Digital Vacuum: The Evolution of IS Central’s Media Outreach in Southeast Asia
Digital Vacuum: The Evolution of IS Central’s Media Outreach in Southeast Asia
Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi and Benjamin Mok
This article sheds light on the changing relationship between the Islamic State Central (IS Central) and its Southeast Asian (SEA) affiliates in the digital realm. The article revolves around some key findings. First, evidence points to a decrease in both the quality and frequency of SEA-focused content produced by IS Central. This suggests IS Central is reducing its digital engagement with SEA factions. Second, it highlights recent moves by regional propagandists to rely on borrowed legitimacy from IS Central to establish themselves. Even as IS Central’s digital involvement declines, these regional groups continue their propaganda activities, drawing on IS Central for legitimacy. Their approach includes translating and adapting IS propaganda to fit local contexts. These groups, branding themselves as media centres, use the association with IS Central to boost their messages’ reach. These developments contrast with the period prior to the 2017 Marawi Siege, when the digital relationship between IS Central and SEA groups was much stronger. Then, IS Central was deeply involved in official translations, videos and SEA influencers in Syria who directly followed IS Central leadership. In conclusion, the article emphasises a clear digital separation between IS Central and SEA groups, which has major implications for future counter terrorism efforts.
Introduction
Analysing the ebb and flow of digital propaganda has become an instrumental part of understanding modern-day extremist movements. In recent years, a marked shift has been observed in the dynamics of digital propaganda production between the Islamic State Central (IS Central) and pro-IS Southeast Asian (SEA) terrorist factions. Analysing this shift offers a window into how key recruitment tools and platforms for ideological dissemination have changed in the region. It also hints at both the regional goals of SEA pro-IS propagandists and the wider strategic goals of IS Central.
Many recent studies have investigated the current state of IS Central’s influence in the region. Some scholars have employed Network
[1] and State Border[2] theories to examine this influence at a country-level perspective,[3] while others have undertaken quantitative analyses of IS-related operational activities in SEA to tease out ongoing relationships between regional groups and IS Central.[4] A key conclusion drawn, particularly since 2020, is that the Islamist militant threat in SEA has significantly abated following the 2017 Marawi Siege. This is in large part due to the aggressive actions taken by regional governments.[5]
However, given the amorphous and ambiguous nature of digital propaganda, studies on the changing nature of SEA-related digital propaganda amidst this shift remain limited. This is largely due to the decentralised and fragmented methods of distribution of online content, the anonymous nature of comments and contributors, the intricacies of localised narratives, and the challenges posed by stringent moderation and security measures on mainstream platforms.
This article assesses the shift in pro-IS digital propaganda production related to SEA post-Marawi. This investigation is conducted through primary source examination of propaganda content – newsletters, videos and speeches – produced by IS Central and regional official and unofficial affiliates. A typological backdrop is first provided of the types of content and actors involved. The article then presents a trilogy of evidence-backed claims that chart the evolution and eventual decline of IS Central’s digital influence over its SEA factions.
Typology of IS Media Production
The propaganda produced by IS originates from an array of independent yet connected and hierarchically structured content producers.[6] These producers share the misconstrued Islamic doctrines central to the group’s ideology, while also localising these narratives to reflect the region-specific socio-political and cultural landscapes in which they exist.
Many also operate on different structural levels. Drawing upon existing literature[7] as well as primary source examinations of IS propaganda machinery and productions,[8] three tiers can be identified – the Ministry of Media Bureau (Diwan Markaz al-Ilam), the Provincial Media Offices (Al-Makatib al-‘Ilaamiyah li-al-Wilayat) and unofficial productions by IS supporters (Isdaraat Al-Ansar).[9]
- Ministry of Media Bureau (Diwan Markaz al-Ilam)
The bureau arguably represents the zenith of IS content creation, manufacturing high-quality audio-visual and textual material that forms the foundation of IS propaganda. Content creation is highly centralised and top down,[10] with operational responsibilities divided amongst different content producers based on their different functions.
