Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Central Asian militants continue to pose more terrorist threats abroad than at home. Though no large-scale terrorist attacks were witnessed in 2023 within the five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), armed clashes and a steady patter of detentions at home and abroad stood out as two major trends. Neighbouring Xinjiang also remained quiet, with no reported attacks or major plots disrupted. Regional concerns continue to focus on Afghanistan, though so far, the problems Afghanistan has exported have for the most part gone south to Pakistan (or east to Iran) rather than north into Central Asia. However, the repeated appearance of Tajik nationals in terrorist attacks and plots around the world is concerning. In Afghanistan and Syria, Central Asian (including Uyghur) militants continue to play a prominent role, though whether this poses more than just a local threat remains to be seen.
Trends
Rise of the Tajiks
Whilst not an entirely new phenomenon, this past year saw a spike in Tajik nationals appearing in substantial terrorist plots in a growing number of places. Many of these were linked to the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), though in some cases the nature of the link and direction was not clear.
The first such instance claimed in 2023 actually took place in December 2022, when a pair of Tajik ISK members launched an attack from within a Chinese-run hotel in downtown Kabul.[1] One of the two survived, and, according to ISK, went on to carry out a suicide bombing against Kabul’s military airport on January 1, 2023.[2] In March, an explosion killed the Taliban’s governor for Balkh province, Mohammad Daud Muzammil, who had played a crucial role in dismantling ISK’s network in Nangarhar and had been a close associate of Taliban leader Haibatullah.[3] Reportedly, the assassin was a Tajik militant who hid explosives in his prosthetic leg.[4]
In August 2023, there was an attack at the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, which led to two deaths and numerous injuries.[5] A Tajik was arrested and others detained in the subsequent investigation.[6] This was the second attack by a Tajik linked to ISK on this particular target in just under a year. While there is no doubt there is a tense rivalry between ISK and Iran, in part due to the ideological weight that ISK narratives put on Shia apostasy, there is also likely an opportunistic element to ISK’s efforts against Iran. With a long and porous border with Afghanistan, alongside a large resident Afghan diaspora, Iran is likely a relatively easy target for ISK to strike. Given the narrative importance of the target, it is therefore likely a priority for the group in order to demonstrate its ability to project violence against its enemies successfully. It is certainly a considerable failure and demonstration of weakness by Iranian security forces that the same target could be hit twice in under a year.
Numerous Tajiks were also detained for their involvement in terrorist plots further afield. On New Year’s Eve 2022, authorities in Istanbul detained a Tajik-Uzbek pair who were reportedly planning an attack under instruction and training by ISK.[7] In mid-January 2023, Turkish authorities detained a 15-member cell in Istanbul allegedly inspired by ISK for a series of plots targeting the Swedish and Dutch consulates, as well as churches and synagogues in the city.[8] The leader of the cell was a Tajik who had been dispatched personally by ISK’s leadership in Afghanistan.[9] Soon after this news was made public, authorities in Turkey detained another Tajik national, a senior figure in ISK, and his wife.[10]
Likewise, in late June, German authorities detained seven men and Dutch authorities detained a couple, allegedly for an undefined IS-linked terrorist plot.[11] Five of those detained in Germany and one in Holland were Tajikistanis. Finally, in October, Russian authorities presented a case against a group of five Tajiks and one Dagestani whom they accused of being behind a terrorist plot to attack the Lubyanka, the headquarters of Russia’s domestic intelligence service, the Federal Security Service (FSB).[12]
Full details and information on all these plots and cases are unclear (nor is this list exhaustive – numerous other arrests of Tajikistanis have also been seen in other Central Asian countries and beyond), but they paint a worrying picture of Tajikistanis repeatedly appearing, either responsible for or accused of terrorist activity linked to ISK outside their borders. Whilst Tajiks were noted for their prominent role within IS in Syria as the group’s most willing would-be suicide bombers,[13] and they have already been appearing as attackers around the world in growing numbers for some years,[14] the pace of their appearances has increased. The Taliban have also noted this and one of their supporting news organisations, Al-Mirsaad, released a video highlighting the connection and claiming that almost all of the attacks in Afghanistan over the previous 10 months had been undertaken by Tajiks, drawing on “information” they had received and confessions from various Tajiks in Taliban custody.[15]
A plausible explanation of the surge in Tajiks’ involvement in terrorist attacks in 2023 is difficult due to the scarcity of reliable data. Nonetheless, the martyrdom statements or confessions released by either ISK or the Taliban point to individual anger that in part stems from the oppressive and anti-Islamic nature of the Tajik government. However, a curious fact is that there have been no major attacks in Tajikistan itself.[16] It is certainly notable that many of those who have been radicalised appear to do so while living in Russia. Again, it is difficult to decipher whether this is because radical networks target the Tajiks there specifically; the experience of being migrant labourers in Russia contributes to radicalisation vulnerability; some other factors; or a combination of all of the above. It is also notable that in sheer volume terms, there are far more Uzbeks in Russia than Tajiks. Yet, it is the Tajiks who are radicalising to violence in proportionally larger numbers. It is possible that the newly created recruitment networks are simply able to recruit and activate people with ease – flowing from supportive to active roles. For example, the suicide bomber responsible for the June 2022 ISK attack on a Sikh temple in Kabul was a Tajik who had previously served as the chief of Tajik language media for the group.[17]
Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad Internationalises?
