Countering Right-Wing Extremism in Australia: Key Challenges and the Role of Masculinity
This article explores contemporary approaches to addressing the (re)emergence of right-wing extremism in Australia. It provides a broad overview of the diversity of right-wing extremism, something not commonly understood, before exploring the challenges of calibrating a policy infrastructure better suited to engaging minority communities than the majority culture. The article asserts the utility of applying a masculinity lens to understand recruitment by right-wing extremists and to assist in the development of alternative narratives and a whole-of-government approach.
Introduction
Challenging right-wing extremism typically provides a different set of challenges for policymakers and practitioners alike. Right-wing extremism is defined by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) as “the support for violence to achieve political outcomes relating to ideologies, including, but not limited to, white supremacism and neo-Nazism”.[1] This support may be both subtle and overt and may take different forms. However, it is typically majoritarian in nature, often tying into normative attitudes and myths about the nation, including who belongs, key values, and perceived threats and enemies.
Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programmes (in Australia a countering violent extremism [CVE] paradigm is used) are typically preoccupied with engaging and building trust with minority communities to identify those at the margins, and either assisting in disengagement or disrupting their plans. Yet, as is increasingly the case in Western contexts, the question arises as to what to do when the extremist or terrorist is ‘one of us’. More specifically, what steps can be taken to address right-wing extremism when racist, anti-migration, misogynistic, anti-LGBTQIA+ and anti-Semitic messaging intersects with the views of sizeable elements of the wider Australian population? How do we reach those most likely to be drawn into the orbit of right-wing extremism to prevent them from becoming radicalised and potentially harming others?
This article commences by providing relevant context on right-wing extremism (also often referred to as the ‘extreme right’) in Australia, before examining contemporary responses to their emergence across the legislative and policy domains, including responsibility for disengagement programmes. It becomes clear that differences exist in challenging right-wing and Salafi-jihadist extremism, the latter of which has predominated.
The article asserts that the concept of masculinities has significant promise in reaching those ‘angry men’ most likely to be drawn to violent extremism across the political and religious spectrum. The article explores how right-wing extremist movements target manhood and emotional drivers including anger, resentment, humiliation and shame in their narrative messaging, and how this resonates with some young men. Drawing upon a significant body of empirical work, it asserts the utility of foregrounding masculinity in the development of both alternative narratives and a whole-of-government approach.
Context
Right-wing extremism in Australia has grown and evolved over the past decade. Emboldened by international developments, including the election of former United States President Donald Trump in 2016, a collection of relatively unsophisticated, yet menacing ‘patriots’ movements’ and ‘Proud Boy’ copycats[2] has since indigenised and become more sophisticated threat actors.
These movements seek to build a mass movement with the catch cry “Australia for the white man” and to utilise online spaces for recruitment and action. In the post-pandemic environment, they are developing a uniquely Australian brand of right-wing extremism, fusing online activism with public protests deploying extreme right symbology, narrative messaging and, most importantly, masculinity. Physical training and combat sports are an important element of their group identity, and these protest marches consist entirely of men seeking to project physical strength.[3]
Groups such as the National Socialist Network (NSN) and their proxy, the European Australian Movement, consist of angry young white men, most of whom remain masked and will not show their faces or reveal their identities. The capacity for violence by Australian right-wing extremists has been well established. A member of the True Blue Crew, an early patriot movement, Philip Galea remains imprisoned for a terror plot targeting the Victorian Trades Hall in Carlton, Melbourne.[4] The leader of the NSN Thomas Sewell has been prosecuted twice for assaults related to activities he was conducting as a member of the NSN.[5] The violence, explicit and implicit, in NSN rhetoric has deep links to the National Socialist Movement and the Holocaust. It is known that Christchurch terrorist Brenton Tarrant had contacted the Lad’s Society (a progenitor to the NSN), praising their activism, though their attempts to recruit him were unsuccessful.[6]
These developments have paralleled the existence of right-wing extremist movements amongst some second- and third-generation Australians, for whom a continuation and evolution of extremist right politics serve as a consolidating and organising feature of their communal identity. These cases have included Croatian ultra-nationalists[7] drawing upon Ustaše fascist symbology, some in Greek communities being linked to the Golden Dawn[8] fascist movement, Serbian ultra-nationalists[9] and Indian Hindu nationalism.[10] Most recently, extreme right ultra-nationalist activists aligned with the Vladimir Putin regime, including “Aussie Cossack” Simeon Boikov, allegedly launched a campaign of targeted hate and harassment of the Ukrainian ambassador in Australia.[11] Notwithstanding the violent rhetoric of these groups and their aspirations for their homeland, these are of secondary concern to the emergence of a new manifestation of right-wing extremism, most clearly evident in the new Australian neo-Nazi groups.