Al-Furqan Foundation, the oldest outfit within the bureau, and Al-‘Itisam Foundation are the main Arabic production arms of IS Central media,[11] primarily focused on creating videos and releasing audio speeches by IS Central leaders. Al-Hayat Media Center and Al-Furat Media Foundation are the outfits responsible for all official non-Arabic language content as well as non-Arabic language magazines such as Dabiq, Rumiyah[12] and Al-Fatihin.[13] The bureau also incorporates Al-Bayan Radio and Al-Ajnad Foundation, which are devoted to the broadcasting of audio productions,[14] and Al-Amaq Agency and Al-Nashir News,[15] which handle news related to IS’ global expansion and military operations.[16]
- Provincial Media Offices (Al-Makatib al-‘Ilaamiyah li-al-Wilayat)
IS provinces can be categorised into two primary groups. First, the core provinces, encompassing territories (wilayat) within Iraq (12)[17] and Syria (9)[18] that are directly controlled by IS. Second, the 14 distant provinces,[19] including SEA, comprising localised groups that have pledged allegiance to IS. In terms of media coverage, this provincial structure not only augments the primary digital initiatives spearheaded by IS’ Ministry of Media, it also legitimises various groups designated as IS mouthpieces targeting non-Arabic speakers.
Wakeford and Smith point out that in response to the exigencies of safeguarding media operatives in conflict zones, IS has embarked on a decentralisation of its media network. Within this framework, the individual provincial media offices bear the responsibility of generating online content in accordance with IS’ bureaucratic protocols. Moreover, they are mandated to report to the central media ministry.[20] It is worth highlighting, however, that the decentralisation of the media network, as emphasised by Milton, does not inherently confer unrestrained autonomy to each province. There exists substantive evidence indicating centralised control within this provincial media structure.[21]
- Unofficial Productions by IS Supporters (Isdaraat Al-Ansar)
This is where a clear departure from the tiered typology emerges. Although the Isdaraat Al-Ansar, which consists mainly of unrecognised IS supporters commonly referred to as Al-Munasirun,[22] expands the digital footprint of IS, it does so with a conspicuous decrease in professional IS Central or provincial oversight.
Relying on borrowed legitimacy from the former two entities, these supporters reflect a decentralised framework, reshaping and recreating core IS propaganda to resonate with local contexts. In certain instances, these unofficial media outfits autonomously generate their own brand media in their respective native languages,[23] emulating IS Central and thereby propagating its ideological tenets. They produce narratives, such as those that demonise the Jewish people and call for retaliation against ‘democratic crusaders’, which are unmistakably rooted in the core IS ideology. Yet, their approach often appears derivative, echoing traces of the original narrative rather than directly replicating it.
In comparison with the first two tiers, which are marked by centralised control and professional-grade quality, the decentralised nature of Isdaraat Al-Ansar often takes liberties with core content, leading to variations in quality and authenticity.
Pre-Marawi Digital Bond: IS Central’s Robust Engagement in SEA Propaganda
Prior to the 2017 Marawi Siege, IS Central’s involvement in SEA-related content was prominent, underlining the significance of their digital engagement. First, they regularly published videos in languages native to Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. While there are numerous examples of such content, a few stand out. In 2014, IS released a propaganda video featuring an Indonesian foreign fighter named Abu Muhammad, who spoke in Bahasa Indonesia and called his fellow countrymen to join the fight in Syria.[24]
This was followed in 2015 by a 15-minute-long propaganda video in Bahasa Indonesia with Arabic subtitles, celebrating the activities of youth fighters in Syria.[25] In 2016, another video was released by IS Central in Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, English, Malay and Tagalog, calling its supporters in SEA who were unable to travel to Syria to instead focus their efforts on the Philippines.[26] These videos were ostensibly produced by the Ministry of Media Bureau, and bore all the hallmarks and quality expected of such productions.
This focus on regional languages was structurally integrated into IS Central’s propaganda efforts. As pointed out by Moir, the function of the Majmuah al-Arkhabiliy (MA) group, formerly known as Katibah Nusantara,[27] extended beyond accommodating SEA foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. Not only did MA translate IS propaganda into Bahasa Indonesia for dissemination on Indonesian and Malay social media sites, it also worked directly with the Al-Hayat Media Center to produce sanctioned subtitles for IS Central’s videos.[28] As such, while MA was not defined as a provincial media office, it nevertheless served functions that aligned with such a role.
