Evolving Global Geopolitics and Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia: Past, Present and Future
This study examines terrorism’s evolution in South and Southeast Asia over the past two decades to decipher its trajectories in the era of great power competition. Specifically, it looks into terrorism’s evolution during two gamechanging events, the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 2012 Syrian conflict, and three episodic triggers of terrorism, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Taliban’s 2021 Afghan takeover and the 2023 Hamas-Israel Conflict. Despite losing eminence, terrorism has persisted and diversified in the past 20 years. Presently, religious terrorism, despite being weakened, co-exists with far right ethnonationalist terrorism as the fifth wave of terrorism crystallises. The examination of South and Southeast Asia’s threat landscapes reveals that global geopolitical developments have local consequences, and vice versa.
Introduction
As global geopolitics evolves from the era of the “global war on terror”[1] to the era of “great power competition”, terrorism has lost its pre-eminence.[2] However, terrorism has not only persisted, but it has also diversified and expanded.[3] Hamas’[4] coordinated October 7 attack last year against Israel and the ensuing Hamas-Israel tensions provide a stark reminder of its potent threat.[5] Whether the October 7 attack can shape future trajectories of terrorism, however, warrants further research.[6] Hence, as global attention and resources move away from counter terrorism, it is critical to revisit terrorism’s evolution and see how it currently manifests.
Terrorism and by extension terrorist groups do not operate in a geopolitical vacuum. Rather, they are by-products of sociopolitical and ethnic grievances, identity and ideological contestations, and economic marginalisation.[7] Furthermore, there is also a strong interplay between terrorism and geopolitics as major geopolitical events often influence the way terrorist groups recruit, propagandise and fund-raise.[8]
Viewing the current terrorist landscape through Rapoport’s “wave framework”, as the era of great power competition dawns, the fifth wave of terrorism where religious and ethnonationalist terrorism co-exist is crystallising.[9] Broadly, the religious wave of terrorism persists, albeit weakened, while the ethnonationalist wave, spearheaded by several far right groups, has resurged.[10] However, it remains to be seen whether this “dual co-existence” will become the norm in future terrorism waves.[11]
Against this backdrop, this study examines terrorism’s evolution in South and Southeast Asia vis-à-vis the shifting geopolitical sands of the past two decades. It categorises geopolitical developments into two broad categories: gamechangers[12] (9/11, the Syrian civil war and the rise of the Islamic State);[13] and episodic triggers (the COVID-19 pandemic, the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Hamas-Israel conflict). Using primary and secondary materials, it traces jihadism’s evolution in the two regions by looking at the ebbs and flows of its five strains: global, classical, revolutionary, irredentist and sectarian.[14]
The Impact of Geopolitical Gamechangers on Terrorism
Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s 9/11 Attacks
The 9/11 attacks and the ensuing developments marked an evolutionary turning point for global terrorism, especially in South and Southeast Asia. In Afghanistan, it triggered a new wave of terrorism in the country with far-reaching implications.[15] In the 1990s, irredentist and sectarian strains of terrorism dominated South Asia’s terrorism landscape. Following 9/11, global and classic strains of jihadism ascended – with the former aiming to create a self-styled global Sunni caliphate and the latter aiming to force the United States (US)’s forces to leave the Arabian Peninsula.[16]
Characteristically, new aspects in jihadism in South and Southeast Asia were observed. First was the unprecedented scale and frequency of suicide terrorism.[17] Following Pape’s observation,[18] suicide terrorism surged as the global war on terror escalated, especially in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.[19] Second, post-9/11 terrorism was different in its structures, aims and goals. Unlike the erstwhile jihadists who drew attention to their grievances and causes through selected violence and sought reforms in the political system or concessions from the governments, AQ’s aim was to overthrow the system altogether.[20]
Third, this phase of jihadist militancy also brought into sharp focus the challenge of fragile states and their strong correlation with terrorism.[21] The ungoverned spaces in different parts of Asia and Africa afforded safe havens to various jihadist groups – allowing them to evade counter terrorism pressure, regroup and restrategise their violent campaigns. For instance, after being ousted from Afghanistan, AQ and the Taliban’s remnants relocated to Pakistan’s tribal areas and relaunched their violent campaigns after absorbing the setbacks.[22]
South Asia also witnessed the emergence of new jihadist groups.[23] Notably, most jihadist militant groups in South Asia drew their guidelines from AQ’s ideology and tactics, notwithstanding that many are Deobandis while AQ is an adherent of Takfiri-Salafism. AQ popularised the notion of Ghazwa-e-Hind to capture the imagination and win the loyalties of South Asian jihadists.[24] As a result, anti-state or anti-establishment agendas became the major driving force behind post-9/11 militancy in South Asia. Indeed, almost all South Asian groups became signatories to Osama bin Laden’s global jihad declaration and respected AQ as the vanguard of jihadism.[25]
Coupled with the presence of the old groups, South Asia thus became home to the highest concentration of local, regional and global jihadist groups in the world.[26]
Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, AQ’s September 11 attacks had a polarising effect on the region’s terrorism landscape. On the one hand, it became a catalyst which pushed other Southeast Asian terrorist organisations to align their strategic priorities with the global jihadist movement – as exemplified by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s 2002 Bali bombings, which AQ helped fund and inspire.[27] Notably, the attack was a stark departure from JI’s operational priorities, which, up to that point, had largely focused on the Ambon and Poso sectarian conflicts.[28]
Despite internal debate within the organisation, JI continued to conduct attacks targeting Western symbols, with various levels of financial support from AQ.[29] In contrast, other regional terrorist organisations moved away from aligning themselves with the global jihadist movement. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), for example, a Philippines-based group that had received AQ training and funding from the 1980s up until 2000, quickly saw their ties as a liability and distanced itself from AQ following the September 11 attacks.[30]
The Syrian Conflict and the Rise of the Islamic State (IS)
