Bangladesh’s Evolving Security Crisis: The Rise of Religious Extremism Amid Political Transition
From January to May 2025, Bangladesh witnessed a rise in religious extremism, worsened by ongoing political instability. This has increased intolerance towards minorities, secular voices and women’s rights. The growth of hardline groups and mob violence targeting those seen as “un-Islamic” signals a worsening security situation. The interim government, facing leadership challenges, has struggled to effectively counter radicalisation. There is also growing concern about Bangladeshi youth being radicalised, including online, by transnational extremist groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Experts warn that without stronger surveillance and more inclusive governance, Bangladesh risks deeper societal divisions, with wider implications for regional instability.
Introduction
Bangladesh went through significant political upheaval in 2024 that led to the overthrow of the then ruling Awami League[1] regime led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The resulting security vacuum led to widespread chaos, including public demonstrations, mass prison escapes, looted weapons and a breakdown in law enforcement. Local media, for example, reported that police stations were deserted in the upheaval, and subsequently attacked and ransacked by mobs. Strikingly, over 5,800 weapons and 300,000 rounds of ammunition were looted from police stations in Bangladesh. Extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) and local actors such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) have also swiftly exploited this disorder, spreading radical ideologies, targeting youth and inciting violence against minorities. At least 70 militants were among the 2,200 prison escapees.
In the aftermath, religious extremism has regained traction.[2] Many previously arrested terrorists are currently active online, including on platforms like Facebook (Meta) and YouTube. Some have claimed that law enforcement agencies under the previous administration detained them illegitimately for political reasons and subjected them to harassment.[3] This narrative has been amplified by many individuals in the current political and administrative spheres, who have also purported that the arrests of many previously apprehended terrorists were fabricated. Taken together, this situation has undermined public trust in law enforcement and the justice system, potentially emboldening extremist groups and complicating future counter terrorism efforts.
While there have been no major terrorist attacks, the concerning surge in mob violence[4] has been accompanied by threats against minority groups and secular voices and the overt display of extremist symbols.[5] Banned hardline organisations like HT and Ansar al Islam are reportedly reassembling, with many of their leaders now released.[6] Moreover, the renewed push to recruit Bangladeshi youth by transnational terror groups has led to a rising number aligning with groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[7] In their outreach efforts, these groups are leveraging digital platforms to target vulnerable youth.[8]
This article posits that extremist groups are effectively exploiting weakened counter terrorism efforts by state actors, driven by leadership transitions, institutional weaknesses and a critical lack of focus within counter terrorism agencies. Drawing from publicly available sources, this analysis concludes that without immediate, community-driven prevention efforts and a stronger institutional focus, Bangladesh risks deepening societal polarisation and long-term security instability.
Key Trends in Religious Extremism
Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in 2024, Islamist political groups have re-emerged with renewed vigour. They include Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh (HIB), an influential hardline organisation of Qawmi madrassa teachers and students.[9] These groups are now positioning themselves to enter parliament in the 2026 elections, advocating for the implementation of shariah law, including the death penalty for blasphemy.[10] A massive rally organised by HIB on May 3, 2025, in Dhaka, which drew thousands of attendees, demonstrated their expanding influence and signalled a more significant role for these hardline groups in Bangladesh’s political future. This event, described as one of their largest public shows of strength in years, demonstrated their mobilisation capabilities and renewed assertiveness.
Their rise has raised alarm, especially among women,[11] religious minorities and secular communities, who fear efforts to suppress cultural activities and remove secular literature. In April 2025, a theatre performance of Shesher Kobita, a famous novel by Nobel Prize winner Rabindranath Tagore, was cancelled in Dhaka after an Islamist vigilante group called Tawhidi Janata made threats.[12] A similar incident happened on May 19, 2025, in Madhupur, Tangail – a folk festival honouring Lalon, a well-known Bengali mystic and musician, was cancelled after HIB said Lalon’s beliefs were against Islam. Despite the organisers providing assurances that no controversial songs or messages would be featured, the event was still cancelled to avoid violence.[13]
Additionally, these hardline groups are aligning with other opposition forces like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, creating a potentially formidable bloc in the lead-up to the 2026 national elections. Their growing influence signals a potential shift towards a more conservative and religiously governed state, with possible further implications for freedom of expression, minority rights and gender equality. Additionally, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus has struggled to mount an effective counterresponse, and local leaders have begun imposing restrictions such as blocking women’s soccer games. Jamaat-e-Islami is also aiming to capitalise on public disillusionment with secular politics, presenting itself as a viable alternative.[14]
“Moral Policing”
During Ramadan 2025 in Bangladesh, several incidents of “moral policing” occurred where individuals and food vendors were harassed, shamed or forced to close their businesses for operating during daylight hours.[15] These actions, often captured on video and shared online, have been linked to members or sympathisers of Islamist political groups, such as Islami Andolon Bangladesh and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, though the parties have denied involvement. Human rights groups and Islamic scholars have condemned these acts, stating they spread fear, misrepresent religious teachings and infringe on basic rights – especially for non-Muslims, the elderly and the ill. Despite public outcry, law enforcement has largely failed to take firm action, leading to criticism of administrative inaction and growing concern over individuals taking the law into their own hands.[16]
Normalisation of Extremist Narratives
Since the fall of the Awami League government on August 5, 2024, there has also been a noticeable increase in the public display of symbols linked to internationally designated terrorist groups, including flags of the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ). Protesters have also carried images of extremist leaders, such as Osama bin Laden, portraying them as heroic figures.
