Indonesia
The overall threat posed by Indonesian terrorist organisations continued to decline in 2025. Largely the result of Special Detachment (Detasemen Khusus, or Densus) 88’s sustained pressure on pro-Islamic State (IS) groups and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s decision to disband in June 2024, terrorist activities are now at their lowest level to date. Notably, for the third consecutive year, Indonesia recorded no terrorist attacks, alongside a steady decrease in attempted plots.[1] Whereas three plots were publicly recorded in 2024, none of the suspected terrorists arrested in 2025 were found to be actively planning attacks, although some had called for others to bomb places of worship.[2] The key challenge now is for Indonesia to consolidate this period of relative calm by implementing measures that can sustainably disengage existing networks and prevent a long-term resurgence of these groups.
Organisational Dynamics
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
Following its disbandment in June 2024, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has taken notable steps to demonstrate its commitment to the decision. Beyond surrendering firearms and explosives,[3] collaborating with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) to update its madrassa curricula,[4] and having 8,000 members pledge allegiance to the Indonesian state,[5] JI seniors in several regions have also begun cooperating with Densus 88 to develop sustainable reintegration programmes for the group’s members. In Bengkulu province, for instance, JI seniors worked with Densus 88 to integrate members into the local Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) farmers’ cooperative, providing them with stable livelihoods and new community networks.[6] Meanwhile, in Semarang, Central Java, JI seniors collaborated with Densus 88 and local authorities to identify members’ financial challenges and facilitate access to social assistance.[7]
One of the most notable countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives jointly established by JI and Densus 88 is the Rumah Wasathiyah (House of Moderation) programme. Launched in June 2025 and led by JI seniors, such as Para Wijayanto, the group’s former emir,[8] Rumah Wasathiyah aims to engage former JI members and terrorist inmates to encourage disengagement from extremism. Its activities include face-to-face seminars, online webinars and in-prison discussions with inmates convicted of terrorism offences. To date, Rumah Wasathiyah has conducted nine seminars across several provinces – East Java, Riau, North Sumatra, Lampung, Central Java and Central Sulawesi – as well as four in-prison discussions within the Nusakambangan maximum-security prison complex.[9] While Wijayanto has noted that the programme has been generally well received among JI members, some observers have criticised it as “detached and overly bureaucratic”.[10] However, lacking a structured monitoring and evaluation framework, its long-term impact remains uncertain.
Despite this progress, the threat of dissenting JI members sustaining the organisation’s struggle remains. Former JI senior Imtihan Syafi’i, for example, noted that the process of convincing JI members to abandon extremism will take time, as “this behaviour cannot immediately be erased”.[11] Similarly, former JI member Khairul Ghazali observed that there are members who are still active underground, as “not all chapters have abided by the organisation’s disbandment”.[12] For now, however, no concrete efforts to reorganise have been observed. Rather, dissent has tended to surface in more subtle ways. Former JI leader Adung, for instance, has taken an ambivalent stance – neither openly rejecting the dissolution nor explicitly declaring his support for it.[13] Others have continued to share classic JI texts and manuals, such as Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (Jihad Education), within JI-affiliated study circles,[14] avoiding direct calls for violence but quietly sustaining JI’s core doctrines of Muslim victimhood, resistance and the religious legitimacy of jihad.[15]
Pro-Islamic State (IS) Groups
Pro-Islamic State (IS) groups in Indonesia have continued to remain low profile, focusing on rebuilding their networks and resources. Due to strong policing of offline activities, most supporters have migrated to online communities on mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, WhatsApp and YouTube.[16] Recent studies have shown that within these online spaces, pro-IS networks have successfully maintained a sense of community. Propagandists, for example, continue to connect local supporters with global IS developments through consistent translations of the group’s major audio statements and by echoing calls to attack in Syria.[17] Meanwhile, local “jihobbyists”[18] have sustained discourse between members by producing and sharing emotive content that taps into broader national grievances. Additionally, pro-IS Indonesian women in Syrian refugee camps remain powerful symbols of resilience, maintaining engagement by sharing day-to-day updates from their lives.[19]
This sustained sense of community online has translated into some degree of offline activity. Despite pro-IS groups’ weakened state, collective fund-raising efforts via social media campaigns have persisted. Notably, most of the funds remain directed towards supporting pro-IS families – demonstrating the community’s commitment to sustaining the IS cause. For example, the Anfiqu Centre, managed by Bahrun Naim’s former second-in-command, Ibadurrahman, raised IDR 211,455,276 (SGD 16,493) between January and September 2025,[20] while Gubuk Sedekah Amal Ummah (GSAU) – another well-known pro-IS charity – reported disbursing IDR 306,076,000 (SGD 23,874) in the first half of 2025.[21] Despite these efforts, however, pro-IS groups’ operational capacity remains at its weakest point, with communities unable to mobilise resources in a sustainable manner or facilitate travel abroad.
