Bangladesh
In 2025, Bangladesh’s security situation deteriorated, largely due to a political transition that created a law enforcement vacuum and the interim government’s weak, permissive response. Extremist and Islamist groups exploited this vacuum to reorganise, increase capability (including funding) and mobilise publicly. Key evidence of this included a foiled United States (US) Embassy attack plot in July, surging online radicalisation led by controversial extremist ideologues, premeditated mob violence and targeted communal attacks, including devastating attacks on various Sufi shrines. The state’s failure to re-apprehend key militants and recover arms looted during the 2024 uprising, coupled with the diversion of specialised counter terrorism (CT) forces to conventional crime, resulted in an unsustainable CT posture. Heading into the volatile 2026 election cycle, the risk of conventional terrorist attacks is escalating. The primary concern is the likely transition from low-intensity attacks to the successful execution of major, high-profile terrorist attacks, unless a robust, unbiased CT policy is immediately implemented.
Trends
A Critical Backslide
2025 was a critical period for Bangladesh, with a noticeable backslide in counter terrorism (CT) gains and a widespread deterioration of law and order. This turbulent security environment emerged from the complex and fragile political transition of 2024, which saw the installation of an interim government under Chief Adviser Dr Muhammad Yunus. This transition inadvertently created a significant security vacuum, which was swiftly and aggressively exploited by a resurgent array of non-state actors.[1]
Bangladesh’s Islamist political landscape in 2025 was characterised by a significant and assertive resurgence following the ouster of the Awami League government in August 2024. Major Islamist political groups, notably Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) and Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), have capitalised on the political vacuum to expand their influence and activity. The political freedom currently enjoyed by BJI and other groups, which had been suppressed under the previous regime, is allowing them to rapidly gain strength and dictate the terms of the political transition, potentially normalising extremist demands within the political mainstream.
BJI has re-entered mainstream politics, forming new alliances and aggressively lobbying for constitutional and electoral changes, including the implementation of proportional representation and the banning of former ruling parties.[2] Meanwhile, HeI demonstrated its street power through a massive grand rally in May 2025,[3] using misogynistic rhetoric,[4] vehemently demanding the annulment of government commissions promoting women’s rights, and advocating for the constitutional re-establishment of “absolute trust and faith in Allah”.[5]
Islamist political groups in Bangladesh have also forced the cancellation of women’s football matches and targeted secular events, fuelled by their push for shariah law.[6] BJI’s leadership has indicated that it will reduce the official workday for mothers from eight to five hours if the party comes to power.[7] Critics have perceived this proposal as essentially an attempt to limit women’s professional careers.[8]
This heightened visibility of hardline political Islam has corresponded with a concerning rise in religious extremism, intolerance and a wave of violence targeting religious minorities, secular individuals and women’s rights activists.[9] Radicals and their supporters have been active and visible on major online and social media platforms, such as Facebook[10] and YouTube, where they have continued to spread hate narratives and misinformation.[11] A noted Bangladeshi journalist covering terrorism was even threatened by pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) elements.[12] Bangladesh also saw a drastic decline in media reports on terrorism and radicalism in 2025.
From a CT perspective, the political transition and Islamist resurgence have created a significantly heightened security risk. The interim government’s policy changes have led to the weakening and sidelining of key CT agencies, creating a critical security vacuum.[13] This breakdown in the state’s strategic and operational CT capacity, coupled with the mainstream normalisation of hardline rhetoric, has provided a more permissive environment for jihadist and violent extremist groups to recruit, reorganise and potentially launch attacks.[14] The surge in targeted communal violence is a direct manifestation of this rising extremism. The overall political instability increases the potential for both domestic and transnational militant activity, posing a long-term threat to Bangladesh’s internal stability as well as to regional security.[15]
A Resurgence in Violent Extremism
The most significant development of 2025 was the rise of political and extremist violence. This escalation directly stemmed from the perceived “soft” approach adopted by the state following 2024’s political upheaval, an environment which extremist groups seized upon with remarkable alacrity. The atmosphere of impunity, compounded by the return of previously incarcerated militants to the public sphere both online and on-ground, established fertile ground for radicalisation and reorganisation.[16]
This resurgence manifested both physically and digitally. The arrest of Shamin Mahfuz, the founder of the proscribed terrorist group Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS),[17] was an isolated success in an otherwise challenging year for law enforcement. However, this achievement was largely eclipsed by the controversial bail granted to over two dozen high-profile militants and radical ideologues. Among these was Asif Adnan, a prominent, young and urban ideologue with a history of connections to local groups like Ansar al Islam (AAI) and global networks like AQ. Adnan quickly became a key figure of online radicalisation, leveraging digital platforms to breathe new life into extremist networks, particularly targeting and recruiting urban and educated youth.[18] The real and present danger posed by these militants was starkly highlighted by the alleged involvement of such actors in a foiled plot against the United States (US) Embassy in Dhaka in July 2025,[19] an incident which underscored the persistent intent to strike high-value foreign interests and the growing capability for complex operations.
