Decentralising and Coordinating P/CVE through the Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub)
A recently established online platform called the Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub) has come to play an important role as the country sees out the first iteration of its national action plan to prevent violent extremism (known as RAN PE). Among several functions, the national counterterrorism agency (BNPT) platform serves as an instrument to collate and share data regarding P/CVE activities underway throughout Indonesia, thereby encouraging local initiatives and facilitating coordination. In collaboration with the EU Delegation to Indonesia, a series of provincial workshops was organised in mid-2023, which sought to increase platform uptake among regional stakeholders and learn more about local P/CVE policies and practices. While ongoing challenges include differing perceived priorities and hesitant buy-in from regional governments, platforms such as the BNPT I-KHub can be an effective tool for the implementation of the national action plan and management of its myriad activities.
Introduction
Bolstered by legislative updates in mid-2018, Indonesia’s counterterrorism policing has been highly effective over the past six years. Over 1,600 suspects were arrested and charged with terrorism offences during this period, and the nation has recorded an almost total decrease in attacks, according to the 2023 I-KHub National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) Outlook. In 2022 alone, police thwarted ten violent extremist plots, surely saving several lives while preventing the malignant side effects of terrorism.
Yet recent data suggests a concerning level of sympathy among young people for extremist causes and discriminatory views of perceived out-groups. The polling firm, Lembaga Survei Indonesia, found in 2023 that 6% of Indonesians under 40 support the use of organised violence to defend their religion, while a considerable 36% expressed discontent towards other religious faiths.[1] Successful policing has clearly blunted threats in the near-term, but such findings confirm the ongoing importance of more patient prevention initiatives.
With this longer view in mind, the government issued a presidential regulation in 2021 to enact a National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism (RAN PE), following advocacy and planning from the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and partners.[2] Among a raft of processes and intentions, the plan sought to improve coordination among stakeholders and encourage regional ownership of prevention strategies. This article will assess broad progress toward these goals, and particularly the role played by an innovative new online platform called the Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub).[3] Despite persistent challenges, the Indonesian government is constructing highly promising P/CVE infrastructure that can produce long-term benefits, if enthusiasm and resources are mobilised and sustained over the coming years.
Local Ownership and Coordination
International consensus has now largely formed that P/CVE is most effective when programming and activities are decentralised, so efforts can focus on distinct contextual factors and seek local solutions.[4] While drivers for violent extremism certainly operate at societal and global levels, more specific root causes are found in municipalities, communities, and the associated experiences of people attracted to extremist narratives. For P/CVE initiatives, this ideally requires locally relevant programme design and management, as well as buy-in from subnational authorities. But as extremist threats are often ambiguous and/or obscure, prevention plans can struggle to find prominence on regional lists of priorities.
Another key feature of P/CVE strategy is the fundamentally multi-stakeholder composition of its activities.[5] Security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies are clearly required to thwart plots, dismantle networks, and ensure public safety, but upstream prevention efforts involve a diverse range of actors, including religious scholars, educators, community leaders, social service providers, mental health professionals, youth workers, and even the private sector, such as business associations.[6] This is often called a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to P/CVE, which was a central recommendation from the United Nations in its mid-2010s global call for nations to develop national P/CVE action plans tailored to their particular needs and contexts.[7] However, establishing effective coordination mechanisms among often-disparate actors is not easy, especially in large nations with immense institutions, ample space for local autonomy, and multiple levels of administration.
National Action Planning
Overcoming the challenge of coordination and ensuring programmatic relevance were among the central themes of Indonesia’s new P/CVE strategy, which was officially coined the National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (RAN PE – Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan Dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Yang Mengarah Pada Terorisme).[8] Instituted in 2021 but covering an initial four-year period of 2020-2024, RAN PE sought to target the drivers of violent extremism but also aimed to build community resilience and undermine the influence of violent extremist narratives more generally. The comprehensive plan involves three pillars:
- Pillar One: Prevention (preparedness, counter-radicalisation, and de-radicalisation).
- Pillar Two: Law enforcement, protection of witnesses and victims, and strengthening of the national legislative framework.