With the onset of the Syrian civil war in the early 2010s and the rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS), the classic strain of jihadism subsided, and sectarian and global strains dominated the jihadist landscape.[31] Unlike AQ, which eschewed sectarian violence, IS greatly escalated the Sunni-Shia rivalry and successfully created a self-styled proto-caliphate between Iraq and Syria, a feat AQ never achieved.[32]
The Syrian civil war and IS’ rise combined had three effects on the evolution of terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. First, it resulted in an unprecedented rise of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Through IS’ call for Sunnis to pledge allegiance (bai’ah) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and perform hijrah (migration) to the self-styled caliphate in the Middle East, over 30,000 FTFs from 53 different countries mobilised to Syria.[33] The bonds FTFs formed under IS-controlled territories, coupled with their linkages with like-minded individuals in their respective home countries, facilitated travels of more individuals to the Middle East as well as new waves of terrorist attacks. After IS’ territorial defeat, some FTFs were repatriated to their home countries while 42,000-48,000 others, especially women and children, remain in north-eastern Syrian prison camps controlled by the Free Syrian Army.[34]
Second, the developments during this phase revived jihadist attacks in the West. IS leveraged its network of FTFs to mount these attacks, and as a result eclipsed AQ as the leader of the global jihadist movement.[35] Attacks in the West together with the control of territories and the slick use of social media for propaganda earned lS the loyalties of more jihadist groups through bai’ah.[36] Third, IS revolutionised terrorist communication and recruitment using social media.[37] During this period, the battlefield expanded from the real to the cyber world, putting serious limitations on state-driven, top-down counter terrorism initiatives and underscoring the pivotal role of civil society and social media companies in mitigating the risks of violent extremism.[38]
In South Asia, AQ largely held its ground against IS’ growing appeal, barring the rise of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), IS’ official franchise for the Khorasan region.[39] Initially, ISK comprised Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) breakaways. However, it grew to encompass rebel elements from the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and several Pakistani anti-Shia Sunni militant groups like Jandullah and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).[40] Through its multilingual social media propaganda and inclusive recruitment strategy, ISK created a niche appeal among South Asia’s urban, educated middle and upper-middle classes.[41] This is evident from the profiles of pro-IS militants involved in the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack,[42] the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings[43] and the 2015 Safodra Goth attack,[44] along with radicals from the Maldives and South India.[45]
IS’ ideological and operational ingress in South Asia also differed significantly from AQ’s influence. For instance, until 2012, jihadists from South Asia only travelled within the region and barely ventured outside. However, through IS’ influence, South Asian jihadists, albeit in low numbers, began travelling to Iraq and Syria. Additionally, IS’ inclusion of Deobandi militant groups also escalated pre-existing sectarian fault lines to a new level.[46] Consequently, almost all the major Sufi shrines across Pakistan were targeted by ISK, while the targeting of the Shia community expanded from Pakistan to Afghanistan.[47]
ISK exploited the fact that the Taliban rarely engage in sectarian feuds with the Shias and positioned itself as the main anti-Shia militant groups in Afghanistan.[48] As regards propaganda, ISK also unprecedentedly challenged the Taliban’s monopoly over South Asia’s jihadist landscape.[49] Notably, ISK criticised the Taliban for being soft on Shias and for staying silent on China’s repression of the Uyghur Muslims – making it difficult for the Taliban to show any leniency to the international community on several ideological positions it has taken in the past.[50]
Meanwhile, Southeast Asian groups’ waning desire to align with global jihadism was reinvigorated with the Syrian conflict in 2012 and the emergence of IS in 2014. This time, the realignment occurred more swiftly and extensively. Not only did the groups pledge loyalty to IS faster, but radical-minded Southeast Asians also displayed an unprecedented eagerness to travel to Syria and Iraq.[51] By 2015, over 18 Indonesian terrorist organisations had pledged their allegiance to IS, with many becoming key avenues for sending Indonesians to fight in Syria.[52] Groups, however, were not the only avenue of travel, as charismatic personalities also played a significant role – as exemplified by the case of Malaysia.[53]
Additionally, IS’ emergence also resulted in increased terrorist attacks in the region. Indeed, major Indonesian pro-IS groups became most active between 2015 and 2018. The Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, for instance, conducted multiple attacks each year from 2016 using female and family suicide bombers, as exemplified by the 2018 triple church bombing in Surabaya, East Java.[54] In the Philippines, pro-IS groups, led by Isnilon Hapilon and the Maute Group, used IS funds, fighting techniques and media strategies to capture and occupy the city of Marawi in 2017 for more than five months – resulting in the deaths of over 1,100 people.[55]
The Impact of Geopolitical Episodic Triggers on Terrorism
The COVID-19 Pandemic
The impact of COVID-19 on terrorism’s evolution was varied across peaceful and conflict-hit states. In peaceful states, such as in the West, terrorism declined during the pandemic.[56] Contrastingly, in conflict-hit states, COVID-19’s impact was twofold.[57] Conflict-hit states with strong governments mostly dealt with terrorist groups effectively, such as in India where the Maoist and Kashmiri insurgencies subsided. But conflict-affected states with weak governments, like Afghanistan, saw terrorism rise as they struggled in responding to the twin crises of health and security.[58] Regardless, jihadist groups across the ideological divide all tried to appropriate the pandemic into their propaganda narratives.[59]
On the operational front in South Asia, the impact was varied. As mentioned, the Kashmiri and Maoist insurgencies went dormant in India due to strong government control. However, there was no pause in terrorist attacks or the Taliban’s ground offensive in Afghanistan. In fact, COVID-19 also hastened the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and catapulted the Taliban back into power.[60] Similarly, ISK remained active, continuing its attacks against Afghanistan’s Hazara Shias and launching a major attack on the Nangarhar jail in August 2020.[61] Other militant groups like TTP and AQ quietly supported the Taliban’s ground offensive in Afghanistan to expand the group’s territorial control.