This re-establishment of terrorist networks was likely facilitated by their uninterrupted access to funding channels, including remittances from radicalised individuals among the Bangladeshi diaspora as well as clandestine financing, which underpinned the groups’ ability to quickly reorganise and mobilise.[20]
Beyond the online sphere, the physical presence and confidence of extremist and Islamist groups became overtly visible. Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), for instance, moved dramatically from its previously covert proselytisation to open mobilisation in major cities.[21] The “March for Khilafah” in March 2025,[22] which drew thousands of supporters to the national mosque in Dhaka, served as a clear and public display of the group’s renewed organisational capacity and confidence – a sharp departure from the state-sanctioned clampdowns on HTB by the previous administration. It is noteworthy that though the Bangladesh police arrested some HTB activists,[23] the group has continued its activities both online and on the ground.
2025 also saw the emergence of the Intifada Bangladesh (IB), a radical Islamist organisation with explicit links to AQ-centric extremist groups, signalling the politicisation and mainstreaming of jihadist ideology in the post-2024 political vacuum, which demands close monitoring. Underscoring its extreme ideological foundation, a key member of the group is the radical cleric Jasimuddin Rahmani – described as a follower of AQ ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki – while some of its other members and organisers were previously arrested on terrorism charges. IB does not rely solely on secret plots; instead, it uses controversial public activism, including opposing the establishment of a United Nations Human Rights Office,[24] challenging alleged “Indian hegemony”[25] and demanding the abolition of “anti-Islamic reforms”, to exploit national and communal grievances and expand its base of support. IB’s agenda, which included a demand on October 24, 2025, for an investigation into and prohibition of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (a Hindu religious movement),[26] demonstrates how the group poses a direct threat to Bangladesh’s secular foundations and risks escalating intercommunal violence.
The Breakdown of Law and Order: Mob Violence and Communal Attacks
The security vacuum and subsequent lawlessness were not restricted to militant activity; they became a systemic scourge. The country has been gripped by an intense surge in mob violence and clashes between rival political factions.[27] Mob violence has explicitly targeted vulnerable groups. These incidents reflect a growing atmosphere of intolerance and radicalised vigilantism that the interim government is struggling to contain.
This widespread lawlessness has seen justice increasingly meted out by vigilante mobs rather than through a functional legal system, effectively outsourcing violence to weaponised political and communal cadres. A report documented 114 people killed in mob violence between January and mid-August 2025 alone.[28] Experts have raised questions over law and order as well as the interim government’s ability and willingness to contain the menace.[29]
This environment of unchecked violence has proven especially devastating for Bangladesh’s religious minorities and secular voices. In particular, violence against Hindu temples, Christian churches and Sufi shrines has escalated dramatically and has often appeared to be targeted.
The Bangladesh Hindu Bouddho Christian Oikya Parishad, a civil society group focusing on protecting the rights of religious minorities in Bangladesh, reported 258 attacks on minority communities in the first half of 2025, including 20 rapes and 59 attacks on places of worship.[30] There was a significant rise in the number of attacks on Christian churches. On October 8, a crude bomb exploded in front of the Holy Rosary Church – one of the oldest and largest Roman Catholic churches in Bangladesh – in Dhaka’s Tejgaon area. The attack was reportedly carried out by two men on a motorcycle, though no injuries were reported.[31] A second wave of attacks took place overnight in Dhaka on November 7, 2025, targeting St Mary’s Cathedral and St Joseph’s Higher Secondary School and College.[32] While the police on November 9, 2025, confirmed the attacks had caused no injuries, they stated the incidents were “certainly” aimed at terrifying the community. No group has claimed responsibility for the bombings, and the attacks add to the existing political turmoil in Bangladesh.[33]
This surge in targeted communal violence was further underscored by the September 2025 attack on a Sufi shrine in Rajbari under the banner of a newly emerged organisation named the Iman-Aqidah Rakkha Committee (Faith and Creed Protection Committee), which killed one person and injured 50.[34] Hardline Islamist groups in Bangladesh have been waging an ideological war against the country’s traditional, pluralistic Sufi heritage, marked by an increase in mob attacks on shrines since late 2024. Groups like the Towhidi Janata have targeted and damaged over 80 sites, as they view Sufi practices as heresy.
