India
In 2023, India witnessed multiple incidents of mass violence despite the weakening of several militant and separatist movements. Hindutva organisations weaponised Hindu religious festivals and processions to unleash mob and vigilante violence against Muslims. Meanwhile, Manipur, where ethnic tensions and insurgencies had declined in recent years, saw an eruption of violent clashes, potentially providing a fertile ground for the revival of militancy in the border state. Militant attacks declined in Jammu and Kashmir, and militants shifted operational focus to the thickly forested Pir Panjal region. Though the global jihadist groups failed to carry out any attacks in India in 2023, the country remained in the crosshairs of their social media propaganda. Likewise, while the support for Sikh separatism in India was weak, the movement found traction among pockets of the Sikh diaspora community in Canada, where the rhetoric for an independent Khalistan was articulated strongly. As for the Maoist insurgency, it continued to decline in terms of attacks and areas of influence. While a variety of reasons underlie India’s multiple militant protests and movements, Hindutva violence appears to be playing an important role in fueling many of them.
Trends
Hindutva Violence
Attacks by Hindutva activists and organisations on Muslims continued in 2023. Hate speeches, which often referred to anti-Muslim conspiracy theories like ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad’, were used to justify violence against them.[1]
According to the independent United States (US)-based research project, Hindutva Watch, there were 255 cases of hate speech at public gatherings in the first half of 2023 in India. Direct calls to violence, including ethnic cleansing and genocide of Muslims as well as the destruction of their places of worship, were made in 33 percent of these events. In 12 percent, the call to arms included Hindutva leaders inciting Hindus to keep weapons. Events for the distribution of trishuls (tridents) were also organised. Hate speech events surged in March; 18 hate speech events took place that month across India, suggesting that there was a coordinated campaign to incite violence that month.[2]
Hindutva groups repeatedly weaponised Hindu festivals and processions to unleash violence against Muslims. The surge in hate speeches in March was likely aimed at using processions on Ramanavami and Hanuman Jayanti,[3] which fell on March 30 and April 5 (and coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan) to incite violence against Muslims. Processions on Ramanavami, for instance, entered Muslim neighbourhoods, and violent clashes ensued for several days across India.[4]
Hindutva groups’ exploitation of religious processions to incite violence against Muslims was on full display in Haryana’s Nuh district, which has witnessed several incidents of cow vigilantism since 2016, the most recent being in February. Communal tensions were therefore already running high when Hindutva organisations like Vishva Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang Dal called for a Brijmandal Jalabhishek Yatra (religious procession) on July 31. The run-up to the event saw a high-decibel campaign of provocation and incitement on social media. On the day of the procession, sword and trident-brandishing activists entered a Muslim neighbourhood shouting anti-Muslim slogans. Stone pelting followed, which quickly escalated into violent clashes that culminated in the loss of lives, damage to homes and shops, and large-scale displacement of Muslims. The communal violence in Nuh was not a spontaneous, sudden eruption of festering anger which manifested in violence. It was thus not a riot. Instead, it was, as is the case with many incidents of Hindutva violence, a pre-planned violent attack on minorities.[5]
While Hindutva organisations have used festivals and processions to incite violence in previous decades too, their frequency, scale and intensity have grown in recent years. Hindutva activists mobilise mass support, under cover of a so-called tradition, and gain religious legitimacy for their violent attacks.[6]
The Hindutva movement has always had a powerful global component, enjoying the support of a strong network of organisations in the Hindu diaspora and benefiting from their funding of its activities in India.[7] Recent developments indicate that Hindutva violence has gone global, too. As in India, Hindutva supporters abroad are issuing threats and attacking Sikhs and Muslims. Violent clashes have broken out between Hindutva groups and Khalistan activists among the Sikh diaspora in several Western countries, especially Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.[8]
Jihadist Threats
Global jihadist groups did not carry out any attacks in India in 2023 although they were active in their anti-India propaganda.
