Bangladesh
In 2023, Bangladesh faced a complex security situation marked by the resurgence of Al-Qaeda-centric threats, as the influence of Islamic State-affiliated groups seemingly declined. The breakaway factions from established militant groups actively recruited and trained members for surprise attacks, with a specific focus on key installations like prisons. At the same time, extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir were also active in major cities. At any rate, Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies undermined militant groups’ ability to coordinate attacks through arrests and timely identification of emerging threats. As a result, Bangladesh’s ranking in the 2023 Global Terrorism Index improved. Though Bangladesh has made progress in addressing security threats, sustained vigilance and counter terrorism efforts remain essential.
TrendsTop of Form
Ansar al Islam (AAI) / Al-Qaeda Bangladesh
The primary security concern in Bangladesh centres around Ansar al Islam (AAI), also known as Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which now operates under the name Al-Qaeda Bangladesh (AQB).[1] AAI has forged a joint front with the former Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B), amplifying the security risks.[2]
Additionally, AAI has established a new women’s division comprising wives and female relatives of militants, providing the group with additional manpower and capability. For example, investigations showed that a member of AAI’s women’s wing played an active role in planning the abduction of two militants from the court premises in Old Dhaka on November 21, 2022.[3] The group is reportedly trying to bring in fighters from overseas to carry out attacks.[4]
Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B)
Despite numerous setbacks, HuJI-B poses a persistent threat in Bangladesh. Though the group was more active in dawah (missionary work) and recruitment activities, one of its factions has been plotting attacks in Bangladesh and Myanmar.[5] HuJI-B has tried to recruit from Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar and is active in the Arakan (Rakhine State) region. The group is now divided into several sections, with each section performing a specific task. For instance, one HuJI-B section is trying to infiltrate politics by merging with Hefazat-e-Islam, an unregistered but influential Islamist group among Muslim students and teachers in local madrassas.
Likewise, one other section is reorganising itself, including from within prisons, for militant activities under its own banner, while another has forged an alliance with AAI. Many of the HuJI-B members have been convicted in various cases, but they have escaped after securing bail. At the same time, some imprisoned HuJI-B leaders are continuing their activities from within the jails.[6] Some members, after serving their prison sentences, have also rejoined HuJI-B.[7]
According to Bangladeshi law enforcement, HuJI-B is active in the Greater Sylhet region (northeast Bangladesh). Alarmingly, international terrorist entities such as those within the Al-Qaeda (AQ) network continue to maintain contact with HuJI-B, heightening concerns about its enduring presence and influence.[8]
In February 2023, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit arrested a key HuJI-B leader, Fakhrul Islam, who had received training in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.[9] After returning to Bangladesh, he became associated with HuJI-B, primarily focusing on fund-raising and social media activities. He also visited Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar, aiming to bolster the group’s membership and plot attacks in Bangladesh.[10] HuJI-B’s resilience and ability to adapt to changing circumstances underscore the ongoing security challenges it presents in Bangladesh.[11]
Jamaatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS)
Jamaatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) is a new extremist group, with connections to HuJI-B, JMB and AAI. JAFHS’ activities have raised concerns, particularly in the remote hilly regions of Bandarban and Rangamati, where it has links with separatist outfits as well. The group had plans to create a naval unit for its members with military training to take refuge if law enforcement became vigilant against their existence. They secured financing from AAI and intended to use large rivers and river islands for shelter. Currently, they are scattered across the plains, and efforts are ongoing to apprehend them. Numerous individuals connected to the group have been arrested, but some key figures are still at large.[12]
JAFHS had been under scrutiny for its alleged connections with a fugitive militant, Ziaul Haque, who had been sentenced to death for his involvement in the murders of secular writers and bloggers. Authorities had previously arrested the group’s alleged leader, Md Anisur Rahman, along with two others.[13]
JAFHS was founded by Shamin Mahfuz, an ex-member of the Islami Chatra Shibir, the student wing of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI), the largest Islamist political party in the country. Shamin Mahfuz, who was associated with AAI, had been arrested in 2011 and 2014. While in prison, he first planned to form JAFHS and developed close links with the imprisoned top leaders of JMB and HUJI-B.[14] Arrested once more in June 2023, Shamin Mahfuz was found with a huge cache of explosives in his possession.[15]
Bangladesh has officially proscribed JAFHS, citing the organisation as a significant threat to public safety and law and order. JAFHS’ ban brings the total number of proscribed militant organisations in Bangladesh to nine.[16]
Tawhidul Uluhiah al Jihadi (TUJ)
In September 2023, Bangladesh’s Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) uncovered a newly formed jihadist group, Tawhidul Uluhiah al Jihadi (TUJ), led by Jewel Molla.[17] The group was planning a major attack in the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, including at a high security prison to release an AAI ideologue, Jasimuddin Rahmani. Molla’s journey from a bakery worker to a jihadist leader is emblematic of the digital age’s impact on radicalisation. He initially joined AAI, having been inspired by online lectures, and quickly rose through its ranks. Molla was eventually arrested by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in 2019 during a covert meeting with other JMB members in Rajshahi district (northern Bangladesh), but he continued radicalising fellow inmates during his nine-month prison term. Upon his release in 2023, he founded TUJ, drawing recruits from various Bangladeshi jihadist groups. TUJ, with an estimated 80-90 members, gained attention for disseminating jihadist propaganda and advocating the establishment of a caliphate by overthrowing Bangladesh’s democratic system. Molla’s livestreamed messages led to increased surveillance by the ATU and, in September, he and other TUJ leaders were arrested.[18] However, many TUJ members remain at large.
