From Jihad Tanzim to Jihad Fardiyah: The Renewed Emphasis on Individual Jihad among Pro-IS Militants in Indonesia
While the threat of pro-Islamic State (IS) groups in Indonesia has largely diminished following widespread leadership arrests in 2018, new pro-IS cells have continued to emerge in recent years. These cells exist as small operations comprising one to five individuals, a noticeable shift from the large-scale networks of pro-IS operations in the past. The decision to operate as small cells is not arbitrary – it is rooted in the doctrine of jihad fardiyah (individual jihad), a competing doctrine with jihad tanzim (organised jihad) which prioritises organisation-building. By examining both doctrines, we can gain a clearer understanding of pro-IS groups’ goals and their potential future trajectory. This article applies the jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah framework to Indonesian pro-IS supporters over the years, including recent key developments. Moving forward, the deliberate and persistent use of jihad fardiyah will likely rise, driven by IS central’s increased emphasis on individual attacks and prevailing environmental pressures. In Indonesia, a hybridised approach is likely to emerge in the form of large pro-IS networks consisting of small, insulated cells.
Introduction
Islamist terror groups over time have typically shuttled between two key schools of thought, jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah, depending on subjective organisational goals, capabilities, and guiding ideology. Jihad fardiyah[1] refers to the practice of individual jihad. The idea of jihad fardiyah was proposed by Al-Qaeda (AQ) ideologues Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Qatada al-Filistini. Al-Suri campaigned for decentralised, “non-hierarchical networks”, as he believed organisations restricted the growth of the jihadi movement.[2] Similarly, al-Filistini argued that individual jihad is obligatory for all Muslims, and “did not require the permission of their organisation”.[3] Both believe that jihad goals are best achieved through qital nikayah (repeated strikes to weaken the enemy),[4] achieved more easily through isolated individual cells. Though the size of cells is never explicitly stated, they usually range from one to five members in practice.
In jihad fardiyah, the role of central leadership, including the amir (leader) of the movement, is diminished. The central leadership’s role is only to provide a “common aim, the common name, a programme of beliefs and a method of education”.[5] Abu Musab al-Suri described this movement as “nizam, la tanzim”, meaning system, not organisation,[6] referring to the non-necessity of a top-down chain of command. The jihad fardiyah doctrine for “leaderless resistance” was widely disseminated through al-Suri’s 2004 “Call for Worldwide Islamic Resistance” manifesto,[7] and was consistently promoted through AQ’s Inspire magazine after al-Suri’s arrest in 2005.[8] Later, the jihad fardiyah doctrine was also adopted by influential IS ideologues such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,[9] who laid the foundation for Al Qaeda in Iraq and subsequently, the birth of IS.[10]
In contrast to jihad fardiyah, some militants were proponents of jihad tanzim (organised jihad), which typically takes the form of qital tamkin i.e. seizing territory to build a secure base from which the group can apply Islamic law.[11] Because the goal is to control a territory from which the group can govern, attacks are thus planned systematically to bolster the overarching goal of gaining territory and support, to maintain the organisation’s longevity.
From the explanation above, the differences between jihad fardiyah and jihad tanzim can be seen in: (1) command structure, that is, either a hierarchical chain of command or decentralised cell network; (2) method and frequency of attacks; (3) size of cells; and (4) importance of seizing territory. Choosing one doctrine over the other impacts the movement’s priority and subsequent activities. In the Indonesian context, proclivity for jihad tanzim or jihad fardiyah has consistently fluctuated. At various junctures, either camp would emerge as the preferred modality of jihad, “in response to environmental pressures” and circumstantial perceptions.[12]
The failure of the Aceh militant training camp experiment in 2010 is a distinct example of how Indonesian pro-IS supporters have oscillated between jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah based on the practical aspects of feasibility and continued survival. The camp, originally initiated by former Bali bomber, Dulmatin, sought to bring together militants from disparate schools of jihad tanzim and fardiyah to collectively calibrate a ‘frontal’ style of jihad against government forces.[13] He was particularly interested in claiming secure parcels of territory to govern from, with the intention of waging war against the government and implementing Islamic law.