Second, much of this content focused not only on appeals to IS supporters in SEA to join the fight in Syria, but also involved narratives touching directly on regional grievances. Such content lionised the image of SEA men who fought in Syria, such as the 2014 video featuring Abu Muhammad. Other examples include an “advertisement-styled spread of Southeast Asian men” in the fourth issue of Dabiq,[29] along with concerted efforts to encourage the indoctrination of children.[30] SEA foreign fighters in Syria were also granted prominence within IS Central’s propaganda, such as slain Indonesian fighter Bahrun Naim[31] for his leadership of MA.[32]
At the same time, some of IS Central’s SEA-related propaganda pushed narratives that showcased a comprehensive understanding of regional politics and governance. The 2015 video, for instance, not only criticised the Indonesian government, but also included “images from and in-depth commentary on Indonesia”.[33] This localised approach bolstered IS Central’s influence, positioning it as a significant voice within the SEA extremist milieu.
Third, IS Central’s SEA-related propaganda was marked by the meticulous branding and production quality typical of their media content. SEA-related videos carried the group’s official logos and were produced in collaboration with or directly by media centres close to IS Central, granting legitimacy to the messages being pushed. The videos also featured adept editing, high-quality visuals and compelling narratives, augmenting their effectiveness.[34]
In sum, the pre-Marawi era was marked by intensive collaboration which involved the upper two tiers of the IS media production typology (i.e., the Ministry of Media Bureau and the Provincial Media Offices).
Digital Disengagement: Post-Marawi Siege and IS Central’s Declining Commitment to SEA Propaganda
Post-Marawi, a notable shift in IS’ digital propaganda strategy for SEA became discernible. As noted above, IS had historically been adept at crafting potent propaganda that fostered allegiance within SEA. In the wake of Marawi, however, the emphasis on SEA regionalisation or localisation in online content has noticeably waned. There has also been a glaring deficit of SEA-related content emerging from IS Central. A mere two allegiance-pledging (bai’ah) videos were released by IS Central in recent years. Both claimed to be produced by the IS SEA network – a claim that serves to perpetuate a narrative of direct IS SEA involvement. However, there is a disparity in content quality between these two videos and previous content.
The first video, “Wa-al-Aqibatu li-al-Muttaqin” (The Pious Will Have a Pleasant End), released in June 2019, prominently featured Abu Abdullah Al-Tanumi.[35] Speaking in Tagalog, Al-Tanumi addressed fighters presumably located in the Philippines. The reverence conferred upon him with the title “Sheikh” signified his stature within the organisation. This video captured fighters renewing their bai’ah to then IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, culminating in a conflict against Filipino government forces. Yet, juxtaposed against previous IS productions, it lacked the technical sophistication traditionally associated with IS Central’s works.[36] The absence of noise-cancellation and cinematic effects arguably underscored a possible reduction in emphasis on or resources for the SEA sector.
An April 2022 video, titled “Madhin Jihad al-Mukminin” (The Jihad of the Believer Will Proceed),[37] offers further insight. A veiled fighter, Abd Rahman, articulately beckoned supporters in Arabic to rally behind the IS cause. It painted a vivid tableau of regional factions, predominantly from the Philippines, pledging allegiance to the then Caliph. Prominently featured was Abu Turaife, believed to be the contemporary IS SEA leader based in the Philippines.[38] The video concluded with a short audio segment from the then IS Central spokesperson, Abu Umar al-Muhajir, accompanied by footage of combatants in skirmishes. Like its predecessor, this video lacked the cinematic distinction typically observed in IS Central’s productions.[39]
Beyond these videos, there has been an evident dearth of coverage on IS SEA in the al-Naba newsletter.[40] Sporadic al-Naba photo reports, capturing SEA fighters pledging bai’ah to each new Caliph, reveal another intriguing facet: some images premiered in unofficial group networks, hinting at a dependency on decentralised sources.[41] Furthermore, SEA operations are inconsistently spotlighted in al-Naba‘s routine operational report, “Harvest of the Soldiers”.[42] This selective reporting and emphasis, juxtaposed against the utilisation of SEA materials by IS Central, paints a revealing picture. Evidently, IS Central leans on derived materials from distant provinces to bolster its lack of direct media collaboration with, and subsequent media access to, outfits in the region.