In March 2022, the US government announced the addition of Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) to its roster of proscribed terrorist organisations.[18] Mostly active in Syria, KTJ has nonetheless shown that its tentacles reach beyond Syria and Central Asia. Between December 2022 and January 2023, South Korean authorities deported 10 individuals of Central Asian origin whom they accused of sending money in support of KTJ.[19] Those arrested in January were accused of using cryptocurrencies,[20] part of a much wider deployment of such funding methodologies by Central Asians.[21]
In April, Indonesian authorities were shocked when an attempted deportation of Uzbek nationals turned into a violent confrontation in which at least one security officer was killed.[22] The Uzbeks were reported to be linked to KTJ and had entered the country earlier in the year for unspecified reasons. Some were reported to be linked to local militant groups, though the exact nature of their intended radical activity was not clear. There was a suggestion that they might have been involved in the production of extremist materials.
In August, authorities in Philadelphia, US, arrested a 17 year old linked to KTJ through social media who had seemingly procured bomb-making materials.[23] The exact nature of his link to KTJ was unclear aside from the public statements by local authorities.
Whilst this roster of radical activity paints a picture of a group increasingly going global, when looking in detail at the cases, the links between the group and this activity seem distant. In each case, KTJ’s involvement appears passive, something reflective of the fact that the group itself appears for the most part focused on the battlefield in Syria where it fights alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).[24] According to the United Nations (UN) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s February 2023 report, in the wake of KTJ’s proscription by the US government, HTS commanded the group’s name be changed to “Liwa Abu Ubayda”.[25] At the time, its strength was placed at around 800 fighters, a cohort described as “the most capable Central Asian terrorist group acting under the HTS umbrella”.[26] In May 2023, the US Treasury Department added a Turkey-based key fund-raiser, Kubilay Sari, to its list of sanctioned individuals, accusing him of fund-raising globally and sending battlefield equipment to the group’s fighters in Syria.[27]
Foreign Battlefields
As illustrated above, Afghanistan and Syria continue to be the priority foreign battlefields for Central Asians, with residual cases associated with IS in Syria and Iraq still posing security challenges for authorities. While the Central Asian governments have been far more forward-leaning in repatriating their nationals from the Levant, a number still remain there. In 2023, a number of videos emerged from Iraq of Kazakh[28] and Uzbek[29] women, incarcerated on charges of being linked to IS, pleading with their governments to bring them home. In May, some 104 women, children and adolescents were brought back by the Tajik government from Syria, alongside five Kazakhs at Astana’s request.[30] Likewise, Kyrgyz authorities were reported talking to the Iraqi government in April about bringing back 41 of their nationals.[31] Separately, two Kyrgyz groups of 59 (in February) and 95 (in August) were repatriated from camps in Syria during the reporting year.[32] There is little clarity as to how many Central Asian nationals are still in custody (or fighting) in Syria and Iraq.
