Global Threat Assessment 2023
Overview
Without doubt the year 2023 was eventful as the latest pieces in this current volume will show. This overview will cover the following three broad themes: significant global developments and trends; notable operational trends and developments; and, finally, the enduring salience of a holistic, integrated approach in dealing with violent extremism.
Significant Global Developments and Trends
The Israel-Hamas War and Its Wider Repercussions
2023 will certainly be remembered for “Hamas’s unexpectedly large assault from the air, sea and land on southern Israel on October 7”.[1] Hamas militants “killed some 1,200 Israelis, injured many more, and kidnapped about 240 Israeli civilian and military personnel, including several children and foreign nationals”.[2]
The attacks appeared to have “caught Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s most right-wing government in Israel’s history and its array of intelligence and security forces… off guard”, while at the same time also surprising the United States (US), Israel’s chief backer.[3] Israel responded with a massive assault on the Gaza Strip, aiming to utterly destroy Hamas. During the first four weeks of the war alone, Israel dropped more than 6,000 bombs on Gaza and killed over 10,000 civilians, including some 4,000 children.[4]
At the same time, almost one million of Gaza’s 2.3 million population were dislocated, generating a huge humanitarian crisis. Following heavy pressure from the international community, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) agreed to a humanitarian pause to allow aid and relief to thousands of traumatised Gazans. At the same time, some hostages taken by Hamas on October 7 were released in exchange for Palestinians held in Israeli detention centres.[5] Sadly, the Hamas-Israel war brought an abrupt end to a period of gradual improvement in Middle Eastern security, involving Israel and some Arab states, marked especially by a China-brokered normalisation of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March.[6] It was noted that the Hamas attack was likely an attempt to thwart Saudi Arabia from normalising ties with Israel.[7]
The Hamas attacks on October 7 energised transnational Islamist threat networks. Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab, celebrated the attacks, calling for the “complete liberation of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem”, while AQ urged Muslims everywhere to “take part in the fighting in Gaza, whether physically as fighters, financially or through moral support”.[8] AQ also called for “attacks on Israelis in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain”, and on “American military bases, airports and embassies in Muslim countries”.[9]
In Southeast Asia, pro-AQ social media activists, primarily from Indonesia, intensified their activities, echoing AQ’s call for Muslims to actively participate in the Israel-Hamas conflict.[10] Such activists justified participation as “a fardhu ain, or religious obligation”.[11] Such online calls are significant. In October 2022, the Singaporean authorities arrested a local teacher who had planned to travel to and engage in armed jihad in Palestine. Radicalised by foreign extremist preachers and online material, he intended to join Hamas and participate in armed combat against the IDF.[12] There were also concerns that “regional terrorists” would seek to “emulate Hamas’ surprise terror attack, which demonstrated terrorists’ evolving ability to effectively combine high- and low-tech forms of warfare to devastating effect”.[13]
The Continuing Challenge of Afghanistan Under the Taliban and Its Regional and Global Implications
The re-emergence of a Taliban-run Afghanistan since August 2021 continued to worry observers. Despite the Taliban regime’s denial of links with AQ and its claims of dominance over its ideological rival, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), both AQ and ISK “remain[ed] active in Afghanistan”.[14] AQ was “clearly “protected by and working with the Taliban”.[15] From Afghanistan, AQ reportedly launched terrorist attacks in neighbouring Pakistan with the assistance of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[16] Additionally, in Afghanistan, AQ “boosted its propaganda once again with Al-Qaeda in the Indian-Subcontinent (AQIS) being the most active” in this effort.[17] Notably, the “senior AQ leadership in Afghanistan” reportedly continued to plan “attacks in other regions of the world”, calling into question the “professed commitment” of the Taliban regime “to a free and secure Afghanistan”, and suggesting that this stance may well be “a facade concealing the actual global threat” from that country once again.[18]