As in previous years, in 2023, global jihadist organisations drew on anti-Muslim violence in India in their propaganda aimed at Indian Muslims. Groups like Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State al-Hind (ISH) tailored their propaganda to focus on local grievances in their publications. For instance, AQIS threatened to avenge the “Muslims killed on live television in UP [Uttar Pradesh]”, a reference to the extrajudicial killing of gangster-turned-politician Atiq Ahmed and his brother Ashraf, who were shot dead at point-blank range in the full glare of television cameras.[9]
Jihadists used vitriolic and incendiary rhetoric to incite violence against non-Muslims in India. For instance, an article in the Voice of Khorasan (VOK), while goading Muslims to kill Hindus in India, noted, “Leave dar al-kufr (country ruled by non-Muslims) and perform Hijrah (religious migration). For those who cannot make hijrah, make dar al-kufr your battleground. Put your trust in Allah, take a knife, and slice the Kafir’s throat, poison his food, burn their houses and greenery, turn their joy to sorrow and strike terror in their hearts with Allah’s help”.[10]
Separately, an important target of ISH’s propaganda was Indian Muslim preachers and scholars. Issues of Seerat-ul-Haq, ISH’s English-language magazine, carried articles deriding Muslim scholars for participating in an inter-religious meeting with leaders of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the ideological fount of Hindutva organisations, in January 2023. In this meeting, Muslim scholars from leading Islamic organisations like Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind and the Darul Uloom Deoband engaged RSS leaders in discussions on hate speech, mob lynching and disputed religious sites. Likewise, an article in VOK’s 24th issue criticised Muslim scholars for giving up claims on Babri Masjid and discussing RSS demands for “surrendering the mosques in Varanasi and Mathura, jointly declaring cows as a national animal, and imposing a ban on cow slaughter”.[11]
ISH’s propaganda efforts are focused on South India by reviving radical content in Malayalam, which is spoken in Kerala. The messages in ISH’s publications are addressed “especially to mujahedin in south India” along with attack threats.[12]
Alarmingly, ISH propaganda appears to be gaining traction on the ground. On April 2, a 25-year-old youth doused his fellow passengers travelling on the Alappuzha-Kannur express train in Kerala with petrol and set them ablaze. Although initial reports hinted at IS links, investigations revealed that this was a lone-wolf attack. However, he had drawn inspiration from online jihadist propaganda.[13]
In 2023, ISH suffered a setback when its chief of India operations Ejaz Ahangar was killed in Afghanistan in January.[14] Ahangar had been declared a terrorist in India just weeks earlier and his elimination is likely to have hit the ISH hard as he was a key recruiter and propagandist for the outfit in India. Following his death, ISH went on a propaganda overdrive, which analysts interpreted as aimed at signalling that its capacity was intact. It also, rather belatedly, claimed responsibility for blasts in southern India in October-November 2022.[15] Amid the fall in morale among Indian jihadists following Ahangar’s death, ISH was perhaps keen to show through its claim for the attacks, which were in fact a failure, that it remains operationally active and engaged in India.
Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir
Militancy declined in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in 2023. There were 42 terrorism-related incidents in the first nine months of 2023, the lowest since the start of the militancy in 1990. The previous low of 113 was registered in 2013.[16] The decline in militancy in recent years has been attributed to the “muscular approach” of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government since the revocation of J&K’s autonomy on August 5, 2019.[17]
Under pressure in Kashmir, militants have been shifting base to the Jammu region of the union territory. In 2023, the Pir Panjal region of Jammu, which spans the Poonch and Rajouri districts, witnessed a resurgence in militancy. There were several major attacks in the two districts which border the Line of Control with Pakistan administered Kashmir.[18] In addition to some of the best infiltration routes into India lying in these two districts, the hilly and thickly forested terrain provides an ideal environment for militants to operate.[19]
Between June and October, there were several ambushes and gunfights between security forces and militants in Kulgam and Anantnag districts in the Kashmir Valley, which are contiguous to the Pir Panjal range. In September, security forces were locked in a week-long encounter – the longest in many years – to flush out militants holed up in a Gadool hill cave in Anantnag district. If in previous years, militants operated in built-up urban areas in Kashmir, the Gadool encounter indicated that they now operate in hilly and forested areas in Kashmir, similar to Jammu earlier in 2023. Importantly, while militants in Kashmir flaunted their faces and identities in public and in photographs and videos posted on social media in recent years – this helped security forces to locate and eliminate them – they now prefer to maintain a low profile, hiding in caves and forests.[20]
The number of local youths, i.e., those from J&K, joining militancy is said to be falling. Compared to 143 local youths who picked up arms in 2019 and 100 in 2022, the number who joined militancy up to September 2023 was below 30.[21] Importantly, the foreign component of the militancy appears to have risen. Of the roughly 100-plus militants said to be active in J&K, as many as 71 are foreign militants, i.e., from Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and around 38 are said to be locals.[22]
While the fall in local recruitment to militancy could be interpreted as declining local alienation, the rising foreign component is a matter of concern for India’s counterinsurgency operations in J&K. Foreign militants are usually more battle-hardened and better trained than their local counterparts, and are thus harder to eliminate.
Ethnic Violence in Manipur
The security situation in the north-eastern state of Manipur, which had “been showing sustained improvement over the last several years, with occasional intervening spikes”, deteriorated significantly in May 2023, when violent clashes broke out between the majority Meitei and minority Kuki-Zo communities. Mob violence, which has included killings and rapes as well as looting and arson of properties, continues to date. Importantly, the unrest has been accompanied by a reactivation of militancy. That the ethnic clashes were a trigger to the return of militancy in Manipur is evident from the fact that Manipur recorded four insurgency-linked fatalities between January 1 and May 2, compared to 120 fatalities between May 3 and September 22.[23]
Meitei and Kuki militants have participated in mob violence, ostensibly in defence of their communities, and carried out sniper attacks and ambushes against the Indian security forces.[24] Several insurgent groups that were dormant till recently, as they had signed a Suspension of Operations agreement with the Indian and Manipuri governments in 2008, are active again. These include some 25 Kuki militant groups linked to the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), United People’s Front (UPF), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), among others.[25]
The resurgence of militancy in Manipur can be attributed to several factors. First are the ethnic clashes since May, which served to reignite long-running ethnic tensions and hostilities. Then, amid the breakdown of law and order in the early months of the crisis, rampaging mobs looted the armouries of police stations and took away large quantities of weapons and large quantities of ammunition, boosting the firepower of the militant groups.[26] Additionally, Manipur shares a 400-kilometre-long unfenced border with Myanmar, which is in the grip of a civil war. Manipuri militants, who were reportedly fighting in Myanmar, are said to have returned. Instability in Myanmar will facilitate their operations in India. Additionally, a thriving narcotics-guns network in the region fuels militancy and instability in Manipur.[27]
While the conflict in Manipur has been largely along ethnic lines, the communal dimension cannot be ignored. The Meitei are largely Hindu, while the Kukis are Christian. Political power resides in the hands of the Meitei. Moreover, the Hindu nationalist BJP, which has been in power in Manipur since 2017, has pursued an “aggressive majoritarian” agenda. Hindutva networks have expanded in the state. It culminated in the burning down of scores of Kuki churches, especially in the early stages of the clashes in 2023. [28]
Sikh Separatism
The Indian media was rife with reports of a possible revival of Sikh separatism in the Indian state of Punjab in the early months of 2023. This perception was prompted by sporadic incidents of violence in Punjab accompanied by occasional calls for Khalistan in recent years. Additionally, in late 2022, Amritpal Singh, a self-styled radical Sikh “preacher”, who made fiery pro-Khalistan speeches and advocated violence, began drawing crowds in rural Punjab. This and the storming of Ajnala police station by Singh’s sword-wielding supporters on February 3, which culminated in the Punjab police giving in to their demands to free a jailed associate, and the failure of the police to nab Singh swiftly, fuelled reports of the revival of Sikh militancy in Punjab.[29] However, separatist activism died down quickly.