- Pillar Three: International partnerships and cooperation.
Each pillar includes several sub-focus points outlined with an acknowledged problem, response strategy, associated actions, intended output, and expected results, allowing for a structured monitoring and evaluation logframe system. Almost 50 government institutions were identified as requiring involvement in the plan, while ministries, agencies, and local government authorities are expected to work together to implement the RAN PE actions, with community participation as and when necessary. A RAN PE Secretariat was established to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation process, both at the national and local levels.[9]
As of July 2024, focus group discussions among key government stakeholders and civil society representatives were underway to seek refinements and continuity towards the next phase of RAN PE, which is expected to be detailed in a subsequent regulation in 2025, once the incoming presidential administration is in place. Among the likely updates appears to be further emphasis on provincial strategies and enhanced local ownership of context-relevant programming.[10]
Promoting Local Ownership
Regional P/CVE action plans (Rencana Aksi Daerah) or RAD PE have been developing throughout the national plan’s inception period but have not necessarily emerged naturally among the nation’s 38 provincial governments. In the late 1990s, Indonesia passed legislation that would devolve considerable administrative authority toward regional levels of government to promote democratic processes and prevent secessionism.[11] However, certain areas of governance remained under the purview of the central government, including security and defence.[12] P/CVE may be a multi-disciplinary endeavour involving both security and social programmes, but over the past 20 years addressing terrorism has largely been viewed by regional governments as the remit of key institutions in Jakarta, such as the National Police (Polri), National Intelligence (BIN), and the BNPT. That said, roles such as social conflict prevention, nation-building and resilience, and fostering community harmony, which are closely related to P/CVE initiatives, have been outlined as responsibilities shared with local government since 2014.[13]
Under the guidance and encouragement of RAN PE, this dynamic has been evolving, and several of Indonesia’s 38 provinces have now established their own RAD PE, including East Java, Central Java, West Java, Banten, Aceh, Lampung, South Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi. Others, such as South Sulawesi, have regional action plans currently in development. While notably encouraging, the regional strategies generally remain works in progress. Some appear to be quite similar in design and focus to the national action plan, suggesting that suboptimal assessments were undertaken regarding specific threats, needs, and contextual relevance. In other cases, P/CVE-focused civil society organisations were the main driving force behind the respective strategy, which may adversely impact provincial government ownership and subsequent compliance for implementing the stated plan.[14]
Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub)
An innovative instrument that has built an increasingly important role in the implementation of RAN PE is an online platform called the Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub), which was officially launched in October 2020. Developed by the BNPT, the I-KHub was initially intended to coordinate provincial P/CVE stakeholders from across the archipelago and encourage information exchange among practitioners. Soon, the platform grew into the official reporting mechanism for RAN PE progress and now has three established areas of work:
- Knowledge Management: Identifying, capturing, and disseminating data worthy for policy making process, valuable insight, best practices, and lessons learned from partnerships and collaborations.
- Platform Management: Technical site operation, security, aggregation, and organisation of content and users.
- Partnership Management: Coordinating stakeholder input, engagement, and promoting active participation.
From late 2022, the BNPT I-KHub has partnered with the European Union Delegation to Indonesia to promote registration and uptake of the platform in the regions, while at the same time mapping current threats, ongoing grassroots activity, and strengthening local approaches through coordination. The engagement has been an important aspect of the EU’s Counterterrorism and P/CVE Activity Plan for Indonesia and the Region (2020-2024).[15] Supported by the EU project, Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA), the I-KHub team held operational workshops in five provincial capitals in 2023, and have since followed up with five more in 2024.
The 2023 workshop series visited Surabaya (East Java), Semarang (Central Java), Bandung (West Java), Pekanbaru (Riau), and Ambon (Maluku) between June and December. Participants included representatives of the Directorate of National and Political Unity (known by its Bahasa Indonesia abbreviation Bakesbangpol), which is an entity of the Ministry of Home Affairs tasked with coordinating and implementing certain central government activities at the regional level, including security. The second group were local members of the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forums (FKPT), which is a BNPT-initiated monitoring and engagement network with chapters present in most of the nation’s 38 provinces. Finally, P/CVE stakeholders from local civil society organisations (CSOs) joined the activities and conversations.