In sum, post-Marawi, the upper two tiers of IS’ media machinery (the Ministry of Media Bureau and Provincial Media Offices) have offered minimal acknowledgment of SEA. Their engagement, or lack thereof, is exemplified by the infrequent deployment of socio-political narratives pertinent to SEA in al-Naba.[43] While there have been sporadic mentions of operations conducted by pro-IS SEA factions, several recent developments were overlooked, including the 2021 Makassar bombing conducted by Indonesian supporters of the pro-IS Jamaah Ansharut Daulah.[44]
Unofficial Content Producers Attempting to Bridge the Gap
Against this backdrop of digital disengagement between IS Central and SEA, there thrives a plethora of unofficial IS media outlets, primarily based in Indonesia and the Philippines. The Indonesian networks are particularly aggressive in promoting IS ideology.[45] One significant player was the Al-Najiyah Media Center, which was operated by Indonesian pro-IS supporters and, despite challenges, persisted in its digital endeavours until only recently.
Remarkably, these networks have innovatively circumvented mainstream censorship. Upherogy Media,[46] a nasheed network, exemplifies this. The network champions IS ideology through songs posted on Facebook, YouTube and Instagram. An analysis of viewer responses on these platforms suggests that these songs resonate with segments of the audience.[47] While Upherogy Media started out catering to Malay-speaking audiences on platforms like TamTam and RocketChat–TechHaven, it has now rebranded as Islamic State Indonesia.
Similarly, networks like ShareNewsOk and Tamkin Indonesia distribute translations of IS global operations, while Al-Buruwy and Poster Dakwah[48] position themselves as news outlets that produce posters echoing IS ideology. By repackaging official IS media and al-Naba excerpts in Bahasa Indonesia, they align with the broader narratives of IS. Importantly, they have also supported campaigns initiated by IS Central, using campaign-specific hashtags such as #mendukung_ribat_dan_jihad,[49] to align with initiatives like Ribat & Jihad from 2023.[50]
These networks’ propensity for localisation is evident. Not only do they produce content featuring SEA leaders and landmarks, they also undertake significant translation projects, ensuring materials from both official and unofficial networks are accessible in Bahasa Indonesia. On platforms like Facebook, individual supporters publicly express their allegiance to IS and narrative-based supporters deliver news from locales like the al-Hol and Roj camps in Syria in Bahasa Indonesia.[51]
In the Philippines, the media scenario appears to be in flux. Efforts are underway to consolidate media power, as evidenced by the merger of the East Asia Knights media outlet (EAK) with Al-Nibras, an alleged pro-IS Thai network. The rebranded Al-Faris Media now operates under the Fursan Al-Tarjuma banner, known as the “Knights of Translation”.[52] These Philippines-based entities primarily exploit encrypted platforms like Telegram, TamTam and TechHaven to share updates on skirmishes against local security forces. Meanwhile, embryonic attempts to establish networks in Malaysia have also been witnessed with the emergence of Al-Malaka Media.[53]
An examination of the multifaceted operations of the Isdaraat Al-Ansar reveals two key findings regarding their functional architecture and ideological underpinnings.
First, these entities lack inherent legitimacy despite their fervent propagation efforts. They operate with the distinct knowledge that they have not been acknowledged by IS Central and are neither part of the Ministry of Media Bureau nor the Provincial Media Offices. The meticulous reproduction of primary IS propaganda by entities like Upherogy Media and Poster Dakwah, illustrates their reliance on borrowed jihadist credibility. Their constant efforts to weave broader IS narratives into localised stories, along with their detailed translations and adaptations, further underscore the need to legitimise themselves. Essentially, their content – whether translations of IS Central’s propaganda into Bahasa Indonesia or the use of local landmarks and figures – highlights an inherent need to connect with an established jihadist authority, primarily IS Central.