This violence is fuelled by a culture of impunity, as the interim government has been criticised for its failure to take decisive action, thereby allowing a rigid, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam to threaten the nation’s unique, syncretic identity.
Transnational Linkages and Conflict Zone Travel
Adding to the domestic volatility, evidence of transnational linkages and travel to conflict zones worsened Bangladesh’s persistent regional threat profile. Concrete evidence has emerged of Bangladeshi extremists actively participating in terrorist activities in Pakistan.
On September 26, 2025, a 21-year-old Bangladeshi national, Faisal Hossain, was killed while fighting for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). He was one of 17 TTP members killed during a Pakistani security operation in the Karak district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The TTP reportedly released a video acknowledging his killing.[35] Faisal’s family, who live in Bangladesh’s Madaripur district, believed he had gone to Dubai for work in March 2024. This marked the fourth confirmed death of a Bangladeshi fighting for the TTP in just over a year, raising serious concerns about foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) recruitment, which has already led to arrests in Bangladesh.[36] Earlier, a Bangladeshi digital media outlet reported that at least eight Bangladeshi nationals are currently active in Afghanistan as TTP members.[37]
This confirmed travel of FTFs to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region highlights a clear, high-risk pipeline for extremism. This pipeline has been made significantly easier due to the normalisation of Bangladesh-Pakistan diplomatic relations under the current administration, which has effectively reopened travel vectors that were constrained under previous governments. These vectors not only allow new recruits to travel out of the country, but, critically, also enable seasoned fighters to return to Bangladesh and the wider region, potentially bringing advanced improvised explosive device (IED) and operational tradecraft directly from the Afghan conflict theatre. Furthermore, reports of individuals, including radical Islamist figures like Mamunul Haque, visiting Afghanistan[38] indicate active efforts to establish or reinforce direct links with groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, raising the spectre of highly trained, radicalised FTF returnees. Extremist rhetoric also continued to consistently identify India as a persistent, long-term regional target.
There have also been cases of radicalisation among a vulnerable segment of the Bangladeshi diaspora community. In June 2025, the Malaysian authorities announced the arrests of 36 Bangladeshi citizens across Selangor and Johor for their direct involvement with a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS)-linked ideology and engaging in terrorism-related activities, including fund-raising and recruitment. Five of the suspects have since been charged with terrorism offences, 15 have been deported and the rest remain under investigation.[39] On September 24, a 22-year-old Bangladeshi national was expelled from Italy following an anti-terrorism investigation by the Turin police. He was deported for his heavy involvement in virtual jihadist circles, where he openly celebrated groups like AQ and IS, spread propaganda inciting hatred and possessed concerning materials, including manuals on explosives-making and guerrilla tactics, demonstrating a dangerous commitment to sectarian terrorism.[40]
Furthermore, the Gaza crisis has been a dual catalyst, significantly accelerating the resurgence of mainstream Islamist political parties while also amplifying extremist threats in Bangladesh. In mainstream politics, the crisis has driven a shift to the right, with BJI as the prime beneficiary. BJI has successfully leveraged the issue, framing the conflict as a defence of the global Muslim community and organising massive public rallies, including a 100,000-person strong protest in Dhaka. This strategy has boosted BJI’s visibility, consolidated its conservative base and provided a unifying platform for a broader Islamist alliance aimed at influencing the new interim government, with allied groups like Islami Andolon Bangladesh (IAB) and HeI also utilising intense religious emotions to advance their pro-shariah agendas.
