Digital Shadows: Key Trends in Online Extremist Narratives and Activities in 2023
In 2023, online extremism persisted with extremist Islamist and far right extremist (FRE) actors adapting and refining their digital strategies, amidst relaxed moderation across online spaces and mainstream social media platforms. Jihadist groups, particularly the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates, are leveraging a sophisticated and decentralised approach in propagating extremist narratives, combining official and unofficial sources to bypass moderation efforts. Ostensibly, this shift towards interactive and borderline content obscures the line between serious extremist narratives and innocuous postings. Meanwhile, the rise in FRE narratives globally underscores diversification of ideological divides, with an emphasis on reinforcing existing biases and advocating for violence, indicative of a potential escalation in real-world conflicts and ideological confrontations. These narratives, fuelled by political turmoil and societal discord, portray a trend of intensified and diversified extremist ideologies, reflecting a broad spectrum of threats.
Developments Within the Extremist Online Sphere
As digital evolution continues to shape narratives and communities worldwide, online activities by terrorist and extremist actors remain a key threat in counter terrorism assessments. The inception and circulation of extremist narratives, coupled with community activities such as discussions between like-minded parties, burgeoned within platforms ranging from mainstream social media to obscure, underground forums.
In 2023, the digital landscape was impacted by an industry-wide re-evaluation and diminution in moderation resources within the technology sector.[1] The ramifications of this are pivotal, heralding medium- to long-term consequences as extremist factions evolve, capitalising on the dilution of moderation measures, particularly within mainstream social media platforms.[2]
The Survival of Islamist Extremism Online Amidst Ongoing Platform Moderation
In November 2019, a Europol-led purge of jihadist activity on the encrypted messaging platform Telegram marked the beginning of a new push for moderation efforts targeting Islamist extremist content, accounts and groups (CAGs).[3] This push has largely been successful over the past three years,[4] curtailing the online activities and propaganda of jihadists to this day, particularly when compared to the impunity with which they operated prior to moderation efforts before 2019.[5] Most notably, the loss of easy access to Telegram – the core platform favoured by the CAGs following purges on mainstream social media platforms such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and Instagram – has since resulted in significant disruption to their propaganda distribution and the building of online communities.[6] This focus on moderating Telegram continues to this day, with the reported removal of 15,021,951 instances of extremist content and the shutdown of 6,824 channels in 2022.[7] Attempts by jihadist CAGs to recover from these takedowns have shown mixed results, particularly in regions that enjoy less support from established jihadist groups and communities, and that possess higher moderation capabilities, such as South Asia.[8]
However, reports indicate that while the volume of such jihadist CAGs on Telegram has declined, they nonetheless continue to persist through the creation of new private channels backed up by bot automation.[9] Research has shown that despite the significant volume of removal reported in 2022, many new extremist channels were subsequently created, replacing those that were taken down.[10]
Looking beyond Telegram, jihadist communities have a vibrant online ecosystem which is spread across a variety of small, less regulated platforms.[11] Popular encrypted messaging platforms hosting jihadist CAGs include Hoop Messenger, TamTam, Rocket Chat and Element, all of which possess minimal content moderation.[12] Password-protected forums, the platform of choice for jihadist activity prior to the proliferation of mainstream social media and messaging platforms,[13] remain active.[14] Other forums traditionally used by far right extremists have also been co-opted by some users to host jihadist content, as seen in the regular posting of nasheed (Islamic vocal music) threads on 4Chan.[15] Furthermore, while the dark web has been eschewed as a core platform for outreach and propaganda by online jihadists due to its inaccessibility, it is nevertheless used as a repository for past propaganda materials.[16]
Perhaps most concerning amongst these general trends is the realisation that the mainstream social media platforms operated by major tech companies, particularly Facebook, X, Instagram and TikTok,[17] have once again become susceptible to infiltration by jihadist CAGs, despite prior efforts to purge their respective platforms of such content.[18] The factors allowing for such re-entry into these mainstream platforms are manifold, but can largely be divided into two categories: 1) technical expertise allowing for the evasion of automated moderation used by these platforms;[19] and 2) the adoption of borderline content,[20] i.e., radical materials tied to jihadist CAGs that do not violate platform policies and could potentially radicalise consumers.
The above trends point to an ongoing “learning competition” between online platforms seeking to eliminate jihadist CAGs, and the jihadists seeking to bypass such moderation efforts.[21] At the same time, many of these actors do not belong to any particular group, operating as online communities isolated from established organisations. As noted in the following sections, this learning competition involves sophisticated attempts by jihadist CAGs to adapt to the changing online landscape, while at the same time spreading jihadist propaganda and building communities.
Islamic State (IS)
Remaining vs Expanding: An Examination of al-Naba
Official IS online propaganda continues to demonstrate the organisation’s focus on both baqiyah (remaining) and tatamadad (expanding), with a shift towards a balance of both, as opposed to favouring the former over the latter as it did in 2021.[22] This shift is apparent through an analysis of a regular infographic featured in IS’ official weekly newsletter, al-Naba, which highlights attacks conducted in various IS “provinces”. A numerical breakdown of these self-reported attacks according to province is provided in the chart below (Figure 1).