This view of Afghanistan once again being a springboard for global jihadism was further strengthened by the ISK factor. In 2023, ISK continued to attract the “international community’s attention as a transnational jihadist entity in competition with the Taliban”, and its appeal remained potent.[19] In Afghanistan, ISK remained resilient, undergoing “several transformations” in “its tactics while keeping intact its broad strategy in the region”.[20] Despite territorial and operational setbacks at the hands of the Taliban, ISK doggedly persisted, although not controlling any territory – unlike Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP); Islamic State in Sahel Province; or Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP). ISK remained “the only province in IS’ ecosystem which [was] projecting itself as the launching pad for regional and international operations aimed at targeting Afghanistan’s neighbours as well as the West”.[21] ISK seemed intent on imitating “AQ, the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which have successfully carried out overseas attacks”.[22]
The concern that AQ or ISK could seek to conduct or influence external operations from Afghanistan is not unwarranted. In Bangladesh, the “primary security concern centre[d] around Ansar al Islam (AAI), also known as Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which now operates under the name Al-Qaeda Bangladesh (AQB)”.[23] AQB joined forces with the former Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B), “amplifying the security risks”.[24] Meanwhile, the IS threat in Bangladesh largely emanated from “homegrown militants belonging to the Neo-JMB network” who have been influenced by IS ideology. While Neo-JMB’s network had somewhat fragmented following IS’ military setbacks in the Middle East, it was notable that “some remaining members ha[d] attempted to establish contact” with ISK in Afghanistan.[25]
In Southeast Asia, while the operational capacities of Indonesian pro-IS groups appeared to generally decline, they still “exhibited a strong enthusiasm to connect with international organisations and stay informed of dynamics abroad”, with pro-IS online networks actively interacting with Indonesians in Syrian IS camps, and translating “Abu Huzaifah’s audio communications when he became IS’ new emir” in August 2023.[26] Conversely, there was “little evidence” of “Malaysian militants having an interest in IS’ African affiliates and wanting to travel there”.[27] Likewise, there was “little indication” of Malaysian nationals seeking to “travel to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to join either AQ or IS and their affiliates there”.[28] That said, in Singapore, a 15-year-old self-radicalised boy who planned to attack non-Muslims had been influenced, apart from other online material, by IS propaganda.[29]
The Growing Transnational Threat Involving Central Asian Jihadists
A third notable trend that emerged in the year, though not an entirely new issue, was a discernible uptick in the number of Central Asian jihadists involved in plots worldwide. For instance, “Tajik nationals” appeared in “substantial terrorist plots in a growing number of places”, with many cases linked to ISK.[30] Additionally, the number of Uyghurs fighting under the “Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)’s banner in Syria and Afghanistan” remained “substantial”.[31] TIP reportedly plotted alongside the TTP, Jamaat Ansarullah and ISK in Afghanistan to plan attacks against Chinese targets in Kabul.[32] A June United Nations (UN) report also noted that TIP had sent militants to “establish bases in Africa and South Asia” so as to “expand its operations” and target “Chinese nationals and agencies”.[33] From a “global terrorism threat perspective”, Central Asia remained a potential “source of concern”, because networks associated with the region and embedded with ISK or the AQ-linked Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) or other threat groups continued to “emerge around the world, with a geographical reach”.[34] While Central Asian militants were implicated in plots in Europe in particular, their signature was also detected in the US and even Southeast Asia. In March 2023, Indonesian authorities detained four Uzbek citizens associated with KTJ. The Uzbeks had “met with an Indonesian ISIS sympathiser” who suggested they become religious teachers to encourage individuals to travel abroad to support IS.[35] While this was likely an outlier event, the Central Asian nexus is worth monitoring.[36]
The Persistence of the Extreme Right Threat
The extreme right can be understood as a movement that espouses “at least three of the following five features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state advocacy”, while the far right can be regarded as referring to the “political manifestation of the extreme right”.[37] Certainly, the relatively close nexus between extreme right social movements and far right political entities continued to be discerned in 2023.