CVE: Executive Structures and Responsibilities
Governmental efforts to address violent extremism cover both the federal and state government levels, and rely on strong communication between them, as well as on work with the private sector and communities. In 2022, the Australian government released the document, Safeguarding Our Community Together: Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022.[12] The precise (and most up-to-date) dimensions of the relationships are spelt out in the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee’s National Counter-Terrorism Plan: 5th Edition 2024 document.[13] It focuses on four key areas of prevention (under which CVE falls), preparedness, response and recovery.
The overarching efforts of the Australian government in CVE are spelt out as follows:
- Support diversion of individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists;
- Build awareness and resilience of communities to violent extremism;
- Rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremists, including those who have returned to Australia from overseas conflict zones;
- Prevent the exploitation of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists;
- Provide positive, alternative narratives to build the resilience of individuals vulnerable to extremist messaging; and
- Support and invest in measures to strengthen social cohesion to mitigate the social impacts of violent extremism.[14]
Federally, security agencies fall within the remit of the Attorney-General’s Department, whilst the Department of Home Affairs houses the Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination. State Departments of Justice typically enact CVE legislation and policies, whilst federal and state police agencies enforce the law, including in the state of New South Wales (NSW). The law here refers to the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW), which aims to “provide for the extended supervisor of certain offenders posing an unacceptable risk of committing serious terrorism offences so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community”.[15]
The Federal Department of Home Affairs focuses on four core areas, namely, “building strength in diversity and social participation”, addressing societal drivers to violent extremism, “early intervention, disengagement and reintegration”, working with communities to identify individuals who may be vulnerable, targeted work with vulnerable communities and institutions including training packages, and “addressing terrorist propaganda online”.[16]
A core element of this interconnected ‘prevention’ approach is the Safe and Together Community Grants Program, which engages and “funds communities to deliver activities and programmes to support, at the earliest possible state, individuals who may be vulnerable to developing violent extremist views and behaviours”.[17]
Another is the High-Risk Rehabilitation and Reintegration (HRRR) Program, which involves work between the federal and state governments to “deliver high-risk rehabilitation and reintegration services for high-risk violent extremists in custody and the community”.[18] Intervention programmes are based on a highly calibrated approach to suit the circumstances of each individual. Family members, friends, community leaders and other trusted associates often play a role in these programmes, alongside the provision of a range of services. These may include psychological support, mentoring, education and employment support.
These programmes have traditionally been calibrated at Australian Muslim communities. They have, over the years, been condemned by Muslim community activists as some form of clandestine attempt to surveil and steer their communities. The question, however, is, how are they reaching young white men drawn to right-wing extremist movements espousing violent extremist ideas and language?
Preventing and Countering Right-Wing Extremism: The Role of Masculinities
A key element of addressing this question has been overlooked in many P/CVE approaches for years. Yet, it cuts across the religious and political spectrum, targeting the core demographic attracted to violent extremism: angry men. Violent extremist recruitment narratives specifically target anger and associated shame, humiliation and resentments amongst men.[19] How can the use of masculinities as a recruitment mechanism by right-wing extremists be challenged, and what alternative narratives can be developed?