The Gaza conflict has also served as a powerful ideological fuel for violent extremist groups, notably AAI, significantly amplifying their radicalisation and recruitment efforts throughout 2025. AAI has systematically exploited the suffering of Palestinians in online propaganda to craft a compelling narrative of a “global war against Islam”, which has been particularly effective in recruiting among young, educated and urban segments of the population. This external fervour has exacerbated the existing online radical milieu. The impact of this radicalisation was visible during an April 2025 event, when a demonstrator was photographed holding a large poster of AQ’s founder Osama bin Laden. The poster highly praised bin Laden and prominently featured his quote: “America will never dream of security unless we will have it in reality in Palestine.”[41]
The Rohingya Crisis
Throughout 2025, the situation along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border remained volatile, combining ongoing refugee issues with escalating regional conflicts and emergent domestic security threats. The security crisis has been compounded by the Arakan Army (AA), a non-state Rakhine ethnic armed group which has consolidated significant control over the border area, creating a complex challenge that has intensified the already dire Rohingya crisis. Bangladesh currently hosts 1.3 million[42] Rohingyas, of which 150,000 are new arrivals from mid-2024 to 2025. Bangladesh is facing growing concerns over a fresh influx of Rohingya refugees fleeing intense conflict and brutal attacks in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, with many risking their lives in desperate sea crossings even as border forces step up patrols.[43]
The protracted crisis and the lack of a sustainable solution have turned refugee camps into a major security vulnerability, with the camps acting as hubs for Rohingya armed groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), which are now reportedly fighting across the border alongside the Myanmar military against the AA.[44] This cross-border conflict has seen immediate spillovers into Bangladesh, with stray bullets repeatedly striking the town of Teknaf in late October 2025[45] and the AA actively targeting Bangladeshis, such as by abducting at least 314 fishermen from the border area between February and September 2025, including 14 off St Martin’s coast on October 1, 2025.[46]
Adding to these concerns, a source within the Bangladeshi security establishment has indicated that a leading Bangladeshi figure in the TTP is allegedly trying to mobilise trained fighters from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to the Bangladesh-Myanmar border to fight against the AA and the Tatmadaw, with these fighters likely to be embedded within ARSA or RSO.[47] While the TTP’s link to Rohingya militancy is not entirely new,[48] the resurgence of the AA in Western Myanmar and the ongoing security vacuum has created more opportunities for the TTP to revive this linkage. Bangladesh has attempted to mitigate the threat posed by Rohingya militancy, notably by arresting ARSA’s commander-in-chief Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi on March 18, 2025, although the group is already trying to reorganise under a new leader.[49]
The growing influence of a powerful non-state actor like the AA on the border, coupled with the ongoing humanitarian crisis and funding cuts to the camps, represents a long-term threat to both domestic and regional stability.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region presented a distinct but deeply interconnected security challenge in 2025, with the Bangladesh Army maintaining an intensive counterinsurgency offensive against the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), the armed wing of the Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF). The Bangladesh Army’s offensive began with a successful raid on July 3, 2025, which resulted in the killing of a KNA major and another insurgent, a significant strike against the group’s hierarchy.[50] This was followed by a prolonged major operation from July 25 to August 26, which culminated in the dismantling of a key KCNF training camp in the Reng Tlang hill range in Ruma Upazila. During the final raid, troops seized crucial tactical installations – including a firing range, trenches and bunkers – along with military supplies like training rifles and solar panels. The offensive demonstrated the government’s sustained approach to neutralising the threat posed by the KCNF, a separatist group which seeks an autonomous state for smaller ethnic communities, and which gained notoriety after a series of bank robberies in April 2024.[51]
However, in September 2025, the CHT saw a devastating escalation of ethnic and political violence, independent of the counterinsurgency effort. On September 28, a catastrophic clash erupted in Ramsu Bazar, Khagrachhari, when a protest against the rape of a teenage Marma girl spiralled out of control, resulting in three deaths and at least 16 injuries. Arson attacks by miscreants also destroyed at least 85 shops and homes, including a three-storey building housing nine government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) offices. The destruction completely wiped out the livelihoods of the predominantly Marma community.[52]
The Failure of Response: A State Apparatus in Disarray
The state’s response to these multifaceted and escalating threats was a concerning mix of denial,[53] downplaying of threats[54] and institutional paralysis. Crime analysts and law enforcement officials have stated that attempts have been made to project a sense of normalcy by labelling incidents of extremist activities as “drama”. The way in which previous anti-extremism operations have been widely propagated as “drama” has served to legitimise the actions of extremists.[55]
The interim government’s perceived “soft” approach and denial of the terrorism threat were cited as the most concerning aspects of its 2025 CT response.[56] This policy shift was widely described as disempowering CT agencies, sidelining experienced professionals, and creating a fundamental lack of trust and lack of coordination between the new cabinet and the security services.[57] The institutional paralysis was compounded by internal divisions and a perceived lack of security experience within the new cabinet, which often led to contradictory public statements and a breakdown in clear policy directives to the police and the intelligence services.
