India
In 2025, India’s internal and external security environment was marked by the convergence of traditional and emerging threats. There was a pronounced intensification of cross-border jihadist violence, including the Pahalgam terror attack in April and the subsequent launch of Operation Sindoor – India’s retaliatory military campaign that precipitated the most serious India-Pakistan confrontation in over two decades.
[1] This attack and escalation not only underscored the persistent threat of Pakistan-based militant networks in Indian Kashmir, but also revealed the fragility of state deterrence mechanisms in South Asia’s nuclear environment.
At the same time, India’s internal fault lines continued to deepen, thereby normalising vigilante behaviour and deepening Hindu-Muslim divides. Concurrently, India’s long-standing insurgent movements presented a mixed picture – Maoist activity and some separatist movements continued their downward trajectories, despite episodic violence. In Northeast India, ethnic clashes, especially in Manipur, continued, generating humanitarian crises and creating fertile ground for insurgent recruitment.
External ideological currents, particularly Khalistani activism, posed an additional layer of complexity to India’s counter terrorism discourse, in addition to sporadic transnational incidents impacting India’s borders with Myanmar and Bangladesh. At the same time, strategic frontiers such as Leh-Ladakh remained sensitive to political mobilisation and potential political unrest, further intersecting with broader India-China-Pakistan geopolitical concerns.
Taken together, all these dynamics indicate that India’s security framework in 2025 has become multilayered, requiring policy responses that address both the operational and underlying societal drivers of violence.
Trends
Pahalgam Terror Attack and Operation Sindoor
In April 2025, there was a lethal assault on Hindu pilgrims in the Pahalgam region of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state, where 26 civilians[2] – mostly Hindu men – were targeted and killed on the basis of their religious identity.[3] In the immediate aftermath, The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), initially claimed responsibility for the attack, but later retracted its claim.[4] It is worth noting that this was one of the deadliest attacks in Kashmir since the Pulwama attack in February 2019.[5] In response to the Pahalgam attack, on May 7, 2025, India executed coordinated and targeted missile and airstrikes – called “Operation Sindoor”[6] – against jihadist camps and military bases across Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.[7] The strikes disrupted the operational networks of several groups, including LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).[8] JeM’s chief Masood Azhar confirmed the deaths of 14 individuals, including 10 of his family members and four close associates, in a missile strike on the group’s headquarters in Bahawalpur, Pakistan.[9] The strikes demonstrated the precision and reach of India’s retaliation while underscoring the vulnerability of jihadist command structures, and also marked a dramatic shift from prior non-operational responses to terrorism. Pakistan responded with drone and missile counterstrikes, targeting “terrorist infrastructure”[10] in Kashmir, leading to high tension and extensive diplomatic engagement between the two countries for several days.[11] The engagement escalated over four days, bringing the nuclear-armed neighbours to the brink of armed conflict.
This confrontation quickly migrated from kinetic clashes to the domain of narratives, where competing claims of victimhood and legitimacy were fought over by both state actors and jihadist groups. India framed the attacks as a legitimate, proportionate act of counter terrorism grounded on the long-standing assertion that Pakistan has been enabling cross-border militant attacks and infrastructure.[12] Pakistan, on the other hand, denied any complicity in the Pahalgam attack and emphasised sovereign prerogatives in its defensive military attacks.[13] This produced two overlapping narratives, with each actor stressing its own grievances while legitimising coercive measures, further feeding domestic securitisation and diplomatic escalation.
Here, the prominent jihadist organisations in the region also projected their own ideological storylines and exploited discursive fissures to reinforce their own agendas. For instance, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) initially echoed the Pakistani state’s defence posture against India but quickly pivoted to its default narrative of betrayal, depicting the Pakistani military as weak and tied to foreign interests.[14] The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also ran a similar narrative and went on to add that the crisis was orchestrated by the Pakistani security apparatus to disguise internal failings, further delegitimising the army and reinforcing its anti-state propaganda.[15] LeT and its affiliated groups leveraged the Pahalgam incident to adjust their operations, reportedly shifting their activities deeper into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province – possibly to evade Indian military strikes – and consolidating their networks for future mobilisation.[16] In contrast, JeM and HM did not issue any statements regarding the Pahalgam attack, though their broader involvement in cross-border terrorism is well documented.