Imam Mahmuder Kafela
Bangladeshi authorities have unearthed a new terrorist group, Imam Mahmuder Kafela (IMK), named after its leader. Mahmud is also known as Jewel Ali, Jewel Mahmud and Habibullah Mahmud. IMK remained unknown until August 2023, when authorities arrested Mahmud, a physically challenged member and the regional commander of JMB, along with at least 40 other members. Under Mahmud’s leadership, IMK had established a training camp in a remote hilly area of north-eastern Bangladesh for preparing youth for eschatological “armed jihad” described as Ghazwatul Hind.[19] Subsequent investigations brought to light their recruitment efforts, which encompassed a broad spectrum of individuals, including youth, women and families. Jewel had been arrested at least two times for terrorist activities in 2019 and 2020.[20]
Islamic State-Centric Threats
Since the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in 2016 carried out by pro-Islamic State (IS) JMB elements, the Neo-JMB organisational network has largely disintegrated and its activities have been effectively curtailed. IS’ diminished global influence after its military defeat in the Middle East has dented the terror group’s appeal in Bangladesh as well. The Neo-JMB’s network has since fragmented, although some remaining members have attempted to establish contact with the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) in Afghanistan.[21] However, the persistence of IS radical narratives, coupled with the emergence of lone-actor terrorism, the use of cryptocurrencies for financing and the rapid dissemination of IS propaganda in Bengali, indicate the persistent terrorist threat of IS ideology in Bangladesh.
The growing presence of ISK’s supporters in Bangladesh is a serious concern for law enforcement agencies. Local-language websites and social media accounts actively spread ISK content, fostering indoctrination and depicting the terror group as a role model. In Afghanistan, ISK has transitioned from seeking territorial control to urban warfare, posing a security threat to the Afghan government and aiming to disrupt the Taliban’s governance. Saiful Islam Khaled, a Neo-JMB leader in Bangladesh who is currently facing a death sentence, reportedly used Telegram from prison to communicate with ISK militants in Afghanistan to seek financial assistance.[22] Notably, a Bangladeshi ISK member Mohammad Tanvir, who was arrested in Afghanistan in 2020,[23] escaped during a jailbreak, and is believed to still be in Afghanistan. Several other Bangladeshi ISK members are also thought to be in the Af-Pak region.
Leadership of the Islamic State (IS) in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the IS threat primarily comes from homegrown militants belonging to the Neo-JMB network (a splinter of JMB) who have been influenced by the former’s ideology. Neo-JMB’s leader Mahadi Hasan Jon was arrested in Turkey, and Bangladeshi authorities were trying to bring him back with the help of Interpol.[24] While counter terrorism operations have weakened the capabilities of Neo-JMB, the emergence of virtual cells and the use of secure apps for communication among IS followers pose new security challenges. According to Bangladeshi police, recruitment by Neo-JMB, particularly for lone-actor operations, primarily occurs online and predominantly among younger males aged 18-22 years old. It is also worth mentioning the existence of a female unit within Neo-JMB, predominantly used for communication and logistics support.
