Indonesia
This article discusses developments in Indonesia’s terrorism landscape and counter terrorism efforts in 2023. In line with the trends of the past five years, the threat posed by terrorist organisations in the country declined last year. While the number of terrorist plots increased, no attacks were successfully conducted in 2023. While major terrorist organisations in Indonesia do harbour intentions to exploit the sociopolitical dynamics in the upcoming 2024 national elections, it is unlikely that they will possess the necessary operational capacities to successfully execute them – if counter terrorism efforts are sustained.
Introduction
The overall threat posed by Indonesia’s terrorist organisations continued to decline in 2023. While the number of recorded terrorist plots increased from five plots in 2022 to seven plots in 2023, the number of successful attacks decreased, from one attack in 2022 to none in 2023.[1] While this is a welcome trend, caution is still warranted as Indonesia’s major terrorist organisations – namely, the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the main pro-Islamic State (IS) group; the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s largest pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) group; and the Darul Islam (DI), the country’s oldest terrorist organisation – are known to be resilient and seeking to exploit the sociopolitical dynamics of the upcoming 2024 national elections.
Organisational Dynamics
Jemaah Islamiyah
Ever since senior members of JI became the main target of Indonesia’s counter terrorism operations in 2020,[2] the group’s operational capacity has significantly weakened.[3] Court documents involving JI members disclosed in 2023 noted that apart from successfully disrupting JI’s outward-facing initiatives, such as its attempts to fund-raise via charity foundations and conduct dakwah via mass organisations,[4] widespread arrests of JI members between 2018-2022 have also compelled the organisation to dissolve its more inward-facing units. These include its Education and Cadet Academy (ADIRA), which JI shut down in June 2020; its Coordination and Synchronisation Unit (KOSIN), which stopped operating in early August 2019; and its Intelligence Division (ALWI), which was dissolved in June 2019.[5]
The weakening of JI’s operational capabilities continued in 2023 with the arrest of 38 members. Among these, the arrests of two clusters were particularly detrimental to JI. The first involved the six-member Lampung cell, who retaliated and opened fire during their arrest.[6] Further investigations found that the group possessed various weapons[7] and had made plans to conduct attacks targeting local police officers.[8] These arrests were particularly damaging to JI not only in terms of disrupting the planned attacks, but also because the Lampung cell had played a pivotal role in assisting fugitive senior group members. With the arrest of these members, JI is now more limited in its ability to safely relocate senior leaders.[9]
The second arrest cluster which was detrimental to JI involved five members in Palu, Central Sulawesi. During the arrest, investigations found that the group possessed over a dozen weapons,[10] along with links to two local charity foundations in Donggala and Sigi.[11] This Central Sulawesi cell had, over the past decade, helped JI to restore and test various programmes in the area, such as domestic military training programmes in Kolaka, Southeast Sulawesi, firearms procurement efforts and recruitment initiatives.[12] With these individuals arrested, JI will now have a harder time exploiting the local population’s historical grievances and rebuilding its presence in a strategically vital region.[13]
Despite its ongoing operational decline, however, JI remains a key security concern. Notably, the organisation has demonstrated a clear intent to capitalise on the 2024 national elections, in line with its evolving “bullet to ballot” strategy.[14] This shift in approach has been evident in recent years, with JI members’ participation in the 2016 212 Defend Islam Rally, efforts to establish and infiltrate new political parties,[15] and attempts to influence communities through participation in other mass organisations like the National Anti-Syiah Alliance (ANNAS).[16] While the senior members who were key in spearheading this new strategy have been arrested, there are still over 40 Syrian-trained JI members who are at large and could be specifically groomed to replace them.[17]