Ultimately, the camp dissolved in February 2010 following stringent counterterrorism operations, which included the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and other senior JAT leaders, as well as the decimation of Ring Banten[14], a group that was responsible for the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004.[15] Jihad fardiyah was consequently upheld as the ideal path forward within Indonesia’s jihadi sphere in order to better evade detection and circumvent group-related arrests.[16] The concept was also used as a justification by factions that wanted to carry out attacks despite their wider organisation’s stance against attacks in Indonesia – the prominent militant Noordin M. Top often used jihad fardiyah as a justification for continuously carrying out attacks without Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s leadership approval.[17]
The brief discussion above illustrates how scholars have examined the unfolding of the jihad fardiyah vs jihad tanzim dilemma among Islamist groups in the past. However, there has been little systematic application of the framework to Indonesian IS supporters, particularly in recent years.
Doctrinal Differences among Indonesian IS Supporters
Like other terror groups, pro-IS militants in Indonesia have also internally debated the merits of organised and individual jihad. While pro-IS groups can be characteristically defined by their (1) swearing of allegiance (baiat) to former IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; (2) strong anti-government stance; (3) pro-takfiri[18] ideology; and (4) approval of conducting violent attacks within Indonesia, there are notable differences in the preferred modality to support Baghdadi’s caliphate project.
The largest pro-IS coalition, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), was first established in 2015. JAD initially adhered to the jihad tanzim doctrine, replicating the hierarchical structure of earlier organisations.[19] JAD’s chief ideologue, Aman Abdurrahman, had championed jihad tanzim since 2005, believing that it is important to seize territories through armed struggle in order to establish Islamic governance.[20] JAD was responsible for some of the most brutal attacks in Indonesian history, including the Surabaya church bombings in May 2018 which killed 15 civilians, the August 2018 police shooting in Cirebon which caused two fatalities, and the Jakarta Sarinah bombing in January 2016 which killed five. However, despite proclaiming the importance of seizing territory to establish governance, JAD never accomplished this. After 2018, JAD’s organisational structure largely dissolved due to strong police action, and the group functioned more as a loose network of cells.[21]
Another pro-jihad tanzim IS group in Indonesia, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), got notably closer to governing territory. Reports of member arrests reveal that MIT’s organisational structure included individuals tasked with recruitment, military training, weapons and logistics.[22] Santoso, the leader of MIT, had attempted to establish a qoidah aminah (secure base) multiple times in various areas in Poso,[23] ultimately taking control over the area of Mount Biru, Central Sulawesi by 2016 where it regularly terrorised the local community to obtain basic goods.[24] This control was short-lived as the Indonesian police and military neutralised Santoso in July 2016.[25] Nevertheless, MIT maintained a degree of resilience and continued active attacks until 2021.[26]
Meanwhile, other pro-IS militants in Indonesia have espoused jihad fardiyah, valuing a higher frequency of attacks over organised movement. The biggest supporter of jihad fardiyah was the now-deceased Bahrun Naim, who opposed JAD’s territorial goals, believing that IS only gave two orders: “migrate to Syria or wage war”.[27] These instructions did not include establishing an organisation.[28] Bahrun thus strongly supported autonomous cells, believing they were best for conducting attacks.[29] Ultimately, none of the cells linked to Bahrun succeeded in attacking as all were preventively arrested by police. Regardless, Bahrun’s legacy of encouraging individual attacks and empowering individual action, through his various manuals on creating explosives, remains.[30]
Many similar cells also sprouted between 2018 and 2019, including the Lion of Allah, Ansharul Kholaqoh and the Sibolga cell.[31] These unaffiliated cells included individuals who were either rejected from joining JAD – due to a perceived lack of commitment – or were never interested in JAD at all, deeming the organisation “arrogant and elitist”.[32] Additionally, while JAD initially functioned as a more robust jihad tanzim-style organisation, it has since shifted into a more jihad fardiyah style of a decentralised network, particularly after mass arrests in 2018. Once the organisation became leaderless, many local branches functioned more autonomously with most cells conducting attacks independently.[33]
Recent Indonesian Pro-IS Activity
The authors’ review of IS activity in 2024 indicates that jihad fardiyah has dominated as the preferred doctrine among IS supporters. Concerted analysis of recent pro-IS offline and online activities points to the emergence of a hybridised doctrine of jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah, operationalised through large networks consisting of small, insulated cells.