A notable instance occurred during a rally in Dhaka on April 7, held in protest against Israeli actions in Gaza, where IS flags and a portrait of bin Laden were prominently displayed.[17] These incidents reinforce concerns of radical elements exploiting both domestic political shifts and international grievances to gain visibility and legitimacy. While the public display of terrorist symbols by some protesters does not signify widespread national acceptance of extremist narratives, it risks normalising these ideologies and making them more accessible to a wider audience.
Controversial Bail Releases of Terrorism Suspects
In another blow to public confidence in the country’s security and legal apparatuses, over 300 individuals accused of terrorist and extremist activities in Bangladesh have been released on bail since last August, sparking mixed reactions.[18] While some argue that many were ‘wrongfully’ detained under the previous government, others believe that hardline extremists have exploited the situation. Among the released are members of banned groups like Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), with Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, who is accused of leading the latter, claiming that the group “never existed”.[19] Families of victims have expressed dismay, highlighting the emotional and social toll of these releases. Politically, the government faces criticism for being lenient on terrorism, and the releases may tarnish Bangladesh’s international reputation if extremists regain influence.
Evolving Alliance of Educated and Traditional Hardline Figures
Extremism is evolving, marked by a notable collaboration between traditional religious figures and mainstream educated hardliners who are increasingly spreading its messages.[20] This trend is supported by earlier observations from various counter-extremism bodies noting an uptick in individuals with mainstream educational backgrounds engaging in propaganda and radicalisation efforts.[21] These actors use their academic credentials, digital platforms and emotionally charged global issues – such as the Palestine conflict – to frame violent ideologies as moral imperatives. By presenting radical views through the language of intellectual discourse, they are able to engage younger, urban and educated audiences who might previously have been considered less vulnerable to such influence.
This shift reflects a more sophisticated and adaptive form of extremism, expanding its reach and complicating traditional approaches to detection and prevention. Bangladeshi observers note that that while mainstream educated students and young professionals have been active for more than a decade, under the previous administration they were operating in isolation or in silos. Since the regime change in August 2024, however, these individuals have been coming together and forming alliances on common platforms, with SEAN Publication being a prominent example.[22]
Re-Emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB)
Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), banned since 2009, is rapidly regaining influence by recruiting youth through social media and educational institutions, exploiting grievances such as high unemployment and political instability. A large rally in Dhaka in March 2025, attended by over 2,000 supporters, showcased the group’s bold defiance of state authority and its call for an Islamic caliphate.[23] Despite the ban, HTB continues to grow, spreading extremist ideology and attempting to infiltrate the military and state institutions. The group’s activities have come under scrutiny, particularly as it promotes jihadist narratives like Ghazwatul Hind.[24] HTB’s presence in Bangladesh has expanded considerably in recent years, particularly among youth. The group now has an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 members in the country.[25] While it originally concentrated on recruiting university students, it has since broadened its focus to include high school and junior college students. HTB actively engages with young audiences, leveraging social media to promote extremist ideologies and attract new members by playing on emotions and misrepresenting Islamic history.