Newly released court documents indicate that over the past decade, several pro-IS groups have sought to address their challenges in collective resource mobilisation by attempting to establish a centralised, cross-regional command structure.[22] The most recent example was the Abu Oemar halaqoh (Quranic study circle) network, which, at the time of his arrest in 2023, comprised over 42 members across 13 halaqoh in West Java, Jakarta and Banten.[23] However, this was not the first time such an attempt had been made. In 2019, an unnamed pro-IS group in Lampung planned to merge local pro-IS cells with Khilafatul Muslimin – a pro-caliphate, non-violent Islamic organisation – to address the former’s “lack of structure” and the latter’s “lack of action”.[24] While these initiatives ultimately failed and do not indicate the imminent revival of pro-IS networks, they represent a notable development in organisational capability for a network historically characterised by decentralisation and disorganisation.[25]
Darul Islam (DI)
Members of Darul Islam (DI), Indonesia’s longest-standing terrorist organisation, have continued attempts to resuscitate the group, albeit with little success. Two of the three DI-linked individuals arrested in 2025 served as a recruiter and a fund-raiser.[26] Furthermore, 15 DI-affiliated charities in Jambi had their assets frozen and operations suspended in 2025.[27] These developments follow the trend of arrests made in 2024, during which police uncovered organised efforts to recruit, train and acquire weapons for DI – albeit with little success, as only bladed weapons were recovered during the arrests.[28]
The authorities’ approach to DI differs slightly from that taken towards JI and pro-IS individuals, in that greater emphasis has been placed on rehabilitation rather than prosecution. At least 28 government officers in Jambi have been identified as being affiliated to DI and will receive “guidance” from the government.[29] While the softer approach is likely driven by overcrowded prisons,[30] it has also facilitated better reintegration of ex-DI members – at least 424 ex-members pledged allegiance to Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI, or the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) and Pancasila in 2023,[31] 256 in 2024[32] and at least 30 last year.[33]
Responses: Counter Terrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
Arrests
2025 marked the fourth consecutive annual decline in terrorist-related arrests in Indonesia over the past five years.[34] Between January and October 2025, news sources reported only the arrest of 20 suspected terrorists – a 65.5 percent decrease from the 58 arrests made in 2023, and a 94.8 percent decrease compared to 2021, when the highest arrest figures since 2020 were recorded. Importantly, this decline does not indicate a weakening of Indonesia’s counter terrorism (CT) capabilities, as evidenced by the continued absence of attacks and plots. Rather, when viewed alongside qualitative assessments of Indonesia’s terrorist landscape, the trend more likely reflects the diminishing prosecutable threat posed by terrorist organisations. Concurrently, however, the figures may also be influenced by the media’s increasing underreporting of arrests. Notably, while 88.5 percent of arrests were reported in 2023,[35] only 29.5 percent were publicised in 2024.[36]
Out of 20 arrests in 2025, only nine had known group affiliations – three were linked to DI and six were pro-IS supporters. Among them, three in particular stood out. In August 2025, authorities in Aceh detained a DI recruiter and a fund-raiser, both of whom were public servants – one was employed at the local Religious Affairs office and the other at the local Department of Tourism office.[37] While this underscores the persistent risk of extremist infiltration into state institutions, such cases remain rare – of the 781 terrorists arrested since 2021, only 2.1 percent were government employees. The third person was an 18-year-old pro-IS supporter arrested in May 2025 in Gowa, South Sulawesi. Notably, he was the only suspect recorded to have explicitly promoted violence, urging others in a newly formed online chat group to “carry out bombings against places of worship”.[38] Crucially, however, no evidence indicated any actual attack plot.