Meanwhile, the Taliban in Afghanistan maintained a carefully neutral line and treated the escalation as a military dispute between states rather than a religious conflict. This reflected the Taliban’s shift towards a more pragmatic state actor positioning.[17] On the other hand, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) rejected national narratives and presented itself as the uncompromising standard-bearer for global jihadism, condemning Pakistan for cowardice and castigating the Taliban for their neutrality.[18]
Collectively, these narratives illustrate how South Asian jihadist movements appropriate India-Pakistan flashpoints for their own distinct purposes: 1) to act as recruitment tools, with groups tailoring their messaging to their target constituencies – for instance, AQIS focused on the pan-South Asian Islamists, TTP on anti-establishment militants in Pakistan, LeT on pro-Kashmir sympathisers and ISK on transnational jihadist aspirants; 2) to delegitimise rival institutions; and 3) to reinforce their ideologies within the jihadist ecosystem.
Red Fort Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Attack
On November 10, 2025, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack occurred near New Delhi’s Red Fort,[19] representing one of the most significant urban terrorist incidents in recent years. The blast, which took place in a densely populated area, killed 13 individuals and injured several dozen more.[20] The National Investigation Agency (NIA) identified the suicide bomber as Umar Muhammad (also known as Umar Un Nabi).[21] In the days following the attack, the NIA also arrested his aide, Amir Rashid Ali, a resident of J&K, under whose name the vehicle was registered.[22] Law enforcement agencies also conducted extensive raids across multiple states, including Delhi, J&K, Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.[23]
A key lead in the investigations was the Al-Falah University in Faridabad, where closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage showed the VBIED car parked on campus in the month before the attack.[24] CCTV footage also showed the car’s movements across some 40 locations,[25] suggesting a high degree of premeditated planning and safe house usage within benign civilian environments.
Investigations further revealed that the explosive used in the VBIED contained a mixture of ammonium nitrate and triacetone triperoxide (TATP) – highly sensitive materials which can be obtained commercially.[26] Concurrently, NIA raids in J&K, particularly in Srinagar, uncovered the existence of multiple stockpiles of materials in various locations, suggesting the perpetrators were operating as part of a wider network.[27]
However, the motive behind the attack remains opaque. The bomber may have acted out of panic or desperation, after a major crackdown on a terror module in Faridabad resulted in the seizure of nearly 2,900 kilogrammes of explosives, detonators and weapons shortly before the Red Fort blast.[28]
Hindutva-Driven Communal Violence
In 2025, India continued to witness an intensification of communal violence, which human rights monitors and civil society groups have increasingly linked to the spread of Hindutva ideology, with most incidents clustered around religious festivals, such as Holi, Ram Navami and Ramadan, among others. Data compiled by the India Persecution Tracker, a civil society monitoring project maintained by the South Asia Justice Campaign, recorded dozens of such incidents between January and March 2025 across at least seven states, including Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.[29] For example, during 2025’s Ram Navami celebrations in West Bengal, people openly brandished weapons, such as swords, tridents and axes, in processions while chanting religious slogans, despite prohibitory orders from the Calcutta High Court.[30] The normalisation of such displays has further contributed to an environment where religious festivals are increasingly polarised.
Parallel to festival-linked clashes, vigilante “cow protection” violence has remained a defining feature of Hindutva attacks.[31] Suspicion of cattle slaughter, especially cow slaughter, has fuelled mob lynchings and assaults targeting Muslims and Dalits, as noted by Human Rights Watch.[32] Christians, too, have faced escalating hostility. Indian Christian advocacy group and civil society organisation, The United Christian Forum, documented over 300 incidents between January and May 2025, ranging from the harassment of pastors to mob assaults during Sunday services.[33] In August 2025, in the Kanker district of Chhattisgarh state, a mob attacked 36 Christians after Sunday prayers, leaving two women hospitalised.[34] These attacks are often justified under the banner of fighting “forced conversions”, despite a lack of evidence.
Apart from the cases mentioned above, misinformation, or “fake news”, continues to act as a frequent accelerant for incidents of communal violence in India. Rumours spreading rapidly through WhatsApp groups or local networks, claiming incidents such as cow slaughter, “love jihad”[35] or the desecration of religious Hindu symbols, often serve as immediate flashpoints for mob attacks.[36] A stark example occurred in Nagpur, Maharashtra, on March 17, 2025, when rumours circulated that a Hindu holy book had been burned, which escalated into large-scale rioting by Hindutva-affiliated groups, leaving more than 30 injured and one dead.[37] The sharp increase in these attacks has also led to the normalisation of hate speech in both public and online spaces. Social media networks play a big role in amplifying anti-minority rhetoric through memes and coded language, illustrating how misinformation and targeted messaging have become central tools in instigating and legitimising anti-minority attacks.[38]
The overall effect of these trends is a deep erosion of social cohesion and communal trust, with Muslims and Christians reportedly feeling increasingly marginalised. Civil society groups and international observers have noted that these developments have frayed India’s plural social fabric. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) again designated India a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom issues for the sixth consecutive year.[39] Domestically, independent bodies have flagged a decline in rule of law: for instance, India’s own National Human Rights Commission was downgraded for a lack of independence and failure to address communal abuses,[40] leaving minority communities increasingly exposed while deepening social divisions and communal polarisation.