Each workshop also involved a panel of practitioners and policy makers from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain, who discussed municipal-level P/CVE programming in their nations, including systems of coordination among stakeholders – vertically between central government and local authorities, and horizontally among various working level programme staff and front-line actors. Despite the obvious differences in context, it was remarkable how similar the challenges were between the EU Member States and Indonesian provinces regarding the implementation of initiatives – particularly around the management of tasks and input, the sharing of information, and the often-differing perspectives of those involved.
Findings and Discussion
The principal challenges to implementing P/CVE programmes and policies in the five Indonesian provinces were found to be variations in the priorities of central and local government, coordination snags, and resource constraints. During one discussion, a vice-governor from Java remarked that P/CVE policy and programming was generally considered an important yet non-urgent task for local governments, who remain focused on what they see as more pressing public matters, such as ensuring health services, alleviating poverty, and coping with housing issues.[16]
This hierarchy of priorities impacts budgeting, human resources, and the consideration allocated for P/CVE efforts at the local level. For instance, Bakesbangpol currently has a single full-time officer working on P/CVE in one of the provinces this author and colleagues visited (with a population of a medium-sized country). This example also highlights the issue of geography and scope of the potential problems. Central Java alone has over 35 cities and regencies, yet a majority of programmes are centred in the city of Surakarta (Solo), with less attention paid to other vulnerable pockets of the province, as identified in I-KHub mapping studies. Elsewhere, certain remote communities may also prove physically difficult to reach, inhibiting the frequency of interactions and monitoring.[17]
While Bakesbangpol appeared to be rather stretched in some provinces with regard to P/CVE management and activities, the agency conducts some valuable training for security and engagement at the local level. Examples include annual coordination meetings on security updates with other local agencies and engagement with different government-established civil society-based forums such as Forum Kewaspadaan Dini Masyarakat (FKDM).[18] In Java, workshop participants stressed the importance of promoting ‘local wisdom’ (kearifan lokal) in holistic prevention efforts, which embody fundamental cultural values such as respect for the elderly, cooperation, and mutual assistance activities (gotong royong).
Given the tentative buy-in among busy provincial authorities, the I-KHub team has noted the similarity between the current P/CVE ambitions and well-established mechanisms for mitigating social conflict in the regions. These include the Community Awareness Forum (Forum Kewaspadaan Dini Masyarakat, FKDM) mentioned above, but also the Religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, FKUB), and National Intermingling Forum (Forum Pembauran Kebangsaan, FPK). P/CVE-relevant initiatives can and have been ‘piggy backing’ on the instilled nature of these social conflict-focused forums in several regions, which may also help to desensitise activities, as engagements branded with terms like ‘extremism’ can be divisive and stigma-inducing.[19]
This method emerged during the Maluku workshop in Ambon, as well as subsequent meetings in West Nusa Tenggara, Riau Islands, and DKI Jakarta.[20] Similar notes were again made during the RAN PE focus group discussions in mid-2024, as participants stressed the need to avoid stigmatisation and adhere to a rights-based human security approach for the second phase of RAN PE.[21]
Another notably positive aspect of regional P/CVE observed during the I-KHub workshops was the proactive efforts of civil society organisations (CSOs) and the experience and knowledge accrued by many of their practitioners. According to last year’s K-Hub Community Outlook[22], 81 CSOs have engaged with more than 255 PVE programmes across Indonesia, over the preceding two years alone. The myriad programmes cover both ends of the P/CVE spectrum, from upstream youth-focused prevention activities to reintegration interventions for former extremists. Examples include school co-curricular initiatives and peace empowerment in Central Java; teacher and scout-leader schemes in West Java; and disengagement-focused former-terrorist associations in East Java.