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and Other Pro-Islamic State Groups
Indonesia’s largest pro-IS organisation, JAD, has yet to recover since senior members from its central command structure were arrested in mid-2018.[18] Till today, JAD’s remaining members have yet to formulate a viable, unified strategy, and individual cells have rarely been able to collectively mobilise resources and collaborate for a coordinated operation.[19] Consequently, whereas JAD operations in 2016 often mobilised members and cells from multiple regions, JAD operations today are commonly planned and executed by a single cell.[20] When cells do cooperate with one another, they are often made possible not by the formal coordination efforts of cell leaders, but by the informal social ties between cell members.[21]
Despite its current state of disarray, however, JAD cells continue to remain active in planning attacks. The arrest of five JAD members in Central Java in August 2023, for example, led to the discovery that another Solo cell had in their possession an improvised explosive device (IED) that they were planning to use in an attack targeting the police headquarters of Solo Raya, Central Java.[22] Further investigation also found that the head of JAD Solo Raya was in fact responsible for creating the IED used in the 2022 Astana Anyar Bombing in Bandung, West Java.[23] Unfortunately, no details exist as to whether this cooperation was an isolated incident or if it indicates a systemic development within JAD’s overall operational capabilities to structurally foster inter-regional cooperation. Additionally, the arrest of two JAD suspects in West Java in late November 2023 revealed the existence of a JAD faction led by Abu Oemar, whose members have devised several plans to disrupt the 2024 elections.[24]
Indonesia’s other pro-IS terrorist organisation, the Mujahidin of East Indonesia (MIT), remained inactive in 2023 following the killing of its last known member in late 2022.[25] Moreover, while MIT had experienced a surge in potential recruits in early 2022,[26] there was no discernible increase observed in 2023. That said, MIT still warrants concern. Not only has the organisation successfully rebuilt its ranks before,[27] there still exists several potential sources of MIT recruitment across its areas of operation in Poso. These include sympathisers in neighbouring districts like Parigi Muotong and Tojo Una-Una; former MIT detainees who are set for release in late 2023, including a potential successor to major MIT figure Ustadz Yasin;[28] and individuals associated with MIT-affiliated Islamic schools like Pesantren Darul Anshor Putri in Kayamanya.[29]
Overall, despite the continued decline of their domestic operational capacities in 2023, Indonesian pro-IS groups still exhibit a strong enthusiasm to connect with international organisations and stay informed of dynamics abroad. Pro-IS networks online, for instance, still actively interact with Indonesians in Syrian IS camps, and some were quick to translate Abu Huzaifah’s audio communications when he became IS’ new emir in August 2023.[30] This enthusiasm has also manifested offline. In March 2023, for example, Indonesian authorities in Jakarta detained four Uzbek citizens who were associated with the AQ-affiliated Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ).[31] Subsequent investigations found that the group had “met with an Indonesian ISIS sympathiser” who suggested the Uzbeks become ustazs (religious teachers) to advocate for people to travel abroad and support IS.[32] While this was notably an outlier event, it points to the underlying threat of international events and actors aggravating domestic groups’ fervour to conduct jihad.
Darul Islam (DI)
Indonesia’s oldest terrorist organisation, DI, did not make significant headway in achieving a mass revival in 2023. Whereas some DI cells in 2022 were discovered to have formulated attack plots, like DI’s West Sumatra cell which had intended to carry out low-level attacks using machetes in March 2022,[33] there was no indication of any DI cells expressing an intent to conduct attacks in 2023. Additionally, whereas over 24 DI members were arrested in 2022, throughout 2023, Indonesian authorities arrested only one individual affiliated with DI – a man in North Jakarta who was detained in late January.[34] Importantly, no weaponry or documents containing details of attack plots were found in the investigations following his arrest.