Ethnic Clashes in Manipur
The ethnic violence in Manipur, which started in May 2023, between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, continued to profoundly affect the region in 2025. Chief Minister Biren Singh resigned after 21 months of violence, followed by the imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025.[41] However, the underlying communal tensions remain unresolved, leading to continued security challenges and humanitarian crises. Periodic attacks have also been reported. For instance, on September 19, there was an ambush affiliated with the banned terror outfit, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which resulted in casualties among security personnel and subsequent arrests of the militants.[42] Similarly, in another incident in October 2025, security forces faced stiff resistance from a Kuki mob when they raided the residence of a United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) leader, showing the heightened state of communal tensions.[43] Insurgent groups have continued to exploit this crisis as well as the transnational spaces along the border with Myanmar, further complicating operational planning and regional security.
The ongoing conflict is primarily driven by entrenched communal and political grievances.[44] There needs to be immediate security measures to protect civilians, combined with sustained political dialogue and comprehensive rehabilitation programmes aimed at social reconciliation among the communities.[45] Without the proper addressing of these grievances, insurgent groups are likely to continue recruiting from among displaced and marginalised youth. The humanitarian impact of this conflict has been severe, with over 60,000 people displaced and living in relief camps.[46] International observers and civil society groups, including Amnesty International, have called for urgent rehabilitation measures and the return of the displaced population.[47]
Cross-Border tensions at the Eastern Frontiers: Bangladesh and Myanmar
India’s eastern frontiers continued to be affected by two cross-border dynamics in 2025: 1) insurgent sanctuaries and transnational operating bases, which are being exploited by Indian insurgent groups along the porous India-Myanmar border;[48] and 2) refugee and smuggling pressures along the Bangladesh border, which are complicating security governance issues in India.[49] These phenomena are episodic but carry strategic salience, as they create staging grounds for insurgents, trafficking networks and other humanitarian flows, which interact with security operations.
In Myanmar, a wave of reported drone and air attacks struck insurgent camps in Myanmar’s Sagaing and Naga-administered areas in July. Groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) and Manipur-based armed factions reported casualties and deaths of senior commanders.[50] Some local media and insurgent groups attributed these strikes to Indian security forces,[51] though the Indian authorities officially denied involvement.[52] Whether or not India was directly responsible, the incidents illustrate a broader trend: the growing use of remote and precision strike capabilities to disrupt insurgent networks across borders.[53] They also highlight the diplomatic sensitivity inherent in such operations, as India must balance counterinsurgency objectives with Myanmar’s sovereignty concerns and the risk of regional escalation.[54]
As Bangladesh underwent a violent government ouster in 2024, the borders remained a site for migration-related friction in 2025. The Indian authorities continued to detain and, in some cases, repatriate groups they considered illegal migrants or “security risks”, including Rohingya and Bengali-origin populations. There were also several reports of cross-border smuggling[55] and trafficking of arms,[56] drugs[57] and contraband, among other things, persisting in localised corridors, creating law enforcement challenges for the border states.
In addition, there emerged a distinct socio-political narrative in India where, irrespective of citizenship status, Bengali Muslims were often conflated with “Bangladeshi nationals”.[58] There are two lasting effects of this narrative: 1) it amplifies existing anti-minority sentiments, particularly against Muslim communities; and 2) it frames cross-border migration as a national security problem rather than a humanitarian or administrative challenge. This conflation of identity with foreign origin creates a layered threat perception that, while not always reflecting the actual risk, influences policing practices, local governance and community relations. In more extreme cases, it normalises anti-minority rhetoric.
Maoist Insurgency: Contraction and Residual Challenges
By mid-2025, both government and media reports indicated the Maoist insurgency had significantly decreased in scale and territorial control.[59] Official figures suggested that there was a steady reduction in active cadres, with sustained surrenders and leadership captures weakening command structures across strongholds in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha.[60] Nevertheless, episodic attacks, like improvised explosive device (IED) ambushes, continued in regions like Bastar.[61][62] However, despite a significant decline in attacks, Maoist violence still holds disruptive potential in the resource-rich tribal belts.