The concept of masculinity, understood here as “the social construction of what it is to be a man”,[20] invites us to view actors who have been cast in the public imagination as inherently malevolent and fanatical as both human and subject to social processes. This is possible irrespective of where they are situated on the political or religious spectrum.
Masculinity defines the social expectations of manhood and the social structuring of hierarchies based on the privileging of what is considered the masculine and the devaluation of that which is considered feminine. The participants in violent extremist groups are most often men, but beyond this, such groups’ origins, ideologies, internal processes and means of recruitment are tied in powerful ways to masculinity.[21] That is, they are tied to the political, cultural and economic relations of many men’s lives, to influential ideologies about men and gender, and to narratives about men’s roles and positions in society.
As men turn online and find communities of likeminded actors who they may never otherwise have encountered face to face, we have witnessed the formation of an online ecosystem[22] sometimes referred to as ‘the manosphere’, which consists of a variety of actors from men’s rights groups to misogynistic influencers and involuntary celibates, or ‘incels’. The manosphere is founded not only upon the logic of misogyny and anti-feminism, but on male supremacy, an ideological current that seeks the restoration of male power and the re-domestication of women.[23] Terror attacks from extremist actors associated with constituent elements of the manosphere, including incels, who often overlap with right-wing extremist beliefs including racial hierarchies, have spread globally.[24] Participation in manosphere groups is driven by a deeply visceral emotional response to social change amongst those men who do not perceive themselves to be doing well. This is ably exploited by extremists and anti-women grifters, such as misogynistic influencer Andrew Tate and the like.
The core drivers of anger are disempowerment and associated feelings of shame, humiliation and grief resulting from unfairness, injury and frustration.[25] Research demonstrates the gap between expected and actual trajectories and a process of shattering.[26] This can result in the search for an alternate source of meaning, where suffering makes sense.
The search ties directly into hatred, resentment, blame, the desire to hurt and punish, avenge perceived wrongs and reclaim a subordinated manhood. This phenomenon used to be limited to younger men. However, we are increasingly seeing a cohort of radicalised and angry men and, more recently, women, in middle age.[27] Consequently, we are seeing status frustration combined with a sense of nostalgia for a time and place where men were successful, were the head of the household, and had a pathway toward a guaranteed upward economic and social trajectory.
This is precisely what extremist narratives target. Like other forms of extremism, including Salafi-jihadism,[28] the emotional pitch of right-wing extremist messaging is highly calibrated and framed to capture anger. Anger is primarily personal, but can be mobilised toward societal issues and, indeed, can play a role in achieving positive social change. However, in relation to right-wing extremism, the opposite is the case.
It helps to understand what drives anger to understand the success of right-wing extremist groups in tapping into it. Our research interviews with 40 Australian men[29] revealed that over half experienced anger at least weekly, with over three quarters experiencing anger at least monthly. Over half of interviewees stated that being slighted by others drives their anger. Over half also linked their anger to a deficit of some sort, including a lack of ability or control. However, noting the above, just over a third of the men interviewed discussed wider societal injustice as driving their anger. Hatred linked to anger, whilst rejected by the majority, was experienced by almost half of the respondents, due to an experience of personal injustice or maltreatment by another. This is critical. A sense of having been mistreated or slighted is a core mobilising element for the attraction to extremist narratives which make sense of these complex emotions.
A Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Analysis and a discourse analysis reveal that anger and hatred are critical and central to the messaging and narratives of violent extremist and terrorist groups. Such groups are also adept at framing violence through a defensive, rather than offensive, lens, asserting that any attack, no matter how violent, is righteous and just.[30]
How Can Right-Wing Extremist Narratives be Challenged?
The concept of masculinities in its application to P/CVE brings relationships of power and emotion to the fore, and assists us in understanding responses to a lack of respect, recognition and perceived disempowerment, resulting in shame, humiliation, resentment and hate. Masculinities encourage us to look at the man, his social trajectory and emotional drivers. They can help us identify the otherwise invisible.