It should be noted that these numbers do not necessarily reflect the full scale of IS attacks conducted across its so-called provinces, as the authors of al-Naba have indicated that the information provided in the newsletter is partial.[24] Rather, this acts as an indicator of where al-Naba’s editorial attention is focused. Viewed through this lens, it is instead apparent that the newsletter’s focus is equally split between attacks within the self-proclaimed Syria-Iraq provinces – indicating the focus on baqiyah – and attacks within the self-declared African provinces – indicating its shifted focus onto tatamadad. This shift was reflected in the editorials provided in the newsletter in 2023, with multiple editorials focused purely on Africa.[25] IS video production has exhibited a similar split in focus: for example, the videos produced by Al-Makatib al-‘Ilaamiyah[26] in January included one footage detailing attacks carried out against Iraqi security forces,[27] and another highlighting the organisation’s campaign in Somalia.[28]
The ideological nuance of this shift towards tatamadad in Africa was reflected in the narratives produced in al-Naba. The editorial of Issue 388 emphasised that Muslims in Africa are continuing the path set by IS in Iraq and Syria, and that IS’ expansion in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo is a “divine reward” for the faith shown by the organisation’s fighters in Syria.[29] In doing so, the editorial tied together the notions of both baqiyah and tatamadad, placing them as mutually reinforcing concepts.
Decentralising Online Propaganda and Reconciling It With the Caliphal Institution
While IS official media has demonstrated a slight shift in focus towards tatamadad, the breakdown of reported attacks and contents of al-Naba indicates that this shift is primarily targeted towards IS activities in Africa. Meanwhile, regions in which IS operations have been suppressed continue to see reduced attention from online IS propaganda, particularly Southeast Asia following the failed 2017 Marawi Siege.[30] However, this has not resulted in a significant reduction in online production and dissemination of IS propaganda related to other provinces, as unofficial regional and local actors have stepped in to fill the gap.[31]
The trend of decentralisation within IS’ online propaganda machine encompasses multiple factors. First, official IS propaganda remains a central pillar of much jihadist CAGs throughout the online sphere; many of the unofficial outlets operate as translators of such material. A key development in this space has been the coalescence in March of numerous such translation entities under a single umbrella coalition named the Fursan al-Tarjuma (Knights of Translation).[32] The group is active across encrypted messaging platforms, particularly Telegram, Rocket Chat and Element.[33] The reach of the group is particularly strong on Rocket Chat, which can be attributed to the established nature of its constituent members, such as the French translation outfit Infos An-Nur (IAN) and the Spanish translation outfit Voice of Al-Andalus (VOA).[34]
Second, unofficial media outfits (Al-Munasirun)[35] have produced their own propaganda content related to a wide range of issues.[36] Many of these pertain to local sociopolitical issues – for example, the Philippines-based Al-Faris Media group (previously known as the East Asia Knights), has produced substantial propaganda focused on the Southeast Asian region, including calls for violence against prominent Southeast Asian political leaders.[37] Some unofficial IS propaganda content has also been produced anonymously, such as the 60-minute documentary titled The End and the Beginning II: The War Hasn’t Started Yet anonymously circulated on Rocket Chat and Telegram.[38] Other unofficial outlets have also experimented with the production of training materials – for example, in May, a channel named “#The_Kitchen” was formed on Rocket Chat to provide guidance on creating homemade explosives, in English and Arabic.[39]
Third, much of the decentralised propaganda machine revolves around online community interactions, rather than traditional production of media. The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)’s research of a major pro-IS Rocket Chat server has shown that users on the server not only actively persuade others to undertake hijrah to IS-controlled “provinces”, but also advise on travelling incognito and evading surveillance measures and border controls.[40] Similarly, many users encourage one another to carry out attacks in their respective areas, sharing training materials on producing homemade weapons and explosives.[41]
Fourth, the decentralisation of IS propaganda has also resulted in increasing sophistication of technical expertise as well as in the masking of proscribed content. The issue of artificial intelligence (AI) automation and chatbots has become a key factor in the learning competition between automated platform moderation and the continued activity of pro-IS CAGs.[42] Meanwhile, the decentralised propaganda machine’s reliance on online communities populated by younger generations of pro-IS supporters has resulted in memes and “terrorposting” making up a significant portion of the propaganda content being circulated today.[43] Much of this content can be considered “borderline” content, making it difficult to distinguish between what is posted ironically and what is posted seriously as part of IS’ cyber jihad.