Concurrently, human rights groups continued to raise concerns about counterinsurgency operations, documenting instances of alleged disproportionate force, custodial violence and extrajudicial killings.[63] This also risks undermining legitimacy of governance among the tribal populations of the region,[64] from whom the insurgency historically draws its social base.[65] A purely military approach risks perpetuating grievance cycles in the region, and a more sustainable strategy that integrates rehabilitation and reintegration programmes is thus required. There also needs to be sustained investment in governance capacity, livelihood security and accountability mechanisms, to pave the way for socioeconomic development in these historically marginalised and affected areas.
Political Volatility of Leh-Ladakh
The Union Territory of Ladakh, particularly the Leh region, witnessed a marked increase in political mobilisations throughout 2025, with local groups pressing for political autonomy and full statehood.[66] Demonstrations and public assemblies have become increasingly visible, with the latest protests in September escalating into clashes with law enforcement.[67] There have also been reports of police firing tear gas and baton-charging at protesters, resulting in multiple injuries among civilians.[68] The drivers of these mobilisations are a combination of economic, cultural and political grievances. Locals are seeking to safeguard their cultural and demographic identity amid growing development of and investment in the region, while contesting employment opportunities and land-use rights. These demands also include constitutional guarantees, such as inclusion under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, to secure tribal protections.[69]
From a security perspective, these movements have not escalated into organised militancy or insurgency. However, critics note that the heavy-handed response by the state, including restrictions on public gatherings, has raised concerns regarding polarisation and political disenfranchisement.[70] Given Ladakh’s strategic position along the borders of China and Pakistan, maintaining stability in the region is imperative. The region remains a critical frontier where local unrests could intersect with broader geopolitical tensions. Therefore, proactive engagement, including dialogues and conflict mitigation measures, is necessary to prevent escalation and to integrate the demands of local stakeholders into policymaking.
Other Regional and Diasporic Dynamics: Nepal and the Khalistani Movement
Other developments which shaped India’s wider security outlook included its regional neighbour Nepal as well as diaspora politics, even though the direct impact of these factors remained limited.
Nepal’s political landscape experienced significant turbulence in 2025, marked by widespread protests that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli.[71] Primarily mobilised by the youth and called “the Gen Z revolution”,[72] the protests erupted after a controversial social media ban and escalated to result in 74 deaths and over 2,000 injuries.[73] While there is currently no threat of an observable spillover effect of this violence into Indian territory, the situation in Nepal – given its political volatility as a neighbour – warrants vigilance rather than immediate concern.
Meanwhile, Sikh separatist discourse associated primarily with the Khalistan movement continued to persist in pockets of the diaspora, particularly in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.[74] The movement remains primarily discursive on digital platforms and has not translated into significant mobilisations within India itself, even though diaspora groups have used the alleged repression of Sikhs in India to mobilise.[75] Domestically, however, Sikh-majority regions like Punjab have remained insulated from separatist resurgence. Nevertheless, the discourse retains the potential to generate diplomatic strains, as seen in the context of India and Canada, where diaspora-linked activism has strained bilateral relations.[76] While the domestic impact of Sikh separatism remains low, the persistence of diaspora-led Khalistani narratives could also be leveraged by other hostile actors, further complicating India’s diplomatic engagements.[77]
Outlook
Looking ahead, India’s security landscape in 2026 is likely to remain impacted by a convergence of internal volatility and other strategic pressure points. Cross-border violence may challenge deterrence stability in the region, particularly if Pakistan-based networks attempt retaliatory strikes following Operation Sindoor. Domestically, rising communal polarisation, vigilante mobilisation and digitally amplified hate narratives will continue to strain India’s internal social cohesion. On the eastern side, refugee flows from Bangladesh and Myanmar may continue to complicate border management and safety, while the unresolved ethnic fault lines in Manipur will sustain if not properly addressed. The Maoist movement’s decline is promising; however, if developmental grievances in the region are neglected, there runs the risk of cyclical grievance resurgence. Meanwhile, the growing mobilisation in Ladakh may emerge as a key flashpoint for local unrest, with strategic overtones. At the transnational level, diaspora activism – particularly Khalistani discourse – will shape India’s security and diplomatic moves, even if their direct impact within India itself remains limited. Therefore, 2026 will test India’s capacity to manage hybrid threats which blend conventional security challenges with socio-political and informational dimensions, requiring more integrated and community-sensitive security strategies.