Currently, support for Sikh separatism and the Khalistan narrative is weak on the ground in Punjab; what exists in Punjab today is a shadow of the insurgency that raged in the 1980s and 1990s. The current spate of Sikh separatism “is diaspora-led, fed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and implicitly supported” by several Western countries, especially Canada “for geo-strategic political reasons and domestic political imperatives”.[30]
India has alleged that Canada is sheltering Khalistan extremists and turning a blind eye to their anti-India propaganda, fund-raising and financing of violence in India.[31] According to the Punjab police, 56 pro-Khalistan outfits are operating in Western countries, and some of them were responsible for 15 targeted killings in Punjab over the past six years.[32] Khalistani elements have issued threats from abroad. For instance, the US-based Gurpatwant Singh Pannun of the banned Sikhs for Justice, has repeatedly issued threats, including one in October, when he warned India of a “Hamas-like attack” and incited Palestinians to attack the Indian consulate in Ramallah.[33]
Lacking support among the Sikh people in Punjab, Sikh separatism appears to be propped up from abroad, with the idea of an independent Khalistan being kept alive by sections of the Sikh diaspora. Also, whether in India or abroad, Sikh militancy is being fuelled by Hindutva violence. Hindutva and Khalistani groups have repeatedly clashed abroad.
Left-Wing Extremism
Data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal reveals that on all parameters of violence, be it the number of terrorism-related incidents, major incidents and fatalities, or the number of districts varyingly affected by Maoist activities, the declining trend in left-wing extremism continued in 2023.[34] There was a 52 percent decline in left-wing extremism and a 69 percent drop in fatalities during the 2014-2023 period compared to the preceding decade. Home Minister Amit Shah said in October that the number of “vacuum areas”, i.e., “core” Maoist strongholds where the state’s administrative or security machinery could not function, are shrinking.[35]
Yet, the Maoists continue to display the capacity to inflict severe damage on the security forces. On April 28, they set off an improvised explosive device packed with 50 kilogrammes of explosives that targeted a van in south Chhattisgarh, killing 10 soldiers and a civilian. This was the deadliest Maoist attack in two years,[36] indicating that the Maoists’ intelligence-gathering capacity continues to exist.
State Response
The Indian government’s approach to militancy and separatism in 2023 remained kinetic, relying on terrorism legislation and arrests. Security forces carried out raids against proscribed groups like the Popular Front of India and global jihadist groups, and the government has been successful in dismantling their networks.[37] Several militant groups active in J&K, including The Resistance Force, the People’s Anti-Fascist-Front and the Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force, were declared terrorist groups and banned.[38] The Indian government was also accused of eliminating Sikh separatists abroad. For instance, the Canadian government alleged in October that there were “credible allegations potentially linking” India to the killing of Canadian Sikh Hardeep Singh Nijjar, who was declared a terrorist in India in 2016, in Canada. India rejected the allegations.[39]
With militancy abating in Kashmir, the government is reportedly considering withdrawing the army from the region in a phased manner and replacing it with the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force.[40] In Jammu, it revived a plan to arm civilians to defend their villages against terrorists.[41] Political processes in the union territory remained in abeyance. Neither dialogue nor elections were announced in 2023.
The Indian state’s approach to extremism and communal violence has been selective thus far, underscored by its reluctance to act against Hindu extremism especially. No Hindutva group or activist was included in the terrorist list. Those arrested in communal clashes were overwhelmingly Muslim, and collective punishment meted out after communal clashes was reserved for Muslims only.[42]
Outlook
The government’s arrests and crackdowns may have helped dismantle networks and prevent jihadist and militant attacks in J&K and other parts of the country. However, it is not addressing the underlying grievances and is thus keeping alienation among different affected communities alive. Indeed, the government’s reluctance to act robustly against Hindutva violence and the ecosystem that sustains it is providing fuel for anti-India propaganda by militant and secessionist groups. The possibility of the government changing its approach on the matter is low as it is the polarisation of society along communal lines that keeps the BJP in power.