Southeast Asian groups’ response to COVID-19 was also varied. In the Philippines, emboldened by the pandemic, groups were keen on sustaining attacks.[62] In Indonesia, pro-IS groups incorporated COVID-19 into their propaganda and used it as a rallying cry to increase attacks.[63] Indeed, in the pandemic’s early stages, the Mujahidin of East Indonesia, a Sulawesi-based pro-IS group, stepped up its operations and conducted four attacks within two months.[64] As governments’ movement restrictions intensified and death tolls from the pandemic rose, however, Indonesian militants took a more “passive stance” and prioritised more inward-looking operations that benefitted members.[65]
The Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan
Indeed, the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 was a pivotal movement in the evolution of militant jihadism.[66] Their victory not only provided inspiration to but also served as a template for like-minded jihadist groups such as Hamas,[67] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Al-Shabaab.[68] It also resurrected jihadists’ belief in the ideological doctrine that with strategic patience and perseverance, the creation of a shariah state is possible.[69] However, these impacts mostly did not expand beyond affecting the groups’ psychological and spiritual beliefs.[70] Following the Taliban’s victory, groups like Pakistan’s TTP and Indonesia’s JI have since become inward-looking – focused on toppling their respective governments through violent and non-violent means.
In South Asia, the impact was varied across regions: it was most pronounced in Pakistan, but impacted other countries like India and Bangladesh only marginally.[71] Pakistan, for its own strategic myopia, suffered the most. Pakistan overlooked the long-standing ideological, ethnic and battlefield camaraderie between TTP and the Afghan Taliban, hoping the latter would help rein in the former.[72] However, not only did the Taliban term TTP as Pakistan’s internal matter and deny its presence in Afghanistan, they also refused to acknowledge the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as an internationally recognised frontier.[73] Instead, the Taliban’s return to power actually rejuvenated TTP, as violence in Pakistan surged by 73 percent because of the Taliban’s victory.[74]
Moreover, the Taliban’s offensive against ISK also pushed the latter’s remnants to Pakistan, where, in a bid to stay relevant, they have carried out large-scale attacks.[75] It needs to be noted, however, that the Taliban have not fully succeeded in diminishing ISK’s external attack capabilities.[76] Indeed, ISK’s history shows it has resilient regenerative capacity. For instance, despite being weakened, ISK’s external operations have remained intact, and the group has plotted/executed attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and as far as Iran, Turkey and Europe.[77] Contrary to ISK, other less active groups like AQ and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) are lying low while ideologically rehabilitating and re-establishing old networks.[78]
In Southeast Asia, the Taliban’s takeover resulted in the revitalisation of groups’ morale.[79] Their responses, however, never went beyond rhetorical support. Notably, Southeast Asia did not see an increase in terrorist activities caused by the Taliban’s victory. This is understandable, as by 2021, Southeast Asian groups were suffering heavy membership losses due to mass arrests. In Indonesia, for example, the police arrested over 1,200 terrorist suspects between 2018 and mid-2021.[80] In the Philippines, the security institutions are also far better trained and far more vigilant than they were several decades ago, preventing groups from operating effectively.[81] Hence, the Taliban’s victory did not result in the exchange of resources, skills and knowledge which could have increased attacks in the region.[82]
The Hamas-Israel Conflict Since Hamas’ October 7 Attack
Despite Israel’s occupation of Palestine always evoking strong sentiments from Muslims globally, the subject has never mobilised FTFs as the civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria did.[83] Indeed, both major global jihadist groups, AQ and IS, have their own mixed positions on Palestine – keeping in view their ideological differences with Hamas’ embrace of democracy, territorial nationalism and Iran allyship. IS, for instance, labels Hamas as apostate for taking assistance from Iran, and while AQ praised Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades for the October 7 attack, it has also criticised Hamas’ political wing.[84]
Both groups’ positions on the current Hamas-Israel tensions should be understood as a means to fuel fresh recruits and inspire attacks against their respective adversaries, while also highlighting their respective positions in the Middle East’s evolving geopolitical landscape.[85] For instance, both IS and AQ believe that the path to Jerusalem’s conquest goes through the establishment of a self-styled caliphate in the Middle East, where certain Arab monarchical regimes have supported Israel.[86] To achieve this, IS believes that instead of directly attacking Israel, targeting Jews living in the West would be more effective in cutting off Israel’s support.[87] Likewise, AQ has also tried to profit from the Hamas-Israel war by broadening the conflict and mobilising jihadists to carry out attacks in the West.[88]
At the regional level, groups’ response to the conflict varied as they tried to frame the event within their respective strategic priorities and ideological frameworks. In South Asia, AQIS gave the most elaborate coverage of the Hamas-Israel conflict.[89] Notably, the group ranked Hamas’ October 7 attack alongside the 9/11 attack and the Taliban’s 2021 victory, and urged Muslims to target Israeli interests and allies around the world – portraying itself as the champion of global Muslim resistance movements in the process.[90] Likewise, TTP also termed the October 7 attack as a great victory for Hamas while drawing a parallel with its own militant campaign against Pakistan and implying that steadfastness, as shown by Hamas, can overawe even the most powerful enemy.[91] However, TTP’s tone was cautious as it also went to great lengths in reassuring the world it is a Pakistan-centric group which poses no threat to the international community.[92]
Similarly, the Taliban regime also adopted a circumspect position to the Hamas-Israel tensions – condemning Israel’s disproportionate use of force while urging Muslim rulers and the international community to halt atrocities in Gaza and take action against Israel’s war crimes.[93] This calculated response was aimed at showcasing itself as a responsible state and member of the international community, notwithstanding that no state has recognised its regime. ISK, on the other hand, incorporated the tensions into the framework of its ongoing ideological rivalry with the Taliban. ISK lambasted the Taliban for taking a soft stance on Palestine, accusing the latter of being the US’ lackey.[94] ISK also criticised Hamas and its supporters, Iran and Qatar, while reinforcing IS’ message that a self-styled Sunni caliphate is the only durable solution to the occupation of Muslim lands.[95]
In Southeast Asia, groups gave largely muted responses to the conflict as they focused more of their attention on their respective domestic theatres. In the Philippines, while terrorist groups expressed sympathies with Hamas and the Palestinian people, no further actions were made as they are currently either too fragmented to launch an organised response or too focused on the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region and the Muslim Mindanao peace process.[96] Amongst Indonesian terrorist milieus, the Hamas-Israel conflict elicited a mixed, mostly online response. Indonesian pro-AQ sympathisers, for example, generally expressed strong backing for Hamas.[97] However, pro-IS communities on social platforms combined their hopes for a Palestinian victory over Israel with criticisms of Hamas, highlighting concerns about Hamas’ failure to implement shariah in Gaza and its focus on territorial nationalism.