Over the course of the year, the far right made “further strides in becoming politically more mainstream in Western Europe”, with multiple observers noting “the rise of the far right in national politics of various Western European countries”.[38] Analysts warned that far right ideological tropes were increasingly “reflected in the agendas of elected governments in these countries”, and the shift in the public political mood “in turn could stoke violence”.[39]
Furthermore, 2023 evinced the “globalised nature of some aspects of the extreme right-wing and white supremacist movements in particular”.[40] In January, a British teenage extremist was jailed for producing videos which had directly inspired at least “two far right attacks in the US”.[41] The following month, the founder of the US-based Atomwaffen Division was charged with planning to attack infrastructure targets in the US, and had apparently been “passing similar planning material along to Australian extremists”.[42] In Kyrgyzstan, several youth were arrested in August after attacking “Asians” and employing “fascist imagery”.[43] Kyrgyz authorities were concerned that this case might have been influenced by “the war in Ukraine, where Russia continues to advance a narrative of fighting a fascist government in Kyiv”.[44] Observers have suggested that Moscow has been “behind a range of far and extreme right political activity in Europe in particular”.[45] Closer to home, while “Islamist terrorism” remained the key threat, “extreme right-wing ideology or strands of it” – such as “Islamophobia” and “anti-Semitism”, for instance – also “resonated among a few self-radicalised individuals in Singapore in recent years”.[46]
Hindu extreme right activity continued unabated in 2023, encouraged by the “aggressive majoritarian” politics of the ruling far right-oriented, “Hindu nationalist” Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).[47] In India, hate speech, which “often referred to anti-Muslim conspiracy theories like ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad’, were used to justify violence against them”.[48] Like the Western extreme right, the “Hindutva movement” includes a “powerful global component, enjoying the support of a strong network of organisations in the Hindu diaspora and benefiting from their funding of its activities in India”.[49] Worryingly, it seemed in 2023 that “Hindutva violence [went] global, too”, with “Hindutva supporters” issuing “threats and attacking Sikhs and Muslims”.[50] In 2023, clashes occurred between Hindutva groups and Khalistan activists amongst the Sikh diaspora in Western countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.[51]
The Continuing Salience of Social Media as a Force Multiplier for Violent Extremism
It has long been known that IS “has not backed down from its 2014 vision of cyber jihad”,[52] and its online activists have readily embraced the increasingly “decentralised nature” of “pro-IS online propaganda and community activities emerging within the expanding digital landscape”.[53] Certainly, in 2023, social media firms attempted to eliminate violent extremist content from their platforms. However, while the volume of such jihadist content on, for instance, Telegram has declined, much of the material remains online through the “creation of new private channels backed up by bot automation”.[54] Jihadist communities thus maintained a “vibrant online ecosystem” spread across a range of “small, less regulated platforms”, “all of which possess minimal content moderation”.[55] Mainstream social media platforms also remained “susceptible to infiltration” by jihadist influencers, despite their efforts to purge such extremist material.[56] The implications remain significant. For instance, the “role of the internet has always played a crucial role in the radicalisation process of Malaysians”, as more than “75 percent of Malaysians who had been involved with IS cited the internet as a primary source of radicalisation”.[57]
Social media was similarly exploited by the extreme right in 2023. The Western extreme right “online landscape saw the continued traction of militant accelerationist proponents” like Terrorgram, a “loose network of white supremacist Telegram channels and accounts”.[58] Terrorgram disseminated ideological material promoting “white supremacist and accelerationist ideologies, offering detailed instructions on how to carry out attacks”.[59] Online extreme right “communities’ propagation of conspiratorial and disinformation narratives” – containing elements of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim racism, misogyny and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments – were also increasingly “more prominent on mainstream social media platforms, occasionally leading to violence”, as “far right actors” became “increasingly adept at evading platform regulations and moderation”.[60] In the Hindutva case, there were “indicators that such online narratives” had fuelled “actual acts of violence on the ground”, as was evidenced in the “bouts of civil unrest” in the Indian State of Haryana in June and July, as well as “violence between diaspora Sikh and Indian communities in Melbourne in January”.[61]