Reintegration
Reintegration programmes for former terrorist offenders have been sporadic. In April, Densus 88 launched a roadmap for ex-JI members’ reintegration, divided into three phases: 1) 2024-2025: socialisation, legal actions, asset tracking and mapping of members; 2) 2026-2027: continued monitoring, repatriation and pre-integration measures; and 3) 2028: full reintegration.[39] While the effort appears systematic, there have been inconsistencies in how the programmes have been carried out. For example, JI-affiliated charities and schools in Palu, Central Sulawesi, have reportedly been shut down since JI’s disbandment, despite no evidence of illegal activities, while JI-affiliated schools elsewhere have been allowed to continue operations.[40] Such unequal treatment may lead to more grievances, which could hamper reintegration efforts. Provision of assistance has similarly differed by region – ex-JI members based in Central Java speak of well-coordinated reintegration programmes, while those in Jakarta report that assistance is given intermittently.[41]
The uneven distribution of attention and support, though not a new issue,[42] became more pronounced following the release of high-profile terrorist figures, such as Umar Patek. Notably, Umar’s establishment of Kopi Ramu 1966, a café located in an upscale area in Surabaya, is a story of successful reintegration. However, much of this success can be credited to the strong backing of entrepreneur and human rights advocate David Andreasmito,[43] who both financed the business and mentored Umar.[44] Before this, Umar admitted he had difficulties reintegrating – failing to secure funding for a mini market business and relying on income from speaking engagements at deradicalisation forums.[45] While commendable, Umar’s success underscores the fragility of the state’s current reintegration initiatives, as such crucial support is at times only available through unique opportunities like third-party interventions which are unlikely to be extended beyond high-profile terrorist figures.
Budget Cuts and the Role of the Military
The National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) lost 24.29 percent of its budget in 2025, mostly impacting business trips of Jakarta-based officers to other regions.[46] While seemingly concerning, government audits indicated that BNPT only utilised 55 percent of its allocated national budget in 2024.[47] However, this underutilisation was partly due to a reliance on foreign aid, most of which is no longer available due to the United States (US)’s freezing of funding of US Agency for International Development (USAID) projects for CT and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).[48] Nevertheless, BNPT said they will proceed to focus on playing a coordinator role and have commenced Phase II of the National Action Plan Against Extremism (RAN PE) for 2025 to 2029, which emphasises improving interagency collaboration and engaging local governments to take an active role in P/CVE.[49]
Another development on the horizon is a renewed role for the Indonesian military (TNI) in CT operations. The revision of the TNI Law in April 2025 allowed active military officers to head BNPT,[50] and included plans to establish 22 new regional military commands (Kodam) and 100 new territorial development battalions.[51] Historically, the TNI has often played a role in CT. Under Law No. 34/2004, the military was authorised to conduct “hard” approaches, such as intelligence gathering using military assets, and “soft” approaches, such as deradicalisation seminars held at the army’s local territorial command headquarters. In 2019, the military also established a dedicated CT Special Operations Command (Koopsus TNI).[52] Yet, despite the new authority for active TNI officers to lead BNPT, Police Commissioner General Eddy Hartono was reinstated as BNPT’s head in August.[53] This indicates that while the TNI will likely continue to play a significant role in CT – perhaps with expanded intelligence capabilities once the new regional commands have been established – the Prabowo administration is also mindful of preserving a balance between the police, the military and other state institutions involved in CT.
Outlook
Non-Violent Extremist Organisations
As violent extremist organisations have kept a low profile, authorities are turning their attention to the activities of non-violent extremist organisations. Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), in particular, has seen a resurgence in activity over the past year. Thousands attended nationwide rallies in January and February in support of Palestine, calling for the establishment of a caliphate.[54] HTI was proscribed in 2017 due to its perceived opposition to Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution, but is technically not a terrorist organisation since it has not committed any indiscriminate violence. However, the organisation is still considered to pose security concerns because of its ideological similarity with violent Islamist organisations, leading to potential member crossovers. The now-deceased Bahrun Naim, one of the most notorious Syria-based IS leaders, was a former HTI member. More recently, members of HTI were found to be part of a “cross-regional pro-IS network” implicated in plans to attack the 2024 general elections.[55]
Repatriation
While the repatriation of Indonesian foreign terrorist fighters was much discussed this past year, hardly any progress has been made as repatriation appears to have been de-prioritised by the Prabowo administration. Efforts to repatriate Indonesians from Syria – BNPT verified that 483 Indonesians are in Syrian detention camps as of December 2024[56] – have partly been complicated by the regime change in Syria.[57] While direct repatriation from Syria has stalled, BNPT successfully brought back 41 ex-IS Indonesians from Afghanistan, Turkey, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines between December 2023 and December 2024.[58] However, unless serious efforts are made to coordinate responsible repatriation from Syria, Indonesia will be vulnerable to a looming IS threat in the future. Already, some Indonesians residing in the al-Hol camp have reportedly helped to recruit children from the camp for IS, and many more are at risk of becoming entrenched in a resurgent IS network.[59] Another key development to look out for is the return of former JI members – 16 ex-JI members from Syria and 10 from the Philippines were initially scheduled for repatriation in 2025, but this plan was postponed to 2026[60] – potentially impacting JI’s disbandment process, as many former members abroad hold seniority and combat experience conducive to splinter formation.