The above factors point to the complex dynamic between the centrality of the IS caliphal institution and the decentralised propaganda machine. The issue of unsanctioned online communities coming into friction with centralised portions of IS is not new; the notion of “jihadi fanboys” was coined as early as 2015. It denotes how established members of the IS ecosystem use it as a derogative term for these unsanctioned online content producers.[44]
Furthermore, the March 2022 scandal revealing Afaq, a major unofficial pro-IS online foundation, as a fraudulent group, has brought to the forefront issues of potential trust-related scandals.[45] The outgrowth of IS’ decentralised propaganda arms thus conversely runs the risk of highlighting how the once-central IS media production/dissemination hierarchy is diminishing from its prior role as a symbol of the caliphal institution, into the role played by a “paper state”.[46] Yet, at the same time, these unofficial IS media outlets and communities remain reliant on IS Central’s narratives. Furthermore, it seems that IS Central’s strategy has not backed down from its 2014 vision of cyber jihad,[47] and may even come to embrace more of the decentralised nature of the pro-IS online propaganda and community activities emerging within the expanding digital landscape.
Continuation of Trends Surrounding Governance and Identifying Disbelievers
IS propaganda narratives generated by both centralised and decentralised arms of its propaganda machine have continued to push two key trends: 1) establishing the legitimacy of IS governance (tamkin) via “soft” propaganda; and 2) identifying disbelievers (kuffar) via theological and socio-political justifications.
With regard to the former, the soft propaganda continues to take the form of announcements and infographics covering issues unrelated to militancy and extremism. For instance, after the Turkey-Syria earthquake in February 2023, al-Naba included infographics teaching readers disaster response procedures.[48] Such a trend is also reflected in decentralised propaganda production by unofficial outlets. The Al-Saafat channel, which emerged on Telegram and Instagram in February, produces propaganda specifically focused on the wellness and needs of IS-affiliated women detained in refugee/detainee camps. Apart from the usual theological exhortations and sharing of IS media, the channel’s content also includes practical information such as guides on fire safety, cooking and sewing.[49]
With regard to the latter, IS Central has increased its focus on identifying Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates as kuffars in various issues of al-Naba and the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)’s flagship English-language propaganda magazine, the Voice of Khorasan.[50] In this regard, IS Central’s response to its fourth caliph Abu Al-Husayn’s alleged killing by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is instructive. In al-Naba’s 405th issue, IS characterised HTS as a collaborator with Turkish intelligence and apostates of Islam, and promised vengeance against the group.[51] There has also been a steady focus on anti-Israel propaganda in al-Naba as well,[52] with the 377th issue wholly dedicated to a call for violence against Jews worldwide. It dovetails with another key IS narrative concerning the identification and condemnation of taghut (imperialist – implying that the government is a puppet of Western imperialism) governments, particularly the Taliban government in Afghanistan.[53]
Al-Qaeda (AQ)
Following the successful United States (US) drone strike that killed former AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2022, the volume of social media propaganda emanating from Afghanistan has decreased noticeably.[54] This shift in online activity came after an initial surge following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, which saw an increased frequency of Zawahiri’s India-focused videos and propaganda.[55] AQ’s reduced propaganda in Afghanistan could be attributed to the Taliban’s desire to keep a low profile. Specifically, this comes as the Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network, seek to establish international legitimacy amid accusations of harbouring Zawahiri and efforts to conceal evidence of the strike.[56]
However, in the latter half of 2023, the online activities of AQ and its affiliates increased as they capitalised on two contentious and emotionally-charged events to mobilise sympathisers: 1) disrespect for Prophet Muhammad and the Quran following the Quran-burning protests in Denmark and Sweden; and 2) the Israel-Palestine conflict.
First, on August 13, 2023, AQ’s official propaganda arm, Al-Sahab Media, issued calls for revenge against those committing acts of aggression towards the Quran and the Islamic faith.[57] Additionally, they leveraged the historical touchpoint of 9/11 to release a new edition of the magazine, Umma Wahida, dedicated to the 9/11 attacks. This publication described the “next Islamic strike” as not only more sophisticated and impactful but also unpredictable in terms of location, as it may not necessarily target the US.[58]
Second, following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, AQ’s General Command and affiliated groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab expressed their support and called for the complete liberation of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem.[59] The statement issued by AQ’s General Command, in particular, urged all Muslims to take part in the fighting in Gaza, whether physically as fighters, financially or through moral support.[60] Furthermore, it called for attacks on Israelis in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and urged for attacks on American military bases, airports and embassies in Muslim countries.[61]
Responding to AQ’s calls to support the Palestinian cause, a pro-AQ media outlet, Jaysh Al-Malahem Al-Electroni (Electronic Army of Epic Battles), claimed that it had successfully conducted “cyber warfare” against Jewish and European targets.[62] The attack, which they characterised as “a first of its kind”, entailed the dissemination of disinformation through fabricated bomb threat reports at multiple European airports, tourist sites and educational institutions.[63] While not definitively linked, news reports indicate that there have been at least 70 bomb hoaxes at French airports since October 19, 2023.[64] Given the success of this operation in causing widespread disruption, there is a credible possibility that AQ and its affiliates will conduct further disinformation campaigns.