A new concern has arisen, however, over the past year of Central Asian nationals participating in the Russia-Ukraine war. Legislation has been passed in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan making it illegal to go and fight, while the Tajik authorities have told people not to go or face potential conviction. It is not clear whether Turkmenistan has done anything about this specific issue. Nevertheless, stories continue to emerge of Central Asians going to join in the war. In October, a court in Uzbekistan sentenced a man to five years in prison for fighting alongside Russian-backed forces in Donetsk.[33] In June, authorities in northern Kazakhstan (a region with a large ethnic Russian population) reported identifying efforts to recruit people to go and fight in Ukraine, with reports that Kazakhs had been found fighting on both sides.[34] Stories also continue to emerge of Central Asian labourers in Russia being coerced or tricked into joining the fighting.[35]
Authorities in Central Asia have also expressed some concern about ideologies linked to the battlefield spreading among their populations. For instance, a group of Kyrgyz youth was arrested in August after attacking “Asians” and using fascist imagery in Bishkek and Chuy regions.[36] The young men were potentially in part inspired by nationalist messaging they had heard from Russia. Similarly, authorities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan moved in March to disrupt an online community called PMC Redan, which draws inspiration from Japanese anime to incite youth to large brawls. An online community which is present in Belarus and Russia as well, some Uzbek commentators have linked the group to Moscow, suggesting it is being stirred up by Russian nationalists. Others, it should be noted, have blamed the US.[37] This story brings into sharp focus how the region is constantly seeking to identify and is highly concerned about any possible overspill of the conflict in Ukraine – either through people or ideas.
Central Asia: A Quiet Front
The growing presence of Central Asian jihadists around the world belies a curious paradox at home, where no major terrorist attacks were reported this past year. Whilst all five countries display concern about potential threats, participate in both global and regional sessions focused on terrorist and extremist threats, and seem preoccupied about events in Afghanistan, there have been very few instances of violence or publicly revealed plots indicating high levels of planning and sophistication.
Kazakhstan
For example, in Kazakhstan, while authorities throughout the year continued to detain individuals on charges of propagating extremism, there were no open trials involving major terrorist plots. This does not mean they did not disrupt any, however. In April, the authorities reported detaining an anonymous foreigner for planning a terrorist attack in the south of the country.[38] In August, security chief Yermek Sagimbayev expanded on this threat picture when he said that earlier in the year his forces had disrupted and neutralised a radical group “[p]lanning terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan”.[39] In June, they reported detaining some 31 individuals in the year to date.[40] Highlighting the level of concern they see, the Deputy Chief of the National Security Council flagged that there are around 80,000 Kazakhs consuming extremist materials online.[41]
Kyrgyzstan
The situation in Kyrgyzstan was no different, though authorities did get involved in a shoot-out with an individual identified as an extremist in May in Chuy region. Two officers were injured while the man was shot.[42] In other cases, authorities arrested individuals they variously linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir, Afghanistan, KTJ and other anonymous groups. Kyrgyzstan also appears to have become something of a source of passports for extremists trying to mask their countries of origin. In March[43] and June,[44] cases were revealed of individuals manufacturing or doctoring Kyrgyz passports to facilitate extremists’ travel. In many ways, however, the bigger security threat Kyrgyzstan faces is its border dispute with Tajikistan, which, while quieter this past year, has led to a substantial military build-up between the two countries (more in the next section).
Tajikistan
As already highlighted, the biggest feature of Tajik extremism during the reporting period was its growing appearance around the world. At home, however, authorities found themselves fighting conflicts on two borders, while also reporting a year-on-year growth of 18 percent between 2021 and 2022 of terrorism-related crimes.[45] In April 2023, a senior figure in the local security forces was killed in a shootout with unidentified assailants from across the border in Afghanistan.[46] A similar incident played out in September, leading to no more security forces deaths but ending three cross-border terrorists.[47] There are other, less verifiable stories of such border clashes, with authorities often blaming a group called Jamaat Ansarullah, which has been fighting the Tajik state for some time to little effect. Reportedly, the group numbers a couple hundred and retains limited capability.
Tajik security forces, for the most part, seem more focused on their border with Kyrgyzstan. In the wake of clashes in 2022 (a continuation of clashes that date back to the foundation of the two countries), dozens were killed and tensions have continued to grow on the border. Currently, both sides are increasing their military and security spending on their border, including purchasing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology from Iran and Turkey, something that is likely to remove capability from confronting security threats that may come across the border from Afghanistan.[48]
Turkmenistan
There was no reporting of instances of violence or extremism within Turkmenistan during the past year. Surprisingly, amongst the Central Asians arrested in Germany in July, there was a Turkmen national identified – something of a rarity in jihadist reporting.[49] Other than this, experts in Ashgabat reported a threat picture which is limited to occasional cross-border incidents with Afghan forces largely blamed on criminal networks.