Recidivism
The issue of terrorist recidivism has been a persistent concern in Indonesia. Notably, the country’s last terrorist attack – the 2022 Astana Anyar bombing – was carried out by the pro-IS recidivist Agus Sujatno.[61] Previously arrested in 2017 for his participation in the Cicendo bombing plot, Agus was released in 2021 and quickly reconnected with a jihadist network by working as a parking attendant at a pro-IS school.[62] That said, the overall recidivism rate among Indonesian terrorists remains relatively low. Studies by Indonesian think tanks have found that only four to 11 percent of former terrorist inmates re-engage with terrorist networks following their release.[63] This aligns with more recent research by BNPT, which found that out of 1,200 former terrorists who participated in deradicalisation programmes over the past decade, eight percent reoffended.[64]
Although no terrorist incidents involving recidivists were recorded in 2025, court documents released last year show that former terrorists have played a crucial role in the recent evolution of terrorist networks in Indonesia. A key example was the establishment of Abu Oemar’s centralised halaqoh network in 2023.[65] Alongside Oemar himself, who was a former DI member released in 2021, 15 other recidivists joined his network.[66] Court documents indicated that many joined not only because Oemar was regarded as “the most senior and experienced [jihadist] figure” they knew, but also because Oemar was willing to overlook their pledged allegiance to the Indonesian state and assist them in annulling it.[67] Notably, some of these recidivists later assumed key leadership roles. One example was Abdul Halim, a recidivist who was eventually appointed coordinator of Oemar’s Muara Angke cell, where he actively recruited other ex-offenders.[68] Ensuring that all former terrorists systematically receive consistent reintegration support – without the need to rely on ad hoc third-party interventions – will be key to further reducing Indonesia’s terrorist recidivism rate.
Memetic Violence and Youth
On November 7, multiple explosions detonated at SMA N 72 Jakarta (72 Jakarta State High School), injuring 96 people.[69] Police investigations uncovered the suspect as a 17-year-old student from the school. Importantly, the police also found that the perpetrator had carried with him two airsoft guns inscribed with various far-right extremist references.[70] These included the names of far-right terrorists, such as Brenton Tarrant, Luca Traini and Alexandra Bissonnette,[71] and neo-Nazi symbolisms, such as the phrase “14 Words” and “For Agartha”.[72]
Despite these influences, it is crucial to note that police investigations on the suspect’s social media accounts did not find that he conducted the bombing in support of any political goal. Instead of classifying it as terrorism, Densus 88 has termed the incident as “memetic violence”[73] – violence inspired by previous, similar attacks and committed in pursuit of personal goals such as communal notoriety.[74]
Although the incident was not classified as terrorism, it underscored the growing number of Indonesian youths who are being exposed to and radicalised by extremist content. Notably, a week after the SMA N 72 bombing, the police announced that in 2025, they arrested a total of five terrorist suspects for “attempting to recruit youths and students into a terrorist network”.[75] The police also noted a sharp rise in child radicalisation cases: while only 17 children had been identified as victims of terrorist recruitment between 2011 and 2017, Densus 88 conducted interventions for 110 radicalised children in 2025.[76]
It is important to note, however, that while the absolute number of children being exposed to radical content may have increased, the proportion of youths arrested for joining a terrorist organisation has remained largely consistent over the past two decades. Whereas youths made up 25.8 percent of all terrorism-related arrests in 2002,[77] they made up 26.5 percent of all terrorism-related arrests between 2021 and 2025.[78]
About the Authors
Alif Satria and Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah are Associate Research Fellows with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Adrian Pranata on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Noor Huda Ismail, “The Misleading Narrative of ‘Zero Attack’,” Kompas, May 27, 2025, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/en-narasi-zero-attack-yang-menyesatkan.