Organisational Strategy and Tactics
So far, IS followers in Bangladesh have been adapting their organisational tactics. They now form small cells comprising six to seven members, employing a “cut out” method to conceal their identities and addresses.[25] However, a more recent trend indicates a preference for lone attackers. According to Bangladeshi investigators, these individuals are trained for various types of operations, including target killings, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and even suicide attacks. The group’s primary targets are the police, other law enforcement agencies, non-Muslims and foreigners.
Hizb ut-Tahrir
In the lead-up to Bangladesh’s general elections in 2024, the banned extremist outfit Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has striven to regain prominence in the country. HT has been banned in some countries, including Bangladesh, for its political activities and perceived threat to government stability. While HT promotes non-violent means to achieve its goals, it has faced criticism for its conservative interpretation of Islamic law, rejection of democracy, opposition to nationalism and vision of a unified Islamic state, which many argue misrepresents Islam and challenges modern democratic principles and human rights.
HT initiated its organisational activities in Bangladesh in 2001, holding public gatherings and marches during the BNP-Jamaat coalition government’s tenure. In 2009, the Awami League government banned HT in Bangladesh. However, the security agencies believe that even after more than a decade of proscription, HT remains a major security threat.[26] Though HT in Bangladesh initially had an urban footprint, it has since expanded its reach to suburbs and even the rural areas.
Despite increased vigilance against its activities currently, HT has distributed inflammatory leaflets and displayed posters in Dhaka and other major cities.[27] Some of the posters and leaflets carrying anti-state slogans called for the overthrow of the government. HT activists have openly encouraged public participation in their online conferences and placed their posters in areas without CCTV coverage to evade surveillance and arrests. HT has actively recruited students from educational institutions, explaining their presence in these areas.[28] In May, HT also reportedly sent invitations to journalists and police officers in the southern port city of Chattogram to participate in their online conference.[29] Law enforcement agencies claimed to have arrested several HT members on charges of anti-state activities.
According to law enforcement officials, HT may have a plan to sabotage the upcoming parliamentary elections. HT had called an online conference in March 2022 mainly to publicly articulate its position on various political issues in Bangladesh. Due to frequent changes in live broadcast platforms and URLs, law enforcement agencies were unable to detect their online activities.[30] According to media reports, more than a hundred HT members on bail have left Bangladesh and are financing the group from overseas, including from the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Hong Kong and Pakistan.[31]
Rohingya Armed Groups
In 2023, Bangladesh faced significant threat from Rohingya armed groups. For instance, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a Rohingya insurgent group active in Cox’s Bazar, committed crimes such as murders, kidnappings, extortion and smuggling of narcotics. Although various criminal groups operate in the Rohingya camps, ARSA is reportedly the most organised. ARSA is also reportedly working closely with AQ-centric groups such as AAI and HuJI-B. However, there is conflicting information about the presence of criminal elements in Rohingya camps. For instance, security agencies suggest that around 450 ARSA members are involved in crimes; however, local Rohingyas claim thousands of Rohingyas are engaged in crimes. Typically, violence and insecurity stem from turf wars, drug trade and extortion, with most incidents involving ARSA. Besides, reduced food allocations within the Rohingya refugee camps have created financial difficulties, pushing some to engage in criminal activities.[32]
In August, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested ARSA’s finance secretary Mohammad Yunus in Cox’s Bazar. His arrest brought into sharp focus ARSA’s financial network and arms procurement methods. During the investigation, Yunus revealed that ARSA collects funds from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the US, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Thailand as well as donations from Rohingya villages in Myanmar. These sources provide the group with an estimated monthly income of BDT 1,000,000–1,500,000 (US$10,000–15,000).[33] Furthermore, ARSA is heavily armed, with an arsenal including looted AK-47 assault rifles. ARSA operates in a well-structured manner, making it challenging for law enforcement agencies to uproot it entirely, as members receive training in remote hills in Myanmar.