That said, DI should remain on the security radar. Not only do DI members often break away to become recruits of more violent terrorist organisations,[35] its largest faction, the Tahmid Faction, has issued clear instructions for its members to prepare for an armed jihad in 2024.[36] This armed jihad, however, is not particularly motivated by the 2024 Indonesian elections, but by their belief in a hadith (prophetic saying) predicting “the end of time”. Specifically, this refers to a hadith which stated that a mujahideen (fighter) will lead Muslims to victory every 100 years. Senior DI ulama (religious scholars) then calculated the timeline as beginning with the fall of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 – indicating that a Muslim victory would come in 2024.[37]
Hence, since 2020, DI’s Tahmid Faction has carried out various preparations. The faction has set up home-based factories to produce sharp weapons like machetes and arrowheads, conducted military training exercises in West Sumatra and South Tangerang, and accelerated its recruitment process.[38] A 2023 report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) noted that DI uses what they have termed the “One Man One Object (OMOO)” strategy for its recruitment efforts, where each member is required to recruit “at least one other person”. Additionally, each subdistrict-level unit is given a quota to recruit at least “seven new members per month” and up to 30, if possible.[39]
However, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that DI’s attempt to stage an armed jihad in 2024 will manifest. This is chiefly because a large number of DI members have revoked their membership. Up to September 2023, for example, over 1,079 DI members had retracted their bai’ah (pledge of allegiance) to the organisation and instead pledged loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.[40] While some may have retracted their bai’ah to avoid arrest, many have done so because they are merely new recruits with no strong personal or official ties to the organisation.[41] Additionally, in late June 2023, DI-affiliated Al Zaytun Madrassa in Indramayu, West Java, became mired in a national controversy when its leader, Panji Gumilang, was reported to the police for blasphemy.[42] While the government decided not to close Al Zaytun,[43] the recent spotlight will make it more difficult for DI to use it as a recruitment source.
Trends in Plot Tactics and Targets
Tactics of Attacks
Almost all terrorist attacks and plots in Indonesia involve a combination of three types of weaponry: IEDs, firearms and sharp weapons – which encompass melee weapons such as machetes and long-range weapons such as bows. However, among these three weapon types, firearms and sharp weapons are the most commonly used. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) indicates that between 2017-2021, over 73.9 percent of all terrorist attacks and plots in Indonesia featured some form of firearm or sharp weapon, while only 26.1 percent involved explosives.[44] This pattern persisted in 2022, where firearms and bladed weapons featured in over 66.7 percent of all terrorist plots and attacks, and explosives accounted for only 33.3 percent of such incidents.[45]
In 2023, however, there was a slight increase in percentage terms of terrorist plots that intended to use explosives. Among the five discovered attack plots whose details were publicised by the Indonesian authorities, 60 percent featured IEDs.[46] These include the plot of a pro-IS individual who was apprehended in Sleman, Yogyakarta, in January 2023,[47] the aforementioned plot of the JAD cell in Central Java to target the police headquarters of Solo Raya,[48] and the plot to disrupt the 2024 planned by Abu Oemar’s JAD faction.[49] Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite this slight increase in percentage, the absolute number of IEDs employed in 2023 remained relatively low compared to years like 2018, when over five IEDs were used in terrorist plots and attacks.
The two remaining terrorist plots uncovered in 2023 intended to use firearms as their primary means of violence. The first of these was the plot by the JI Lampung cell, who wanted to attack local police officers. In preparation, the group had amassed various firearms including air rifles and factory-made weapons, including an M-16 which experts believe to have come from the southern Philippines.[50] The second plot was planned by a pro-IS individual who worked in the state-owned railway company PT KAI and was arrested in August 2023.[51] Investigations found that this individual had prepared over 18 firearms, including factory-made rifles and modified airsoft guns, to attack the Police’s Mobile Brigade Corps’ headquarters in Kelapa Dua, Banten.[52]
Targets of Attacks
Like in 2022,[53] Indonesian police officers and headquarters continued to be the primary target of terrorist attack plots in 2023. Notably, out of the seven attack plots uncovered, four planned to attack police-affiliated entities, namely, local police officers in Lampung and Riau, the police headquarters of Solo Raya and the Police’s Mobile Brigade Corps’ headquarters in Kelapa Dua. However, apart from targeting the police, online posts by JAD members also indicate that the group intends to attack polling stations that are “within reach”.[54] Additionally, some experts have noted that pro-IS groups have signalled their intent to attack not only during polling day, but also during the campaigning period leading up to the 2024 elections.[55]
Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
Counter Terrorism Developments
Indonesia’s counter terrorism (CT) capabilities have increased significantly compared to the early 2000s.[56] These capabilities were further bolstered when Indonesia enacted the 2018 Anti-Terrorism Law, which expanded the pre-emptive detention powers of the country’s CT unit, the Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88).[57] Hence, since 2018, the number of terrorist arrests in Indonesia has increased greatly. Before 2018, CT operations annually saw an average of 170 suspects apprehended. Afterwards, this number surged to around 300 terrorist suspects annually. Importantly, this increased capacity has also enabled the arrest of key senior members of various terrorist organisations, such as members of JAD’s central command and JI’s Shura Council.[58] In total, over 1,565 terrorist suspects were arrested between 2018-2022.