[2] Rio Feisal, “Densus 88 Tangkap Terduga Teroris Terafiliasi ISIS di Sulawesi Selatan,” ANTARA News, May 25, 2025, https://babel.antaranews.com/berita/487933/densus-88-tangkap-terduga-teroris-terafiliasi-isis-di-sulawesi-selatan.
[3] Gita Irawan, “EKSKLUSIF: Eks Bos Jemaah Islamiyah Ungkap Bahan Peledan dan DPO Telah Diserahkan ke Densus 88,” Tribun News, September 16, 2024, https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2024/09/16/eksklusif-eks-bos-jamaah-islamiyah-ungkap-bahan-peledak-dan-dpo-telah-diserahkan-ke-densus-88.
[4] Saifulbahri Ismail and Louisa Tang, “Former Jemaah Islamiyah Leaders, Affiliated Schools in Indonesia Take New Steps Towards Moderation,” Channel News Asia, August 13, 2025, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-ji-jemaah-islamiyah-former-leaders-schools-moderation-5292206.
[5] Gusty Da Costa, “Former JI Leader Affirms Disbandment, Pledges Loyalty to Indonesian State,” Indonesia Business Post, June 5, 2025, https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/4243/Politics/former-ji-leader-affirms-disbandment-pledges-loyalty-to-indonesian-state.
[6] ICPVTR internal report.
[7] ICPVTR internal report.
[8] In addition to Para Wijayanto, JI seniors who are involved in the Rumah Wasathiyah programme include Choirul Anam (former head of JI’s Tajhiz Division), Joko Priyono (former head of JI’s Military Training Division) and Wiji Joko (former head of JI’s International Relations Division). For more, see Muhlis Al Alawi and Andi Hartik, “Eks Pemimpin JI Keliling Indonesia Bimbing 8.000 Anak Buahnya Kembali ke NKRI,” Kompas, September 3, 2025, https://surabaya.kompas.com/read/2025/09/03/201311178/eks-pemimpin-ji-keliling-indonesia-bimbing-8000-anak-buahnya-kembali-ke.
[9] Al Alawi and Hartik, “Eks Pemimpin JI”; Muhlis Al Alawi and Icha Rastika, “Eks Pemimpin JI Minta Presiden Prabowo Pulangkan Puluhan Anggotanya dari Timur Tengah dan Moro,” Kompas, September 4, 2025, https://surabaya.kompas.com/read/2025/09/04/084506878/eks-pemimpin-ji-minta-presiden-prabowo-pulangkan-puluhan-anggotanya-dari; “Cara Eks Amir JI Para Wijyanto Ajak Napi Terorisme Bertaubat,” Tempo, August 3, 2025, https://www.tempo.co/hukum/cara-eks-amir-ji-para-wijayanto-ajak-napi-terorisme-bertaubat-2054314.
[10] Noor Huda Ismail, “Between Emotion and Reason: The Reintegration of Former Jemaah Islamiyah Members,” RSIS Commentary, no. 196 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/CO25196.pdf.
[11] Wahyudi Soeriatmadja and Hariz Baharudin, “Indonesia to Consider Cutting Jail Terms of Former Jemaah Islamiyah Members,” The Straits Times, December 22, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-to-consider-cutting-jail-terms-of-former-jemaah-islamiyah-members.
[12] Apriadi Gunawan, “North Sumatra Jemaah Islamiyah Officially Demobilizes,” The Jakarta Post, September 3, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2025/09/03/north-sumatra-jemaah-islamiyah-officially-demobilizes.html.
[13] Noor Huda Ismail, “JI: The Art of Disbandment and the Politics of ‘Wait-and-See’,” The Jakarta Post, March 15, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2025/03/15/ji-the-art-of-disbandment-and-the-politics-of-wait-and-see.html.
[14] Noor Huda Ismail, “Jemaah Islamiyah Isn’t Dead – It Is Evolving,” The Straits Times, June 14, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/jemaah-islamiyah-isnt-dead-it-is-evolving.
[15] Noor Huda Ismail, “How Jemaah Islamiyah Has Morphed Since Its Disbandment,” RSIS Commentary, no. 156 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/CO25156.pdf.
[16] Jordan Newton, “Staying Alive: The Indonesian Pro-IS Community’s Online Resilience and the ‘Lone Actor’ Threat in 2025,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 3 (2025): 1-10, https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CTTA-April-2025-2.pdf.