Second, the operational ecosystem of the Isdaraat Al-Ansar is starkly decentralised. This is evident from their grassroots initiatives and the plethora of self-proclaimed media centres that have emerged in SEA, such as the defunct An-Najiyah Media Center.[54] While this decentralised model offers flexibility and a certain resilience against external crackdowns, it simultaneously poses challenges. The absence of centralised support and resources is apparent in their media quality, which pales in comparison to the sophisticated productions of the IS Media Office. For instance, their utilisation of platforms attuned to SEA audiences, like TamTam and TechHaven, while innovative, does not exhibit the polished production capabilities of videos like “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsus” from 2016.
Potential Developments and Implications for CT and CVE
As the media landscape moves from a period of digital integration to an era marked by disconnect between IS Central and SEA networks, there are implications for both counter terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) endeavours.
CT efforts can be more effective in targeting the circulation of pro-IS propaganda. With the decentralisation of content production, translations and interpretations of IS Central propaganda, and wholly regionally produced propaganda, takedowns of regional producers on mainstream media platforms have been effective on an individual scale,[55] limiting their content’s circulation. For example, the arrest of a key Al-Faris Media member and the takedown of his content resulted in a significant decrease in the footprint of the outfit’s content within the region, as they had to migrate to unregulated channels.[56]
This can be juxtaposed with the circulation of raw IS Central content, which can be disseminated by pro-IS supporters even if they do not possess content production capabilities. For instance, takedowns of regional actors within the pre-Marawi media landscape did not limit IS Central’s narrative footprint as the original content continued to circulate, albeit through a multitude of minor actors operating solely as content circulators instead of producers.
For CVE initiatives, the transition towards more regionally driven narratives presents both challenges and opportunities. On one hand, these narratives, tailored for regional audiences and grievances, might resonate more deeply with the local populace, necessitating adaptive CVE campaigns. On the other, the evident decrease in production quality and the lack of official endorsement from IS Central might render these narratives less convincing to some segments of their intended audience.
However, without centralised oversight, SEA groups might operate with increased autonomy, leading to diversified strategies and tactics. This could result in a more erratic and unpredictable threat matrix. The void left by IS Central’s digital withdrawal may provide an opportunity for new regional extremist entities to vie for dominance in the SEA digital propaganda space.
There also remains the credible possibility of reconnection between regional content producers and wider networks. Their inherent desire for legitimacy, as seen in their emulation of IS Central’s media strategies, might drive SEA groups to seek reintegration with global jihadist entities, whether IS Central or other global extremist factions.
About the Authors
Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi is a Senior Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is also a religious counsellor and a member of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). He can be reached at [email protected].
Benjamin Mok is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Ashkan Forouzani on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Network theory highlights how relationships between entities, whether one-way, bidirectional or balanced, shape the flow of extremist ideas. The peripheral location of the terror network in SEA suggests vulnerability to external influences. Yet, the interconnected nodes and directional flows of these networks play a pivotal role in determining the reach of IS Central’s influence.
[2] State Border theory examines how borders, initially shaped by state independence, can impact the flow of ideas, governance and regional identity. While ‘frontier’ suggests the outreach of IS Central, ‘boundary’ denotes the limitations posed on this influence, ensuring regional autonomy.
[3] Tri Legionosuko et al., “THE THREATS ANALYSIS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION: Case Study of the Border of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines,” Journal of Defense Resources Management, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2020).
[4] Amira Jadoon et al., Rising in the East: A Regional Overview of the Islamic State’s Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2020), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/rising-in-the-east-a-regional-overview-of-the-islamic-states-operations-in-southeast-asia/.
[5] Munira Mustaffa, “Reassessing The Extremist Threat in Southeast Asia,” New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, June 28, 2022, https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/reassessing-the-extremist-threat-in-southeast-asia/.
[6] Stephane J. Baele et al., ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). See also Daniel Milton, Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts (New York : Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf; and Jamileh Kadivar, “Daesh and the Power of Media and Message,” Arab Media & Society, March 22, 2021, https://www.arabmediasociety.com/daesh-and-the-power-of-media-and-message/.
[7] Ibid.
[8] This includes newsletters, videos, speeches, books, operating platforms and others.