Despite this consistent increase in operational capacity, the number of suspected terrorists arrested in Indonesia, however, decreased in 2023. Whereas more than 248 terrorist suspects were apprehended in 2022, up until November 2023, only 108 terrorist suspects were arrested – marking a 56.4 percent decline. These arrests have largely targeted members of pro-IS groups, constituting for 51.8 percent of all arrests, and JI, accounting for 36.1 percent.[59]
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Developments
Indonesia’s CVE infrastructures have also developed significantly compared to the 2000s, when such programmes were largely ad hoc and off budget.[60] Not only are CVE responsibilities now institutionalised in the programmes of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88’s Directorate of Identification and Socialisation,[61] Indonesia has also developed the 2021 National Action Plan Against Extremism (RAN PE). This involves a blueprint with 130 CVE reform plans ranging from strengthening CVE data governance to standardising CVE assessment metrics.[62] These government-led efforts have also been complemented by a significant number of CVE programmes by civil society organisations (CSOs). Recent research by PeaceGen found that over the past couple of years, CSOs have conducted over 448 CVE programmes across 11 provinces.[63]
Despite these advancements, Indonesia’s CVE initiatives face persistent challenges such as a lack of robust evaluation methods and standardised risk assessment tools.[64] While the RAN PE has prioritised addressing these issues, implementation of Indonesia’s CVE reforms has stalled due to budget constraints, coordination problems and a lack of prioritisation among relevant ministries and local governments.[65] For instance, only six provinces and two cities have enacted the necessary regional regulations to implement RAN PE programmes.[66] Furthermore, CSO-led CVE programmes currently face ongoing challenges ranging from insufficient incentives to poor coordination and a lack of programme sustainability. Consequently, there is often an overlap in the various CSO initiatives. PeaceGen’s study, for example, found that 84.6 percent of CSO-led CVE initiatives focus solely on preventive measures.[67]
Outlook
The operational capabilities of terrorist organisations in Indonesia have been on the decline in the past five years, a trend which continued in 2023. Indonesia’s main pro-AQ group, JI, has not managed to rebuild its ranks to the level prior to the arrest of its leader Para Wijayanto in 2019, and its options on where and how to do so are dwindling. Additionally, JAD is still in a state of disarray as collective strategising and resource mobilisation, except in some instances, remain rare amongst their cells. Moreover, DI is increasingly unlikely to successfully orchestrate a 2024 armed jihad, with many of its members having renounced their membership.
That said, Indonesian terrorist organisations are highly resilient and have all expressed varying levels of interest in exploiting upcoming events in 2024. As mentioned above, JI has planned to influence upcoming political dynamics through either infiltrating political parties or bandwagoning on the activities of other mass organisations; JAD has expressed its intention to attack polling stations on voting day and other targets throughout the campaign period; and DI has carried out preparations to launch an armed jihad in the belief that 2024 will be the year of victory for Muslims. Furthermore, the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has resulted in heightened animosity and large demonstrations that terrorist organisations could exploit to recruit, fund-raise or send members to Palestine.[68] If CT operations are sustained, however, it is highly unlikely that these groups will have the operational capacities needed to successfully realise their intentions.