There was no significant Southeast Asian-specific activity on Geo News, the password-protected platform known as AQ’s “propaganda diffusion backbone”. [65] However, ICPVTR has identified pro-AQ users, primarily from Indonesia, disseminating official statements, attack updates and videos from AQ and its affiliated groups predominantly on Facebook. With the recent escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, these pro-AQ users have stepped up their activities, echoing AQ’s call for Muslims to actively participate in the conflict.[66] They justify this as a fardhu ain, or religious obligation, emphasising that all Muslims must defend themselves against aggressors.[67]
Pro-IS Social Media Content on the Upcoming Indonesian Elections
As the February 2024 general election in Indonesia draws near, the pro-IS community on mainstream social media platforms, notably Facebook, has been actively participating in online discussions against the elections and democracy. Central to this discourse is the concept of tawhid hakimiyah (Unity of Law), which asserts that only Allah has the authority to establish laws, in stark contrast to laws created by humans.[68] They draw parallels between voting and shirk, which refers to idolatry or polytheism, implying that it is contrary to Allah’s will.[69]
It is also worth noting that some of these pro-IS users have resorted to spreading misinformation to support their positions. For instance, following the nomination of Ganjar Pranowo as the Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)’s candidate for the upcoming election, some pro-IS users began allegations against Pranowo, such as his so-called connections with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and suggested that he might become subservient to the People’s Republic of China, thereby bolstering their point that he is a taghut, or, in this context, the puppet of imperialists.[70] On occasion, such discussions and debates have inflamed the feelings of pro-IS sympathisers to the point where they have expressed a willingness to resort to violence.[71]
Global Far Right Extremism
In 2022, far right extremism (FRE)-related attacks declined in the West compared to 2017.[72] However, given the primarily online nature of the FRE movement,[73] it is critical not to underestimate the persistent threat it poses. Specifically, far right groups and adherents have been known to use the digital sphere (e.g., social media platforms, online forums and messaging apps) to not only disseminate and normalise their violent ideologies, but also radicalise and recruit vulnerable populations. Furthermore, it should be noted that the mainstreaming of violent FRE extends beyond its frequently highlighted Western variant (e.g., neo-Nazis and white supremacists) and includes other forms of ethnonationalist extremism, such as the Hindutva movement in India.[74]
Continued Dissemination of Ideological Propaganda
In 2023, FRE groups and affiliates continued to rehash previous ideological propaganda through encrypted online platforms. In 2022, the FRE online landscape saw the continued traction of militant accelerationist[75] proponents such as Terrorgram, a loose network of white supremacist Telegram channels and accounts associated with the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) and The Base. Specifically, Terrorgram has been responsible for spreading new ideological publications, such as Hard Reset, a manifesto that promotes white supremacist and accelerationist ideologies, offering detailed instructions on how to carry out attacks.[76]
However, in 2023, there was a noticeable absence of similar ideological propaganda releases, possibly indicating an attempt to maintain a low profile considering the series of arrests of individuals directly linked to the Terrorgram network, such as Luke Kenna, Michael Brown Jr, Brian Tierney and AWD’s founder Brandon Russell.[77] Nonetheless, various white supremacist and accelerationist Telegram groups continue to disseminate Terrorgram’s ideological propaganda, manifestos of far right “saints” like Slovakian shooter Juraj Krajcik and Christchurch shooter Brenton Tarrant, and operational manuals detailing ways to sabotage cellular and electrical towers.[78]
Besides encrypted platforms, white supremacists and militant accelerationists persist in evading moderation on popular social media platforms like TikTok. For example, neo-Nazis have used seemingly innocuous memes like “gnome hunting” as anti-Semitic dog whistles to the act of murdering Jews. Similarly, eco-accelerationists have been identified creating videos that feature Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, often indirectly advocating for the use of violence in the name of environmental preservation. While these tactics involve coded language understood primarily by those deeply entrenched in niche subcultures, the presence of Discord and Telegram links on such accounts poses a risk of leading sympathisers to radicalisation.
Far Right Conspiratorial Narratives and Disinformation
Online FRE communities’ propagation of conspiratorial and disinformation narratives are becoming more prominent on mainstream social media platforms, occasionally leading to violence as well.[79] These narratives often contain elements of racism (particularly anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim racism), misogyny and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments. They are not, however, only found on alt-tech platforms like 4Chan, Bitchute and Odysee, but also persist in dissemination on mainstream social media platforms like Facebook and X, as far right actors become increasingly adept at evading platform regulations and moderation.[80] Of note, X has witnessed the resurgence of far right accounts, as Elon Musk continues to tacitly support them through his engagement with accounts known for spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories.[81] There were notable instances in 2023 where such beliefs translated into violent action. For instance, following the Brazilian presidential election in early January, a slew of conspiracy theories claiming electoral fraud incited supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro to storm various government buildings, similar to the events at the US Capitol riots in 2021.[82] Moreover, as the Israel-Palestine tensions unfold, there seems to be a surge in conspiracy theories in far right online communities that suggest Jewish involvement in the October 7 attacks, with the alleged intention of triggering World War III or bolstering their influence, regionally and globally.[83] This, combined with online incitements urging attacks on local Jewish individuals and institutions,[84] raises the concern of potential real-world incidents, such as the recent firebomb attack on a synagogue in Berlin.[85]
Additionally, often accompanying these conspiratorial narratives is the deliberate and expanding use of disinformation, designed to further incite reactionary far right sentiments. This was evident in the aftermath of the Nashville school shooting in late March, when an anonymous right-wing “sock puppet” account masquerading as a transgender individual shared old photos of Alana Mclaughlin posing with a firearm as well as threatening tweets directed at Christians, in the hopes of stoking anti-trans sentiments.[86] Additionally, a fake manifesto claiming that the shooter did it in support of trans rights was also discovered on 4Chan. According to an intelligence analyst, the supposed manifesto was most likely created using image-editing software that mimics handwriting.[87] This not only underscores the ongoing inclination of the far right to employ disinformation strategies in their propaganda efforts, but also highlights their growing reliance on sophisticated software and AI tools.