Official responses were often reactive and politically motivated rather than proactive and genuine. The widely publicised “Operation Devil Hunt” in February 2025, which led to the arrest of nearly 11,000 individuals, was seen by many observers as a witch-hunt intended to target political opponents rather than a sincere effort to restore law and order.[58]
The low number of high-profile militant arrests, combined with the numerous controversial bails granted to key extremist figures, severely reinforced the perception of a weakened and ineffective law enforcement apparatus. Law enforcement agencies have not been able to recover the 1,350 firearms and over 257,000 rounds of ammunition which have remained missing since the 2024 mass uprising. Officials fear many may have been sold to criminal groups. The police have yet to determine in whose hands these missing weapons have ended up.[59] It is also likely that militant groups have taken this opportunity to enhance their firepower.
The failure to re-apprehend the numerous absconded militants remains a critical concern and can be directly linked to the CT backslide. Key CT units, such as the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit, which had been lauded for their successes in previous years, appeared to have their operational capacity severely hampered in 2025 due to low morale and political interference.
One year into the interim government’s term, the Bangladeshi police force remains demoralised and ineffective. Following their role in 2024’s violent crackdown, police officers fear reprisal, which, combined with a lack of administrative support, has caused a breakdown in the chain of command and a reluctance to intervene in crimes. This vacuum has been blamed for rising crime rates and has been evidenced by viral videos of police officers standing passively by while crimes occur. Despite new leadership efforts, the force’s own inspector general has admitted they are less than 50 percent effective.[60]
Large CT units like the Anti Terrorism Unit (ATU) and the CTTC were reportedly diverted to capturing juvenile gangs and other conventional criminals, sidelining their specialised CT mandates.[61] While Chief Adviser Dr Yunus has maintained a public rhetoric of “zero tolerance”,[62] this rhetorical commitment has been widely contradicted by policy actions and the observed security vacuum, which has emboldened perpetrators and increased the sense of insecurity among minority communities.
While Bangladesh continued to pursue international security cooperation, exemplified by joint military exercises like September’s “Operation Pacific Angel 25-3” with the US,[63] these external partnerships stood in stark contrast to the ongoing internal turmoil.
Outlook
The security outlook for Bangladesh is precarious and projected to escalate significantly in 2026. This is critically linked to the upcoming February 2026 election,[64] as political volatility and electoral violence are highly likely and are expected to generate widespread instability, which extremist groups are poised to exploit. With militant capabilities having grown unhindered in 2025, the primary concern is the likely transition from soft targets to the successful execution of major, conventional terrorist attacks in the short to mid term. Averting this requires a peaceful and orderly transfer of power through a free, fair and inclusive election, and, eventually, the strong political will of the incoming government to abandon the current weak security posture and to immediately implement a robust, intelligence-led CT strategy and a comprehensive approach to prevent and counter extremism in all its forms and manifestations.
About the Author
Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh’s Evolving Security Crisis: The Rise of Religious Extremism Amid Political Transition,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 4 (2025): 23-28, https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/bangladeshs-evolving-security-crisis-the-rise-of-religious-extremism-amid-political-transition/.
[2] “Islamist Parties in Bangladesh Announce New Protest Programmes, Demand Electoral Reform,” News On Air, September 17, 2025, https://www.newsonair.gov.in/islamist-parties-in-bangladesh-announce-new-protest-programmes-demand-electoral-reform/; Mubashar Hasan, “Resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami Shifts Bangladesh Politics to the Right,” The Diplomat, August 19, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/resurgence-of-jamaat-e-islami-shifts-bangladesh-politics-to-the-right/.
[3] “Bangladesh Islamists Rally in Show of Force,” France24, May 3, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250503-bangladesh-islamists-rally-in-show-of-force.
[4] “Hefazat and Those Exploiting Religion Are Running Misogynistic Campaigns: 68 Human Rights Organisations,” Ajker Patrika, May 4, 2025, https://www.ajkerpatrika.com/national/ajpofveolsbz3.
[5] “No Tolerance for Policies Against Quranic and Prophetic Principles,” Jugantor, May 4, 2025, https://www.jugantor.com/tp-firstpage/949242.