About the Author
Antara Chakraborthy is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. With a background in journalism covering Indian domestic politics, Antara’s research now broadly focuses on social cohesion, social resilience, and polarisation in multicultural contexts. She also examines disinformation and gender, alongside the rise of religious nationalism in India and its impact on diasporic identities and societies. Her commentaries have been published in various outlets such as The Diplomat, The Interpreter, new mandala, etc. Antara loves cats, tea, and a good fantasy novel. She can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Abid Hussain, “Why Did India Strike Pakistan? All We Know About Operation Sindoor,” Al Jazeera, May 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/7/why-did-india-strike-pakistan-all-we-know-about-operation-sindoor.
[2] Gaya Gupta, “What to Know About the Kashmir Attack and India-Pakistan Tensions,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/23/india-kashmir-attack-pahalgam-baisaran.
[3] “‘Act of War’: What Happened in Kashmir Attack That Killed 26 Tourists?” Al Jazeera, April 23, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/23/act-of-war-what-happened-in-kashmir-attack-that-killed-26-tourists.
[4] “US Labels the Group Accused of Pahalgam Attack a ‘Terrorist’ Organisation,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/18/us-labels-the-group-accused-of-pahalgam-attack-a-terrorist-organisation.
[5] “‘Act of War,” Al Jazeera.
[6] Hussain, “Why Did India Strike Pakistan?”
[7] Rudra Chaudhuri, “Indian Airstrikes in Pakistan: May 7, 2025,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 7, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/05/indian-airstrikes-in-pakistan-may-7-2025?lang=en.
[8] Tom Ambrose et al., “Shehbaz Sharif Authorises ‘Corresponding Action’ After India Strikes Kill 26 – As It Happened,” The Guardian, May 7, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/may/06/pakistan-india-attacks-kashmir-live-updates.
[9] “Operation Sindoor: Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief Masood Azhar’s Sister & Other Family Members Killed in India’s Targeted Strikes,” The Economic Times, May 7, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/operation-sindoor-jaish-e-mohammed-chief-masood-azhars-sister-other-family-members-killed-in-indias-targeted-strikes/articleshow/120956479.cms.
[10] Aftab Ahmed, Adnan Abidi and Saeed Shah, “India Says Military Stations Attacked By Pakistan Drones and Missiles,” Reuters, May 9, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blast-heard-pakistans-lahore-amid-tensions-with-india-say-geo-news-reuters-2025-05-08/.
[11] Devjyot Ghoshal, Ariba Shahid and Shivam Patel, “India and Pakistan’s Drone Battles Mark New Arms Race,” Reuters, May 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/india-pakistans-drone-battles-mark-new-arms-race-asia-2025-05-27/.
[12] Sophie Landrin, “India Bombs Pakistan, Which Denounces ‘An Act of War’,” Le Monde, May 7, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/05/07/india-bombs-pakistan-which-denounces-an-act-of-war_6741004_4.html.
[13] “‘Don’t Blame Us’: In First Reaction, Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif Denies Role in Pahalgam Terror Attack,” The Times of India, April 23, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/dont-blame-pakistan-in-first-reaction-defence-minister-khawaja-asif-denies-role-in-pahalgam-terror-attack/articleshow/120538889.cms.
[14] Soumya Awasthi, “Operation Sindoor and AQIS: What India’s Airstrikes Triggered in the Jihadist World,” Observer Research Foundation, May 9, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/operation-sindoor-and-aqis-what-india-s-airstrikes-triggered-in-the-jihadist-world; Abdul Sayed, “Jihadist Narratives in the Aftermath of India’s Airstrikes on Pakistan,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 23, no. 3 (2025), https://jamestown.org/program/jihadist-narratives-in-the-aftermath-of-indias-airstrikes-on-pakistan.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] “LeT Shifts Operations Deeper Into Pakistan After Indian Strikes,” The Economic Times, September 27, 2025, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/let-shifts-operations-deeper-into-pakistan-after-indian-strikes/articleshow/124180668.cms.
[17] Sayed, “Jihadist Narratives in the Aftermath.”
[18] Ibid.
[19] “Red Fort Blast and an Inter-State Terror Module: What We Know,” The Hindu, November 13, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/red-fort-blast-and-an-interstate-terror-module-what-we-know/article70276165.ece.
[20] Ibid.
[21] “Red Fort Blast Case: NIA Calls Umar ‘Suicide Bomber’, Nabs Key Plotter,” Hindustan Times, November 17, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nia-calls-umar-suicide-bomber-nabs-key-plotter-101763317994717.html.