[17] Newton, “Staying Alive”; Nurrisha Ismail and Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesian Extremists Divided over Syria’s Regime Change,” East Asia Forum, June 4, 2025, https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/06/04/indonesian-extremists-divided-over-syrias-regime-change/.
[18] Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2009).
[19] Newton, “Staying Alive.”
[20] Anfiqu Center publicly reported that most of the funds raised were for the development of a mosque and facilities at the Islamic boarding school Pondok Pesantren Tahfidz Hamalatul Quran in Karanganyar, Central Java (73.5 percent), followed by donations to family members of pro-IS individuals (15 percent) and general religious donations i.e., zakat, infaq and shodaqoh (11.5 percent). Data collated by ICPVTR from Anfiqu Center’s Instagram account (@mediaanfiqu), accessed September 29, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/mediaanfiqu/.
[21] GSAU funds were similarly distributed for construction of religious facilities; daily, educational and medical expenses; and providing business capital to members. Data collated by ICPVTR from GSAU’s monthly financial reports, see “Laporan,” Gubuk Sedekah Amal Ummah, accessed September 29, 2025, https://www.gsaupeduli.com/#laporan.
[22] Alif Satria, “Indonesian Pro-Islamic State Groups’ Attempts to Centralise Command Structures,” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, September 17, 2025, https://icct.nl/publication/indonesian-pro-islamic-state-groups-attempts-centralise-command-structures.
[23] Verdict of Nisran Bin Sutarman alias Salman alias Irfanto alias Udin Bubur, East Jakarta District Court, 2024, no. 403/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Tim, https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/zaef90280a30ffb29baa313034353131.html.
[24] Verdict of Yudistira alias Yudi alias Yunus bin Ahmad Rifai, East Jakarta District Court, 2024, no. 580/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt.Tim, https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/845273aada92eeb7d69f2d5ee6f5c83b.html.
[25] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,” IPAC Report, no. 69 (2021), https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/bc65535bafbdeb094a56e382e6f6bb91.pdf.
[26] “Densus Ungkap Peran 2 ASN Terduga Teroris Aceh, Pemkot Buka Suara,” CNN Indonesia, August 6, 2025, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20250805192131-12-1259111/densus-ungkap-peran-2-asn-terduga-teroris-aceh-pemkot-buka-suara.
[27] Aryo Tondang and Reni Susanti, “Densus 88 Tutup Yayasan yang Terafiliasi dengan Jaringan NII di Jambi,” Kompas, July 7, 2025, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/05/123825178/densus-88-tutup-yayasan-yang-terafiliasi-dengan-jaringan-nii-di-jambi; “Bupati Muaro Jambi Tutup lima Yayasan lembaga Yang Terafiliasi Kelompok Negara Islam Indonesia (NII),” Halo Jambi News, August 15, 2025, https://halojambi.id/index.php/advertorial/55-pemkab/15851-bupati-muaro-jambi-tutup-lima-yayasan-lembaga-yang-terafiliasi-kelompok-negara-islam-indonesia-nii; “Pemilik Toko dan Warung Waspada, Berikut Nama Kotak Amal yang Terafiliasi Gerakan Negara Islam Indonesia,” Jambi Update, August 7, 2025, https://jambiupdate.co/read/2025/08/07/119457/pemilik-toko-dan-warung-waspada-berikut-nama-kotak-amal-yang-terafliasi-gerakan-negara-islam-indonesia.
[28] Kiki Safitri and Icha Rastika, “Densus 88 Tangkap 8 Tersangka Teroris Jaringan NII,” Kompas, November 21, 2024, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/11/21/18024531/densus-88-tangkap-8-tersangka-teroris-jaringan-nii.
[29] Kurnia Sandi and Farid Assifa, “28 ASN dan Honorer di Merangin Jambi Terafiliasi NII, Terancam Dipecat,” Kompas, July 25, 2025, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/25/190425378/28-asn-dan-honorer-di-merangin-jambi-terafiliasi-nii-terancam-dipecat.
[30] The largest DI faction, led by Tahmid Basuki Rahmat in Garut, West Java, reportedly has around 35,000 members. In 2022, Densus 88 arrested some DI members who held management positions but “realised there was no way it could possibly arrest all the DI/NII members it had identified”, and prioritised a programme of reconciliation, pledging allegiance and re-education through a “guidance” programme. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Search for an Islamic State in Indonesia: The Many Guises of DI/NII,” IPAC Report, no. 82 (2023): 3-10.