Conclusion
Bifurcating notable geopolitical developments of the past two decades into two broad categories of gamechangers and episodic triggers, this study examined their impact on terrorism’s evolution in South and Southeast Asia. It is evident that the 9/11 attacks, which heralded the era of global jihadism, and the Syrian civil war, which saw the rise of IS, were gamechanging events that left indelible impacts on terrorism’s evolution. On the contrary, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Taliban’s Afghanistan takeover and the Hamas-Israel conflict were episodic triggers which mobilised violence and boosted terrorist propaganda temporarily, but were taken over by other events as the geopolitical climate evolved.
As global geopolitics enters the era of great power competition, however, it remains a moot point how terrorism will evolve. In this regard, two contrarian but equally compelling arguments exist. One argues that terrorism will be used as a proxy tool, as witnessed during the Cold War. The other upholds that the presence of apocalyptic groups like AQ and IS will discourage the US, Russia and China from using terrorist groups as their proxies. In fact, much like how the US and Russia previously cooperated with each other on nuclear non-proliferation to avoid mutually assured destruction, counter terrorism could offer them another window of cooperation. Nonetheless, below the threshold of national security, the possibility of using terrorists for sabotage and disruption remains open.
Additionally, while the current state of global terrorism’s fifth wave sees the co-existence of both religious and far right ethnonationalist groups, it requires closer observation and more in-depth research to assess whether it will sustain in the future. If this co-existence does sustain, the challenge of reciprocal radicalisation is hard to rule out. Concurrently, as a plethora of far right groups in the West have developed a staunch anti-establishment attitude, several jihadist groups have also become inward-looking. Hence, the revolutionary strain of terrorism is likely to dominate the future terrorism landscape. However, this does not mean other strains will become less relevant – they will likely co-exist, but in a less pronounced manner.
About the Authors
Abdul Basit and Alif Satria are Senior Associate Fellow and Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Emad-el-byed-FG AIoyhwZc on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Ben Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era is Over,” The Atlantic, April 6, 2020,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/its-not-september-12-anymore/609502/.
[2] Michael J. Boyle, “Counterterrorism in an Era of Great Power Politics,” Science Direct, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2022), pp. 184-200.
[3] United Nations Security Council, Terrorist Groups Remain Significant Threat in Conflict Zones, Neighbouring States, Senior Official Tells Security Council, Noting Force Alone Can Exacerbate Matters, SC/15396, August 25, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15396.doc.htm; Catrina Doxsee, Alexander Palmer and Riley McCabe, Global Terrorism Threat Assessment 2024 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024), p. 4, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-02/240208_Doxsee_Global_Terrorism.pdf.
[4] Hamas stands for the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya.
[5] Cole Bunzel, “Gaza and Global Jihad: Why the HAMAS-Israel War Is Unlikely to Revive ISIS and al Qaeda,” Foreign Affairs, November 2, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/gaza-and-global-jihad.
[6] Colin Clarke, “Could HAMAS Become a Global Threat?” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/19/hamas-terrorism-threat-global-europe-germany-arrests/#.
[7] Steven M. Radil and Colin Flint, “The Geopolitics of Religious Terrorism,” in The Changing World Religion Map: Sacred Places, Identities, Practices and Politics, ed. Stanley D. Brunn (New York: Springer, 2013), pp. 2-5, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237077063; Steven M. Radil and Colin Flint, “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Situating al-Qaeda and the Global War on Terror within Geopolitical Trends and Structures,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2009), pp. 150-171.
[8] Clay Schrader, Terrorism and Geopolitics (New Delhi: Vij Books India Private Limited, 2017), pp. 12-20; Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism a Continuing Threat,” Contemporary Voices, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2020), pp. 42-46; Daniel Bayman, “Geopolitical Game Changers and Their Impact on Global Terrorism,” in Routledge Handbook of Transnational Terrorism, ed. Nicholas Stockhammer (London: Routledge, 2024), pp. 22-31.
[9] David C. Rapoport, Waves of Global Terrorism: From 1879 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022), pp. 269-306; Or Honig and Ido Yahel, “A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2019), pp. 1210-1288; Vincent A. Auger, “Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave? Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2020), pp. 87-97; James H. Hess, John P. Dolan and Paul A. Falkenstein, “The Fifth Wave of Modern Terrorism: Perpetual Grievances,” American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2020), pp. 128-138.