The Grey Zone: Non-Violent Islamist Extremism
In 2023, there was subtle evidence of a blurring of lines between putatively constitutional, non-violent Islamist political parties/civil society groups and violent Islamist actors. For instance, the Barelvi “radical group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is entrenched in Pakistan’s Barelvi community, which is 60 percent of the population”.[62] On paper, the TLP “operates in the country’s mainstream politics, participates in elections” and formally “eschews violence”.[63] However, the TLP’s mainstream political participation gives it “a semblance of legitimacy to its incendiary ideological rhetoric” – which has “undermined efforts to foster moderation, tolerance and respect for religious diversity and harmony in Pakistan”.[64] This has prompted some observers to argue that over the long run, the putatively non-violent TLP is arguably “more dangerous” than violent threat groups like the TTP and ISK.[65]
Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, a similar ideological and institutional porosity between certain Islamist parties and more extremist groups was noted. In 2023, a “new extremist group”, with connections to the Islamist threat groups “HuJI-B, JMB, and AAI” emerged, called Jamaatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS). Notably, JAFHS was founded by a former student wing member of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI), the largest Islamist political party in the country. Bangladesh has officially banned JAFHS, “citing the organisation as a significant threat to public safety”.[66] This worrying potential blurring of lines between violent groups and non-violent Islamist ones, was further evidenced by a HuJI-B section which tried to “infiltrate politics by merging with Hefazat-e-Islam, an unregistered but influential Islamist group among Muslim students and teachers in local madrassas”.[67]
Yet another example of ostensibly non-violent “Islamist extremism in Bangladesh” was provided by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). While HT supposedly “promotes non-violent means to achieve its goals”, it has been criticised for its “conservative interpretation of Islamic law, rejection of democracy, opposition to nationalism and vision of a unified Islamic state, which many argue misrepresents Islam and challenges modern democratic principles and human rights”.[68] While HT Bangladesh was banned in 2009, the authorities believe that “even after more than a decade of proscription, HT remains a major security threat”, especially since it has expanded its reach from the urban areas to “suburbs and even the rural areas”.[69] Meanwhile, Hizb ut-Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) remains active in the country, disseminating its ideology amongst university students, lecturers and businessmen.[70] While HTM has not engaged in any violence thus far, it has certainly stirred communal passions. In January 2023, HTM organised a public demonstration in front of the Swedish and Dutch embassies in Kuala Lumpur to protest the “Quran burning and desecration incidents in Sweden and the Netherlands, respectively”.[71]
Notable Operational Trends/Developments
In terms of more narrowly focused operational trends and developments, three key themes appeared to stand out in the 2023 survey.
Attack Modalities and Targets
As in previous years, threat groups employed a wide variety of attack modalities against a range of diverse targets. In Afghanistan, a change in ISK tactics was detected from 2022 onwards. ISK began to focus on mass-casualty attacks employing mostly suicide bombers. Hence, several suicide operations and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks were carried out in Kabul and other cities, targeting high-ranking Taliban officials.[72] From its Afghan base, ISK also seemed intent on targeting Pakistan’s upcoming election in February 2024 under its so-called “battle against democracy”.[73] ISK additionally targeted religious gatherings, political rallies and politicians in different parts of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the aforementioned TJP, a front group of the TTP, also carried out suicide bombings. In seeming contrast to ISK, the TTP and TJP appeared to target the security forces rather than soft targets. For its part, the aforementioned “non-violent” but arguably extremist TLP, viewing the Ahmadiyya and Christian minority communities as “an imminent risk to the Barelvi way of life and values”, weaponised “incendiary narratives” to “dehumanise Ahmadis and Christians” and “normalise violence against them”.[74] In Bangladesh, observers noted that pro-IS threat groups engaged in targeted killings and employed IED and suicide attacks against “the police, other law enforcement agencies, non-Muslims and foreigners”.[75]