Doxing as an Offensive Strategy
Another concerning trend within the Western FRE online milieu is the continued use of doxing[88] as part of an offensive strategy, carried out to intimidate and incite harm against specific individuals perceived as enemies. In the context of the US, the intensified use of doxing was initially observed as part of a strategic shift within the broader online far right landscape following the events of the US Capitol riots in 2021, as far right actors began to enhance their own security out of fear of being tracked down or banned from various social media platforms.[89] Specifically, the far right online community actively engaged in both individual and coordinated efforts on Telegram and even dark web forums to identify and release personally identifiable information of supposed investigators and, in some cases, their families.[90]
In 2023, pro-Donald Trump supporters were observed employing online doxing on multiple occasions. For instance, following the indictment of former US president Trump and 18 of his associates by the state grand jury in Georgia, there were attempts on 4Chan to dox members of the Georgia jury.[91] This trend, however, is not merely limited to the US but has also been observed in Europe. In France, where far right groups have grown in prominence and organisation, far right Telegram groups have been reported to have sent death threats and doxed members of the migrant rights non-governmental organisation Utopia 56.[92]
Deepening Radicalisation Within the Pro-Hindutva Online Ecosystem
Narratives and rhetoric circulated online point to an increasing rift between the fringe pro-Hindutva extremists and the mainstream pro-government elements of the Hindutva movement, particularly with regard to contentious issues related to the Indian Muslim community. For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s decision on January 5, 2023, to stay a prior order by the Uttarakhand High Court to evict approximately 50,000 individuals[93] from residences encroaching on public railway land, resulted in a significant increase in anti-government narratives being circulated on fringe pro-Hindutva online Telegram channels. Many of these narratives condemned the Supreme Court’s decision as evidence of the Indian government’s policy of appeasement towards Indian Muslims, at the expense of Indian Hindus, with some even labelling Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a coward.[94] Similarly, following the expulsion of prominent opposition politician Rahul Gandhi from the Indian Parliament, fringe pro-Hindutva extremists on Facebook mocked the ruling party and criticised its alleged oppression of the opposition.[95]
The choice of such individuals to critique the establishment, even if they are acting against a figure to whom these individuals are ideologically opposed, indicates a possible deepening of the divide between fringe and establishment members of the Hindu nationalist movement. Whether such a deepening divide may lead to the radicalisation of individuals who are both firmly anti-government and believe in extremist ideals, bears further observation.
At the same time, the established trend of pro-Hindutva far right extremism online to push for violence against Indian Muslims intensified throughout 2023. Notable narratives included the reinforcing of the “Love Jihad” narrative[96] following the release of the film The Kerala Story, as well as the idolisation of a mass shooter who opened fire on and killed multiple Muslim individuals aboard a train carriage in Maharashtra.[97] Much of the anti-Muslim rhetoric employed in these narratives remains highly violent, often resorting to calls for genocide against the Indian Muslim population. There have been indicators that such online narratives have in turn translated into actual acts of violence on the ground, as seen in the bouts of civil unrest in Haryana in June and July,[98] as well as violence between diaspora Sikh and Indian communities in Melbourne in January.[99]
Outlook
The digital domain remains a contested space between extremist entities and counter terrorism efforts. Jihadist and far right actors exhibit adaptability and resilience, indicating an evolving threat landscape. The diversification of online propaganda showcases a nuanced approach to disseminating extremist narratives, involving sophisticated evasion of moderation. Younger participants in extremist online spaces are gravitating towards interactive, “borderline” content, blurring distinctions between genuine propaganda and seemingly harmless posts. Such divisions can escalate radicalisation and real-world violence, necessitating vigilant monitoring and analyses. Enhanced moderation and strategic community engagement are pivotal to counteract the evolution and spread of extremist ideologies online.
About the Authors
Benjamin Mok is a Senior Analyst and Saddiq Basha is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Philipp Katzenberger on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Hayden Field and Jonathan Vanian, “Tech Layoffs Ravage the Teams that Fight Online Misinformation and Hate Speech,” CNBC, May 26, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/26/tech-companies-are-laying-off-their-ethics-and-safety-teams-html; Clare Duffy, “It’s An Especially Bad Time’: Tech Layoffs Are Hitting Ethics and Safety Teams,” CNN, April 6, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/06/tech/tech-layoffs-platform-safety/index.html.