[10] Katarzyna Czornik and Monika Szynol, “Between the Fourth and Fifth Waves: The Evolution of Modern Terrorism,” Studia Polityczne, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2022), pp. 139-162.
[11] C. Dale Walton, “Not Only Islamism: Great Power Politics and the Future of Terrorism,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, No. 1, (200), pp. 21-37.
[12] Byman, “Geopolitical Game Changers.” The term geopolitical gamechanger has been adopted from this work, but the authors’ categorisation of events is different.
[13] The article recognises that the first gamechanging event of jihadism is in fact the 1980s Afghan Mujahideen’s fight in Afghanistan. It was through that event that the ideology and networks of global jihad were first disseminated into South and Southeast Asian groups. However, due to the thematic and word constraints of the series, this article will not discuss it. For more on the Afghan Mujahideen’s impact to South and Southeast Asia, see Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Quest to Understand Global Jihad: The Terrorism Industry and Its Discontents,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, (2009), pp. 329-338; Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan’s Resurgent Sectarian War,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2014, p. 2, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB180-Pakistan-Resurgent-Sectarian-War.pdf; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010), pp. 17-25; Nasir Abbas, Membongkar Jemaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2005), pp. 45-46; Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 90-91; Julie Chernov Hwang and Kirsten E. Schulze, “Indonesian Jihadi Training Camps: Home and Away,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2024), p. 5, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2296235.
[14] Revolutionary jihadism aims to overthrow regimes; sectarian jihadism focuses on targeting Shias; irridentist jihadism seeks to separate “Muslim lands” from “non-Muslim rule”; classical jihadism focuses on ousting non-Muslim forces from Muslim lands; and global jihadism aims to overthrow the US-led world order. These terms have been borrowed from Tricia Bacon, “The Jihadist Landscape Amidst Israel-HAMAS War: Five Critical Factors,” International Counterterrorism Centre, December 7, 2023, https://www.icct.nl/publication/jihadist-landscape-amidst-israel-hamas-war-five-critical-factors.
[15] Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 9 (2008), pp. 775-807.
[16] Bacon, “The Jihadist Landscape Amidst Israel-HAMAS War.”
[17] Michael C. Horowitz, “The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2015), pp. 69-84; Meagan Smith and Sean M. Zeigler, “Terrorism Before and After 9/11 – A More Dangerous World?” Research and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2017), pp.1-8, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017739757.
[18] Robert Pape observed that suicide terrorism is largely directly proportional to asymmetric conflicts and vice versa. See more in Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 30-32.
[19] Assaf Moghadam, “Shifting Trends in Suicide Attacks,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2009), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss1-Art4.pdf.
[20] Ulf Brüggemann, “Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: Objectives, Threat, Countermeasures,” Federal Academy of Social Policy, January 1, 2016, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22199.
[21] Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2011), p. 17.
[22] Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan.”
[23] These include the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Indian Mujahideen (IM), the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), among others.
[24] Ghazwa-e-Hind (The Battle of India) refers to a disputed eschatological narrative of a great battle between believers and non-believers in the Indian subcontinent towards the end of times, resulting in the former’s victory. See more in Hussain Haqqani, “Prophecy & the Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent,” Hudson Institute, March 27, 2015, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/prophecy-the-jihad-in-the-indian-subcontinent.
[25] Farhan Zahid, “Al-Qaeda’s Future in Pakistan Amid the Rise of Islamic State,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 12, No. 20 (2014), https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaedas-future-in-pakistan-amid-the-rise-of-islamic-state/; Thomas F. Lynch III, “The Impact of ISIS on Global Salafism and South Asian Jihad,” Hudson Institute, August 15, 2015, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-impact-of-isis-on-global-salafism-and-south-asian-jihad.
[26] M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat, “Contextualising Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia,” in Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia: National, Regional and Global Implications, eds. M. Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat (New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 3-20; Arif Rafiq, “The Evolving Jihad in South Asia,” The Diplomat, April 7, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-evolving-jihad-in-south-asia/.
[27] There were other attempts prior to the September 11 attack in which AQ coordinated with Southeast Asian groups to conduct attacks, notably the 1995 Bojinka Plot and JI’s attempts in 1997 to attack shuttle buses which transported US military personnel in Singapore, but they all failed. See more in Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 106-139; “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia,” International Crisis Group, August 8, 2002, p. 2; Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “Revisiting the Early Al Qaeda Years: An Updated Account on its Formative Years,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2012), p. 24; Kumar Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiyah 20 Years After the Bali Bombings: Continuity and Change,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 5 (2022), pp. 1-6, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-14-issue-05/; “Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 94, July 24, 2009, p. 6; Justin Magouirk, Scott Atran and Marc Sageman, “Connecting Terrorist Networks,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2008), p. 8; Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah, trans. Dave McRae (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013), p. 188; Tricia Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 183.
[28] That said, JI’s adoption of the global jihadist movement’s priorities of targeting the far enemy did not fully replace their original operational priorities of targeting the near enemy. In fact, following the 2002 Bali bombings, JI underwent intense internal debates over whether participating in the global jihad was worth the popular backlash and security pressure. See more in Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, p. 192.
[29] This included the 2003 JW Marriott bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings. See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database 1970 – 2021 (2022), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[30] Abuza, Militant Islam, p. 99; “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” International Crisis Group, Report No. 80 (2004), p. 22. The MILF, which was then in the midst of peace talks with the Philippines’ Arroyo government, stated that they refused to answer Osama bin Laden’s call to wage jihad against the US as their efforts were directed towards the peace process in Mindanao.
[31] Bacon, “The Jihadist Landscape Amidst Israel-HAMAS War.”