The larger concern is whether stakeholders can effectively implement the CVE reform measures that were listed in the 2021 RAN PE. As of now, these efforts are mired in challenges and thus have not made a meaningful, positive impact on how CVE programmes are run in the country. Even today, former terrorist prisoners in Poso are still distrustful of BNPT’s programmes as they believe that the institution’s CVE initiatives, such as its economic empowerment programmes, are “just promises”.[69] Without these reforms, it is unlikely that Indonesia will be able to reduce its recidivism rate of 11.4 percent.[70] While this percentage is not necessarily high, it is still a major concern given that the number of arrested suspects CVE programmes need to monitor and rehabilitate has exponentially increased in the past five years. A complacent CVE environment, in which radicals are released without having been weaned off their violent jihadist inclinations, will only provide opportunities to terrorist groups to rebuild and re-orchestrate their radical communities.
About the Author
Alif Satria is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Prananta Haroun on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Unaesah Rahmah and Amresh Lavan Gunasingham, “Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2023), p. 12, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-15-issue-01/.
[2] Aisyah Llewellyn, “How ‘War On Terror’ Was Fought and Won in Indonesia – For Now,” Al Jazeera, September 15, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/how-war-on-terror-was-fought-won-in-southeast-asia-for-now.
[3] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Impact of the Taliban’s Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” IPAC Report, No. 73 (2021), p. 1.
[4] V. Arianti, “Jemaah Islamiyah After the 2002 Bali Bombings; Two Decades of Continuity and Transformation,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 5 (2022), pp. 21-22, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-14-issue-05/; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Impact of the Taliban’s Victory,” p. 13.
[5] Verdict of Syawal Wahyudi alias Yudi alias Arka bin Tukiran, East Jakarta District Court, 2023, No. 646/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Tim., p. 8; Verdict of Sulthoni Arifudin alias Dikun alias Ust. Sulton alias Kojiro alias Yamada bin Ahmad Rujito, East Jakarta District Court, 2022, No. 596/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim., p. 16.
[6] This resulted in the death of two suspects. See “Dua Orang Tewas Ditembak Densus 88 di Lampung, Diduga Jaringan JI,” CNN Indonesia, April 13, 2023, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230413082222-12-937095/dua-orang-tewas-ditembak-densus-88-di-lampung-diduga-jaringan-ji.
[7] This includes factory-made firearms, self-made rifles and sharp weapons. See “Fakta-Fakta Penangkapan 6 Teroris JI di Lampung Berujung Baku Tembak,” CNN Indonesia, April 14, 2023, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230414070734-12-937561/fakta-fakta-penangkapan-6-teroris-ji-di-lampung-berujung-baku-tembak/2.
[8] These plans, however, did not have any specific details regarding time and location. See Norbertus Arya Dwiangga Martiar, “6 Teroris Ditangkap di Lampung, Ada yang Berencana Lakukan Teror,” Kompas, April 13, 2023, https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/04/13/dpo-tersangka-teroris-tewas-dalam-baku-tembak-di-lampung.
[9] Verdict of Imam Sofingi alias Imam Safi’i alias Urip Sumoharjo alias Urip alias Bagus Purnomo alias Bagus alias Abu Afro bin Sudarmo, East Jakarta District Court, 2022, No. 680/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim., p. 17.
[10] Yoanes Litha, “Densus 88 Antiteror Amankan 5 Terduga Teroris di Sulawesi Tengah,” VoA Indonesia, March 18, 2023, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/densus-88-antiteror-amankan-5-terduga-teroris-di-sulawesi-tengah/7011000.html.
[11] Michael Hangga Wismabrata, “Densus 88 Geledah Sejumlah Kantor Yayasan di Sigi dan Donggala, Diduga Terafiliasi Jamaah Islamiyah,” Kompas, March 29, 2023, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2023/03/29/081655478/densus-88-geledah-sejumlah-kantor-yayasan-di-sigi-dan-donggala-diduga.
[12] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Militant Groups in Poso: Down but Not Out,” IPAC Report, No. 86 (2023), pp. 10-12; Alif Satria, “Addressing Jemaah Islamiyah’s Infrastructure in Sulawesi,” The Diplomat, May 26, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/addressing-jemaah-islamiyahs-infrastructure-in-sulawesi/.