In Southeast Asia, “almost all terrorist attacks and plots in Indonesia” involved a “combination of three types of weaponry: IEDs, firearms and sharp weapons”.[76] However, “firearms and sharp weapons” were “the most commonly used”.[77] Furthermore, Indonesian police officers and headquarters “continued to be the primary target of terrorist attack plots in 2023”.[78] That said, online postings by the pro-IS Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network indicated an intent to attack polling stations. This is especially noteworthy as pro-IS groups have “signalled their intent to attack not only during polling day”, but also in the lead-up to the country’s 2024 presidential elections.[79]
In southern Thailand, vehicle bombings targeting the police and mounted by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) Islamist separatist group were observed.[80] A study found that between January to August 2023, unarmed civilians suffered higher casualty rates in attacks compared to the security forces. Infrastructure also seemed to be targeted: in May 2023, 23 locations in Thailand’s Deep South provinces were hit by arson attacks, targeting mobile phone antenna towers and electricity poles.[81]
In Myanmar, where the civil war between the military junta and an array of armed opposition and ethnic groups continued to rage, it was observed that “resistance fighters” were “more frequently relying on commercial drones to conduct bombings and surveillance of military forces”. Technological advances and cost efficiencies “enabled drones to carry greater loads, fly at higher altitudes and circumvent the junta’s anti-drone jammers”.[82]
Youth, Women and Family Networks
A second key operational trend that stood out in 2023 was the continuing salience of youth, women and family networks in terrorist plots. In Pakistan, Islamist extremist propaganda aimed to harness the potential of women “as propagandists, recruiters, informers, matchmakers, nurturers of future generations of militants, icons and mentors for would-be female radicals and, in extreme cases, as suicide bombers”.[83] In Bangladesh, the AQ-oriented AAI “established a new women’s division comprising wives and female relatives of militants”. Similarly, the IS-leaning Neo-JMB formed a female unit, “predominantly used for communication and logistics support”.[84]
Neo-JMB also sought to recruit predominantly “younger males aged 18-22 years old” for lone-actor operations. Additionally, Bangladeshi authorities discovered “a new terrorist group”, Imam Mahmuder Kafela (IMK), which targeted “youth for eschatological ‘armed jihad’ described as Ghazwatul Hind”.[85] IMK’s broader recruitment efforts encompassed “youth, women and families”.[86] Moreover, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria reportedly “trained some 500 ‘minors’ of whom at least 200” had fought on the frontlines.[87]
Meanwhile, since 2015, “11 self-radicalised Singaporean youths aged 20 or below have been detained under the Internal Security Act”, while “three of the four cases dealt with since the previous report in 2022 involved youths”.[88] It was also reported that “traditional social media channels” aside, terror groups had also “started to exploit online gaming and music streaming sites” to attract youth.[89] In Malaysia, officials in November expressed concern that “80 per cent of arrests by police in the latest available data involved those under 40”.[90]
The Lone Actor Threat
A third key operational trend that persisted in 2023 was the continuing persistence of lone-actor incidents. In India in April, a “25-year-old youth”, radicalised apparently by “online jihadist propaganda”, engaged in a “lone-wolf attack” against fellow passengers on an express train in Kerala, dousing them with petrol and setting them ablaze.[91] Meanwhile, Bangladeshi police noted that the IS-leaning Neo-JMB was keen to recruit youth “particularly for lone-actor operations”.[92] Likewise, in Malaysia, the “biggest threat c[a]me from lone-actor terrorism”, with the “most plausible scenario of an attack” being a “lone actor or a decentralised cell” with or without “direct links to a terrorist group”, and “inspired” to attack “as opposed to centrally directed”.[93] In Singapore, it was observed that “lone-actor attacks” in public places “using low-tech weapons such as knives remain[ed] a possibility due to the relative ease of procuring such weapons” from e-commerce platforms and convenience stores.[94]
Lone actors figured prominently in the case of the Western extreme right as well. During an October 2023 hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, US officials “spoke of how lone actors were the most likely threat vector that the country faced”, while in Europe, Europol assessed that while there were fewer “right-wing” incidents in 2023 compared to 2022, the “attacks that took place were all lone-actor incidents”.[95]
The Enduring Need for a Holistic, Integrated Approach in Dealing with Violent Extremism
Finally, the year’s developments showed again that a judicious mix of hard and soft approaches involving serious effort in addressing underlying structural grievances, remained important to effectively mitigate terrorist and extremist threats.