[6] Anbarasan Ethirajan, “Facing Islamist Threats, Bangladesh Girls Forced to Cancel Football Matches,” BBC News, February 19, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxnwnye7wko.
[7] “’Will Reduce Duty Hours for Mothers to 5’: Pledges Jamaat Ameer,” The Daily Star, October 28, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/will-reduce-duty-hours-mothers-5-4020856.
[8] “The Proposal to Reduce Working Hours Is a Tactic to Confine Women to the Jome: Naripokkho,” Bangla Tribune, October 30, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/hjzsppff.
[9] Bashar, “Bangladesh’s Evolving Security Crisis”; Sema Hasan, Factsheet: Bangladesh (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2025), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025%20Factsheet%20Bangladesh.pdf.
[10] In July, the Anti Terrorism Unit (ATU) of the Bangladesh Police arrested a young man named Md Rakib Al Hasan in Mymensingh district for actively promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology across multiple Facebook accounts. He was charged under the Anti-Terrorism Act after investigators found he had shared videos of beheadings, supported IS actions and identified himself as a “jihadi” online. For details, see Hasan al Mahmud, “Propaganda for IS on Facebook: Young Man Arrested from Mymensingh,” The Dissent, July 26, 2025, https://thedissent.news/bn/current-affairs/propagating-pro-is-content-youth-arrested-in-mymensingh.
[11] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[12] “DRU and CRAB Condemn and Protest the Death Threat Against Journalist Nuruzzaman Labu,” Bangla Tribune, April 15, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/2w6swvbw.
[13] Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh Interim Government’s Weakened Counterterrorism Approach,” The Diplomat, August 5, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/bangladesh-interim-governments-weakened-counterterrorism-approach/.
[14] Bashar, “Bangladesh’s Evolving Security Crisis.”
[15] Ibid.; Wahiduzzaman Noor, “Bangladesh’s Revolution Is At a Crossroads. Open Elections Are the Best Way Forward,” The Atlantic Council, August 4, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/bangladeshs-revolution-is-at-a-crossroads-open-elections-are-the-best-way-forward/.
[16] Bashar, “Bangladesh Interim Government’s.”
[17] Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) is a banned, Al-Qaeda (AQ)-centric militant group founded in Bangladesh in around 2017. It maintains a strong financial and operational link with Ansar al Islam (AAI), the Bangladeshi branch of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), drawing members and funding from the older group. The formation of JAFHS was a strategic move by jihadist leaders to reconstitute and unify the movement under a new banner, thereby adapting to intense law enforcement pressure. A critical goal of JAFHS was securing remote military training, achieved through an unusual alliance with the ethno-separatist Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF) in the rugged Chittagong Hill Tracts. Espousing a Salafi-jihadist ideology, JAFHS’s ultimate objective remains the violent establishment of a caliphate in the region.
[18] Iftekharul Bashar, “Asif Adnan: Urban, Young, and Digital Face of Islamist Extremism in Bangladesh,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 21, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/asif-adnan-urban-young-and-digital-face-of-islamist-extremism-in-bangladesh/.
[19] The plot allegedly involved the kidnapping and murder of embassy staff in Bangladesh. See Muktadir Rashid, “Plan to Attack the US Embassy in Dhaka: Intelligence from Washington on Activities in Bangladesh, Discussion of Special Police for the Embassy,” Bangla Outlook, August 27, 2025, https://www.banglaoutlook.org/investigation/245213.
[20] Bashar, “Bangladesh’s Evolving Security Crisis.”
[21] Iftekharul Bashar, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh: A Growing Threat and the Need for Action,” RSIS Commentary, no. 62 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/hizb-ut-tahrir-bangladesh-a-growing-threat-and-the-need-for-action/.
[22] “Police to the Court: Hizb ut-Tahrir Wants to Destroy the Democratic Government and Establish Extremism,” Kalbela, March 8, 2025, https://www.kalbela.com/court-law/170156.
[23] “36 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Held,” The Daily Star, March 9, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/36-members-hizb-ut-tahrir-held-3842621.
[24] “Intifada Bangladesh Protests Opening of UN Human Rights Office,” Daily Sun, August 6, 2025, https://www.daily-sun.com/post/818075.