[13] JI itself has noted that Poso is the “perfect place” to secure a base of operations because it is geographically defensible, has various natural resources for sustenance and has a relatively supportive population. See Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah, trans. Dave McRae (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2013), p. 193.
[14] Amy Chew, “Indonesia Militants Adopt Political Tactics Ahead of 2024 Polls,” Nikkei Asia, August 25, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Indonesia-militants-adopt-political-tactics-ahead-of-2024-polls.
[15] Arianti, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” pp. 19-20.
[16] Verdict of Hadi Masykur alias Hamas alias Fadil alias Marwan alias Doni bin Djawardi, East Jakarta District Court, 2022, No. 12/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim., pp. 8-9.
[17] Amy Chew, “JI’s Infiltration of State Institutions in Change of Tactics,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2023), p. 10, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-15-issue-03/.
[18] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,” IPAC Report, No. 69 (2021), p. 5.
[19] Alif Satria, “Escapades in Papua: Understanding JAD’s Attempts in Indonesia’s Easternmost Province,” The Diplomat, August 18, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/escapades-in-papua-understanding-jads-attempts-in-indonesias-easternmost-province/.
[20] JAD’s first attack, the 2016 Sarinah bombing, for example, was prepared by JAD members across Cirebon, Banten, Bandung, Malang and Jakarta. See Verdict of Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman alias Abu Sulaiman bin Ade Sudarma, South Jakarta District Court, 2019, No. 140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN Jkt.Sel., pp. 25-27.
[21] Verdict of Shalihin alias Sholihin alias Andriansayah alias Andre alias Abu Faizah alias Abu Syamil Basayef bin Mahali, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 1394/Pid.Sus/2019/PN Jkt.Tim., pp. 5-7; Satria, “Escapades in Papua.”
[22] Agil Trisetiawan Putra, “Rekam Jejak Terduga Teroris Boyolali, Ternyata Dilatih Murid Dr Azhari,” Detik News, August 4, 2023, https://www.detik.com/jateng/hukum-dan-kriminal/d-6859286/rekam-jejak-terduga-teroris-boyolali-ternyata-dilatih-murid-dr-azhari.
[23] Agil Trisetiawan Putra, “5 Orang Ditangkap Densus di Sukoharjo-Boyolali Berencana Serang Mapolresta Solo,” Detik News, August 4, 2023, https://www.detik.com/jateng/hukum-dan-kriminal/d-6859045/5-orang-ditangkap-densus-di-sukoharjo-boyolali-berencana-serang-mapolresta-solo.
[24] Abu Oemar himself was arrested as part of a large raid in November 2023. For more details, see Hariz Baharudin, “Upcoming Polls, Israel-Hamas War Creating Tinderbox for Terror Attacks in Indonesia,” The Straits Times, November 9, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/upcoming-polls-israel-hamas-war-creating-tinderbox-for-terror-attacks-in-indonesia.
[25] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Militant Groups in Poso,” p. 9; Dinarsa Kurniawan, “Seluruh DPO MIT Sudah Tertangkap, Terbaru Pak Guru Ditembak Mati,” Jawa Pos, September 30, 2023, https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/01410858/seluruh-dpo-mit-sudah-tertangkap-terbaru-pak-guru-ditembak-mati.
[26] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia,” p. 13.
[27] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “COVID-19 and the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT),” IPAC Short Briefing, No. 3 (2020), pp. 2-4.
[28] Ustadz Yasin is a former JI member who, up until his arrest in 2020, owned the Darul Anshar Madrassa in Kayamanya and played a major role in coordinating recruitment efforts for MIT. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “COVID-19,” pp. 4-5.
[29] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Militant Groups in Poso,” pp. 13-16.
[30] ICPVTR online monitoring.