About the Author
Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent political and security analyst based in Bengaluru, India. She has written extensively on South Asian peace and conflict issues. She can be reached [email protected].
[1] Nayonika Bose and Zeeshan Shaikh, “4 months, 50 Rallies in Maharashtra, One Theme: Love Jihad, Land Jihad and Economic Boycott,” The Indian Express, March 30, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/4-months-50-rallies-in-maharashtra-one-theme-love-jihad-land-jihad-and-economic-boycott-8507077/.
[2] Raqib Hameed Naik, Aarushi Srivastava and Abhyudaya Tyagi, “2023 Half-Yearly Report: Anti-Muslim Hate Speech Events in India,” Hindutva Watch, September 24, 2023, https://hindutvawatch.org/hate-speech-events-india/.
[3] Ramanavami and Hanuman Jayanti celebrate the birth of the Hindu deity Ram and his helper, the “monkey God” Hanuman, respectively. Ram emerged as a mascot of the Hindutva nationalists, especially to mobilise support for constructing a temple at the disputed Ramjanmabhoomi/Babri Masjid site in Ayodhya.
[4] MN Parth, “Spike in Anti-Muslim Rallies Since BJP Retook India’s Maharashtra,” Al Jazeera, April 7, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/7/spike-in-anti-muslim-rallies-since-bjp-retook-indias-maharashtra.
[5] Sudha Ramachandran, “After Haryana Clashes, Indian Court Raps Government For Ethnic Cleansing,” The Diplomat, August 11, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/after-haryana-clashes-indian-court-raps-government-for-ethnic-cleansing/.
[6] Ashutosh Varshney and Bhanu Joshi, “Ram Navami Violence – It Wasn’t Always So,” The Indian Express, April 8, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/ram-navami-violence-it-wasnt-always-so-8544515/.
[7] Ingrid Therwath, “Hindu Nationalism’s Global Networks,” Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2023, https://mondediplo.com/2023/02/11hindutva.
[8] Norimtsu and Vjosa Isai, “Modi’s Hindu Nationalism Stokes Tension in Indian Diaspora,” The New York Times, September 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/30/world/canada/modi-canada-hindu-nationalism.html.
[9] Rajshekhar Jha, “Al-Qaida Threatens to Avenge Killing of Atiq Ahmad,” The Times of India, April 22, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/al-qaida-threatens-to-avenge-killing-of-atiq-ahmad/articleshow/99677210.cms.
[10] Balasubramaniyan Viswanathan, “Islamic State Propaganda May Be Paying Off in South India,” Geopolitical Monitor, April 17, 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/islamic-state-propaganda-may-be-paying-off-in-south-india/
[11] Mona Thakkar and Vineet P, “The State of Play: Islamic State Khorasan Province’s Anti-India Propaganda Efforts,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, May 22, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/05/22/the-state-of-play-islamic-state-khorasan-provinces-anti-india-propaganda-efforts/.
[12] Balasubramaniyan Viswanathan, “Is South India in the Crosshairs of Islamic State?” Geopolitical Monitor, April 4, 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/is-south-india-in-the-crosshairs-of-islamic-state/. Since the “Gulf Boom” of the 1970s, generations of people, especially Muslims, from Kerala, migrated to West Asia. Some would likely have been radicalised there. Additionally, unlike in north India where Hindu-Muslim relations are acrimonious and local grievances and conflicts animate Muslims to attack local targets, inter-communal relations in Kerala are relatively harmonious. Issues of the ummah have resonated with Muslims here, prompting some to gravitate towards jihadist causes. Interview with an Intelligence Bureau official based in Mangalore, Karnataka, India, on October 24, 2023.