The “Hard” Approach: Strengths and Limitations
Strong legislation remained a key measure to deal with the evolving terrorism/extremism threat. In the case of the Thai Deep South, martial law and an emergency Thai government decree had long permitted “security forces to operate with few judicial checks and balances”.[96] In this respect, the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act, which came into effect in February 2023, was “expected to enhance the prevention of human rights violations and torture under state custody”.[97] This is because the law, inter alia, required security officials to “keep voice and video recordings of the arrest and release of a suspect”, and ensured “the right of relatives and lawyers to access information about the detained suspect”.[98] Similarly, the Internal Security Act in Singapore continued to retain its importance in empowering the authorities to act swiftly and pre-emptively to prevent self-radicalised individuals from executing their violent plans.[99]
At the same time, the 2023 survey made it plain that hard approaches alone were insufficient. Hence, while the Indian government’s “arrests and crackdowns may have helped dismantle networks and prevent jihadist and militant attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of the country”, the threat persisted. This is because the authorities were “not addressing the underlying grievances” that were “keeping alienation among different affected communities alive”.[100] In particular, the Indian government’s “reluctance to act robustly against Hindutva violence and the ecosystem that sustains it” empowered “anti-India propaganda by militant and secessionist groups”.[101]
Similarly, in Myanmar, the military junta “deployed airstrikes with greater frequency in 2023, in tandem with ground infantry and artillery operations”, which reports indicated had resulted in “several hundred civilian casualties and left communities in some areas living in perpetual fear of being bombed”, which only increased mass alienation against the authorities.[102] By the same token, many argue that the IDF’s disproportionate use of force in Gaza at the time of writing has been highly counterproductive,[103] generating vast Muslim and global resentment, which Islamist extremists have already exploited.[104]
“Softer” Approaches Needed As Well
Finally, the 2023 survey reinforced once again the consistent theme that addressing underlying political and socioeconomic grievances must be part of the overall mix in dealing with the terrorism/extremism challenge. For instance, most of the Middle Eastern governments remained authoritarian in nature, ignoring “societal forces that demanded political pluralism, individual rights and freedoms, and popularly mandated governments”, as well as an “end to state repression, human rights violations, and social and economic inequity and injustices”.[105] In Pakistan, in the case of the “ethno-separatist insurgency in Balochistan”, the continuing “absence of a political process” contributed to “its lethality and longevity”.[106] Indeed, the Pakistani “state’s indifference to the Baloch community’s political and socioeconomic grievances and continued harassment”, has “pushed the educated Baloch youth towards separatism”.[107]
Within Southeast Asia, Rohingya refugees in southern Bangladesh faced “increasingly dire prospects of returning home to Rakhine State”, while “living conditions in the camps, which house over 700,000 Rohingya Muslims, worsen”, with dwindling supplies of food rations, movement restrictions and criminality rife within the camps.[108]
Observers caution that such unsavoury conditions could “push some disillusioned Rohingya refugees, particularly men and boys, towards militancy or enlistment in armed groups and gangs”.[109] That said, it was heartening to observe in the case of Mindanao that in spite of “the prevailing poor socioeconomic environment, residents from Marawi and Sulu” appeared “resilient against terrorist narratives and recruitment”.[110] Nevertheless, given the continuing “harsh living conditions”, anti-government, even “separatist”, sentiments could well fester, with worrying consequences downstream.[111]
In sum, the geopolitical and transnational terrorism/extremism environment remained challenging in 2023. In particular, the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October, with its worldwide energising impact on threat groups, whilst potentially undermining the domestic security and cohesion of multicultural societies in Southeast Asia and beyond, bears watching into the new year.[112]
About the Author
Kumar Ramakrishna is Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He was previously Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), and is currently its Research Advisor. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Nasa on Unsplash
Citations
[1] See Amin Saikal, “The Middle East,” in this volume.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] United Nations Secretary-General’s Office, Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres at United Nations Headquarters, SM/SM/22021, November 6, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sgsm22021.doc.htm.
By early December 2023, more than 15,000 Palestinians, including 6,000 children, had reportedly been killed in Gaza since October 7. See “More Than 180 Killed As Israel Resumes Gaza Assault After Truce Lapses,” Al Jazeera, December 1, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/1/more-than-170-killed-as-israel-resumes-bombing-of-gaza-after-truce-expires.
[5] United Nations News Centre, “UN Delivers More Aid into Gaza on First Day of Humanitarian Pause”, November 24, 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143957.
[6] Saikal, “The Middle East.”
[7] Nick Robertson, “Biden Suggests Hamas Attack Inspired by US Diplomacy with Saudis,” The Hill, November 24, 2023, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/4326151-biden-suggests-hamas-attack-inspired-by-us-diplomacy-with-saudis/.