Bangladeshi observers anticipate a surge in activities by HTB, particularly around the 2026 elections.[26] While HTB primarily advocates for the establishment of a caliphate through non-violent means, its heightened presence and rhetoric during a politically charged period could significantly impact the environment. Its ideological campaigning could contribute to the radicalisation of individuals, even if it does not directly endorse violence. The group might leverage the electoral environment to amplify its message of political and social change, potentially attracting new followers. For some, exposure to HTB’s ideology might even serve as a stepping stone to involvement with violent extremism.[27] While HTB has not resorted to violence (at least not in the way terrorist organisations do) to achieve its goals, some of its members have shown a willingness to use violence if necessary, even supporting the idea of punishing or killing those they see as blasphemers.[28]
Foreign Fighters and Transnational Radicalisation
An investigative report published by Bangladeshi digital outlet The Dissent on May 15, 2025, revealed that several Bangladeshi youths have joined the TTP and are actively engaged in militant activities along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[29] Among them, a 22-year-old youth was reportedly killed during a Pakistani military operation in North Waziristan, having reached Afghanistan via Saudi Arabia after participating in missionary work through Tablighi Jamaat. His death was confirmed through anonymous calls to family and social media posts from TTP-linked accounts, which also attracted interest from other Bangladeshi users expressing a desire to follow the same path.[30] Another Bangladeshi fighter claimed in an interview to be based in Kabul, stating that at least eight nationals are currently active with the TTP, with three already having been killed. The Bangladeshi authorities acknowledged a lack of updated intelligence on these individuals, underscoring how online radicalisation and transnational networks continue to exploit gaps in surveillance and counter terrorism focus.[31]
This development further highlights the need for Bangladesh to strengthen digital monitoring, community engagement and regional cooperation to prevent the outflow of vulnerable youth into global extremist movements. It is noteworthy that back in 2023, the Italian police arrested a Bangladeshi man in Genoa (northwest Italy) suspected of links to the AQ-linked TTP, accusing him of promoting jihadist violence online and preparing for militant combat.[32] Sources within the Bangladeshi security services have indicated that some Bangladeshi pro-AQ extremists are in communication with the TTP.
State Response
While the interim government upholds a zero-tolerance policy and continues to monitor released individuals, law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh have been slow to respond effectively. Key counter terrorism units, such as the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Unit of Dhaka Metropolitan Police and the Anti Terrorism Unit (ATU), have faced challenges due to shifts in priorities, resource constraints and a focus on conventional crimes over extremist threats. The reassignment of experienced officers and internal coordination issues have further compromised their capacity to address the rise in extremism. Security analysts warn that this complacency could pave the way for more serious threats. Public confidence in the government’s anti-terrorism efforts is waning, especially as past operations are increasingly seen as performative.[33] The perceived lack of transparency in law enforcement and judicial processes, combined with a weak institutional response, has further exacerbated the issue.
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s ongoing political instability, coupled with weakened counter terrorism capacities, has created a conducive environment for the resurgence of religious extremism. The increasing influence of hardline groups, the growing involvement of Bangladeshi youth in transnational extremist movements and the normalisation of extremist rhetoric, particularly online, are indicators of a deeper security concern. If the interim government fails to implement swift and decisive measures to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance counter-radicalisation efforts and foster community-based engagement, the country risks further societal fragmentation and the entrenchment of violent extremism. The preservation of Bangladesh’s democratic and pluralistic values hinges on comprehensive institutional reforms and a renewed commitment to inclusivity, human rights and the rule of law. Without these, Bangladesh may face prolonged instability with implications for both national and regional security.
About the Author
Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Austin Curtis on Unsplash
Citations
[1] The Bangladesh Awami League, the nation’s oldest political party, was instrumental in Bangladesh’s gaining of independence from Pakistan in 1971. In May 2025, Bangladesh’s interim government banned the Awami League and its associated organisations, citing national security, a move the party disputes as illegitimate.
[2] Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 1, (2025): 54-58, https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/bangladesh-2/.
[3] “Sacked Major Zia Applies for Withdrawal of Cases,” The Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/sacked-major-zia-applies-withdrawal-cases-3792041.
[4] On April 7, 2025, protests erupted across Bangladesh condemning Israeli actions in Gaza. Demonstrators targeted Israeli-linked businesses like Bata, KFC and Pizza Hut, vandalising storefronts in cities including Bogra, Sylhet, Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. Protesters called for a boycott of Israeli products and urged action from the government and the United Nations (UN). For details, see “Mobs Target KFC, Bata as Nationwide Protests Condemn Israeli Aggression,” Dhaka Tribune, April 7, 2025, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/378099/nationwide-protest-condemn-israeli-aggression-mob; “Gaza Protests: Demonstrators Attack Bata, KFC Outlets in 6 Districts in Bangladesh,” bdnews24.com, April 7, 2025, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/c72cace94142.
[5] Mukimul Ahsan, “Who Is Marching with the Black Flag Inscribed with the Kalema?” BBC News, October 7, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c748wqp9d29o; Nuruzzaman Labu, “Marches with ISIS and Al-Qaeda Flags Tarnish Image,” Bangla Tribune, April 11, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3c94uzab.