[13] Bharti Jain, “Kerala Train-Arson Accused Self-Radicalised Lone-Wolf Attacker, Says NIA in Chargesheet,” The Times of India, October 1, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kerala-train-arson-accused-self-radicalised-lone-wolf-attacker-says-nia-in-chargesheet/articleshow/104075298.cms.
[14] Praveen Swami and Amogh Rohmetra, “Top Kashmir Jihad Commander Who Led Indian Suicide Bombers in Afghan IS Attacks Believed Killed,” The Print, February 21, 2023, https://theprint.in/india/top-kashmir-jihad-commander-who-led-indian-suicide-bombers-in-afghan-is-attacks-believed-killed/1385976/.
[15] Thakkar and Vineet, “The State of Play.”
[16] “Militancy in J-K at Its Lowest Level: DGP Dilbag Singh,” The Tribune, October 12, 2023, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/j-k/militancy-in-j-k-at-its-lowest-level-dgp-dilbag-singh-552724.
[17] “Ex-RAW chief Dulat Says Muscular Kashmir Policy Working, But Idea of India Losing Out,” Deccan Herald, February 24, 2023, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/ex-raw-chief-dulat-says-muscular-kashmir-policy-working-but-idea-of-india-losing-out-1194684.html.
[18] These included the gunning down of seven civilians – all Hindus – in Dangri village in Rajouri district on January 1-2; the ambush of an Indian Army vehicle in Poonch that resulted in the death of five soldiers on April 20; and the killing of five soldiers in a gunfight with militants during combing operations in the Kandi Forest in Rajouri on May 5.
[19] Sagrika Kissu, “Why Pir Panjal Region is Becoming a Militant Hotspot – Porous LoC, Routes to Kashmir, ‘Local Support’,” The Print, September 15, 2023, https://theprint.in/india/why-pir-panjal-region-is-becoming-a-militant-hotspot-porous-loc-routes-to-kashmir-local-support/1764003/.
[20] Safwat Zargar, “Why Pir Panjal is Now a Staging Ground for Militant Strikes, from Rajouri to Anantnag,” Scroll.in, September 22, 2023, https://scroll.in/article/1056357/why-pir-panjal-is-now-a-staging-ground-for-militant-strikes-from-rajouri-to-anantnag.
[21] Zulfiqar Majid, “With Recruitment in Local Militancy Low, Pak Turning to Foreign Terrorists to Keep J&K Boiling,” Deccan Herald, September 12, 2023, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/jammu-and-kashmir/four-times-more-foreigner-terrorists-killed-than-locals-this-year-in-jk-2682788.
[22] Rahul Tripathi, “Over 100 militants Still Active in J&K, Says Data,” The Economic Times, September 15, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/over-100-militants-still-active-in-jk-says-data/articleshow/103672635.cms.
[23] Afsara Shaheen, “Manipur: Bringing Back an Insurgency,” South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 22, No.14 (2023), https://www.satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-22-No-14.
[24] Arunabh Saikia, “The Return of Meitei Insurgents Marks a New Turn in Manipur Conflict,” Scroll.in, September 2, 2023, https://scroll.in/article/1055257/the-return-of-meitei-insurgents-marks-a-new-turn-in-manipur-conflict; “Manipur: Army Releases 12 KYKL Militants After a Standoff With Women-Led Mob,” The Week, June 25, 2023, https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2023/06/25/manipur-army-releases-12-kykl-militants-after-a-standoff-with-women-led-mob.html.
[25] Shaheen, “Manipur: Bringing Back An Insurgency”; Karishma Hasnat, “‘Gunfights, Extortion – Manipur’s Ethnic Conflict Revives Insurgent Groups, AFSPA Debate Heats Up,” The Print, September 20, 2023, https://theprint.in/india/gunfights-extortion-manipurs-ethnic-conflict-revives-insurgent-groups-afspa-debate-heats-up/1769181/.