[8] See Benjamin Mok and Saddiq Basha, “Digital Shadows: Key Trends in Online Extremist Narratives and Activities in 2023,” in this volume.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Abdul Basit, Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi, Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan, Benjamin Mok, Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, And Saddiq Basha, ICPVTR internal report.
[11] Mok and Basha, “Digital Shadows.”
[12] See Kalicharan Veera Singam and Abigail Leong, “Singapore,” in this volume.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Saikal, “The Middle East.”
[15] Ibid.
[16] See Abdul Basit, “Pakistan,” in this volume.
[17] See Iftikhar Firdous, “Afghanistan,” in this volume.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[23] See Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh,” in this volume.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] See Alif Satria, “Indonesia,” in this volume.
[27] See Rueben Dass, “Malaysia,” in this volume.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[30] See Raffaello Pantucci, “Central Asia,” in this volume.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Satria, “Indonesia.”
[36] Ibid.
[37] Julia Ebner, Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), p. 288.
[38] See Raffaello Pantucci and Kalicharan Veera Singam, “Extreme Right-Wing in the West,” in this volume.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Raffaello Pantucci, “Russia’s Far-Right Campaign in Europe,” Lawfare, April 9, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/russias-far-right-campaign-europe.
[46] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[47] See Sudha Ramachandran, “India,” in this volume.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, February 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189426/2015%202%20Cyber%20Jihad.pdf.
[53] Mok and Basha, “Digital Shadows.”
[54] Ibid.
[55] ICPVTR online monitoring.
[56] Mok and Basha, “Digital Shadows.”
[57] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[58] Mok and Basha, “Digital Shadows.”
[59] Ibid.
[60] Julia Ebner, “From Margins to Mainstream: How Extremism Has Conquered the Political Middle,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, August 10, 2023, https://www.icct.nl/publication/margins-mainstream-how-extremism-has-conquered-political-middle.
[61] Mok and Basha, “Digital Shadows.”
[62] Jawad Syed, “Barelvi Militancy in Pakistan and Salman Taseer’s Murder” in Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan, eds. Jawad Syed et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) pp. 231-272.
[63] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[71] Ibid.
[72] Firdous, “Afghanistan.”
[73] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[74] Ibid.
[75] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[76] Satria, “Indonesia.”
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] See Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand,” in this volume.
[81] Ibid.
[82] See Iftekharul Bashar, “Myanmar,” in this volume.
[83] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[84] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[85] Ibid. The term “Ghazwatul Hind” refers to “righteous battle”, an Islamist extremist trope calling for the violent Islamist conquest of South Asia, to “free the occupied land of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent”. See Shafi Md Mostofa, “Is Hindutva Justifying al-Qaida’s Ghazwa-e-Hind Narrative?” The Diplomat, March 7, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/is-hindutva-justifying-al-qaidas-ghazwa-e-hind-narrative.
[86] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[87] Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[88] Kumar Ramakrishna, “Commentary: Understanding and Countering the Challenge of Youth Radicalisation in Singapore”, TODAY, August 18, 2023, https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/commentary-understanding-and-countering-challenge-youth-radicalisation-singapore-2230191.
[89] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[90] Zam Yusa, “Rise in Young Malaysian Radicals Worrying,” SEA Militancy, November 21, 2023, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/rise-in-young-malaysian-radicals.
[91] Ramachandran, “India.”
[92] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[93] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[94] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[95] Pantucci and Singam, “Extreme Right-Wing in the West.”
[96] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[100] Ramachandran, “India.”
[101] Ibid.
[102] Bashar, “Myanmar.”
[103] Wilson Fache, “Israel’s War On ‘Proportionality’,” Brussels International Center, October 27, 2023, https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/israels-war-proportionality.
[104] Mok and Basha, “Digital Shadows.”
[105] Saikal, “The Middle East.”
[106] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[107] Ibid.
[108] Bashar, “Myanmar.”
[109] Ibid.
[110] See Kenneth Yeo, “Philippines,” in this volume.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Zam Yusa, “How Will Southeast Asian Terror Groups Capitalize on the Israel-Hamas War?” The Diplomat, November 16, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/how-will-southeast-asian-terror-groups-capitalize-on-the-israel-hamas-war/.