[25] “Intifada Bangladesh Alleges Indian Conspiracy Against Bangladesh’s Integrity,” Somoy News, October 6, 2025, https://www.somoynews.tv/news/2025-10-06/59zXIxSw.
[26] “Intifada Bangladesh’s 6 Demands Including Ban on ISKCON,” Dhaka Post, October 24, 2025. https://www.dhakapost.com/national/404363.
[27] “Mob Violence a Threat to Democracy: Says HRFB,” The Daily Star, August 14, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/mob-violence-threat-democracy-3961981; “Mob Beating Jan-August 2025,” Ain o Salish Kendra, https://www.askbd.org/ask/2025/09/07/mob-beating-jan-aug-2025/.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Mohammad Jamil Khan and Shaheen Mollah, “Mob Violence: No End in Sight,” The Daily Star, September 11, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/mob-violence-no-end-sight-3983116.
[30] “BHBCUC Reports 258 Communal Attacks in First Half of 2025,” Bangladesh Hindu Bouddho Christian Oikya Parishad, July 10, 2025, https://bhbcop.org/news/25.
[31] “Crude Bomb Explodes in Front of Tejgaon Church,” The Daily Star, October 9, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/crude-bomb-explodes-front-tejgaon-church-4005406.
[32] “Crude Bombs Explode Bear Christian Sites in Dhaka,” The Daily Star, November 8, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/crude-bombs-explode-near-christian-sites-dhaka-4030076.
[33] “Christians in Bangladesh Alarmed After Bomb Attacks on Churches, School,” The Straits Times, November 9, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/christians-in-bangladesh-alarmed-after-bomb-attacks-on-churches-school.
[34] “One Dead in Attack on Nural Pagla’s Shrine in Rajbari,” Prothom Alo English, September 6, 2025, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/local-news/h78n7n11kn.
[35] Saleem Mehsud (@SaleemMehsud), “Pakistan Taliban have released an informal video featuring a Bangladeshi national, Saadullah, who was killed along with several other militants during a security forces operation in Karak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, on Sep 27, 2025; video providing limited info,” X, September 29, 2025, https://x.com/saleemmehsud/status/1972384666138317098?s=46&t=fkFF8d8hnckHJ_yKbNF2CQ.
[36] “Another Bangladeshi Killed While Fighting for TTP in Pakistan,” The Dissent, September 28, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4s9jzcjn.
[37] Hasan al Mahmud, “Bangladeshi Youths Are Fighting for the Taliban on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border,” The Dissent, May 15, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=122113169462843347.
[38] “Mamunul Haque, Other Islamist Leaders Visit Afghanistan at Taliban’s Invitation,” The Business Standard, September 18, 2025, https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/politics/mamunul-haque-other-islamist-leaders-visit-afghanistan-talibans-invitation.
[39] Ida Lim, “Home Minister: Police Nab 36 Bangladeshis for Ties to Radical Militant Group,” Malay Mail, June 27, 2025, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2025/06/27/home-minister-police-nab-36-bangladeshis-for-ties-to-radical-militant-group/181917.
[40] “Turin: State Police Expels Bangladeshi Terrorist,” Questure Polizia Di Stato Torino, September 25, 2025.
[41] Nuruzzaman Labu, “Protests With ISIS-Al Qaeda Flags Tarnish the National Image,” Bangla Tribune, April 11, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/46zcb7ch.
[42] Mokammel Shuvo, “Rohingyas Fleeing Arakan Army Persecution: 13 Lakh Refugees Now in Bangladesh,” The Daily Star, April 29, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/cross-border/news/rohingyas-fleeing-arakan-army-persecution-3882501.
[43] Mokammel Shuvo, “Growing Concern of Fresh Rohingya Influx Into Bangladesh,” The Daily Star, August 13, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-influx/news/growing-concern-fresh-rohingya-influx-bangladesh-3676496.
[44] “Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency,” International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar-bangladesh/348-bangladeshmyanmar-dangers-rohingya-insurgency.
[45] “Myanmar’s Bullets Again Fell on a Home Across the Border,” Kaler Kantho, October 26, 2025, https://www.kalerkantho.com/online/country-news/2025/10/26/1597356.
[46] “Arakan Army Abducts 14 Fishermen With Two Trawlers Off St Martin’s Coast: Global Arakan Network Publishes Their Photos,” The Daily Star, October 1, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/arakan-army-abducts-14-fishermen-two-trawlers-st-martins-coast-3998931.