[32] “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf.
[33] Richard Barret, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees (New York: The Soufan Center, 2017), https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf; “ISIS chief calls on world’s Muslims to move to ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq, Syria,” France 24, July 1, 2014, https://www.france24.com/en/20140701-isis-calls-muslims-worldwide-immigrate-caliphate-iraq-syria. Additionally, there were also many Shias that came to defend Shia holy sites in Syria as a result of the Iranian regime’s fatwa. See more in Jamie Dettmer, “Number of Shia Fighters in Syria Could Rise Following Fatwa,” VoA, December 16, 2013, https://www.voanews.com/a/number-of-shia-fighters-in-syria-could-rise-following-fatwa/1811638.html.
[34] Jo Becker and Letta Tayler, “Revictimizing the Victims: Children Unlawfully Detained in Northeast Syria,” Human Rights Watch, January 27, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/27/revictimizing-victims-children-unlawfully-detained-northeast-syria; Mona Thakkar and Anne Speckhard, “Breaking the Walls: The Threat of ISIS Resurgence as Social Media Fuels Fundraising in ISIS Women’s Camps,” Homeland Security Today, March 22, 2022, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/breaking-the-walls-the-threat-of-isis-resurgence-as-social-media-fuels-fundraising-in-isis-womens-camps/; Charlie Winter and Abdullah Alrahmoun, “A Prison Attack and the Death of its Leader: Weighing Up the Islamic State’s Trajectory in Syria,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2022), pp. 19-25, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CTC-SENTINEL-022022.pdf. The abysmal conditions of these camps are increasing the risk of prisoners’ re-radicalisation as their home countries are still grappling with the legal, ethical and potential security challenges of their repatriation, and IS has tried to invade these prisons multiple times to free them. It bears mention that freeing prisoners from jails is a major plank of IS’ strategy to replenish its shrinking numbers.
[35] Karen Yourish, Derek Watkins and Tom Giratikanon, “Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks Around the World,” The New York Times, March 22, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html.
[36] Edith M. Lederer, “34 Militant Groups Allegedly Pledge Allegiance to ISIS, UN Chief Says,” Military Times, February 8, 2016, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/02/08/34-militant-groups-allegedly-pledge-allegiance-to-isis-un-chief-says/; Priyanka Boghani, “What a Pledge of Allegiance to ISIS Means,” PBS, November 12, 2014, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-a-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis-means/.
[37] Laura Wakeford and Laura Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media: Dissemination, Support, and Resilience,” in ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message, eds. Stephane J. Baele, Katharine A. Boyd and Travis G. Coan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp.155-187.
[38] “Hashtag Terror: How ISIS Manipulates Social Media,” ADL, July 11, 2014, https://www.adl.org/resources/report/hashtag-terror-how-isis-manipulates-social-media.
[39] Later, IS would announce two separate affiliates for India and Pakistan, the so-called Islamic State of Hind and the Islamic State of Pakistan. See more in “ISIS Claims ‘Province’ in India for First Time After Clash in Kashmir,” The Straits Times, May 11, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/isis-claims-province-in-india-for-first-time-after-clash-in-kashmir; Ayaz Gul, “Islamic State Announces Pakistan Province,” VoA, May 16, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-announces-pakistan-province/4918903.html.
[40] Taimoor Shah and Joseph Goldstein, “Taliban Fissures in Afghanistan Are Seen as an Opening for ISIS,” The New York Times, January 21, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/asia/taliban-fissures-in-afghanistan-are-seen-as-an-opening-for-isis.html; Abdul Basit, “IS Penetration in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2017), pp. 19-39.
[41] Viraj Solanki, “The Increasing Presence of ISIS in South Asia,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, June 1, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2019/06/isis-south-asia.
[42] “Daesh Gunmen in Dhaka Attack Were ‘Well Educated Wealthy Kids’: Officials,” Daily Sabah, July 4, 2016, https://www.dailysabah.com/asia/2016/07/04/daesh-gunmen-in-dhaka-attack-were-well-educated-wealthy-kids-officials.
[43] “Sri Lanka Attacks: Bomber Studied in UK and Australia,” BBC News, April 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48035043.
[44] Madeeha Anwar, “Pakistan’s Emerging Threat: Highly Educated Youth Gravitate to Radicalization,” VoA, May 6, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-emerging-threat-highly-educated-youth-gravitate-to-radicalization/3840686.html.
[45] Sanjeev Miglani and Nidhi Verma, “India Police Detain Man Said to Be Behind Pro-Islamic State Twitter Posts,” Reuters, December 13, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-twitter-india-idUKKBN0JR05120141213/.
[46] “A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 327, September 5, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/327%20Pakistan%20-%20Sectarian%20Violence%20-%20Print.pdf.
[47] “Pakistan: IS Attack on Sufi Shrine in Sindh Kills Dozens,” BBC News, February 17, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38994318; Alia Chughtai, “Attack on Shrines in Pakistan Since 2005,” Al Jazeera, February 19, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/2/19/attack-on-shrines-in-pakistan-since-2005.
[48] “Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on Shia,” Human Rights Watch, October 25, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/25/afghanistan-surge-islamic-state-attacks-shia. In retaliation, the Taliban assured the Hazara Shia community in Afghanistan that they would protect its individuals and interests. See more in Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Taliban Reach Out to Shiite Hazara Minority, Seeking Unity and Iran Ties,” The Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-reach-out-to-shiite-hazara-minority-seeking-unity-and-iran-ties-11630599286.
[49] Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines and Abdul Sayed, “The Evolving Taliban-ISK rivalry,” Lowy Institute, September 7, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-rivalry.
[50] Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani and Charmaine Willis, “Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2018), pp. 23-29, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042018-3.pdf.