Over 40% of pro-IS militants arrested in 2024 were not affiliated with any specific organisation in Indonesia and were part of either a one-person or two-person cell. Despite the small size, these cells were actively manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). One individual, HOK, plotted a suicide bombing attack at two worship houses in Malang, East Java.[34] Another individual, AAR, was making explosives while masquerading as a porridge seller in Karawang, West Java.[35] A duo based in West Jakarta, known as RJ and AM, were arrested after police found evidence of explosive materials, an airsoft gun, and IS paraphernalia.[36] Finally, a pro-IS militant by the initials of ER had threatened to bomb Pope Francis’ visit to Istiqlal Mosque in September 2024.[37]
While some of the other pro-IS supporters arrested this past year were affiliated with JAD, the largest cell only consisted of three individuals: BI, ST, and SQ.[38] The suspects were reportedly plotting an attack as part of an East Java-based JAD cell and had prepared 20 sharp weapons.[39] This is in stark contrast with past JAD related arrests which uncovered large cells. For example, after the JAD-linked suicide bombing in Makassar in 2021, police arrested 18 suspected JAD members in Makassar in total.[40] Similarly, in 2019 the Medan police station bombing uncovered a JAD cell consisting of 23 people,[41] while another 11-member JAD cell was arrested for plotting to bomb election announcement venues.[42]
Even so, the arrests of some pro-IS suspects in 2024 indicated there may still be efforts at building organisations, as police found evidence of more structured outreach, recruitment and training. LHM, a co-founder of a Bima JAD cell who was arrested in 2024, frequently organised halaqoh (Quranic study) meetings and physical training sessions for members in Bima, West Sumbawa, and Lombok.[43] LHM also delivered Friday sermons to the public,[44] indicating an interest in wider recruitment to grow the organisation. His Bima JAD cell included another individual who was arrested in 2024,[45] initialled MW[46], who gave lectures on IS and the pro-IS book “Seri Materi Tauhid”,[47] and trained JAD cadres.[48]
Similarly, the arrests of three MIT members recently indicate that remnants of the organisation may still be functioning, despite previous announcements from the police that the group had been eradicated in 2022 following the death of its last remaining member.[49] Two of the MIT members were arrested in January 2025 in Bailo, Central Sulawesi, while the third was discovered to be an earlier-arrested JAD Bima member, MW.[50] Taken together, these arrests, albeit a small sample, point to the possible presence of members who may want to rebuild MIT or JAD organisationally. However, considering the current weaknesses of both organisations, it is unlikely that this will happen soon.
Moving forward, pro-IS organisations could seek to adhere to an amalgamation of jihad tanzim and jihad fardiyah doctrines in the form of large networks consisting of small, insulated cells. This is evident in the Abu Oemar group discovered in 2023. Over 42 members of this JAD and Negara Islam Indonesia (NII)-affiliated group were arrested across West Java, Jakarta, and Central Sulawesi.[51] While Abu Oemar grew his quasi-organisation by recruiting former terrorists and creating functional cell divisions, he maintained limited contact with the cells until a plotted attack was imminent in order to avoid police detection.[52] Pertinently, while some pro-IS suspects maintain an interest in operating a large-style network, the strategic advantages of organising as small insulated cells persist in the current terrorism landscape.
The offline activities of pro-IS cells have also been complemented by online support for jihad fardiyah in Indonesia. For instance, a key Indonesian pro-IS media centre has drawn from central IS materials, disseminated via an encrypted chat platform, and repurposed propaganda collaterals to promulgate the narrative that “soldiers of the Islamic State” should strengthen their attacks “one by one” and fight in the way of God “against the apostates”. They also assert that the mujahideen should pursue jihad even if they find themselves alone in their willingness to do so, regardless of whether others change their minds or retreat.
Calls for lone actors to take up arms have also remained salient within the Indonesian pro-IS ecosystem on Facebook. For instance, in a post titled “Lone Wolf” published in December 2024, one supporter exhorted followers to kill infidels where they find them – a call where “few are chosen by God” and which “can only be performed by [them]”. Citing Abu Musab al-Suri’s manifesto, the post contends that believing men have no excuse to avoid jihad and advises supporters to learn more about how “lone wolves” should launch and claim attacks.
At the same time, despite appeals to individuals to engage in jihad in their own capacity, pro-IS online discourse in Indonesia, as drawn from IS central, continues to reiterate the need to “invite other believers” and “live among your brothers” in the “arena of jihad”. Assessed holistically, current online narratives indicate that Indonesian pro-IS networks are likely to adhere to a hybridised doctrine of jihad tanzim and fardiyah in the interest of operational survival.