Uzbekistan
Similar to the other nations, Uzbekistan did not face any attacks within its borders in 2023. However, the country saw a regular rate of arrests of locals on terrorism-related offences, including a relatively high number accused of planning to go and join groups in Syria. In October alone, two separate clusters of a total of 13 individuals were arrested on accusations of planning to go to Syria to fight alongside KTJ.[50] Throughout the year, other arrests and detentions were made, for the most part involving the propagation of extremist materials. In September, authorities announced that Ulugbek Bobomurodov, the leader of Syria-based Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari, was killed fighting in Syria.[51] His death was not widely reported, but highlighted how the groups in Syria continue to have a sway on and link to Central Asia in particular.
Xinjiang
The security situation in Xinjiang also remained peaceful as there were no arrests or attacks reported.[52] The UN Monitoring Team’s analysis based on member state reporting suggests that the contingent of Uyghurs fighting under the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)’s banner in Syria and Afghanistan remains substantial. According to UN reporting in February, the group was fighting alongside HTS in Afrin, including in the joint deployment of UAV platforms. The group had reportedly trained some 500 “minors” of whom at least 200 fought on frontlines.[53] The group also reportedly plotted alongside the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat Ansarullah and ISK in Afghanistan – including planning attacks against the Chinese presence in Kabul.[54]
In May, the group was reported to have between 300-1,200 fighters in Afghanistan running multiple bases, with many fighters now possessing Afghan passports and identity documents.[55] According to the UN Monitoring Team’s June report, the group reportedly dispatched individuals to establish bases in Africa and South Asia in an attempt to expand its operations and target “Chinese nationals and agencies”.[56] However, reading the group’s propaganda materials, it is difficult to draw similar conclusions about their actions and intent, with the group seemingly still largely focused on fighting on the ground in Syria, with occasional videos showing its presence in Afghanistan.[57] There have also been no publicly reported attacks by the group on Chinese targets. Beijing in the meantime continues to prioritise its concerns around Uyghur militants associated with ETIM/TIP in its interactions with Taliban authorities, as well as making regular mention of them during discussions with Central Asian interlocutors.
Conclusion
From a global terrorism threat perspective, Central Asia remains a source of concern. Networks associated with the region – be they ISK, KTJ or others – continue to emerge around the world, with a geographical reach that appears unparalleled. The history and depth of this link were illustrated in 2023 with the revelation in UN reporting that an Uzbek-Finn, who had been involved in the radicalisation of a Moroccan asylum seeker who launched an IS-inspired attack in Finland in 2017,[58] has now emerged in Afghanistan alongside ISK, where he is a key figure in the production of extremist materials.[59] This case highlights the European-Central Asian connection which appears to be part of the particular threat ISK poses to Europe, while also illustrating the reach of the group’s extremist narratives amongst the growing and diffuse Central Asian diaspora.
The particular rise of Tajiks in the frontline of attacks highlights a risk to the country, which appears to have one of the weakest security apparatuses in the region, yet at the same time the reality is that no attacks have taken place on Tajik soil in the past year. This is only one of the many paradoxes that appears to exist in Central Asian extremism, which as a region appears to increasingly have one of the most substantial, widespread and threatening networks of violent jihadists around the world, yet who at the same time seem disinterested in launching attacks at home where presumably their biggest target of rage would be. What is clear, however, is that the threat persists and is going to continue to be a priority for international security actors. For Europe in particular, the menace appears strong, and, as was seen in incidents in the past few years in the US as well as in links across Southeast Asia, the network’s reach is far. Central Asian extremism will continue to be something for security officials around the world to pay attention to over the coming years.
About the Author
Raffaello Pantucci is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Previously, he served around three years as a Senior Fellow at RSIS. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Lucas Webber, “Islamic State Claims Tajik Behind Attack on Chinese in Kabul,” Eurasianet, January 11, 2023, https://eurasianet.org/islamic-state-claims-tajik-behind-attack-on-chinese-in-kabul.
[2] BBC Monitoring, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c20404wd.