[2] Caroline Crystal, “Facebook, Telegram, and the Ongoing Struggle Against Online Hate Speech,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 7, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/07/facebook-telegram-and-ongoing-struggle-against-online-hate-speech-pub-90468.
[3] “Europol and Telegram Take On Terrorist Propaganda Online,” Europol, November 25, 2019, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-and-telegram-take-terrorist-propaganda-online.
[4] Amarnath Amarasingam et al., “How Telegram Disruption Impacts Jihadist Platform Migration,” Crest Research, January 8, 2021, https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/how-telegram-disruption-impacts-jihadist-platform-migration/.
[5] Kayla McMinimy et al., “Censoring Extremism: Influence of Online Restriction on Official Media Products of ISIS,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2023), pp. 971-987, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2021.1988938.
[6] “Europol Disrupts Islamic State Propaganda Machine,” BBC Monitoring, November 25, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50545816.
[7] Tamara Abueish, “Saudi Arabia Works with Telegram to Remove Over 15 Million Extremist Content in 2022,” Al Arabiya News, January 4, 2023, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/01/04/Saudi-Arabia-works-with-Telegram-to-remove-15-021-951-extremist-content-in-2022.
[8] Suraj Ganesan and Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “Islamic State Online: A Look at the Group’s South Asian Presence on Alternate Platforms,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, February 27, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/02/27/islamic-state-online-a-look-at-the-groups-south-asian-presence-on-alternate-platforms/.
[9] Meili Criezis, “Telegram’s Anti-IS Campaign: Effectiveness, Perspectives, and Policy Suggestions,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, July 30, 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/07/30/telegrams-anti-is-campaign-effectiveness-perspectives-and-policy-suggestions/; “Jihadists Thrive on Telegram as Takedowns Taper,” Flashpoint, November 5, 2020, https://flashpoint.io/blog/jihadists-thrive-on-telegram/.
[10] “Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 29, 2022 – January 4, 2023),” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, January 5, 2023, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-global-jihad-december-29-2022-january-4-2023/.
[11] Scott N Romaniuk et al., “Terrorist Platform Migration: The Move to Smaller, Less Regulated Online Spaces,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, June 23, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/06/23/how-do-terrorists-utilise-and-exploit-small-covert-online-spaces/.
[12] Based on ICPVTR research.
[13] Charlie Winter et al., “Online Extremism: Research Trends in Internet Activism, Radicalization, and Counter-Strategies,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol. 14, (2020), pp. 1-20, https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-3809.
[14] Kenneth Yeo, ICPVTR internal report. While some have been removed over the past year, such as Dalelansar and Akhi, others such as Al-Shmukh continue to operate to this day.
[15] Based on ICPVTR research.
[16] Yeo, ICPVTR internal report.
[17] Moustafa Ayad, “CaliphateTok: TikTok Continues to Host Islamic State Propaganda,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, June 13, 2023, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/caliphatetok-tiktok-continues-to-host-islamic-state-propaganda/.
[18] Brody McDonald, “Extremists Are Seeping Back Into the Mainstream: Algorithmic Detection and Evasion Tactics on Social Media Platforms,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, October 31, 2022, https://gnet-research.org/2022/10/31/extremists-are-seeping-back-into-the-mainstream-algorithmic-detection-and-evasion-tactics-on-social-media-platforms/.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Erin Saltman and Micalie Hunt, “Borderline Content: Understanding the Gray Zone,” Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, June 2023, https://gifct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GIFCT-23WG-Borderline-1.1.pdf.
[21] Eitan Azani and Daniel Haberfeld, “Media Jihad Campaign: The Islamic State’s Response to Deplatforming,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, July 12, 2023, https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Azani-Haberfeld_Media-Jihad-Campaign_2023_07_13-1.pdf.
[22] Nur Aziemah Azman, “Underlying The Islamic State (IS) Propaganda: Striving For Relevance And Dominance,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2022), p. 116, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CTTA-January-2022.pdf.
[23] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 371 – 408, December 18, 2022 – July 2, 2023.
[24] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 379, March 16, 2023.
[25] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 388, April 24, 2023; “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 394, June 8, 2023.
[26] The official media hub of IS covering its various provinces.
[27] “فتربصوا إنّا معكم متربصون ” – “So Wait; Indeed We, Along with You, Are Waiting.”
[28] “الله وليّ المؤمنين ” – “Allah Is the Protector of the Believers.”
[29] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 388.
[30] Ahmad Helmi bin Mohamad Hasbi and Benjamin Mok, “Digital Vacuum: The Evolution of IS Central’s Media Outreach in Southeast Asia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2023), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CTTA-September-2023.pdf.
[31] Miron Lakomy, “The Return of the Virtual ‘Caliphate’? Mapping the Evolution of the Islamic State’s Information Ecosystem,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, April 19, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/04/19/the-return-of-the-virtual-caliphate-mapping-the-evolution-of-the-islamic-states-information-ecosystem/.