[6] Nuruzzaman Labu, “Marches with ISIS and al-Qaeda Flags Tarnish Image,” Bangla Tribune, April 11, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3c94uzab.
[7] Hasan Al Mahmud, “Bangladeshi Youths Are Fighting on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border for the Taliban,” The Dissent, May 15, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122113173014843347&id=61575300411283&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=eln21VVm2JH3dKxA#.
[8] In Bangladesh, the current wave of online radicalisation uniquely targets tech-savvy, often educated youth through localised, emotionally charged narratives on mainstream and encrypted platforms, exploiting socio-political grievances and a desire for purpose. Extremist groups leverage the ubiquity of Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp to disseminate highly professional propaganda, making their messaging resonate deeply with vulnerable segments of the population.
[9] Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh (HIB) is a hardline outfit comprising Qawmi madrassa teachers and students. The Manhajis, a pro-Al-Qaeda Islamist cleric group, have allegedly embedded themselves within HIB.
[10] “Islamist Parties Seek Unity Before Election to Enforce Sharia Law,” Dhaka Tribune, May 4, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3cbnutnv.
[11] Zia Chowdhury and Jesmin Papri, “Hardliners Increasingly Target Bangladeshi Women for Attire, Playing Sports – and Riding Motorcycles,” Benar News, March 27, 2025, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/moral-policing-of-women-rises-in-bangladesh-03272025145130.html.
[12] Even though the organisers had all the required permits, they cancelled the show because the authorities could not guarantee their safety. See “‘Tawhidi Janata’ Sends Letter to Stop Theatre Performance at Mohila Samiti Stage,” Dhaka Tribune, April 13, 2025, https://bangla.dhakatribune.com/entertainment/95171.
[13] These cases point to a disturbing pattern: extremist groups are using threats to control what types of art and culture can be shared, and the government is not doing enough to stop it due to fears of public backlash. Calling music, plays or festivals “un-Islamic” is becoming a common way to silence different voices. The concern is that extremist ideas are gaining power in public life and limiting freedom of expression in the country.
[14] Mujib Mashal and Saif Hasnat. “As Bangladesh Reinvents Itself, Islamist Hard-Liners See an Opening,” The New York Times, April 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/world/asia/bangladesh-islam.html.
[15] “Eating at a Hotel During the Day Results in the Punishment of Holding One’s Ears and Doing Squats,” Samakal, March 13, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/2ut7np38; Tarikuzzaman Shimul, “Who Are the Ones Engaging in ‘Moral Policing’ in the Name of Protecting the Sanctity of Ramadan?” BBC News, March 13, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/cx20yd5d1g3o.
[16] Shimul, “Who Are the Ones Engaging in ‘Moral Policing’.”
[17] Labu, “Marches with ISIS and Al-Qaeda Flags.”
[18] Abul Kalam Azad, “Jihadism Accused Released on Bail, ‘Many Have Repented after Misunderstanding’, Says Rahmani,” BBC News, April 11, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c3v95kkvq2no.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Author’s interview with a Bangladeshi security official, June 2025.
[21] Author’s field research in Bangladesh, April 2024.
[22] Established in 2013, SEAN Publication produces books and organises public events, among other activities, to propagate radicalism with the primary goal of engaging educated young audiences in dakwah activities across various platforms. Among those it has published are radical individuals with post-graduate credentials who also operate outside of Bangladesh, as observed by the author.
[23] “Police Tell Court, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir Wants to Destroy the Democratic Government and Establish Extremism’,” Kalbela, March 8, 2025, https://www.kalbela.com/court-law/170156.
[24] In some extremist interpretations, Ghazwatul Hind (or “Battle of Hind”) refers to an apocalyptic holy war prophesied in certain Islamic texts, which envisions a final, decisive battle between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. It is often invoked by jihadist groups to promote violent conflict and justify attacks in the region.
[25] Iftekharul Bashar, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh: A Growing Threat and the Need for Action,” RSIS Commentary no. 62 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CO25062.pdf.
[26] Author’s interview with a Bangladeshi security analyst, June 2025.
[27] “Farabi Gets 7yr Jail in ICT case,” Somoy News, January 30, 2023, https://en.somoynews.tv/news/2023-01-30/farabi-gets-7yr-jail-in-ict-case.
[28] Bashar, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh.”
[29] Al Mahmud, “Bangladeshi Youths Are Fighting.”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “Bangladeshi Arrested in Italy on Suspicion of Al-Qaeda Links,” The Daily Star, November 4, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/world/europe/news/bangladeshi-arrested-italy-suspicion-al-qaeda-links-3460881.
[33] Labu, “Marches with ISIS and Al-Qaeda.”