[31] The four Uzbek KTJ members had been in Indonesia since February 2023 and were found to have spread extremist propaganda using social media. During their detention, three of the Uzbek KTJ members escaped – killing one police officer and injuring four others in the process. Densus 88 soon recaptured two while the third drowned in a canal. See Niniek Karmini, “Uzbek Militants Escape Detention in Indonesia; 2 Dead,” The Diplomat, April 13, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/uzbek-militants-escape-detention-in-indonesia-2-dead/.
[32] Zam Yusa, “Uzbek Terror Suspects Had Contact With Local ISIS man in Indonesia,” SEA Militancy, April 12, 2023, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/uzbek-terror-suspects-had-contact.
[33] Rahel Narda Chaterine, “Densus Klaim Punya Bukti NII Sumbar Berencana Melengserkan Pemerintah Sebelum Pemilu 2024,” Kompas, April 18, 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/04/18/13063911/densus-klaim-punya-bukti-nii-sumbar-berencana-melengserkan-pemerintah.
[34] Zintan Prihatini and Nursita Sari, “Teroris Asal Sunter yang Ditangkap Densus 88 Dikenal Jarang Bersosialisasi,” Kompas, January 20, 2023, https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2023/01/20/21231641/teroris-asal-sunter-yang-ditangkap-densus-88-dikenal-jarang.
[35] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia,” p. 14.
[36] Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Search for an Islamic State in Indonesia: The Many Guises of DI/NII,” IPAC Report, No. 82 (2023), p. 6.
[37] Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[38] Ibid., p. 7.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ricky Prayoga, “320 Mantan anggota NII Deklarasikan Kembali ke NKRI,” ANTARA News, September 14, 2023, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3727518/320-mantan-anggota-nii-deklarasikan-kembali-ke-nkri; “Kembalinya 280 Anggota NII Ponpes Al Zaytun ke NKRI,” Detik News, September 20, 2023, https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-6939891/kembalinya-280-anggota-nii-ponpes-al-zaytun-ke-nkri; “31 Anggota NII Panji Gumilang Ikrar Setia ke NKRI,” CNN Indonesia, August 29, 2023, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230828185055-20-991538/31-anggota-nii-panji-gumilang-ikrar-setia-ke-nkri; Rumondang Naibaho, “121 Eks Anggota NII Cabut Baiat, Ucap Janji Setia ke NKRI,” Detik News, August 17, 2023; Feri Purnama, “Sebanyak 104 Anggota NII di Garut Deklarasikan Diri Kembali ke NKRI,” ANTARA News, January 31, 2023, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3373815/sebanyak-104-anggota-nii-di-garut-deklarasikan-diri-kembali-ke-nkri; Sugeng Sumariyadi, “223 Anggota NII Cabut Baiat, Kembali ke NKRI,” Media Indonesia, September 15, 2023, https://mediaindonesia.com/nusantara/613827/223-anggota-nii-cabut-baiat-kembali-ke-nkri.
[41] Most of the individuals that retracted their bai’ah were newly recruited members who had yet to be given any official position in the organisation. See Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Search for an Islamic State,” p. 10.
[42] A’an Suryana, “Is Indonesia’s Al Zaytun Islamic Boarding School Facing an Existential Threat,” Fulcrum, August 2, 2023, https://fulcrum.sg/is-indonesias-al-zaytun-islamic-boarding-school-facing-an-existential-threat/.
[43] “Mahfud MD Tegaskan Tak Akan Tutup Al Zaytun: Kita Selamatkan,” CNN Indonesia, July 18, 2023, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230718132313-12-974842/mahfud-md-tegaskan-tak-akan-tutup-al-zaytun-kita-selamatkan.
[44] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database 1970 – 2021 (2022), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[45] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia,” pp. 14-15.
[46] There was a total of seven discovered terrorist plots in 2023. However, details of two of the plots were never made public and therefore were omitted from this particular analysis.
[47] The details of the plot itself were never published. See “4 Fakta Penangkapan Tersangka Teroris Jaringan ISIS di Sleman,” Detik News, January 23, 2023, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6529375/4-fakta-penangkapan-tersangka-teroris-jaringan-isis-di-sleman.
[48] Putra, “Rekam Jejak Terduga Teroris Boyolali.”