[32] Lucas Webber and Daniele Garofalo, “Fursan al-Tarjuma Carries the Torch of Islamic State’s Media Jihad,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, June 5, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/06/05/fursan-al-tarjuma-carries-the-torch-of-islamic-states-media-jihad/.
[33] Ahmad Helmi bin Mohamad Hasbi, ICPVTR internal report.
[34] Infos An-Nur (IAN) and the Voice of Al-Andalus (VOA) were respectively founded on Rocket Chat in 2018 and 2023 and boasted of 6,855 and 165 followers as of June 2023.
[35] Laura Wakeford and Laura Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media: Dissemination, Support, and Resilience,” in ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message, eds. Stephane J. Baele, Katharine A. Boyd and Travis G. Coan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 155-187.
[36] Ahmad Helmi, ICPVTR internal report. Some of the key outlets include the Al-Battar Foundation, the Al-Dar’ Sunni Foundation, the Sorh Khilafah foundation and the Mathani Foundation, amongst others.
[37] Kenneth Yeo, “Rebranding the East Asia Knights: A Reflection of Dawlah Islamiyah’s Effort to Learn,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, March 1, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/03/01/rebranding-the-east-asia-knights-a-reflection-of-dawlah-islamiyahs-effort-to-learn/.
[38] Ahmad Helmi, ICPVTR internal report. The film chronicled jihadist activity in the Sinai before and after the formation of the IS, following the 12th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. The Telegram channel has since been removed.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Abdullah Alrhmoun et al., “Terrorist Bots: How Islamic State has Automated Management of its Online Community on Telegram,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, April 4, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/04/04/terrorist-bots-how-islamic-state-has-automated-management-of-its-online-community-on-telegram/. See also Miron Lakomy, “Artificial Intelligence as a Terrorism Enabler? Understanding the Potential Impact of Chatbots and Image Generators on Online Terrorist Activities,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2023), DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2023.2259195.
[43] Moustafa Ayad, “Meming 9/11: A New Generation of Salafi-Jihadists Terrorposting the September 11 Atacks,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, September 12, 2023, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/meming-9-11-a-new-generation-of-salafi-jihadists-terrorposting-the-september-11-attacks/.
[44] Gilbert Ramsay, “Jihadi Fans Revisited: Mapping the Commonalities with Non-Islamic Extremism,” in Digital Extremism, eds. Mark Littler and Benjamin Lee (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
[45] Eitan Azani and Daniel Haberfeld, “The End of Islamic State’s Cyber Security Unit Afaq?” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, July 2023, https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ELECTRONIC-HORIZON-FOUNDATION-AFAQ.pdf.
[46] Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, March 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf.
[47] Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, February 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189426/2015%202%20Cyber%20Jihad.pdf.
[48] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 377, February 2, 2023.
[49] @Al-Saafat, Telegram.
[50] Voice of Khurasan, Issue 20, February 2, 2023.
[51] Ahmad Helmi, ICPVTR internal report.
[52] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 373, January 12, 2023; “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 377, February 2, 2023; “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 385, April 4, 2023; “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 390, May 11, 2023; “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 399, July 13, 2023.
[53] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 355, August 18, 2022; “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 368, November 25, 2022.
[54] Asfandyar Mir, “Two Years Under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a Terrorist Safe Haven Once Again?” United States Institute of Peace, August 15, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-under-taliban-afghanistan-terrorist-safe-haven-once-again.
[55] Abdul Basit, “Af-Pak: One Year Since the Taliban’s Return to Power”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2022), pp. 10–11, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/CTTA-August-2022.pdf.
[56] Jake Harrington and Jared Thompson, “Zawahiri’s Death and What’s Next for al Qaeda,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 4, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/zawahiris-death-and-whats-next-al-qaeda.
[57] Herbert Maack, “Al-Qaeda Issues Call for Revenge Against Nordic Countries Following Quran Burnings,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 21, No. 18 (2023,) https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaeda-issues-call-for-revenge-against-nordic-countries-following-quran-burnings/.
[58] “Spotlight on Global Jihad (September 7-13, 2023),” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, September 14, 2023, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-global-jihad-september-7-13-2023/.
[59] “The Iron Swords – The War in the South of Israel,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, October 17, 2023, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/the-iron-swords-the-war-in-the-south-of-israel-updated-to-1-p-m-october-16-2023/.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] “Against Backdrop Of Israel-Hamas War, Pro-Al-Qaeda Media Outlet Claims Responsibility For Large “Electronic Warfare” Attack Against Airports, Jewish Institutions In Europe,” MEMRI, October 23, 2023, https://www.memri.org/jttm/against-backdrop-israel-hamas-war-pro-al-qaeda-media-outlet-claims-responsibility-large.
[63] Ibid.
[64] “Faced with String of Bomb Hoaxes, France Increases Transport Security,” Radio France Internationale, October 23, 2023, https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20231023-faced-with-string-of-bomb-hoaxes-france-increases-transport-security.