[22] “India Arrests Kashmir Resident Over Deadly Delhi Car Blast,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/16/india-arrests-kashmir-resident-over-deadly-delhi-car-blast.
[23] Shrimansi Kaushik and Alisha Dutta, “Three More Detained in Delhi Blast Case; Two FIRs Lodged Against Al-Falah University,” The Hindu, November 16, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/three-more-detained-in-delhi-blast-case-two-firs-lodged-against-al-falah-university/article70285351.ece.
[24] Mukesh Singh Sengar, “i20 Behind Blast Near Red Fort Was Seen At Al Falah Varsity Last Month: CCTV,” NDTV, November 16, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/i20-used-in-delhi-red-fort-blast-was-parked-at-al-falah-university-last-month-cctv-9644099.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Sakshi Chand and Alok Singh, “Red Fort Blast: Explosive Contained Mixture of Ammonium Nitrate and TATP, Shows Forensic Analysis,” The Indian Express, November 16, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/red-fort-blast-explosive-contained-mixture-of-ammonium-nitrate-and-tatp-show-forensic-analysis-10368359/.
[27] Danai Nesta Kupemba, “Nine Killed in Accidental Blast at Police Station in Indian-Administered Kashmir, Officials Say,” BBC News, November 15, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cnvel2gvqeqo.
[28] Neeraj Chauhan, “NIA Begins Red Fort Blast Probe, Traces Umar’s Final Movements,” Hindustan Times, November 13, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nia-begins-red-fort-blast-probe-traces-umar-s-final-movements-101762975638290.html; Leena Dhankar, “2,900kg Explosives Seized in F’bad; 7 Held in ‘White-Collar’ Terror Link,” Hindustan Times, November 11, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/gurugram-news/2900kg-explosives-seized-in-f-bad-7-held-in-white-collar-terror-link-101762822637752.html.
[29] “India Persecution Tracker | 2025 | January – March,” South Asia Justice Campaign, accessed October 3, 2025, https://southasiajusticecampaign.org/ipt2025-1/.
[30] Sulagna Sengupta, “Tension Flares in WB During Ram Navami As Arms Brandished in Rallies; BJP, TMC Trade Barbs,” The New Indian Express, April 6, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Apr/06/tension-flares-in-wb-during-ram-navami-as-arms-brandished-in-rallies-bjp-tmc-trade-barbs.
[31] Md Sinan Siyech and Akansha Narain, “Beef-Related Violence in India: An Expression of Islamophobia,” Islamophobia Studies Journal 4, no. 181 (2018): 181-194, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330458156_Beef-related_Violence_in_India_An_Expression_of_Islamophobia.
[32] “Violent Cow Protection in India: Vigilante Groups Attack Minorities,” Human Rights Watch, February 19, 2019, http://hrw.org/report/2019/02/19/violent-cow-protection-india/vigilante-groups-attack-minorities.
[33] “Over 300 Anti-Christian Attacks Reported in India in the First 5 Months of 2025,” Catholic Connect, June 18, 2025, https://www.catholicconnect.in/news/over-300-anti-christian-attacks-reported-in-india-in-the-first-5-months-of-2025.
[34] “‘We Were targeted Because of Our Faith’: 36 Injured After Hindu Mob Attacks Christian Families in Chhattisgarh’s Kanker,” Maktoob Media, August 13, 2025, https://maktoobmedia.com/india/we-were-targeted-because-of-our-faith-36-injured-after-hindu-mob-attacks-christian-families-in-chhattisgarhs-kanker/.
[35] “Love jihad” refers to a mainstream conspiracy narrative propagated primarily by Hindu nationalist groups which alleges that Muslim men deliberately seduce and marry Hindu women with the intent of converting them to Islam. This narrative has been politically instrumentalised to justify legal and social restrictions on interfaith relationships. Several Indian states, like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Uttarakhand, have enacted legislation known as “love jihad laws”. These laws criminalise religious conversions through marriage or coercion, but the law itself has been criticised for its vague wording and selective enforcement, for disproportionately targeting Muslim men, for infringing on individual autonomy and religious freedom, and for reinforcing harmful stereotypes. See Pragya Tiwari, “What Is Behind India’s ‘Love Jihad’ Legislation?” Al Jazeera, November 30, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/30/what-is-behind-indias-love-jihad-legislation.
[36] Chinmayi Arun, “On WhatsApp, Rumours, and Lynchings,” Economic & Political Weekly, 54, no. 6 (2019), https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/6/insight/whatsapp-rumours-and-lynchings.html.