Recognising the key role non-state organisations now play, BNPT has established the National Partnership Forum (Forum Kemitraan Nasional) and Thematic Working Group (Pokja Tematis) with members representing CSOs, the private sector (which in the next phase will include philanthropy) and higher education institutions. Seeking additional and ongoing support for their efforts will be crucial for the decentralised vision of the national PVE action plan. Another important set of entities is known as Integrated Teams (Tim Terpadu), which generally cover certain thematic areas. One CSO participant highlighted the value of a deradicalisation integrated team in Central Java, which comprises various stakeholders who coordinate to facilitate prisoner reintegration processes, for example.[23]
A further promising finding was that the BNPT-established FKPT prevention forums are becoming an impactful link between stakeholders, while fulfilling other important functions. For example, FKPT conducts provincial annual threat assessments, contributing to BNPT’s national radicalisation potential index, and directs multi-stakeholder practitioner meetings in some provinces. One activity during the workshop series saw FKPT, CSO, and local government participants collaboratively mapping threat assessments and ongoing P/CVE programmes across their provinces. The FKPT and CSO representatives displayed particularly broad knowledge of the regional risks and established initiatives while adding convincing assessments of the associated requirements and deficiencies.
Again, the primary challenges were reportedly coordination and resource constraints, which also impact each other in different ways. Funding shortfalls will often leave programming gaps but similar and/or overlapping initiatives can exacerbate the problem through resource inefficiency. One participant highlighted that former prisoners in their province have received support from different (but unconnected) P/CVE interventions, complicating programme evaluation and possibly even risking counterproductive outcomes.[24] Interventions from the national government are now underway to tackle the issue of resource constraints, which include several guidelines on P/CVE budgeting at local levels.[25]
Public sector budgets have been adversely impacted in many areas following the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic woes felt around the world, but coordination challenges can be overcome or at least mitigated with more effective systems in place. Avenues such as the I-KHub platform can potentially fulfil this need by connecting P/CVE practitioners and cataloguing ongoing projects, which should facilitate information sharing and work towards avoiding programme overlap and repetition.
Ideally, these connections will also induce regular meetings among key stakeholders. Annual or bi-annual update discussions (online or in-person) between FKPT, local government agencies and relevant civil society organisations would improve P/CVE communication, provide risk-landscape updates, and potentially generate fresh ideas. Greater awareness of the complete P/CVE picture in Indonesia will benefit the diverse range of actors involved, from those directing overall strategy in Jakarta to the small organisations working on grass-root initiatives in communities across the country.
Outlook
Indonesia’s National Police proved the value of patient P/CVE work in mid-2024 with the disbandment of the decades-old terrorist organisation, Jema’ah Islamiyah. The historic announcement in late June 2024 was the culmination of successful investigations and prosecutions over several years, as well as “intensive engagement” between the police counterterrorism unit’s (Densus 88) interlocutors and the extremist group’s leading intellectuals.[26] But while the JI declaration is certainly a P/CVE success story, experts are not ruling out the eventual emergence of splinter groups and/or new generations inspired by their militant forebears.[27]
To be sure, prevention is necessarily a long-term endeavour and needs to be sustained during periods of lulled extremist activity. The I-KHub cannot guarantee maintained enthusiasm among all stakeholders with a role to play in Indonesia’s P/CVE plans, but the platform appears well set to facilitate involvement, collaboration, and cohesion as the nation further develops its all-of-society approach to preventing violent extremism.
About the Author
Cameron Sumpter is Coordinator for Counterterrorism and P/CVE at the EU Project, Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA), which aims to build national security engagement between the EU, its Member States, and several partner nations in the Indo-Pacific region. He is also an Adjunct Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). The views expressed in this article are his own.
Thumbnail photo by Glenn Carstens Peters on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Laporan Survei Nasional: Kekerasan Ekstrem, Toleransi, dan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia (Central Jakarta: Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2023), https://www.lsi.or.id/post/diseminasi-lsi-04-mei-2023.
[2] Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 7/2021 tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan Yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2020-2034 [Presidential Decree No. 7/2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism That Leads to Terrorism 2020-2024].
[3] The author would like to acknowledge the substantial input provided for this article by Mr Prakoso Permono, Research Officer at the BNPT I-KHub, and Mr Khelmy K. Pribadi, Project Coordinator at the BNPT I-KHub.