In January, an unverified Bangladeshi media report claimed that Rohingya militant groups have set up base camps in the zero line near the Tumbru between the Bangladesh-Myanmar border as well as in the Totar Dia island. The report also indicated the presence of Rohingya fighters trained by Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani Taliban. The report also indicated that these fighters are paid by ARSA and the Nobi Hossain Group, with both fighting for dominance in Rohingya camps as well as in the burgeoning drug trade.[34]
Response and Challenges
In a continuation of their strategy of recent years, in 2023, the Bangladeshi security authorities carried out operations against planned terror plots and arrested extremists and terrorists belonging to different jihadist organisations. Aside from Jewel Molla and Jewel Mahmud mentioned in preceding paragraphs, another key arrest was that of senior AQIS leader Ikramul Haque in May 2023. Ikramul Haque, a member of AAI who had joined in 2017 and risen to a leadership position in AQIS, was arrested in Dhaka. Haque, also known as Abu Talha, had studied in a prominent Indian madrassa (Darul Ulum Deoband) and was a top wanted terrorist. This arrest aligns with India’s Anti-Terrorism Squad’s efforts to detain Bangladeshi individuals with connections to extremist groups like AAI. In a related incident, four Bangladeshi youths were arrested in Gujarat in May, citing influence from Ikramul Haque. Three Bangladeshi nationals were also arrested in Bhopal in October 2022, leading to the subsequent detention of eight more individuals in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. These actions highlight concerns about the expansion of AQ-centric networks from Bangladesh into India.[35] A source within the Bangladesh police also informed the author that there are reportedly 30 to 40 AAI operatives inside Myanmar, and that the group is increasingly becoming Myanmar focused.
However, despite the low incidence of terrorism in Bangladesh currently, the country continues to face challenges on the legal and digital fronts.
On the legal front, the foremost challenge has been the provision of bail to terrorist suspects who later re-engage in terrorist activities, with some even escaping overseas. Once they are released on bail, it is challenging for the authorities to monitor them. For instance, a Bangladeshi court granted bail to the chief of Neo-JMB’s female unit, Humayara Zakir Nabila, in 2022. After securing bail, she tried to travel overseas. Though Bangladeshi authorities have blocked her passport, she continues to make efforts to travel.[36] While the law enforcement agencies are trying their best to address such legal challenges, there remain weaknesses in the Bangladeshi judicial system.[37]
Additionally, the accelerated dissemination of extremist propaganda materials by new dedicated websites, including those accessible via the dark web, have added to the operational challenges. The faster dispersal of IS materials in Bengali means a rapid flow of ideas, directives and inspirations to the Bengali-speaking audience in Bangladesh and beyond.
Outlook
2023 has revealed a concerning evolution in Bangladesh’s terrorist threat landscape. This threat is now more diverse, widespread and complex, with AQ-centric groups playing pivotal roles. Looking ahead to 2024, it is crucial for the incoming administration to promptly address these challenges, as Bangladesh currently lacks a comprehensive countering extremism strategy. The weaknesses in the nation’s counter terrorism mechanism, compounded by political divisions and the use of religion in politics, underscore the need for a concerted effort to safeguard the country’s security. The forthcoming administration must exhibit both political will and capacity to prevent the resurgence of militant groups and lone-actor terrorists. The terrorist groups are likely to exploit remote terrains and may even target critical facilities, including prisons. The unresolved Rohingya crisis adds another layer of complexity, creating a security challenge that extremist organisations like AAI and HuJI-B actively exploit. The plight of Rohingya refugees provides fertile ground for recruitment and radicalisation, making it crucial to address their grievances and vulnerability within refugee camps.
About the Author
Iftekharul Bashar is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit within the S. Rajaratnam School of the International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
[1] Shahadat Hossain Parash, “The Violent Militants Changed the Name of the Organisation,” Shamokal, February 15, 2023.
[2] The alliance has also established links with certain factions within Hefazat-e-Islam, with the latter attempting to infiltrate the political landscape.
[3] Parash, “The Violent Militants Changed the Name of the Organisation.”
[4] “Terrorist Plans Were Underway by Bringing in Militants From Abroad: ATU,” NewsBangla24, September 14, 2023, https://www.newsbangla24.com/news/231899/Terrorist-plans-were-underway-by-bringing-militants-from-abroad-ATU.
[5] Nuruzzaman Labu, “That Harkatul Jihad is Still Active,” Bangla Tribune, August 21, 2023.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “Huji Active in Disguise,” Jugantor, February 13, 2023.
[8] Nuruzzaman Labu, “That Harkatul Jihad is Still Active.”
[9] During his training, he had encounters with prominent figures like AQ’s Osama bin Laden and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar.
[10] Touhiduzzaman Tanmay, “Harkatul Jihad’ Trying to Lure Rohingyas with Money,” Jago News, February 14, 2023, https://www.jagonews24.com/national/news/833072.
[11] “Big Attacks on Key Installations Were Their Aim,” The Daily Star, January 29, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/big-attacks-key-installations-were-their-aim-3233091.
[12] “RAB: Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya Planned to Form Naval Unit,” Dhaka Tribune, August 3, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/321576/rab-jama-atul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-planned.