[3] Celine Alkhaldi et al., “Blast Kills Taliban Governor in His Office in Afghanistan,” CNN, March 9, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/09/middleeast/afghanistan-taliban-balkh-governor-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html.
[4] The General Directorate of Intelligence (@GDI1415), “The special forces of the General Directorate of Intelligence, Ainuddin (Mohammed), the son of Abdul Wakil, who was killed in the attack on Balkh Governor Maulvi Mohammad Daoud Muzamal,” X, April 2, 2023, https://twitter.com/GDI1415/status/1642467203558563841.
[5] Maziar Motamedi, “Iran’s Shiraz Shrine Comes Under Second Deadly Attack in Months,” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/13/irans-shiraz-shrine-comes-under-second-deadly-terrorist-attack-in-months.
[6] “Chief Element in Logistics of Shiraz Terror Attack Arrested,” Tasnim New Agency, August, 18, 2023, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2023/08/18/2942689/chief-element-in-logistics-of-shiraz-terror-attack-arrested.
[7] “Turkish Police Detain Citizens of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan Suspected in Planning Terrorist Attack in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve,” AKIpress, January 9, 2023, https://m.akipress.com/news:690826:Turkish_police_detain_citizens_of_Tajikistan_and_Uzbekistan_suspected_in_planning_terrorist_attack_in_Istanbul_on_New_Year_s_Eve/.
[8] “Turkey Detains 15 for IS Links, No Concrete Threats Found,” VoA, February 5, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-detains-15-for-is-links-no-concrete-threats-found/6949324.html.
[9] Şahin Şen, “DEAŞ’ın Katliam Planı,” Yeni Şafak, August 20, 2023, https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/deasin-katliam-plani-4546580.
[10] Emrah Gokmen, “Turkish Police Arrest ‘High-Ranking’ Daesh/ISIS terrorist in Istanbul,” Anadolu Agency, June 22, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkish-police-arrest-high-ranking-daesh-isis-terrorist-in-istanbul/2928673.
[11] “Germany Arrests 7 Suspected Members of Islamist Terror Group,” Deutsche Welle, June 7, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-arrests-7-suspected-members-of-islamist-terror-group/a-66131108.
[12] Stanislav Kuchushev, “Subversive Elements: Terrorist Cell Tried For Plans to Attack FSB Building,” IZ, October 26, 2023, https://iz.ru/1595184/stanislav-kuchushev/podryvnye-elementy-iacheiku-terroristov-sudiat-za-plany-ataki-na-zdanie-fsb.
[13] Charlie Winter, “War by Suicide: A Statistical Analysis of the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Industry,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, February 27, 2017, https://www.icct.nl/index.php/publication/war-suicide-statistical-analysis-islamic-states-martyrdom-industry.
[14] Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle, “The Islamic State’s Central Asian Contingents and Their International Threat,” Hudson Institute, October 16, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat.
[15] Al-Mirsad (@almirsad_dari), “’Washehd Shahid Man Ahlaha’ was published in the new edition of Al-Mursad,” X, August 24, 2023, https://twitter.com/almirsad_dari/status/1694721264991281217.
[16] The most recent incidents linked to IS within Tajikistan were the murder of four Western cyclists in July 2018 and two instances of prison violence that the group claimed in November 2018 and May 2019.
[17] United Nations Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2665 (2022) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace Stability and Security of Afghanistan, S/2023/370, June 1, 2023, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/125/36/PDF/N2312536.pdf?OpenElement.
[18] “Terrorist Designation of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad,” U.S. Department of State, March 7, 2022, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad/.
[19] Jacob Zenn, “South Korea Cracks Down on Cryptocurrency Transfers to Central Asian Jihadists,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 21, No. 6 (2023), https://jamestown.org/program/brief-south-korea-cracks-down-on-cryptocurrency-transfers-to-central-asian-jihadists/.
[20] “Foreigners Caught Funding Terrorist Group Using Cryptocurrency,” Yonhap News Agency, February 16, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230216007700320.
[21] Nodirbek Soliev, “The Digital Terror Financing of Central Asian Jihadis,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2023), pp. 20-27, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-digital-terror-financing-of-central-asian-jihadis/.
[22] Pizaro Gozali Idrus, “Uzbek Suspects Blamed for Fatal Stabbing During Escape From Indonesian Detention Center,” Benar News, April 11, 2023, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/uzbek-militant-suspects-break-out-04112023152245.html.