[9] Baele et al., ISIS Propaganda. This typological exploration of the IS media strategy underlines a layered approach to content creation, amplification and circulation. The distinctions between these layers become pivotal in understanding the subsequent shift in digital propaganda related to SEA post-Marawi.
[10] Milton, Communication Breakdown.
[11] Laura Wakeford and Laura Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media: Dissemination, Support, and Resilience,” in ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message, eds. Stephane J. Baele et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[12] Milton, Communication Breakdown.
[13] Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Jani, “Al‑Fatihin: Islamic State’s First Malay Language Newspaper,” RSIS Commentary No. 155 (2016), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co16155-al-fatihin-islamic-states-first-malay-language-newspaper/.
[14] Milton, Communication Breakdown.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Productions from the bureau include the official IS monthly newsletter, “Al-Naba”, as well as the “Maktabah al-Himma,” a publishing house thatwhich disseminates religious literature, dakwah pamphlets, posters, and child-friendly software adapted to multiple platforms. Furthermore, IS Central works are supported by a language and translation department, as well as the Al-Munasirun (supporters). See also “The Structure of the Caliphate”, – Al-Furqan Media Foundation, 6 July 6, 2016;, and Jamileh Kadivar, “Daesh and the Power of Media and Message.”2021.
[17] These include Anbar Province, Falujah Province, Baghdad Province, Dajlah Province, Diyali Province, North Baghdad Province, Salah al-Din Province, Kirkuk Province, Nainawa Province, al-Jazira Province, al-Badiyah Province and Al-Janub Province.
[18] These include Al-Barakah Province, Al-Khair Province, Raqqa Province, Halab Province, Hama Province, Hims Province, Hawran Province, Damascus Province and Al-Furat Province.
[19] These include West Africa Province, Central Africa Province, Sahel Province, Mozambique Province, Yemen Province, Sinai Province, Libya Province, Khurasan Province, Somalia Province, Caucus Province, East Asia Province, Turkey Province, Pakistan Province and Najd Province. Additionally, some cells that pledged allegiance to IS have previously published their own materials, such as in Bengal, the Philippines, Tunisia, Egypt and Azerbaijan.
[20] Wakeford and Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media.”
[21] Milton, Communication Breakdown. While these offices amplify the central narrative and maintain the illusion of territorial control, they are bound within a structure that showcases both centralised and decentralised elements. Still, they mirror the central ideology with a tangible sense of professional oversight.
[22] Wakeford and Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media.”
[23] Ibid.
[24] “‘Join the Ranks’ from the Islamic State,” Syria Focus, Youtube video, July 23, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140818025938/https:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=kxsPR-_fYnk.
[25] “ISIS Eyes Indonesian Youth With Lengthy Propaganda Video,” albawaba, May 17, 2016, https://www.albawaba.com/loop/isis-eyes-indonesian-youth-lengthy-propaganda-video-841534.
[26] Conor Cronin and Phuong Nguyen, “Recalibrating the Islamic State Threat in Southeast Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 7, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/recalibrating-islamic-state-threat-southeast-asia.
[27] Jasminder Singh, “Katibah Nusantara: Islamic State’s Malay Archipelago Combat Unit,” RSIS Commentary No. 126 (2015), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co15126-katibah-nusantara-islamic-states-malay-archipelago-combat-unit/.
[28] Nathaniel L. Moir, “ISIL Radicalization, Recruitment, and Social Media Operations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines,” PRISM, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2017), p. 96.
[29] Adri Wanto and Abdul Mateen Qadri, “Islamic State: Understanding the Threat in Indonesia and Malaysia,” RSIS Commentary No.231 (2015), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co15231-islamic-state-understanding-the-threat-in-indonesia-and-malaysia/.
[30] “Newborns for New Militants: Daesh Uses Baby to Recruit in Indonesia,” albawaba, August 8, 2015, https://www.albawaba.com/editorchoice/newborns-new-militants-daesh-uses-baby-recruit-indonesia-728202.
[31] Quinton Temby, Terrorism in Indonesia after “Islamic State” (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof-Ishak Institute, 2020), p. 3.