Why Jihad Fardiyah?
It should be acknowledged at this juncture that radical organisations have significantly weakened in Indonesia; thus, the individual cells which subscribe to jihad fardiyah have become more visible even though the frequency of small cell operations may not have changed over the years. That said, the prevalence of jihad fardiyah in recent pro-IS activity in Indonesia can be attributed to three factors: Indonesia’s strong counter terrorism regime, global IS influence, and the greater sense of accomplishment.
After legislative changes in 2018, Indonesian CT force Special Detachment (Densus) 88 gained extensive powers to conduct pre-emptive arrests. This led to mass arrests of JAD leaders, many of whom provided funding, strategic guidance, and logistical support for cells. The strong policing regime continues presently, effectively curtailing militant operations due to the threat of detection and arrest. In such a restricted environment, more small autonomous cells have emerged, in which there is little to no communication between discrete cells and plots involve fewer individuals. However, plots are inevitably rudimentary as a result. For example, HOK’s plot to conduct two suicide bombings by himself was easily detected by police surveillance.
Globally, the pro-IS community has also encouraged jihad fardiyah. Besides the Indonesian online posts derived from IS central, global IS supporters have also maintained an enduring interest in promoting “lone wolf” operations. On an encrypted chat platform, international pro-IS users were observed requesting dedicated channels for “lone wolf” content to centralise knowledge of weapons making, operational training, and guidance. Other users have also offered general guidelines for potential lone actor militants, such as contributing ideas for suitable target locations, ideal attack methods to maximise fatalities, and instructions on assembling improvised explosives.[53]
Finally, jihad fardiyah has a specific appeal to individuals who are looking to obtain superior militant roles in jihad. Instead of enduring rigorous selection processes and training prior to being offered to participate in an attack plot, jihad fardiyah allows individuals to reach the stage of combatant faster. For many Indonesians vulnerable to radicalism, this was the appeal of joining terrorist movements – they believed that qital (war) is the “most noble form of worship apart from recognising the oneness of God”.[54] In addition, some individuals grow dissatisfied with an organisation’s slow progress in establishing the caliphate. In fact, this was the reason why numerous JAD members chose to leave the organisation and form independent cells in 2015.[55]
Countering Jihad Fardiyah
The prevalence of individual jihad, as opposed to organised jihad, necessitates the targeted adoption and implementation of appropriate CT strategies. Two key challenges arise from the escalation of jihad fardiyah: (1) less visible recruitment and unpredictable operations; and (2) faster regeneration of cells.
Firstly, with jihad fardiyah comes less visible recruitment and operations. In the past, many terrorist supporters were produced from repeated in-person interactions with extremist thought-leaders through either formal settings like pesantren or informal meetings like halaqoh. However, such in-person meetings have become increasingly difficult due to a restrictive CT regime. Instead, individuals wishing to learn about jihad have turned to the online sphere. Many of the non-affiliated pro-IS militants arrested this past year were radicalised through social media and planned their attacks from terror manuals available online.[56] Since there is no oversight or discipline from a leader, these individuals are more likely to “go rogue” in planning their own individual attacks.
Secondly, the regeneration of cells and plots is significantly quicker. Due to the nature of the movement being leaderless, targeting the leaders of movements in CT operations will be less effective. Jihad fardiyah cells are purposefully designed to be rudimentary so that they can be mobilised and replaced easily.
Since the security challenge has shifted substantially from large networks to individuals and smaller cells, authorities should prioritise early threat detection within the digital sphere. This should be done through consistent online monitoring and the dismantling of contentious extremist ecosystems to curtail pathways to radicalisation. Difficulties in detecting threatening operations in a timely manner will remain a significant concern. As such, national policies that target the cultivation of safety nets at the family and community levels are vital for countering online influences and inhibiting the likelihood of radicalisation.
About the Author
Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah is an Associate Research Fellow and Nurrisha Ismail is a Senior Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Abdelrahman Ismail on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Also referred to as “jihad fardi” by some authors.
[2] Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 6.
[3] Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah, trans. Dave McRae (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013), p. 196.
[4] Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia (Singapore: Springer, 2015), p. 191.
[5] Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 443.
[6] Ibid., p. 7.
[7] Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 5-6 (2011), p. 45.