[47] Author’s interview with a Bangladeshi security official, October 2025.
[48] In January 2014, Bangladeshi authorities arrested three Pakistani operatives (of Rohingya and Burmese Muslim origin) of the AA for allegedly attempting to train Rohingyas for terrorist operations in Bangladesh. “Three Pakistanis Held: Police Say They Belong to Banned Militant Outfit,” The Daily Star, January 21, 2014.
[49] “ARSA Leader Ataullah Arrested in Narayanganj,” The Financial Express, March 18, 2025, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/crime/arsa-leader-ataullah-arrested-in-narayanganj.
[50] “Two KNA Members Killed in Gunfight With Army: ISPR,” New Age, July 3, 2025, https://www.newagebd.net/post/country/268948/two-kna-members-killed-in-gunfight-with-army-ispr.
[51] “Army Busts ‘Training Camp’ of Kuki-Chin Insurgents in Bandarban,” bdnews24.com, September 3, 2025, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2a5e1204bd3c.
[52] Mizanur Rahman Yusuf, “Ramsu Bazar in Khgrachhari Reduced to Rubble, 85 Shops and Homes Worth Tk25cr Burned,” The Business Standard, September 30, 2025, https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/ramsu-bazar-khgrachhari-reduced-rubble-85-shops-and-homes-worth-tk25cr-burned-1250306.
[53] “No Militant Activity in the Country: Home Adviser,” BSS News, July 6, 2025, https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/289660; “DMP Chief Unaware of What Happened at Holey Artisan, ‘What Militants Are You Talking About?’ He Asks,” bdnews24.com, July 1, 2025, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2c0018b2fc07; “Home Adviser: Three Bangladeshis Repatriated From Malaysia Not Militants,” Dhaka Tribune, July 6, 2025, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/385680/home-adviser-three-bangladeshis-repatriated-from; “Mallick: Militancy in Past 18yrs Was Staged Drama,” Dhaka Tribune, July 13, 2025, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/386315/mallick-militancy-was-a-drama-in-bangladesh-in; “Bangladesh Says Malaysia’s IS-Linked Arrest Claims Unfounded, Cites Visa Overstays Instead for Three Citizens Deported,” Malay Mail, July 6, 2025, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2025/07/06/bangladesh-says-malaysias-is-linked-arrest-claims-unfounded-cites-visa-overstays-instead-for-three-citizens-deported/183023.
[54] “No Need to Distort Crime With Any Label, DMP’s Nazrul Comments on Militancy,” bdnews24.com, July 3, 2025, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/397dfd2dc7f3.
[55] Labu, “Protests With ISIS-Al Qaeda Flags.”
[56] Bashar, “Bangladesh Interim Government’s.”
[57] Ibid.
[58] Elaine Pearson, “How the Interim Government Can Make Lasting Reforms,” The Daily Star, March 3, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/how-the-interim-government-can-make-lasting-reforms-3837711.
[59] Mohammad Jamil Khan and Dipan Nandy, “Little Headway Made in Stolen Arms Recovery,” The Daily Star, October 1, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/little-headway-made-stolen-arms-recovery-3999001.
[60] Partha Pratim Bhattacharjee and Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Police Struggle to Regain Their ‘Lost Morale’: New Leadership, Policy Measures Fail to Restore Effectiveness,” The Daily Star, August 16, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/police-struggle-regain-their-lost-morale-3963471.
[61] Kamruzzaman Khan, “The Country’s Militants Are Heading to Pakistan, As the Special Police Team Remains ‘Inactive’,” The Daily Times Of Bangladesh, October 6, 2025, https://shorturl.at/HUbSW.
[62] “Bangladesh Reaffirms Zero Tolerance for Terrorism in Meeting With US Envoy,” Dhaka Tribune, July 28, 2025, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/387572/bangladesh-reaffirms-zero-tolerance-on-terrorism; “Govt Adopts ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy on Terrorism, Yunus Tells US Envoy,” Jagonews24.com, July 28, 2025, https://www.jagonews24.com/en/national/news/84407.
[63] “Operation Pacific Angel 25-3 Concludes,” BSS News, September 19, 2025, https://www.bssnews.net/news/313431.
[64] “On Revolution Anniversary, Bangladesh’s Yunus Announces National Elections,” Al Jazeera, August 5, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/5/on-revolution-anniversary-bangladeshs-yunus-announces-national-elections.