[4] See for example: Eric Poinsot and Anders Bo Christensen, National Hubs Supporting Local Actors in P/CVE – Practitioners’ Insights (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021), https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-11/ran_national_hubs_supporting_local_actors_in_p-cve_third_112021_en.pdf; Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2020); Judy Korn, “European CVE Strategies from a Practitioner’s Perspective,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 668, No. 1 (2016), pp. 180-197, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716216671888; Eric Rosand, Communities First: A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremism (Washington: The Prevention Project, 2016); Eric Rosand, Emily Winterbotham, Michael Jones, and Franziska Praxl-Tabuchi, A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda (The Prevention Project and Royal United Services Institute, 2018).
[5] See for example: Rositsa Dzhekova, Maximilian Ruf, Sophie Kuijper, Margareta Wetchy, and David Tschop, National and Regional Networks Focusing on P/CVE across the EU (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024); Eric Rosand, “Multi-Disciplinary and Multi-Agency Approaches to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: An Emerging P/CVE Success Story?” Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018), pp. 72-75.
[6] Alush Doda and Marina Mclellan, Promoting a Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism (Skopje: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020); Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, “An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization,” DIIS Report, No. 2015:15 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015); Adrian Cherney, Reem Sweid, Michele Grossman, Alexia Derbas, Kevin Dunn, Clarke Jones, Jason Hartley, and Greg Barton, “Local Service Provision to Counter Violent Extremism: Perspectives, Capabilities and Challenges Arising from an Australian Service Mapping Project,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2018), pp. 187-206.
[7] United Nations General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 2015).
[8] Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 7/2021.
[9] Ibid.
[10] BNPT Focus Group Discussion on RAN PE Phase II, July 2024.
[11] Francis E. Hutchinson, “(De)centralization and the Missing Middle in Indonesia and Malaysia,” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2017), pp. 298-299.
[12] Anwar Nasution, “Government Decentralization Program in Indonesia,” ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 601
(2016), p. 4.
[13] Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 23/2014 tentang Pemerintah Daerah [Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 23/2014 on Local Government].
[14] BNPT Focus Group Discussion on RAN PE Phase II, July 2024.
[15] The EU’s CT-P/CVE Activity Plan for Indonesia and the Region (2020-2024) was developed by the EU External Action Service’s Counterterrorism / Security Expert for Southeast Asia, Marc Vierstraete-Verlinde, who has been stationed at the EU Delegation in Jakarta, Indonesia since 2018.
[16] “Strengthening Local Initiatives in the Prevention of Extremism through I-KHub BNPT,” I-KHub-ESIWA Workshop Series held at Surabaya, Semarang, and Bandung, June 23 – July 1, 2023.
[17] Ibid.
[18] FKDM is governed under the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation Number 46 of 2019 as an organisation for civil society members to build and maintain community awareness regarding security and social problems at local levels.
[19] “Strengthening Local Initiatives in the Prevention of Extremism through I-KHub BNPT,” I-KHub-ESIWA Workshop Series held at Pekanbaru and Maluku, November 26 – December 1, 2023.
[20] Ibid.
[21] BNPT Focus Group Discussion on RAN PE Phase II, July 2024.
[22] K-Hub, “Melacak Dampak Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (OMS) PCVE di Indonesia,” K-Hub PCVE Outlook, No. 1 (2023), https://khub.id/outlook/melacakdampak.
[23] “Strengthening Local Initiatives in the Prevention of Extremism through I-KHub BNPT”, I-KHub-ESIWA Workshop Series held at Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung.)
[24] Ibid.
[25] I-KHub BNPT, “Akselerasi Implementasi RAD PE di Tingkat Daerah,” Indonesia Knowledge Hub Policy Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2022); See also, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia No.15/2023 tentang Pedoman Penyusunan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah Tahun Anggaran 2024 [The Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 15/2023 on the Guidelines for Preparing the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget for the 2024 Fiscal Year].
[26] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah?” IPAC Report, No. 96 (2024), p. 1.
[27] Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “JI’s Decision to Disband Is for Real,” Indonesia at Melbourne, July 31, 2024, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/jis-decision-to-disband-is-for-real/.