[13] “Anisur Is the Undoubted Chief of Jamatul Ansar, Says RAB,” The Financial Express, July 24, 2023, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/anisur-is-the-undoubted-chief-of-jamatul-ansar-says-rab.
[14] “Who is Militant Group Founder Shamin Mahfuz?” Dhaka Tribune, June 24, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/314230/who-is-militant-group-founder-shamin-mahfuz.
[15] Ibid.
[16] The other banned militant outfits are Ansar al Islam, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh and Shahadat-e al Hiqma.
[17] “Three Members of New Militant Outfit Arrested,” The Daily Star, September 17, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/three-members-new-militant-outfit-arrested-3420706.
[18] “Tawheedul Ulhuyyah: How the Militant Group was Born,” NewsBangla24, September 16, 2023, https://www.newsbangla24.com/news/232013/Tawhidul-Uluhiyah-How-the-militant-organization-was-born.
[19] “What Is Known About the New Militant Group Imam Mahmud’s Caravan,” BBC Bangla, August 15, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/avp3vd92.
[20] For details, see “4 JMB Men Held in Rajshahi,” The Bangladesh Post, November 21, 2020, https://bangladeshpost.net/posts/4-jmb-men-held-in-rajshahi-47512.
[21] “Worries Now Over Pro-Al-Qaeda Organisations,” Prothom Alo, July 2, 2023, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/jtxnwxzwzg.
[22] Shariful Islam and Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Militants Using Jails to Recruit Operatives,” The Daily Star, July 3, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/militants-using-jails-recruit-operatives-3359461.
[23] Kamran Reza Chowdhury, “Suspected Bangladeshi IS Member Caught in Afghanistan, Officials Say,” Benar News, April 15, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/bangladesh-militants-04152020190400.html.
[24] “7 Years of Holy Artisan Attack: Old Militants Are Active with New Tactics,” Samakal, June 27, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/nwpx783m.
[25] Terrorist groups may use the “cut out” method as a communication and operational security tactic to minimise the risk of detection and interception by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This method involves introducing intermediaries, or “cut outs”, between the individuals involved in the planning and execution of terrorist activities.
[26] Ibid.
[27] The banned organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is actively operating in Rajshahi, with upcoming events and prominently displayed posters along key roads. HT is specifically focusing on higher education institutions and city hostels. The posters advocating for the government’s downfall have raised concerns, as there is a perceived lack of police action in response. HT is increasingly influencing teachers and students, luring them in by misrepresenting Islam, particularly targeting talented yet economically disadvantaged students. Notably, most of the arrested activists have been students.
[28] “Banned Hizb ut Tahrir is Suddenly in the Field, Posters and Leaflets Have Been Put Up, What is the Purpose?” The Dhaka Times, September 30, 2023, https://www.dhakatimes24.com/2023/09/30/325269.
[29] “Banned Organisations Invitation Cards to Journalists and Police,” Songbad Somachar, March 20, 2023, https://songbadsomachar.com/?p=6177.
[30] Ibid.
[31] “Hundreds of Missing Militants Abroad,” Naya Shatabdi, December 1, 2022, https://www.nayashatabdi24.com/exclusive/97383.
[32] Udisa Islam, “Do Authorities have Accurate Info on Criminal Organizations Operating in Rohingya Camps?” Dhaka Tribune, August 25, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/323494/do-authorities-have-accurate-info-on-criminal.
[33] Abdul Aziz, “Arrested ARSA Leader Spills the Beans About Fund Collection from Abroad,” Dhaka Tribune, August 26, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/323561/arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-arsa.
[34] “Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban Border: Militant Base at Zero Line and Totar Dwip,” Jugantor, January 28, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4ttrxxzb.
[35] “Arrested in Bangladesh, Ikramul is One of the Top Terrorists in India Too,” Prothom Alo, 7 July 2023, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime/garwe3vq36.
[36] Shariful Islam and Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Neo-JMB: Financier Now Allowed to Travel Abroad,” The Daily Star, January 12, 2022, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/neo-jmb-financier-now-allowed-travel-abroad-2937256.
[37] These transactions typically involve opening temporary accounts for a single transaction before closing them immediately. For details see: Tipu Sultan, “’Two of Three Militant Outfits Operate from Abroad,” Prothom Alo, July 2, 2021, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/two-of-three-militant-outfits-operate-from-abroad.