[51] Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate: Mapping Malaysian Foreign Fighter Networks in Iraq and Syria from 2012-2019,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2023), p. 1502; Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2015), p. 155.
[52] Muh Taufiqurrohman, “The Road to ISIS: How Indonesian Jihadist Travel to Syria and Iraq,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2015), pp. 18-19.
[53] Dass and Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate,” pp. 1502-1503.
[54] Kirsten E. Schulze, “The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, No. 6 (2018), pp. 1-2, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/surabaya-bombings-evolution-jihadi-threat-indonesia/; Nava Nuraniyah, “Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 30, No. 6 (2018), pp. 904-905.
[55] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Marawi, the East Asia Wilayah and Indonesia,” IPAC Report, No. 38 (2017), p. 8; Robert Postings, “A Guide to the Islamic State’s Way fo Urban Warfare,” Modern War Institute, July 9, 2018, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/guide-islamic-states-way-urban-warfare/; Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani and Charmaine Willis, “Rising in the East: The Evolution of the Islamic State in the Philippines,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 30, 2020, p. 8; “Philippines: Battle of Marawi Leaves Trail of Death and Destruction,” Amnesty International, November 17, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/11/philippines-battle-of-marawi-leaves-trail-of-death-and-destruction/.
[56] United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism: Update, December 2021, p. 2, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Dec/cted_covid19_paper_dec_2021.pdf.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Abdul Basit, “The COVID-19 Pandemic: An Opportunity for Terrorist Groups?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 12, No, 3 (2020), pp. 7-12, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-12-issue-03/.
[60] Mujib Mashal, “Taliban and U.S. Strike Deal to Withdraw American Troops From Afghanistan,” The New York Times, August 23, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/world/asia/us-taliban-deal.html.
[61] ISK’s attack on the Nangarhar jail was consistent with IS’ policy of prison breaks during the pandemic. See more in Ayesha Tanzeem, “Islamic State Attack on Afghan Prison Lasts 20 Hours, Kills 29,” VoA, August 3, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_islamic-state-attack-afghan-prison-lasts-20-hours-kills-29/6193833.html; Thakkar and Speckhard, “Breaking the Walls.”
[62] The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), for example, attacked three army detachments on May 2020, displacing more than 6,000 villagers. See Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Jani, “Covid-19 and Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: More Trouble Ahead,” The Diplomat, August 26, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/covid-19-and-terrorism-in-the-southern-philippines-more-trouble-ahead/.
[63] Pro-IS groups specifically referenced China for its treatment of Muslim Uyghurs, and the West. See more in Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia,” Short Briefing, No. 1 (2020), pp. 5-6.
[64] Sidney Jones, “COVID-19 and Extremism in Southeast Asia,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2020), pp. 3-4.
[65] Ark Group, The Impact of COVID-19: On Terrorism and Extremism Narratives (Abu Dhabi: Hedayah, 2022), p. 11, https://hedayah.com/app/uploads/2022/11/Impact-of-Pandemic-on-VE_2021_Southeast-Asia.pdf; Zachary Abuza and Alif Satria, “How Are Indonesian Extremists Weathering the Pandemic?” The Diplomat, June 23, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/how-are-indonesias-terrorist-groups-weathering-the-pandemic/.
[66] “How Islamist Militants Elsewhere View the Taliban’s Victory in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group, October 27, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/how-islamist-militants-elsewhere-view-talibans-victory-afghanistan.
[67] Khaled Abu Toameh, “HAMAS congratulates Taliban for defeating US,” The Jerusalem Post, August 16, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/hamas-congratulates-taliban-for-defeating-us-676851.
[68] “America’s Flight From Afghanistan Will Embolden Jihadists Around the World,” The Economist, August 28, 2021, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/08/28/americas-flight-from-afghanistan-will-embolden-jihadists-around-the-world.
[69] Kobi Michael and Yoel Guzansky, “How Afghanistan Influences HAMAS, PIJ, and Iran in their Approach to Israel,” Fikra Forum, August 24, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-afghanistan-influences-hamas-pij-and-iran-their-approach-israel.
[70] Europol, Online Jihadist Propaganda: 2021 in Review (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022), pp. 42-47, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Online_Jihadist_Propaganda_2021_in_review.pdf.
[71] Iftekharul Bashar and Kalicharan Veera Singam, “Beyond Af-Pak: Varied Impacts of the Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan in the Rest of South Asia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 4 (August 2022), pp. 16-21, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-14-issue-04/.
[72] Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2023), pp. 1-12, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/CTC-SENTINEL-052023.pdf.
[73] “Afghan Taliban Reject TTP Claim of Being a ‘Branch of IEA,” Dawn, December 11, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1663185.
[74] “Terror Attacks Increased By 73 Percent in Pakistan Since Taliban Takeover,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies, May 31, 2023, https://www.pakpips.com/article/7646.
[75] Alexander Palmer, “The Islamic State Threat in Pakistan: Trends and Scenarios,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, August 3, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/islamic-state-threat-pakistan-trends-and-scenarios; Adam Rousselle, “Pakistan Under Threat: Why ISKP’s Online Campaign Against Pakistan is a Global Concern,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, February 1, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/02/01/pakistan-under-threat-why-iskps-online-campaign-against-pakistan-is-a-global-concern/.
[76] Aaron Y. Zelin, “ISKP Goes Global: External Operations from Afghanistan,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 11, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan.
[77] Dan Lamothe and Joby Warrick, “Afghanistan Has Become a Terrorism Staging Ground Again, Leak Reveals,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/; Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines and Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Next Afghan Jihad? Taliban Efforts to Contain ISKP,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/next-afghan-jihad-taliban-efforts-contain-iskp; Lucas Webber and Ricardo Valle, “The Islamic State’s Central Asian Contingents and Their International Threat,” Hudson Institute, October 16, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat.