Efforts to address radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism must address the emotional drivers of radicalisation and, to be sustainable, must be across the whole of government, from economic reform and social services to education and employment. This has two implications.
First, it is critical that governments and practitioners work to develop alternative narratives of manhood that directly undermine the hyper-masculinised conception of manhood. Counter-narrative messaging – put simply, telling someone they are wrong or at risk of ending up in trouble – can be counterproductive. Alternative narratives are an important alternative approach that emphasise the positive possibilities of engaging in wider society to build an upward social trajectory, and can go hand in hand with positive education that emphasises the development of healthy and prosocial masculinity.[31]
Such approaches emphasise core values and principles as well as critical thinking, which act to inhibit the potential of right-wing extremists’ emotionally laden extremist messaging to gain traction. The most effective alternative narrative programmes appear to be grassroots pilot programmes that incorporate alternative messaging into wider resilience and capacity-building programmes, which include education and vocational and social work workshops.
This logically ties into the second implication – the requirement of a whole-of-government approach to addressing the (re)emergence of right-wing extremism. This includes calibrating services to reach those who may be susceptible to right-wing extremist messaging, ranging from economic reform and social services through to building individualised education and employment pathways. It also requires developing a reinvigorated conception of classical citizenship,[32] moving from the rights-based claim-making based on grievances that has become predominant in Western societies, to instilling a sense of societal obligation and responsibility in young people which will assist in developing resilience to narratives emphasising victimhood.[33]
Conclusion
The emergence of right-wing extremism is indicative of and embedded in a wider set of economic, political and social challenges. Right-wing extremism in Australia remains, for the moment, confined to several dozen particularly active angry young men seeking to project an image of hyper-masculine strength and to grow a mass movement. The very real danger of right-wing extremist terrorism from an individual or a group at the fringe of these movements persists.
It is in this attempt to appeal to men at the margins and to mobilise masculinity as a recruitment mechanism that right-wing extremism can be most effectively countered. The use of alternative narratives and a whole-of-government approach to develop upward social trajectories has the capacity to deprive the extreme right of the political oxygen and, most critically, the anger that they rely upon.
About The Author
Associate Professor Josh Roose specialises in the study of political and religious violent extremist ideologies and terrorism at Deakin University. He has advised local, state and federal governments and law enforcement agencies in Australia, presented his work to international bodies including the United Nations, NATO and the Nordic Network on Masculinities and Violent Extremism, and been cited in a range of international media outlets including The New York Times, BBC, The Washington Post and The Straits Times. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Sara Kurfess on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission to the Inquiry into Extremist Movements and Radicalisation in Australia (Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 2021), p. 3.
[2] Michael McGowan, “Australian White Nationalists Reveal Plans to Recruit ‘Disgruntled, White Male Population,” The Guardian, November 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/12/australian-white-nationalists-reveal-plans-to-recruit-disgruntled-white-male-population.
[3] Nick McKenzie and Joel Tozer, “From Kickboxing to Adolf Hitler: The Neo-Nazi Plan to Recruit Angry Young Men,” The Age, August 21, 2021, https://www.theage.com.au/national/from-kickboxing-to-adolf-hitler-the-neo-nazi-plan-to-recruit-angry-young-men-20210817-p58jfq.html.
[4] CDPP v. Galea, 750 Supreme Court of Victoria (2020).
[5] Kristian Silva, “Neo-Nazi Thomas Sewell Spared Jail Over ‘Sickening’ Assault on Security Guard,” ABC News, January 12, 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-01-12/sewell-sentence-assault-nine-neo-nazi-white-supremacist/101847392; Kristian Silva, “Prosecutor Seeks Jail for Neo-Nazis Who Attacked Hikers in Victorian Bush,” ABC News, March 22, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-22/neo-nazi-court-appeal-thomas-sewell-jacob-hersant/103619202.
