Central Asia
As with previous years, it was a relatively quiet year in terms of terrorist attacks in Central Asia. The one incident associated with terrorist groups which resulted in deaths was a prison riot in Vahdat prison some 20 kilometres east of Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital. Echoing similar incidents in previous years, reporting around the incident was sketchy but seemed to point to militants linked to the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group, who either attempted an escape or tried to stir up a riot. Beyond this, there were numerous terrorism-related arrests reported across the region as well as incidents in Russia, Afghanistan and Europe involving Central Asian militants. Neighbouring Xinjiang did not see any terrorist incidents during the year and Uyghur militants were not linked to any incidents publicly. In the online space, Central Asian militant groups continued to be active (under both IS- and non-IS-linked banners), though the volume and quality of propaganda materials continued to degrade. Most complicated for the region, however, has been Syria, where large numbers of Central Asian militants remain, both incarcerated as former IS members as well as integrated into the senior ranks of the new government. The relatively fluid situation highlights a point of concern for the Central Asian authorities, which will take some time to settle down.
Central Asia’s Continuing Syrian Jihad?
The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the subsequent takeover by Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria in December 2024 marked a major watershed in the global jihadist narrative. Central Asian fighters were a prominent part of the final push to take the country, with the Uyghur fighters of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) particularly prominent in the push to take Latakia and Tartous. Videos emerged of the TIP’s fighters rolling into Damascus on tanks waving the group’s distinct blue flag.[1] Other Central Asian groups were less prominent as they had largely been integrated into HTS’s ranks, with the Uyghurs the last large monoethnic group fighting under their own banner in Syria.
In the wake of HTS’s takeover, the Central Asian governments stayed quiet. Concerned about the presence of their nationals alongside HTS, they became even more anxious when Sayfiddin Tojiboyev, a Tajik national of Uzbek ethnicity, was appointed to a senior role in the new Ministry of Defence.[2] A long-standing fighter, Tojiboyev had started his anti-government career as a member of the previously mainstream opposition party, the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). He quit the party in 2012 (IRPT was later banned in 2015) and went to Syria, where he first joined Liwa al-Muhajireen and later helped form Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, a mostly Central Asian jihadist group which fought alongside HTS (from its earlier days as Jabhat al-Nusrah). In an interview released after his appointment, he stated he had never fought with or been linked to the Islamic State (IS).[3] Reinforcing this narrative of integration with the new Syrian army, the Russian-speaking jihadist mercenary trainers Malhama Tactical re-emerged in January 2025, reportedly providing military training for the new Syrian army.[4]
Yet, since this early embrace, the reporting from Syria has pointed to a more complicated picture. In May 2025, there was an attack on the Russian airbase in Hmeimim, which some reports attributed to Uzbek fighters affiliated with the new government.[5] An unknown number of people were killed, and Russian soldiers reportedly dragged the bodies back into the base. Then, in October, reports emerged of a standoff between the Syrian authorities and a French foreign fighter group, Firqatul Ghuraba, in Harem, a village in northwest Idlib. Uzbek foreign fighters reportedly led a group of non-Syrians who came to the French group’s defence when the new Syrian authorities sought to detain a senior Firqatul Ghuraba member. This led to widespread discussion online amongst Russian-speaking jihadists about the potential betrayal by the new government of their foreign supporters.[6]
This narrative is very prominent in the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)’s Uzbek and Tajik propaganda materials. ISK continues to attack HTS, accusing President Ahmed al-Sharaa of betraying jihadists through his willingness to embrace the American, Russian, Chinese and other “enemy” governments. These concerns came to something of an apex in November when a report emerged that the Syrian government was going to repatriate Uyghurs in Syria.[7] The story was quickly denied by the Syrian government, but it highlighted the levels of anxiety that clearly exist.[8] The Chinese government has never hidden its ongoing concerns towards the Uyghur contingent in Syria (reportedly numbering as many as 15,000),[9] and the topic appears to be a prominent one in discussions between the new government and Beijing.[10] Turkey, a strong supporter of the new Syrian government, has been actively lobbying the Central Asian and other governments to engage with the al-Sharaa government.
Following in Afghanistan’s Footsteps?
The path that Syria eventually takes could be similar to the Taliban regime’s engagement with Central Asia since taking over Afghanistan in 2021. From an early hesitation, the region has now embraced the Taliban authorities, with regional security chiefs making regular visits to Kabul as well as hosting Taliban delegations. Even the Tajik government, historically the regional government most resistant to the Taliban’s harsh theocratic rule, undertook its first senior-level public visit to Kabul in November to engage with senior Taliban officials.[11] Whilst there has been a consistent level of behind-the-scenes engagement, this formal visit signalled that the overall thrust is towards normalisation, notwithstanding reports of tensions.[12]
In mid-July, Uzbek authorities arrested a cell of around 10 ISK-linked radicals, reportedly led by a 19-year-old girl, in Namangan city.[13] A couple of weeks later, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced a series of nine arrests in Moscow, including seven foreigners, also linked to ISK.[14] This came as the chief of the Uzbek State Security Service (SSS) visited Kabul and met with the Taliban’s intelligence and security chiefs.[15] Earlier in July, the Russian government had formally recognised the Taliban government as the designated authorities in Afghanistan. Reports suggest that the Taliban security authorities cooperated closely with their Uzbek and Russian counterparts in the counter-ISK operations.