[23] “Teen Arrested in Federal Terrorism Probe to be Prosecuted by Philly DA,” Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, August 14, 2023, https://phillyda.org/news/teen-arrested-in-federal-terrorism-probe-to-be-prosecuted-by-philly-da/.
[24] Uran Botobekov, “The Evolution of an al-Qaeda Affiliate: Unmasking Notorious Uzbek Leader Abdul Aziz Domla of Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad,” Homeland Security Today, September 10, 2023,
https://www.hstoday.us/featured/the-evolution-of-an-al-qaeda-affiliate-unmasking-notorious-uzbek-leader-abdul-aziz-domla-of-katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad/.
[25] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2610 (2021) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2023/95, February 13, 2023, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/N2303891.pdf.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Treasury Designates Terrorist Financing Facilitators Jointly With Türkiye,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 2, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1456.
[28] “Kazakh Women From the Iraqi Prison ‘Rusafa’: ‘We Have 30 Women in One Cell’,” Tengri News, May 26, 2023, https://tengrinews.kz/article/kazahstanki-irakskoy-tyurmyi-rusafa-u-30-jenschin-odnoy-2060/.
[29] “Iraq Sentenced 44 Citizens of Uzbekistan to Life and Long-Term Imprisonment – Prosecutor General’s Office,” KUN.UZ, April 29, 2023, https://kun.uz/en/27986098.
[30] “104 Citizens of Tajikistan Returned to Their Homeland From Syria,” Avesta Information Agency, May 22, 2023, https://avesta.tj/2023/05/22/104-grazhdanina-tadzhikistana-vozvrashheny-na-rodinu-iz-sirii/.
[31] “41 Kyrgyzstanis Are Being Held in Iraqi Prisons, Two Have Been Returned to Their Homeland,” 24 KG, April 13, 2023, https://24.kg/vlast/263188_virakskih_tyurmah_soderjitsya_41kyirgyizstanets_vozvraschenyi_narodinu_dva_/.
[32] “Kyrgyzstan Brings Back 95 ISIL Wives, Children From Syrian Internment Camps,” Al Jazeera, August 30, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/kyrgyzstan-brings-back-95-isil-wives-children-from-syrian-internment-camps.
[33] “Uzbekistan Sentences Man to Five Years in Prison for Allegedly Fighting in War Against Ukraine,” Meduza, October 31, 2023, https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/10/31/uzbekistan-sentences-man-to-five-years-in-prison-for-allegedly-fighting-in-war-against-ukraine.
[34] “Officials In Kazakhstan’s North Say Efforts To Recruit Locals To Russian Armed Forces In Ukraine Uncovered,” Radio Free Europe, June 30, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/officials-kazakhstan-north-recruit-locals-russia-ukraine/32483965.html.
[35] Mumin Ahmadi, “’I Sent Tajik Men’s Bodies From Bakhmut,’ Central Asian Migrant Worker Claims,” Radio Free Europe, August 17, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/central-asia-migrant-worker-russia-bakhmut-ukraine/32552242.html.
[36] “The State Committee for National Security Detained Members of an Underground Nationalist Group – They Are Teenagers,” AKIpress, August 2, 2023,
https://svodka.akipress.org/news:1963144?from=portal&place=last.
[37] “Uzbek Police Crackdown on Anime-Inspired Group,” BBC Monitoring, March 9, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c204584e.
[38] “Foreigner Was Preparing a Terrorist Attack in the South of Kazakhstan – KNB,” Tengri News, April 21, 2023, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/inostranets-gotovil-terakt-na-yuge-kazahstana-knb-497116/.
[39] Saniya Sakenova, “Security Agencies Neutralize Radical Group Planning Terrorist Attacks in Kazakhstan,” The Astana Times, August 29, 2023, https://astanatimes.com/2023/08/security-agencies-neutralize-radical-group-planning-terrorist-attacks-in-kazakhstan/.
[40] “More Than 30 People Have Been Detained in Terrorism Cases Since the Beginning of the Year in Kazakhstan – KNB,” Tengri News, June 15, 2023, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/30-zaderjali-delam-terrorizme-nachala-goda-kazahstane-knb-502142/.