[8] Carl Ungerer, Beyond Bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism, (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011), p. 19.
[9] Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy, p. 191.
[10] Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 57.
[11] Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy, p. 191; Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, p. 197.
[12] Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy, p. 196.
[13] International Crisis Group, “Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans,” Asia Report, No. 204 (2011), p. 4.
[14] Ring Banten initially splintered from Darul Islam, an Islamist rebellion established in 1949 that strived for the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia. Ring Banten was the West Java network of Darul Islam that splintered in 1999. See Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2015), pp. 158-159; C. Kees van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam (Brill, 1981), https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/32258.
[15] International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Pemboman Hotel,” Asia Briefing, No. 94 (2009), p. 2.
[16] Ibid., 5.
[17] Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, p. 196.
[18] Takfiri refers to the practice of excommunicating Muslims from Islam, which violent extremists argue justifies them as a target for attack.
[19] Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) initially retained the hierarchical structure of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), a separate organisation headed by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, that agreed to support the formation of JAD in 2015. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Surabaya Bombings and the Future of ISIS in Indonesia,” IPAC Report, No. 51 (2018), pp. 2-3.
[20] Gabriel Facal, “The Geopolitics of Islamist Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Between Long-Established Networks and Deterritorialized Cells,” Hérodote, Vol. 176, No. 1 (2020), pp. 128-129.
[21] Sidney Jones, “Terrorism and Extremism in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian Region,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2022), p. 164
[22] Hendrik Khoirul Muhid, “Profil Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, Kelompok Teroris yang 3 Anggotanya Ditangkap Densus 88,” Tempo, December 23, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/hukum/profil-mujahidin-indonesia-timur-kelompok-teroris-yang-3-anggotanya-ditangkap-densus-88-1184921.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ambaranie Nadia Kemala Movanita, “Akhir Petualangan Santoso di Hutan Belantara Poso,” Kompas, July 20, 2016, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/07/20/07240511/akhir.petualangan.santoso.di.hutan.belantara.poso; Rinaldy Sofwan Fakhrana, “Kisah Gunung Biru, Benteng Terakhir Teroris Santoso,” CNN Indonesia, January 11, 2016, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160111065456-12-103315/kisah-gunung-biru-benteng-terakhir-teroris-santoso.
[25] Muhamad Haripin, Chaula Rininta Anindya, and Adhi Priamarizki, “The Indonesian Military and Counter Terrorism in Poso, 2015-2022,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2024), pp. 305-319.
[26] Alif Satria, “Indonesia: Putting the Sigi Attack in Context,” BenarNews, December 4, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/alif-satria-commentary-mit-12042020180200.html; “Polisi Klaim ‘Anggota Terakhir Teroris Poso’ Tewas Ditembak – ‘Pak Guru Jago Merakit Bom’,” BBC News Indonesia, September 30, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-63085237.
[27] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Ongoing Problem of Pro-ISIS Cells in Indonesia,” IPAC Report, No. 56 (2019), p. 4.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Isaac Kfir, “Terrorism and Innovation,” in Counterterrorism Yearbook 2020 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020), p. 94, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep25133.20.pdf.
[30] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Ongoing Problem,” p. 4.
[31] Ibid., p. 3.
[32] Ibid., p. 1.
[33] Jones, “Terrorism and Extremism,” p. 164; Alif Satria, “JAD and the 2021 Makassar Bombing: Disconnected Cells and Interconnected Families,” The Diplomat, April 7, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/jad-and-the-2021-makassar-bombing-disconnected-cells-and-interconnected-families/.
[34] “Densus 88 Tangkap 2 Terduga Teroris Jaringan ISIS di Jakarta Barat,” CNN Indonesia, August 7, 2024, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240807131204-12-1130260/densus-88-tangkap-2-terduga-teroris-jaringan-isis-di-jakarta-barat.
[35] Stefani Wijaya, “BNPT Sebut Penangkapan Terduga Teroris di Cikampek Langkah Mematikan Kelompok Teror,” Berita Satu, June 16, 2024, https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/2822947/bnpt-sebut-penangkapan-terduga-teroris-di-cikampek-langkah-mematikan-kelompok-teror/amp; Usman, “Counterterrorism Unit Densus 88 Arrests Suspected IS-Affiliated Militant in West Java,” Jakarta Globe, June 17, 2024, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/counterterrorism-unit-densus-88-arrests-suspected-isaffiliated-militant-in-west-java.