[49] Baharudin, “Upcoming Polls.”
[50] Martiar, “6 Teroris Ditangkap di Lampung.”
[51] Nina A. Loasana, “Densus 88 Anti-Terror Squad Arrests KAI Employee for Alleged Link to IS,” The Jakarta Post, August 15, 2023, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/08/15/densus-88-anti-terror-squad-arrests-kai-employee-for-alleged-link-to-is.html; “Fakta-Fakta Pegawai KAI Ditangkap Densus: Dukung ISIS-Barbuk 18 Senjata,” Detik News, August 15, 2023, https://www.detik.com/jogja/berita/d-6876860/fakta-fakta-pegawai-kai-ditangkap-densus-dukung-isis-barbuk-18-senjata.
[52] Rahel Narda Chaterine and Diamanty Meliana, “Densus 88: Karyawan KAI Tersangka Teroris Berencana Serang Mako Brimob dan Markas TNI,” August 15, 2023, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/08/15/11202011/densus-88-karyawan-kai-tersangka-teroris-berencana-serang-mako-brimob-dan.
[53] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia,” p. 15.
[54] Chew, “Indonesia Militants Adopt Political Tactics.”
[55] Ibid.
[56] Alif Satria, “Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 5 (2022), p. 7, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-14-issue-05/.
[57] Alif Satria and Cameron Sumpter, “Recognizing Trade-Offs in Indonesian Counterterrorism Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2022), p. 36.
[58] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Decline of ISIS,” pp. 31-35; Verdict of Thoriquddin alias Abu Rusydan alias Hamzah alias Pake, East Jakarta District Court, 2023, No. 402/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Tim., pp. 13-15.
[59] One CT operation targeting JI members in Lampung in April 2023 resulted in the death of two suspects whose identities and roles in the organisation were not made public. However, unlike events that followed the murder of JI members Sunardi in 2022 and Siyono in 2016, there was no public outcry that arose against Densus 88. See Zam Yusa, “Two Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorists Killed, Cops Hurt in Indonesia Shootout,” SEA Militancy, April 13, 2023, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/two-jemaah-islamiyah-terrorists-killed; “Warga Solo protes Densus 88 terkait kematian Siyono,” BBC News Indonesia, March 15, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/03/160314_indonesia_densus_protes_solo.
[60] Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink,” IPAC Report, No. 11 (2014), p. 2; Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 157.
[61] Andi Nova and Muhammad Syauqillah, “Implementasi Resosialisasi oleh Densus 88 Anti Terror,” Journal of Terrorism Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2021), p. 14.
[62] Husni Mubarok, Setelah Terbitnya Perpres RAN PE? Refleksi Peran Masyarakat Sipil di Indonesia (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2021), pp. 13-14.
[63] Utami Nurhasanah, “Tracking the Impact of PCVE Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Indonesia,” K-Hub PCVE Outlook, No. 1 (2023), p. 11.
[64] Mohammad Hasan Anshor et al., Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik, Kebijakan dan Tantangan, (Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2019), p. 76.
[65] Dwi Rubiyanti Khofifah et al., Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook, (Jakarta: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, 2023), pp. 44-45.
[66] Khofifah et al., Counter Terrorism, pp. 41-42.
[67] Nurhasanah, Tracking the Impact of PCVE, p. 11.
[68] Some notable figures in public demonstrations have advocated for Indonesians to go to Palestine. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, for example, stated in a demonstration in Solo that “hopefully there are those among the youths that are ready to be sent there (Palestine)”. For more details, see Tera Wahyu, “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Ikut Aksi di Solo, Tantang Pemuda Berangkat ke Palestina,” Detik News, October 13, 2023, https://www.detik.com/jateng/berita/d-6980619/abu-bakar-baasyir-ikut-aksi-di-solo-tantang-pemuda-berangkat-ke-palestina.
[69] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Militant Groups in Poso,” p. 20.
[70] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Terrorism, Recidivism, and Planned Releases in Indonesia,” IPAC Report, No. 66 (2020), p. 10.