External Threats?
Central Asians continued to pop up in occasional terrorist investigations outside the region. During this reporting period, the Dutch authorities jailed a Tajik national who had been recruiting for ISK,[16] while a German court ordered the repatriation of a Tajik IS member who had finished a prison sentence in the country.[17] It is not clear in the latter case if the extradition will succeed, as previous cases of Tajiks sent back from Germany have led to deaths in custody back in Tajikistan.[18] The Dutch case, however, highlighted how complex geopolitics between Europe, Turkey and the ongoing war in Ukraine have complicated European counter terror efforts.[19]
Within Russia, Central Asians continued to be reportedly involved in terrorist plots. In August, the case against the Tajiks linked to the IS-claimed Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow came to court.[20] All four suspects pleaded guilty at the beginning of the trial and are expected to receive life sentences. Meanwhile, Kyrgyz authorities jailed a man in February for praising the attack online.[21] Also in February, three Tajiks were shot by the FSB in Pskov, accused of planning a bombing at a local train station.[22] In October, the Russian authorities claimed an IS-linked Uzbek working on behalf of the Ukrainian government had been involved in plots to target Russian security officials.[23] There were numerous other lower-profile cases, highlighting the continued intertwining of threats between Russia and the region.
In an outlying case that fits a wider trend,[24] a 29-year-old Uzbek was arrested in Korea on charges of using cryptocurrencies to send money to Hamas and Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ).[25]
Kazakhstan
In May, Yermek Sagimbayev, the chair of the National Security Committee (NSC), announced that 43 people had been prosecuted on terrorism charges since the beginning of the year.[26] In late October, the Kazakh security forces reported that 89 people, including six foreigners, had been detained on terrorism charges since the beginning of the year.[27] Few exact plots were reported during the year, with most cases linked to “terror propagation”, though in May, police presence was stepped up outside an Astana synagogue, reflecting a specific “terror threat”.[28]
Kyrgyzstan
Reported detentions in Kyrgyzstan were lower in 2025, with no major plots reported to have been disrupted. Many of the arrests were of individuals who were reportedly active online talking to extremists abroad.[29] In June, a group of more than 10 was detained, accused of being part of a takfiri-jihadi organisation in possession of firearms seeking to establish an underground network in Bishkek.[30] In October, the authorities disrupted a network of nine linked to the banned group Hizb ut-Tahrir (seven had previously been detained on similar charges), reportedly finding firearms.[31] No specific plots were described in either case.
Tajikistan
The prison incident in Vahdat in February was the only lethal incident linked to terrorism in the region in 2025. Details remain sketchy, with reporting suggesting that between five and 15 were killed in the incident.[32] Reportedly, images emerged showing the IS flag on some of the individuals, with suggestions that it was either a prison break attempt or simply an attack on guards. There were similarities between this incident and earlier IS-linked prison incidents in November 2018 and May 2019, which took place at the same prison in Vahdat.[33] The authorities also claimed to have disrupted much larger operations and networks across the country throughout the year – for instance, in February, jailing 30 accused of being involved in a mass poisoning incident planned by ISK.[34] ISK’s Tajik media channels continued to produce throughout the reporting period, though they were marked by regular outages which seemed to echo events in Afghanistan – suggesting their base may be across the border. At the same time, Ansarullah (which renamed itself the Islamic Emirate of Tajikistan), a modest-sized, alternative jihadist organisation, produced a continuous diet of materials throughout the year on YouTube which condemned the authorities and sought to rally the people to rise up. Both condemned the new Syrian government as well as the authorities in Kabul and Dushanbe.
Turkmenistan
There was no reporting of extremist or terrorist activity linked to Turkmenistan during this reporting period.
Uzbekistan
As highlighted above, the Uzbek authorities worked with their counterparts in Russia and Afghanistan to counter threats within and outside the country during the reporting period. No arrests were linked to specific attack plots, with some linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir[35] as well as to KTJ and ISK. In July, the authorities jailed for 16 years an Uzbek national who had been radicalised in Russia, joined ISK in Afghanistan in 2016, and ultimately reportedly played a role in supplying ammunition for a rocket launcher system used by the group to fire into Termez, Uzbekistan, in 2022.[36] The case was striking as the authorities had at the time denied anything had taken place, while ISK had played it up as part of its campaign against the Central Asian countries.