[31] Ricky Prayoga, “320 Mantan Anggota NII Deklarasikan Kembali ke NKRI,” ANTARA News, September 14, 2023, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3727518/320-mantan-anggota-nii-deklarasikan-kembali-ke-nkri.
[32] Tuyani, ”256 Warga Jambi Cabut Baiat NII dan Ikrar Setia NKRI,” ANTARA News, July 25, 2024, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4216779/256-warga-jambi-cabut-baiat-nii-dan-ikrar-setia-nkri.
[33] “30 Mantan NII Kembali ke NKRI di Hari Kemerdekaan ke-80,” Polda Maluku Utara, August 17, 2025, https://tribratanews.malut.polri.go.id/2025/08/18/30-mantan-nii-kembali-ke-nkri-di-hari-kemerdekaan-ke-80/.
[34] Alif Satria and Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 17, no. 1 (2025): 14-18, https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CTTA-Annual-2025.pdf.
[35] Moch Mardiansyah Al Afghani, “Kepala BNPT: 148 Teroris Ditangkap Sepanjang Tahun 2023,” ANTARA News, December 29, 2023, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3892110/kepala-bnpt-148-teroris-ditangkap-sepanjang-tahun-2023.
[36] “Zero Attack, Densus Polri Tangkap 196 Tersangka Teroris Sepanjang 2024,” CNN Indonesia, December 31, 2024, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20241231162714-12-1182667/zero-attack-densus-polri-tangkap-196-tersangka-teroris-sepanjang-2024; Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[37] “Densus Ungkap Peran 2 ASN Terduga Teroris Aceh, Pemkot Buka Suara,” CNN Indonesia, August 6, 2025, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20250805192131-12-1259111/densus-ungkap-peran-2-asn-terduga-teroris-aceh-pemkot-buka-suara.
[38] Tim Redaksi, “3 Fakta Densus 88 Tangkap Remaja Terduga Teroris Penyebar Konten ISIS,” Detik News, May 26, 2025, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7932418/3-fakta-densus-88-tangkap-remaja-terduga-teroris-penyebar-konten-isis.
[39] Agatha Olivia Victoria, “Densus 88 Sediakan Roadmap Integrasi Setelah Pembubaran JI,” ANTARA News, April 10, 2025, https://kalbar.antaranews.com/berita/634365/densus-88-sediakan-roadmap-integrasi-setelah-pembubaran-ji.
[40] “’REFLEKSI KEMERDEKAN’ Senin, 18 Agustus 2025,” posted August 18, 2025, by Rumah Wasathiyah, YouTube, 2 hr., 5 min., 39 sec., https://youtu.be/LWhdZk0tItc?t=4650.
[41] ICPVTR internal report.
[42] Alif Satria, “After the Astana Anyar Bombing: A Critical Overview of Indonesia’s CVE System,” The Diplomat, December 15, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/after-the-astana-anyar-bombing-a-critical-overview-of-indonesias-cve-system/.
[43] Michael Neilson, “Bali Bomb Maker Starts New Chapter ‘Brewing Peace’ with Coffee – But the Trauma Lingers for His Victims,” The Guardian, June 4, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/04/bali-bomb-maker-starts-new-chapter-brewing-peace-with-coffee-but-the-trauma-lingers-for-his-victims.
[44] Aisyah Llewellyn, “Bali Bomber Umar Patek Seeks a Second Chance by ‘Brewing Peace’ with Coffee,” South China Morning Post, May 31, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3312522/bali-bomber-umar-patek-seeks-second-chance-brewing-peace-coffee; Irma Rahim, “Indonesia’s Deradicalization Program Through the Lens of Umar Patek: From Bomb-Maker to Entrepreneur,” The Jamestown Foundation, July 15, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/indonesias-deradicalization-program-through-the-lens-of-umar-patek-from-bomb-maker-to-entrepreneur/.
[45] Rahim, “Indonesia’s Deradicalization Program.”
[46] Chaula R. Anindya, “Unfading Threats, Shrinking Funds,” Stratsea, July 18, 2025, https://stratsea.com/unfading-threats-shrinking-funds/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Umelto Labetubun and Shashi Jayakumar, “US Aid Cut Will Undermine Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Efforts,” The Jakarta Post, February 28, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2025/02/28/us-aid-cut-will-undermine-indonesias-counterterrorism-efforts.html.