[36] Rumondang Naibaho, “2 Teroris di Jakbar Sudah Rakit Bahan Peledak untuk Lakukan Aksi Teror,” DetikNews, August 7, 2024, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7477692/2-teroris-di-jakbar-sudah-rakit-bahan-peledak-untuk-lakukan-aksi-teror.
[37] Ady Anugrahadi, “Amankan 7 Terduga Pelaku Teror Saat Paus Fransiskus Datang, Densus 88 Temukan Logo ISIS,” Liputan 6, September 6, 2024, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5695443/amankan-7-terduga-pelaku-teror-saat-paus-fransiskus-datang-densus-88-temukan-logo-isis.
[38] The individuals were only publicly identified by their initials, though some media sources reported ST’s full name as Sutaryono aka Abu Zaid.
[39] Kiki Safitri and Dani Prabowo, “3 Terduga Teroris yang Ditangkap Densus 88 di Jateng Berencana Melakukan Aksi Teror,” Kompas, November 15, 2024, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/11/05/14020551/3-terduga-teroris-yang-ditangkap-densus-88-di-jateng-berencana-melakukan.
[40] Satria, “JAD and the 2021 Makassar Bombing.”
[41] Ibid.
[42] Benjamin Mok and Alif Satria, “Indonesian Terrorists’ Attempts to Interfere with the 2024 Indonesian Election,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, February 12, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/02/12/indonesian-terrorists-attempts-to-interfere-with-the-2024-indonesian-election/.
[43] M. Faiz Zaki, “Peran 2 Terduga Teroris Anggota JAD yang Ditangkap Densus 88 di Bima,” Tempo, September 7, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/hukum/peran-2-terduga-teroris-anggota-jad-yang-ditangkap-densus-88-di-bima-11813.
[44] Zaki, “Peran 2 Terduga Teroris.”
[45] Kiki Safitri and Bagus Santosa, “Densus 88 Ungkap Peran 3 Anggota MIT yang Ditangkap di Sulawesi Tengah,” Kompas, December 20, 2024, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/12/20/21164651/densus-88-ungkap-peran-3-anggota-mit-yang-ditangkap-di-sulawesi-tengah.
[46] Aka W aka DW.
[47] Zaki, “Peran 2 Terduga Teroris.”
[48] Arnol Saudila, “Densus 88 Antiteror Polri Tangkap Dua Teroris JAD Bima,” RRI, September 7, 2024, https://www.rri.co.id/nabire/kriminalitas/964067/densus-88-antiteror-polri-tangkap-dua-teroris-jad-bima.
[49] Keisyah Aprilia, “Polisi Nyatakan Mujahidin Indonesia Timur Telah Habis Dengan Tewasnya Anggota Terakhir,” BenarNews, September 30, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/anggota-terakhir-mit-tewas-09302022123227.html.
[50] Historically, MIT did recruit beyond its base in Central Sulawesi and sourced recruits from other regions, including Bima. Though MIT and JAD are organisationally different entities, there have been instances of cooperation between them before; in 2019, former JAD leader Saefullah aka Daniel aka Chaniago channelled funds to MIT in Central Sulawesi. See Devina Halim and Icha Rastika, “Polri: Kelompok Teroris JAD dan MIT Berkomunikasi,” Kompas, July 23, 2019, https://www.rri.co.id/nabire/kriminalitas/964067/densus-88-antiteror-polri-tangkap-dua-teroris-jad-bima.
[51] Danang Triatmojo, “Jubir Densus 88 Ungkap AO Perintahkan Jaringannya Gagalkan Pemilu Lewat Aksi ‘Amaliah’,” TribunNews, November 3, 2023,
[52] Mok and Satria, “Indonesian Terrorists’ Attempts.”
[53] ICPVTR Internal Monitoring.
[54] Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, p. 201.
[55] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Ongoing Problem,” p. 8.
[56] Some scholars have argued that there is no such thing as purely online radicalisation – see Julie Chernov Hwang and Kirsten E. Schulze, “Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadi Organisations,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 30, No. 6 (2018), pp. 911-932 – stating that there needs to be reinforcement from offline interaction or close relationships for individuals to be radicalised. However, the extent to which individuals live their lives online has significantly changed. Thus, it is possible in the current environment that an individual can be fully radicalised online and willing to plot an attack because of it.