[26] Shaheen, “Manipur: Bringing back an insurgency.”
[27] Arunabh Saikia, “Why Manipur’s Civil War is Being Linked to The Narcotics Trade,” Scroll, June 13, 2023, https://scroll.in/article/1050773/poppy-in-the-hills-why-manipurs-civil-war-is-being-linked-to-narcotics-trade.
[28] Sudha Ramachandran, “Kham Khan Suan Hausing on Why Manipur Is up in Flames,” The Diplomat, June 12, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/kham-khan-suan-hausing-on-why-manipur-is-up-in-flames/.
[29] Sudha Ramachandran, “Is Sikh Militancy Returning to India’s Punjab State?” The Diplomat, February 28, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/is-sikh-militancy-returning-to-indias-punjab-state/.
[30] Sudha Ramachandran, “Ajai Sahni on Canada and the Khalistani Movement,” The Diplomat, October 3, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/ajai-sahni-on-canada-and-the-khalistani-movement/.
[31] Abhishek Verma, “Khalistan Movement: Recent Activities and Indian Response,” IDSA Issue Briefs, July 6, 2023, https://idsa.in/issuebrief/Khalistan-Movement-averma-260723.
[32] Mahender Singh Manral, “Punjab Police to MHA: Pro-Khalistan Outfits Abroad Total 56, Behind 15 killings Across State,” The Indian Express, October 11, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/punjab-police-mha-pro-khalistan-outfits-abroad-total-56-behind-15-killings-8977282/.
[33] “Khalistani Terrorist Pannun Threatens India With ‘Hamas-like Attack’ in New Video,” Business Today, October 10, 2023, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/in-focus/story/khalistani-terrorist-pannun-threatens-india-with-hamas-like-attack-in-new-video-401442-2023-10-10.
[34] “Maoist Insurgency: Assessment – 2023,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2023, https://www.satp.org/terrorism-assessment/india-maoistinsurgency
[35] Bharti Jain, “Left-Wing Extremism Will Be Finished in 2 Years: Union Home Minister Amit Shah,” The Times of India, October 7, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/left-wing-extremism-will-be-finished-in-2-years-union-home-minister-amit-shah/articleshow/104223479.cms.
[36] The last major attack was on April 3, 2021, when Maoists ambushed security personnel along the Sukma-Bijapur border in Chhattisgarh, killing 22 personnel.
[37] Thakkar and Vineet, “The State of Play”; “NIA Raids 14 Locations in 5 States in PFI Conspiracy Case,” The Week, August 13, 2023, https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2023/08/13/nia-raids-14-locations-in-5-states-in-pfi-conspiracy-case.html.
[38] “Govt bans Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force for Terror Acts,” The New Indian Express, February 17, 2023, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2023/feb/17/govt-bans-jammu-and-kashmir-ghaznavi-force-for-terror-acts-2548365.html.
[39] Leyland Cecco, “‘Credible Allegations’ Link India to Killing of Sikh leader, Says Trudeau,” The Guardian, September 19, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/18/credible-evidence-india-behind-killing-of-canadian-sikh-leader-says-trudeau.
[40] “GoI May Replace Army With CRPF In Kashmir Interiors: Report,” Kashmir Reader, February 21, 2023, https://kashmirreader.com/2023/02/21/goi-may-replace-army-with-crpf-in-kashmir-interiors-report/.
[41] Sudha Ramachandran, “Will Arming Civilians in Jammu Secure Its People?” The Diplomat, Issue 103, June 2023, https://magazine.thediplomat.com/#/issues/-NWGkzvA9CyZDwkmpaJC.
[42] Sudha Ramachandran, “After Haryana Clashes, Indian Court Raps Government For Ethnic Cleansing,” The Diplomat, August 11, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/after-haryana-clashes-indian-court-raps-government-for-ethnic-cleansing/.