[78] While the Taliban takeover’s impact has largely remained spiritual and psychological, in the US’ absence and the Taliban’s limited counter terrorism capabilities, its long-lasting impact on terrorist networks’ rehabilitation is hard to rule out. See Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda leaders are prominently serving in Taliban government,” Long War Journal, June 11, 2023, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/06/11/al-qaeda-leaders-are-prominently-serving-in-taliban-government/.
[79] Zachary Abuza, “Taliban Return May Revitalize Southeast Asian Terrorist Groups,” BenarNews, August 16, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/asean-security-watch/taliban-abuza-08162021185452.html.
[80] Alif Satria, “For Indonesia’s Terror Groups, Taliban Victory Models Long-Term Success,” BenarNews, August 23, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/id-taliban-08232021182153.html.
[81] Sidney Jones, “Has The Taliban’s Victory Heightened the Terrorism Threat in Southeast Asia?” The Strategist, September 23, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/has-the-talibans-victory-heightened-the-terrorism-threat-in-southeast-asia/.
[82] Satria, “For Indonesia’s Terror Groups.”
[83] Bacon, “The Jihadist Landscape Amidst Israel-HAMAS War.”
[84] Ilana Winter, “Islamic State’s Response to October 7,” Fikra Forum, February 9, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-states-response-october-7; Ali Mamouri, “Why Islamic State Has No Sympathy For HAMAS,” Al-Monitor, July 19, 2014, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/07/islamic-state-fighting-hamas-priority-before-israel.html; Mary Habeck, “Al-Qa`ida and HAMAS,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010), pp. 5-7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss2-art2.pdf.
[85] Peter Smith and Lucas Webber, “The Israel-HAMAS War and Resurgent Jihadist Threats to Europe and the United States,” Lawfare, February 18, 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-israel-hamas-war-and-resurgent-jihadist-threats-to-europe-and-the-united-states.
[86] Bunzel, “Gaza and Global Jihad.”
[87] As Tricia Bacon noted, IS follows the medieval Muslim warrior Saladin Ayubi’s pathway – he destroyed the Fatimid Empire in Egypt in 1187 before taking back Jerusalem. See Bacon, “The Jihadist Landscape Amidst Israel-HAMAS War”;Tore Hamming, “The Beginning of a New Wave? The HAMAS-Israel War and the Terror Threat in the West,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, No. 10 (2023), pp. 27-33, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-beginning-of-a-new-wave-the-hamas-israel-war-and-the-terror-threat-in-the-west/.
[88] Jason Burke, “Al-Qaida and IS Call on Followers to Strike Israeli, US and Jewish Targets,” The Guardian, October 22, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/22/al-qaida-and-is-call-on-followers-to-strike-israeli-us-and-jewish-targets.
[89] AQIS has issued three statements, a podcast and a special 177-page issue of its flagship Urdu-language monthly magazine, Nawai Ghazwat Hind. See more in “Operation Storm Al-Aqsa: A Special Issue,” Nawai Gahzwat Hind (October-November 2023); Abdul Sayed, “Israel–HAMAS War’s Impact on Afghan and Pakistani Jihadist Ecosystem,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2024), https://jamestown.org/program/israel-hamas-wars-impact-on-afghan-and-pakistani-jihadist-ecosystem/.
[90] “New Video From AQIS Leader Ustad Usama Mahmood Addresses Muslims Over Conflict in Gaza,” The Khorasan Diary, January 14, 2014, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/01/14/tkd-monitoring-new-video-from-aqis-leader-ustad-usama-mahmood-addresses-muslims-over-conflict-in-gaza.
[91] TTP also did a podcast on the issue, along with covering it in its monthly Urdu-language magazine, Mujallah Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, in November 2023. See Sayed, “Israel–HAMAS War’s Impact”; Mufti Ghufran, “Thirty-Five-Hundred-Year History of Zionists: The Secret of Their Eternal Humiliation and Defeat,” Mujallah Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (November 2023), pp. 24-26.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Akmal Dawi, “Taliban Leaders Conspicuously Silent on Israel-HAMAS War in Gaza,” VoA, October 18, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-leaders-conspicuously-silent-on-israel-hamas-war-in-gaza/7316729.html; “Taliban: We Strongly Condemn the Atrocities of the Zionists – Stop the Genocide in Gaza,” Bbabo Net, February 13, 2024, https://bbabo.net/en-GB/article/news/4740867-taliban-we-strongly-condemn-the-atrocities-of; Supreme Court of Afghanistan (@SupremeCourt_af), “The declaration of the Supreme Court on the brutal air and ground attacks and atrocities of Zionist Israel on Palestine,” X, November 5, 2023, https://twitter.com/SupremeCourt_af/status/1721064707103072273?s=20.
[94] “ISKP Booklet Criticises Afghan Taliban for Maintaining International Relations in Light of the Ongoing Conflict in Gaza,” The Khorasan Diary, January 28, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/01/28/tkd-monitoring-ISKP-booklet-criticises-afghan-taliban-for-maintaining-international-relations-in-light-of-the-ongoing-conflict-in-gaza.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Zam Yuza, “How Will Southeast Asian Terror Groups Capitalize on the Israel-HAMAS War?” The Diplomat, November 16, 2023 https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/how-will-southeast-asian-terror-groups-capitalize-on-the-israel-hamas-war/.
[97] Benjamin Mok and Saddiq Basha, “Digital Shadows: Key Trends in Online Extremist Narratives and Activities in 2023,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2024), pp. 98-99, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/digital-shadows-key-trends-in-online-extremist-narratives-and-activities-in-2023/.