Outlook
Central Asia continues to face a low-level threat picture which is dominated by online radicalisation and connections around the world. Whilst the threat has not matured as some had expected, there is no doubt that Central Asian militancy remains a persistent concern globally. In the online space, it has been noted that Uzbek and Tajik channels in particular found it harder to broadcast during the previous year, with clampdowns on Telegram creating problems. Some have chosen to migrate to alternative channels like TikTok, Gem Space or Rocket.Chat, but these have been equally difficult to sustain, with relatively low numbers of followers appearing in groups. Tajik-produced materials continue to be the most prominent and active, reflecting the country’s continuing place at the heart of the regional threat. Going forward, how the new authorities in Syria manage their relationships with the Central Asian governments and balance that against the large extremist Central Asian diaspora they have within their borders, will be an important element to watch.
About the Author
Raffaello Pantucci is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is currently based in Hong Kong. Previously, he served for around three years as a Senior Fellow at RSIS. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Sophia Yan, “Uyghur Fighters in Syria Vow to Come for China Next,” The Telegraph, December 13, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/13/uyghur-fighters-in-syria-vow-to-come-for-china-next/.
[2] Abakhon Sultonnazarov, “Potential Risks for Central Asian Countries Due to Developments in Syria,” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, January 29, 2025, https://cabar.asia/en/potential-risks-for-central-asian-countries-due-to-developments-in-syria.
[3] “Interview with Military Commander Sayfuddin Sarhangi,” Imron-TJ, January 12, 2025, YouTube, 14 min., 32 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA_y8ePT7pI.
[4] Daniele Garofalo, “Malhama and Albanian Tactical Groups Train New Syrian Army and Special Forces,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 23, no. 2 (2025), https://jamestown.org/malhama-and-albanian-tactical-groups-train-new-syrian-army-and-special-forces/.
[5] Yuri Kotenok (@voenkorKotenok), “Hmeimim was attacked this morning. Preliminary reports indicate that all of the terrorists were of Uzbek origin, militants from one of the countless groups that were formally disbanded and incorporated into the new Syrian army but in reality continue to exist as autonomous structures. All the attackers were eliminated,” Telegram, May 20, 2025, https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64429.
[6] “Briefing: Russian-Language Jihadists Warn of Crackdown on Syria Foreign Fighters,” BBC Monitoring, October 24, 2025, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0004tsx.
[7] “Syria to Hand Over Uyghur Jihadist Fighters to China, Sources Say,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 18, 2025, https://hongkongfp.com/2025/11/18/syria-to-hand-over-uyghur-jihadist-fighters-to-china-sources-say/.
[8] “Syria Denies Plans to Hand Over Uyghur Fighters to China,” The New Region, November 17, 2025, https://thenewregion.com/posts/3683.
[9] Umar Farooq, “What Are Uyghurs Doing in Syria?” Foreign Policy, April 4, 2025,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/04/uyghurs-tpd-syria-fighters/.
[10] “Syrian FM Visits China, Pledges Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Al Jazeera, November 17, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/17/syrian-fm-pledges-counter-terrorism-cooperation-with-china.
[11] Radio Television of Afghanistan Pashto News (@pashtortanews), “A high-ranking delegation from Tajikistan, including officials from the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security, and other important officials, arrived in Kabul today,” X, November 15, 2025, https://x.com/pashtortanews/status/1989589565879861268.
[12] Andrei Serenko (@anserenko), “Taliban commander Maulavi Mansuri: We are ready to conquer Tajikistan. A sensational video confession by a senior commander of the Afghan Taliban has been published by representatives of the Afghanistan Green Trend (AGT) movement,” Telegram, February 25, 2025, https://t.me/anserenko/7836.
[13] “State Security Service Says It Uncovered IS-KP Cell in Namangan Led By Young Woman,” Gazeta.uz, July 21, 2025, https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2025/07/21/detained/.
[14] “Foreigners Recruiting Migrants for a Terrorist Organisation Were Detained in Moscow,” TASS, August 8, 2025, https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/24735015.
[15] SECURITY (@xavfsizlik_uz), “#Official. The Chairman of the State Security Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan held meetings with the Head of the Afghan Intelligence Service, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Internal Affairs,” Telegram, July 23, 2025, https://t.me/xavfsizlik_uz/1488.
[16] “Tajik Man Sentenced to 5.5 Years for Recruiting for ISIS in Netherlands,” NL Times, July 21, 2025, https://nltimes.nl/2025/07/21/tajik-man-sentenced-55-years-recruiting-isis-netherlands.
[17] “Germany Has Decided to Extradite an Islamic State Militant to Tajikistan,” Radio Azattyk, October 11, 2025, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/germaniya-postanovila-vydat-tadzhikistanu-boevika-islamskogo-gosudarstva-/33557024.html.