[32] This extended even beyond the material published by IS and its affiliates, as seen in the case of two Malaysian foreign fighters who were interviewed by Malaysian mainstream media via Facebook. See Shaul Shay, “The Islamic State and Its Allies In Southeast Asia,” International Institute for Counter-terrorism, October 2014, https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/IS-and-Allies-Shay-Oct-14.pdf.
[33] albawaba, “ISIS Eyes Indonesian Youth.” The video starts with accusations that Indonesia and the Philippines have long been under the control of ‘crusaders’. It claims that Muslims in both countries have been targeted by these ‘crusaders’ (showing images of Indonesian Muslims being arrested), while also claiming that SEA leaders are conspiring with the West (showing an image of President Jokowi shaking hands with then US President Obama). It then proceeds to provide a lengthy explanation on how this alleged dynamic has led to a shift in policies and laws in SEA away from shariah and towards the formation of taghut governments.
[34] Joshua Kurlantzick, “Southeast Asia – The Islamic State’s New Front?” Carnegie Council Asia Dialogues, October 4, 2016, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/series/asia/southeast-asia-the-islamic-states-new-front. A notable example is the 2016 video, “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsus” (The Impenetrable Edifice), which featured brutal acts by three fighters. This video, potentially crafted in Syria/Iraq and ascribed to the then newly minted ISIS Philippines media wing, remains impressive in its production value.
[35] “Wa-al-Aqibatu li-al-Muttaqin” (The Pious Will Have a Pleasant End), Wilayah Sharq Asia, June 22, 2019. See also “Spotlight on Global Jihad (June 20-26, 2019),” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, June 27, 2019, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-global-jihad-june-20-26-2019/.
[36] Baele et al., ISIS Propaganda; and Kadivar, “Daesh and the Power of Media and Message.”
[37] “Madhin Jihad al-Mukminin” (The Jihad of a Believer is Ongoing), Wilayah Sharq Asia, April 3, 2022.
[38] Zam Yusa, “A New Filipino Leader for Southeast Asia’s Islamic State,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/a-new-filipino-leader-for-southeast-asias-islamic-state/.
[39] Baele, et al., ISIS Propaganda; and Kadivar, “Daesh and the Power of Media and Message.”
[40] Based on ICPVTR’s research.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] “Suicide Attack Rocks Indonesia Church, Several Wounded,” Al Jazeera, March 28, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/28/suspected-suicide-attack-rocks-indonesia-church-many-wounded.
[45] Jordan Newton, “Indonesian Pro-IS Supporters on Social Media in 2022: Surviving Not Thriving,” Counter Terrorist Trends & Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2022), pp. 1-8.
[46] Based on ICPVTR’s research.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] “Ribat” denotes the act of guarding the frontline.
[50] “Multiple Pro-ISIS Outlets Continue Campaign Calling On Supporters To Wage Media Jihad,” MEMRI, June 13, 2023, https://www.memri.org/cjlab/multiple-pro-isis-outlets-continue-campaign-calling-supporters-wage-media-jihad.
[51] Based on ICPVTR’s research.
[52] Kenneth Yeo, “Rebranding the East Asia Knights: A Reflection of Dawlah Islamiyah’s Effort to Learn,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET) Insights, March 1, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/03/01/rebranding-the-east-asia-knights-a-reflection-of-dawlah-islamiyahs-effort-to-learn/.
[53] Kenneth Yeo, “ISIS Media Machine for Malaysia? ‘It’s More Like Forging Gale From Gust’,” SEA Militancy, March 19, 2023, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/al-malaka-media-centre-and-isis-forging.
[54] In March 2022, Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 halted the operation of An-Najiyah Media. See Teguh Firmansyah, “Densus 88 Bongkar Annajiyah Media Center, Pembuat Propaganda Teroris di Medsos,” Republika, March 24, 2022, https://news.republika.co.id/berita/r98uoj377/densus-88-bongkar-annajiyah-media-center-pembuat-propaganda-teroris-di-medsos.
[55] J.M. Berger and Heather Perez, “The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How Suspensions are Limiting the Social Networks of English-Speaking ISIS supporters,” George Washington University Program on Extremism Occasional Papers, February 2016.
[56] Yeo, “Rebranding the East Asia Knights.”
