurnya.Sel-sel.Kecil.NIIS?page=all; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence,” IPAC Report no. 25 (2016): 1.

[71] Wardhana and Putra, “The Impact of the Indonesian Jihadist Returnee,” 8.

[72] Anindya, “The Deradicalisation Programme,” 218.

[73] Leebarty Taskarina, “Bring Them Back Home: Indonesia’s Policy Dilemma in Repatriating Ex-ISIS Sympathisers,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism 20, no. 4 (2025): 518–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2025.2518548.

[74] Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “JI’s Decision to Disband Is for Real,” Indonesia at Melbourne, July 31, 2024, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/jis-decision-to-disband-is-for-real/.

[75] Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Endri Sunaryo,” 14.

[76] Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Abdullah Indra Kusuma alias Muhammad Ichwan alias Abang alias Abu Umar bin Abdul Azis,” Court Decision no. 401/Pid.Sus/2024/PN JKT.TIM (2024): 9–11, 18–20, https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/zaef9028120c9.2f08f7c313034353234.html.

[77] Schulze and Liow, “Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad.”

[78] Supreme Court of Indonesia, “Putusan Yudo Ratmiko,” Court Decision no. 127/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Utr (2024).

[79] “Taleban Claims to Have Caught Two Malaysians Fighting for ISIS-Linked Militants in Kabul,” The Straits Times, August 8, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/taleban-claims-to-have-caught-two-malaysians-fighting-for-is-k-in-kabul.

[80] Gartenstein-Ross, Clarke and Hodgson, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters.”

[81] Dete Aliah, “Bahaya Pemulangan Eks NIIS,” Kompas, February 15, 2020, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/bahaya-pemulangan-eks-niis.

[82] Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesia Prepares to Bring Ex-ISIS Families Home,” East Asia Forum, December 26, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/12/28/indonesia-prepares-to-bring-ex-isis-families-home/.

[83] “Kemlu Beber 359 WNI Masih Berada di Kamp Pengungsi Suriah,” CNN Indonesia, November 3, 2025, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20251103203148-106-1291454/kemlu-beber-359-wni-masih-berada-di-kamp-pengungsi-suriah.

[84] “182 WNI Eks ISIS Kabur dari Kamp Suriah,” CNN Indonesia, February 19, 2026, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20260219175447-120-1329743/182-wni-eks-isis-kabur-dari-kamp-suriah/amp.

[85] Rizky Ihsan, “Prabowo Walks a Fine Line in Responding to the Mideast Crisis,” Indonesia at Melbourne, March 11, 2026, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/prabowo-walks-a-fine-line-in-responding-to-the-mideast-crisis/.