[18] “Tajikistan: Forced Returnee Dies in Custody Under Mysterious Circumstances,” Eurasianet, November 14, 2025, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-forced-returnee-dies-in-custody-under-mysterious-circumstances.
[19] Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey’s Release of ISIS Detainees Fuels European Terrorism Threat, Dutch Court Case Shows,” Nordic Monitor, October 6, 2025, https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/10/turkeys-release-of-isis-detainees-fuels-european-terror-threat-dutch-court-case-shows/.
[20] “Main Suspects In 2024 Moscow Terrorist Attack Plead Guilty On First Day Of Trial,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 4, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/33493433.html.
[21] “Citizen of Kyrgyzstan Convicted of Justifying Terrorist Attack at the Crocus City Hall,” Asia-Plus, February 20, 2025, https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/world/20250220/citizen-of-kyrgyzstan-convicted-of-justifying-terrorist-attack-at-the-crocus-city-hall.
[22] Gulbahar Murodi, “Three Tajik Immigrants Killed in FSB Operation. Who Were They?” Radio Ozodi, February 20, 2025, https://www.ozodi.org/a/se-muhojiri-tojik-dar-amaliyoti-fsb-kushta-shudaand-onho-ki-budand-/33321413.html.
[23] “The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Prevented a Sabotage and Terrorist Attack Against a High-Ranking Officer of the Russian Ministry of Defence,” Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, October 13, 2025, http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm%21id%3D10440427%40fsbMessage.html.
[24] For earlier reporting on this Korean-Central Asian jihadist link, see Raffaello Pantucci, “Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 15, no. 1 (2023): 82-91, https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/central-asia-kazakhstan-kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-turkmenistan-uzbekistan/.
[25] “Uzbek National Arrested for Allegedly Financing Terrorist Groups,” Korea JoongAng Daily, October 27, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-10-27/national/socialAffairs/Uzbek-national-arrested-for-allegedly-financing-terrorist-groups/2429611.
[26] Angela Kubasheva, “Tokayev Heard From the Head of the National Security Committee: Damage to the State Budget of 1.6 Trillion Tenge Was Prevented,” TengriNews, May 23, 2025, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/tokaev-zaslushal-glavu-knb-predotvraschen-uscherb-570947/.
[27] National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (@knbgov_kz), “Prevention of a terrorist act. The National Security Committee has prevented a terrorist act planned for September 2025 in Almaty by five foreign nationals. They have all been detained and an investigation is underway,” Telegram, October 28, 2025, https://t.me/knbgov_kz/2836.
[28] Aigerim Tukusheva, “Security Has Been Strengthened at a Synagogue in Astana,” KYPCNB News, May 19, 2025, https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-05-19/tksh-polisia-astana-sinagoga/.
[29] “A Recruited ISIS Supporter Was Detained in the Issyk-Kul Region,” 24.kg – Kyrgyzstan, October 21, 2025, https://24.kg/proisshestvija/347953_zaverbovannogo_storonnika_igil_zaderjali_vissyik-kulskoy_oblasti/.
[30] “The State Committee for National Security (GKNB) Neutralised the Activities of an Illegal Radical Religious Cell in Bishkek,” Kabar, June 16, 2025, https://ru.kabar.kg/news/gknb-nejtralizoval-deyatelnost-nezakonnoj-radikalnoj-religioznoj-yachejki-v-bishkeke/.
[31] “Weapons Were Found During Searches of Members of the Russian Extremist Organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir in Talas,” Vesti.kg, October 21, 2025, https://vesti.kg/obshchestvo/item/144759-v-khode-obyskov-u-chlenov-reo-khizb-ut-takhrir-v-talase-nashli-oruzhie.html.
[32] Nazarali Pirnazarov, “Five Islamic State Prisoners Killed Trying to Escape From Tajik Jail, Source Says,” Reuters, February 4, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/least-five-killed-prison-riot-tajikistan-sources-say-2025-02-04/.
[33] “Dozens Killed in Riot at Tajikistan Prison Holding Isis Militants,” The Guardian, May 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/tajikistan-prison-riot-guards-inmates-killed-isis-militants.
[34] “Court in Tajikistan Jails Over 30 People for Attempted Mass Poisoning Linked to ISIS Offshoot,” The Jerusalem Post, February 14, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-842176.
[35] “An Underground Extremist Organisation Was Dismantled in Uzbekistan,” Podrobno.uz, June 21, 2025, https://podrobno.uz/cat/proisshestviya/v-uzbekistane-nakryli-podpolnuyu-ekstremistskuyu-organizatsiyu-video/.
[36] “A Participant in the Termez Shelling From Afghanistan Has Been Sentenced to 16 Years in Prison,” Fergana News Agency, November 21, 2025, https://fergana.ru/news/138664/.