[37] Neyaz Farouquee, “Curfew in India City After Violence Over Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb’s Tomb,” BBC News, March 18, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yx9gwg4ppo.
[38] “AI-Generated Imagery and the New Frontier of Islamophobia in India,” Center for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH), September 29, 2025, https://www.csohate.org/2025/09/29/ai-generated-hate-in-india.
[39] Kanishka Singh and David Brunnstrom, “US Religious Freedom Panel Urges Sanctions Against India’s External Spy Agency,” Reuters, March 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-religious-freedom-panel-urges-sanctions-against-indias-external-spy-agency-2025-03-25.
[40] “India’s National Human Rights Commission Faces Historic Downgrade as UN-Linked Body Flags Govt Interference,” The Wire, April 28, 2025, https://m.thewire.in/article/rights/indias-national-human-rights-commission-faces-historic-downgrade-as-un-linked-body-flags-govt-interference.
[41] “President’s Rule Imposed in Manipur Days After Biren Singh Resigns As CM,” Hindustan Times, February 14, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/manipur-violence-presidents-rule-bjp-n-biren-singh-101739455456198.html.
[42] Bikash Singh, “Guwahati: Two PLA Militants Arrested for September 19 Manipur Ambush,” The Economic Times, September 27, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/guwahati-two-pla-militants-arrested-for-september-19-manipur-ambush/articleshow/124184630.cms.
[43] “Security Forces Under Mob Attack During Raid At UKLF Leader’s House in Manipur,” The Times of India, October 3, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/security-forces-under-mob-attack-during-raid-at-uklf-leaders-house-in-manipur/articleshow/124278126.cms.
[44] “Finding A Way Out of Festering Conflict in India’s Manipur,” International Crisis Group, February 14, 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india/346-finding-way-out-festering-conflict-indias-manipur.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Rishi Lekhi, “Tens of Thousands Displaced By Ethnic Violence in Northeast India Suffer Squalid Conditions in Camps,” Associated Press, December 23, 2024, https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/tens-of-thousands-displaced-by-ethnic-violence-in-northeast-india-suffer-squalid-conditions-in-camps.
[47] “India: Authorities Should Urgently Rehabilitate Thousands Displaced in Two Years of Ethnic Violence in Manipur,” Amnesty International, May 2, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/authorities-should-urgently-rehabilitate-thousands-displaced-in-two-years-of-ethnic-violence-in-manipur.
[48] Jatindra Dash and Tanvi Mehta, “Indian Army Operation on Myanmar Border Kills 10 Insurgents,” Reuters, May 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-army-operation-myanmar-border-kills-10-insurgents-2025-05-15.
[49] “India, Bangladesh Agree to Curb Trans-Border Crime by Increasing Coordinated Patrols,” News On Air, August 28, 2025, https://www.newsonair.gov.in/india-bangladesh-agree-to-curb-trans-border-crime-by-increasing-coordinated-patrols.
[50] Prabin Kalita, “ULFA-I Claims 3 Big Casualties in ‘India Drone Strikes’ on Myanmar Camps, Army Denies Operations,” The Times of India, July 14, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ulfa-i-claims-3-big-casualties-in-india-drone-strikes-on-myanmar-camps-army-denies-operations/articleshow/122426427.cms.
[51] “Indian Drone Strikes in Myanmar Spark Outcry Over Sovereignty,” Bay of Bengal Post, July 15, 2025, https://www.bayofbengalpost.com/news/indian_drone_strikes_in_myanmar.
[52] “Indian Army Denies Drone Strikes on Insurgent Group ULFA-I Camp in Myanmar,” NDTV, July 13, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/army-denies-drone-strikes-on-insurgent-group-ulfa-i-camp-in-myanmar-8868183.
[53] Dr Smit Gupta, “Myanmar’s Borderlands and India’s Expanding Drone Warfare,” South Asia Journal, September 1, 2025, https://southasiajournal.net/myanmars-borderlands-and-indias-expanding-drone-warfare/.
[54] Mary Khaing, “Indian Army Accused of Deadly Strike on Separatists in Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, July 15, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/indian-army-accused-of-deadly-strike-on-separatists-in-myanmar.html.
[55] Jayatri Nag. “BSF Foils Major Phensedyl Smuggling Bid on Bangladesh Border,” The Economic Times, May 4, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/bsf-foils-major-phensedyl-smuggling-bid-on-bangladesh-border/articleshow/121866896.cms.