[6] Graham Macklin, “The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2019), pp. 24-25.
[7] Drew Cottle and Angela Keys, “Fascism in Exile: Ustasha-Linked Organisations in Australia,” in Histories of Fascism and Anti-Fascism in Australia, eds. Evan Smith, Jayne Persian and Vashti Jane Fox (London: Routledge, 2023), pp. 115-139.
[8] Michael Safi, “Golden Dawn: Australian Branch of Far-Right Greek Party Raises Cash,” The Guardian, September 29, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/golden-dawn-australian-branch-of-far-right-greek-party-raises-cash.
[9] J. Elder, “Divided We Fall,” The Age, August 21, 2011.
[10] Goldie Osuri, “Transnational Bio/Necropolitics: Hindutva and Its Avatars (Australia/India),” Somatechnics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011), pp.138-160.
[11] Jessica Bahr and Tom Canetti, “Australian YouTuber Reported to Police by Ukrainian Ambassador Over Alleged ‘Harassment Campaign’,” SBS News, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australian-youtuber-reported-to-police-by-ukrainian-ambassador-over-alleged-harassment-campaign/niawn7hp2.
[12] Australian Government, Safeguarding Our Community Together: Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2022 (Canberra: Department of Home Affairs, 2022).
[13] Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, National Counter-Terrorism Plan: 5th edition 2024 (Canberra: Department of Home Affairs, 2024).
[14] Ibid., p. 19
[15] New South Wales Government, Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 No. 68, https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2017-068.
[16] Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, “Countering Violent Extremism,” https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-extremism-and-terrorism/countering-violent-extremism-(cve).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Intervention Programs,” https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-extremism-and-terrorism/cve-intervention-programs.
[19] Joshua M. Roose et al., Masculinity and Violent Extremism (London: Palgrave, 2022).
[20] Tristan S. Bridges and Michael Kimmel, “Engaging Men in the United States: Soft Essentialism and the Obstacles to Coherent Initiatives in Education and Family Policy,” in Men and Masculinities Around the World: Transforming Men’s Practices (New York: Palgrave Macmillan New York, 2011), pp. 159-173.
[21] Roose et al., Masculinity and Violent Extremism.
[22] Manoel Horta Ribeiro et al., “The Evolution of the Manosphere Across the Web,” in Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2021), pp. 196-207.
[23] Joshua M. Roose and Joana Cook, “Supreme Men, Subjected Women: Gender Inequality and Violence in Jihadist, Far Right and Male Supremacist Ideologies,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2104681.
[24] Ibid. See also Raffaello Pantucci and Kyler Ong, “Incels and terrorism: Sexual Deprivation As Security Threat,” RSIS Commentary, No. 176 (2020), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/incels-and-terrorism-sexual-deprivation-as-security-threat/.
[25] Roose et al., Masculinity and Violent Extremism, pp. 112-117.
[26] Isaac A. Friedman, “Burnout in Teachers: Shattered Dreams of Impeccable Professional Performance,” Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 56, No, 5 (2000), pp. 595-606.
[27] Michael Jensen, “The Link Between Age and Extremism,” Generations Today, March 15, 2023, https://generations.asaging.org/link-between-age-and-extremism.
[28] Joshua M. Roose, Political Islam and Masculinity: Muslim Men in Australia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan New York, 2016).
[29] Joshua M. Roose et al., Challenging the Use of Masculinity as a Recruitment Mechanism to Violent Extremism (Victoria: Department of Justice and Community Safety, 2022).
[30] Ibid.
[31] Joshua M. Roose, Vivian Gerrand and Shahram Akbarzadeh, Rapid Evidence Assessment on Alternative Narratives (Melbourne: Deakin University, 2021).
[32] T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in Inequality and Society: Social Science Perspectives on Social Stratification, eds. Jeff Manza and Michael Sauder (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), pp. 148-154.
[33] Joshua M. Roose, The New Demagogues: Religion, Masculinity and the Populist Epoch (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 192-208.