[65] Héni Nsaibia and Rida Lyammouri, “The Digital Transformations of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the Battle Against Online Propaganda,” Policy Center, May 20, 2021, https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/digital-transformations-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state-battle-against-online-propaganda.
[66] Abdul Basit et al., ICPVTR internal report.
[67] Ibid
[68] Unaesah Rahmah and Jeselyn Lai, ICPVTR internal report.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] “Global Terrorism Index 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” Vision of Humanity, March 2023, pp. 35–36, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/explainer-far-right-terrorism-in-the-west/.
[73] United Nations General Assembly, Terrorist Attacks on the Basis of Xenophobia, Racism and Other Forms of Intolerance, or in the Name of Religion or Belief, A/77/266, August 3, 2022, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/450/52/PDF/N2245052.pdf?OpenElement.
[74] Tanya Mehra and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Violent Far-Right Movements Aren’t Just a Western Problem,” Defence One, March 15, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/03/violent-far-right-movements-arent-just-western-problem/384003/.
[75] Militant accelerationism, in the context of far right extremism, advocates widespread violence to accelerate the collapse of the current political system in order to establish a white ethno-state. For more, see Matthew Kriner, “An Introduction to Militant Accelerationism,” Accelerationist Research Consortium (ARC), May 9, 2022, https://www.accresearch.org/shortanalysis/an-introduction-to-militant-accelerationism.
[76] Europol, TE – SAT: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2023 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023), p. 52, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2813/370206.
[77] Socal Research Club and Michael Boorman, ‘Here’s The Gore Artist Turning Terrorgram Manuals & Manifestos Into Audiobooks,” Left Coast Right Watch, March 1, 2023, https://leftcoastrightwatch.org/articles/heres-the-gore-artist-turning-terrorgram-manuals-manifestos-into-audiobooks/.
[78] Saddiq Basha, “’Death to the Grid’: Ideological Narratives and Online Community Dynamics in Encouraging Far-Right Extremist Attacks on Critical Infrastructure,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2023), pp. 19–20, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CTTA-September-2023.pdf.
[79] This includes anti-immigrant rhetoric informed by the white supremacist Great Replacement theory, narratives dismissing far right shooting as “false-flag” incidents planned by the government, and QAnon anti-transgender “groomer” conspiracy theories, among others.
[80] Julia Ebner, “From Margins to Mainstream: How Extremism Has Conquered the Political Middle,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, August 10, 2023, https://www.icct.nl/publication/margins-mainstream-how-extremism-has-conquered-political-middle.
[81] Justin Horowitz, “QAnon Supporters, Bigots, and White Nationalists: Here Are the Far-Right Accounts Elon Musk Is Catering to Following Twitter’s Rebrand to X,” Media Matters for America, September 27, 2023, https://www.mediamatters.org/elon-musk/qanon-supporters-bigots-and-white-nationalists-here-are-far-right-accounts-elon-musk.
[82] Jacob Ware, “America the Exporter: Far-Right Violent Extremism in Brazil and Beyond,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/america-exporter-far-right-violent-extremism-brazil-and-beyond.
[83] Liram Koblentz-Stenzler et al., “Countering Hate in the Digital Age: Analyzing Far-Right Extremist Responses to the Israel-Hamas War,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), October 22, 2023, p. 12, https://ict.org.il/far-right-response-to-israel-hamas-war/.
[84] Ibid., pp. 17–19.
[85] “The German Chancellor Condemns a Firebomb Attack on a Berlin Synagogue and Vows Protection for Jews,” Associated Press, October 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/germany-berlin-synagogue-antisemitism-fdd10f32f7d5efc6da973f00c9a8b030.
[86] Arijeta Lajka and Ali Swenson, “The Week in Fake News: Nashville Shooting Prompts False Claims on Social Media,” The Seattle Times, March 31, 2023, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/not-real-news-a-look-at-what-didnt-happen-this-week-151/.
[87] Drew Harwell, “How a Fake Nashville Manifesto Fueled Anti-Trans Rage Online,” The Washington Post, April 1, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/03/31/nashville-shooting-hoax-online/.
[88] Releasing private information such as residential addresses and phone numbers online.
[89] Liram Koblentz-Stenzler and Alexander Pack, “Hiding to Fight Another Day: Far-Right Extremists Adopt a New Strategy in the Cyberspace Arena,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), June 2021, p. 2, https://ict.org.il/UserFiles/Hiding%20to%20Fight%20Another%20Day.pdf.
[90] Ibid., pp. 14–16.
[91] Alex Kaplan, “Far-Right Message Boards Target the Georgia Trump Indictment Grand Jurors after Their Names Were Made Public,” Media Matters for America, August 16, 2023, https://www.mediamatters.org/maga-trolls/far-right-message-boards-target-georgia-trump-indictment-grand-jurors-after-their-names.
[92] Phineas Rueckert, “A Far-Right Fire Is Blazing Across France,” The Nation, July 19, 2023, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/france-far-right-violence/.
[93] Most of whom belong to the Indian Muslim community.
[94] Benjamin Mok, ICPVTR internal report.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