[56] Khaled Ahmed, “Bangladesh Intelligence Uncovers UPDF Bases and Arms Routes in India,” BDMilitary.com, October 2, 2025, https://www.bdmilitary.com/threat-environment/internal-threats/bangladesh-intelligence-uncovers-updf-bases-and-arms-routes-in-india/2828/.
[57] “Arakan Army Assisting in Drug Smuggling: BGB,” The Daily Star, September 15, 2025, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime-and-law/p6iai9eo0g.
[58] Panchali Ray, “India’s Border Crackdown Is Forcing Bengali Muslims Off Their Own Land in the Ganga-Padma Delta,” Article 14, August 25, 2025, https://article-14.com/post/india-s-border-crackdown-is-forcing-bengali-muslims-off-their-own-land-in-the-ganga-padma-delta-68ab89dfe408e.
[59] Devesh K. Pandey, “Why Maoists Are On the Wane in the Once-Dreaded Red Corridor,” The Hindu, August 9, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-maoists-are-on-the-wane-in-the-once-dreaded-red-corridor/article69914276.ece.
[60] Murali Krishnan, “Why Has Maoist Violence Subsided in India?” Deutsche Welle, May 1, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/why-has-maoist-violence-subsided-in-india/a-64292819.
[61] Jatindra Dash, “Eight Policemen, Driver Killed in Maoist Attack in Central India,” Reuters, January 6, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/ten-policemen-feared-killed-bomb-blast-central-india-tv-report-says-2025-01-06/.
[62] “Indian Police Officers Killed in Chhattisgarh Maoist Attack,” Deutsche Welle, January 6, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/indian-police-officers-killed-in-chhattisgarh-maoist-attack/a-71226557.
[63] Status of Policing in India Report 2025: Police Torture and (Un)Accountability (Common Cause & Lokniti – Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 2025), https://www.commoncause.in/wotadmin/upload/SPIR_2025.pdf.
[64] Ashutosh Sharma, “In Chhattisgarh, the War On Maoists Becomes a War On Adivasis,” Frontline, April 9, 2025, https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/battleground-bastar-maoist-insurgency-counter-operations/article69396194.ece.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Aarish Chhabra, “Why Is Ladakh Seeing Youth-Led Protests? Four Demands Form Core of Violent Unrest in Leh,” Hindustan Times, September 24, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/why-ladakh-youth-led-protests-4-demands-form-core-of-unrest-arson-in-leh-bjp-office-burns-sonam-wangchuk-reacts-101758706387182.html.
[67] “Protests Seeking Statehood in India’s Ladakh Turn Deadly,” Al Jazeera, September 24, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/24/protests-seeking-statehood-in-indias-ladakh-turn-deadly.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Chhabra, “Why Is Ladakh Seeing Youth-Led Protests?”
[70] Fayaz Wani, “Restrictions Continue in Leh After Violent Protests Over Ladakh Statehood, Sixth Schedule Demand,” The New Indian Express, September 25, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Sep/25/restrictions-continue-in-leh-after-violent-protests-over-ladakh-statehood-sixth-schedule-demand.
[71] Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Gaurav Pokharel, “Nepal Prime Minister Quits After Deaths at Protests Sparked By Social Media Ban,” The Guardian, September 9, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/09/nepal-protests-social-media-ban-lifted-gen-z-kathmandu.
[72] Salimah Shivji, “TikTok, Discord and Reddit: How A Gen Z Revolution Upended Nepal’s Government,” CBC News, September 24, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nepal-youth-protests-social-media-1.7642523.
[73] Gopal Sharma, “Nepal Panel to Probe Violence During Anti-Graft Protests That Killed 74,” Reuters, September 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nepal-panel-probe-violence-during-anti-graft-protests-that-killed-74-2025-09-22/.
[74] Hanna Duggal and Alia Chughtai, “What Is the Khalistan Movement? How Is It Linked to India-Canada Tensions?” Al Jazeera, September 27, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/what-is-the-khalistan-movement-how-is-it-linked-to-india-canada-tensions.
[75] Dron Parashar, “Australia Should Take Notes on the India–Canada Fallout,” East Asia Forum, October 14, 2023, https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/10/14/australia-should-take-notes-on-the-india-canada-fallout/.
[76] Laura Dhillon Kane and Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “Khalistan: What Is the Sikh Separatist Movement Clouding India-Canada Ties?” Bloomberg, September 25, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-25/khalistan-what-is-the-sikh-separatist-movement-clouding-india-canada-ties.
[77] Ibid.