[41] “Almost 80 Thousand Members of Destructive Groups Have Been Identified Since the Beginning of the Year Among the Youth of Kazakhstan,” Kazakh Telegraph Agency, September 8, 2023, https://kaztag.kz/ru/news/pochti-80-tys-chlenov-destruktivnykh-grupp-vyyavili-s-nachala-goda-sredi-molodezhi-kazakhstana.
[42] “Shootout in Dmitrievka: The Man Killed the Day Before Rented a House in the Village,” Turmush, May 17, 2023, https://www.turmush.kg/ru/news:1921948.
[43] “The State Committee for National Security Detained A Woman Who Tried to Produce Passports of the Kyrgyz Republic for Citizens of Uzbekistan Involved in Terrorist Activities,” AKIpress, March 29, 2023, https://svodka.akipress.org/news:1890421.
[44] “In 2022, the State Committee for National Security Detained A Woman With 100 Passports of Citizens of Kyrgyzstan Before Flying to Istanbul – Details,” Turmush, June 26, 2023, https://www.turmush.kg/ru/news:1945326.
[45] Mehrofarin Najibi, “Prosecutor General: 97 People Were Extradited to Tajikistan Last Year,” Asia-Plus, March 29, 2023, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230329/genprokuror-v-2022-godu-97-chelovek-ekstradirovani-v-tadzhikistan.
[46] “Top Tajik Security Officer Killed In Shoot-Out Along Afghan Border, Sources Say,” Radio Free Europe, April 28, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-security-officer-killed-shoot-out-afghan-border/32383606.html.
[47] Sakhi Khalid, “2 Taliban Members Among 3 Afghan Drug Traffickers Killed by Tajik Border Forces,” Hasht-e-Subh, February 26, 2023, https://8am.media/eng/2023/02/26/2-taliban-members-among-3-afghan-drug-traffickers-killed-tajik-border-forces/.
[48] Svenja Petersen, “Perspectives: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Building Up for Another Potential Round of Fighting,” Eurasianet, August 28, 2023, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan-building-up-for-another-potential-round-of-fighting.
[49] US CENTCOM Commander Erik Kurilla made another passing reference to Turkmenistani radicals in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2023 when he mentioned meeting radicals from Turkmenistan (amongst 16 other countries) during a visit to the al-Roj camp in Syria. See https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kurilla_SASC_Posture_Final_141200March2023.pdf.
[50] “Three Uzbek Citizens Fell Under the Influence of Terrorist Recruiters on Social Networks. They Were Preparing to Go to Syria to Participate in Hostilities,” Podrobno.uz, October 19, 2023, https://podrobno.uz/cat/proisshestviya/troe-uzbekistantsev-popali-pod-vliyanie-verbovshchikov-terroristov-v-sotssetyakh-oni-gotovilis-vyekh/; “Members of a Secret Group Who Tried to Leave for Syria Were Captured,” Daryo, October 6, 2023, https://daryo.uz/2023/10/06/namanganda-suriyaga-chiqib-ketishga-uringan-yashirin-guruh-azolari-qolga-olindi.
[51] “A Citizen of Uzbekistan, One of the Leaders of the Terrorist Group Katibat al-Imam Bukhari, Was Killed in Syria,” Podrobno.uz, September 7, 2023, https://podrobno-uz.translate.goog/cat/proisshestviya/v-sirii-ubit-grazhdanin-uzbekistana-yavlyavshiysya-odnim-iz-liderov-terroristicheskoy-gruppirovki-ka/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp/.
[52] The last reported attack in Xinjiang was in 2016, and the Chinese authorities have stopped referring publicly to the volumes of detentions on accusations of extremism in the region.
[53] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.
[54] Ibid.
[55] United Nations Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.
[56] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2610 (2021) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2023/549, July 25, 2023, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/189/74/PDF/N2318974.pdf?OpenElement.
[57] The group’s online site Muhsinlar is still readily accessible, publishing materials including videos of its activities in Syria for the most part (much less in Afghanistan), while its X/Twitter channel Islam Ovozi is also still accessible though less active.
[58] Christian Jokinen, “’Terrorist Intent’: How Finland’s Justice System Struggles to Tackle Terrorism Offenders,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 16, No. 14 (2018), https://jamestown.org/program/terrorist-intent-how-finlands-justice-system-struggles-to-tackle-terrorism-offenders/.
[59] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.