[49] Agatha Olivia Victoria, “BNPT Fokus Perkuat Deradikalisasi Melalui RAN PE Tahap II 2025-2029,” ANTARA News, February 28, 2025, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4680405/bnpt-fokus-perkuat-deradikalisasi-melalui-ran-pe-tahap-ii-2025-2029.
[50] Sapto Yunus, “UU TNI Sudah Diteken Prabowo, Ini Poin-Poin Penting Perubahannya,” Tempo, April 17, 2025, https://www.tempo.co/politik/uu-tni-sudah-diteken-prabowo-ini-poin-poin-penting-perubahannya-1232437.
[51] Made Supriatma, “Expansion of the Indonesian Army: A Creeping Dual Function?” Fulcrum, January 21, 2025, https://fulcrum.sg/expansion-of-the-indonesian-army-a-creeping-dual-function/.
[52] Muhamad Haripin, Chaula Rininta Anindya and Adhi Priamarizki, “The Indonesian Military and Counter Terrorism in Poso, 2015-2022,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 19, no. 3 (2024): 305–19.
[53] Hartono was earlier transferred out of the position in June in preparation for retirement. See Siti Yona Hukmana, “President Prabowo and Chief of Police to Determine the Head of BNPT,” MetroTV News, July 3, 2025, https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/koGCdqlR-president-prabowo-and-chief-of-police-to-determine-the-head-of-bnpt; Genta Tenri and Raka Adji, “President Prabowo Inaugurates New Counter-Terrorism Agency Head,” ANTARA News, August 25, 2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/375381/president-prabowo-inaugurates-new-counter-terrorism-agency-head.
[54] Norbertus Arya Dwiangga Martiar, “BNPT Monitors Movements of Former HTI Members,” Kompas, February 6, 2025, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/en-bnpt-cermati-pergerakan-eks-hti.
[55] Satria, “Indonesian Pro-Islamic State Groups.”
[56] Leebarty Taskarina, “Bring Them Back Home: Indonesia’s Policy Dilemma in Repatriating Ex-ISIS Sympathisers,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20, no. 4 (2025): 518-526, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2025.2518548.
[57] Coordination of repatriation from Syria has been stalled as the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which oversees the al-Hol and al-Roj camps where many IS-affiliated Indonesians are held, is still negotiating the full integration of AANES-administered regions into Ahmed al-Sharaa’s state structure. See Seth Frantzman, “Delegation from Eastern Syria Meets with Government in Damascus,” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 6, 2025, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/delegation-from-eastern-syria-meets-with-government-in-damascus.php.
[58] Taskarina, “Bring Them Back Home.”
[59] Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesia Prepares to Bring Ex-ISIS Families Home,” East Asia Forum, December 28, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/12/28/indonesia-prepares-to-bring-ex-isis-families-home/.
[60] Kusumasari Ayuningtyas, “National Police to Bring Home Ex-Jamaah Islamiyah Members from Syria, Philippines,” The Jakarta Post, December 23, 2024, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/12/23/national-police-to-bring-home-ex-jamaah-islamiyah-members-from-syria-philippines.html; Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “One Year After Disbandment: What’s Next for the JI Community?” RSIS Commentary, no. 158 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/one-year-after-disbandment-whats-next-for-the-ji-community/.
[61] Yoanes Litha, “Pemerintahan Baru Perlu Perluas Keterlibatan Ormas Sipil dalam Tangani Deradikalisasi Eks Napiter,” VoA Indonesia, May 17, 2024, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/pemerintahan-baru-perlu-perluas-keterlibatan-cso-dalam-tangani-deradikalisasi-eks-napiter/7615938.html.
[62] CNN Indonesia, “Suicide Attack on Polsek Astana Anyar, Bandung Indonesia,” Stratsea, https://stratsea.com/suicide-attack-on-polsek-astana-anyar-bandung-indonesia/.
[63] Iwa Maulana, Dewi Indriana and Gatot Goei, “The Relevance of High-Risk Prisons to Indonesia’s Preventing Violent Extremism Policy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 16, no. 3 (2022): 22.
[64] “Pemerintah Dianggap Glorifikasi Umar Patek Bikin Bisnis Kopi – ‘Seratusan Eks Napi Terorisme Ulangi Kejahatannya’,” BBC Indonesia, June 9, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cvgnjvz95rqo.
[65] Satria, “Indonesian Pro-Islamic State Groups.”
[66] Muhammad Makmun Rasyid, “Residivisme Teroris dan Ancaman Kombatan Pulang,” Kompas, January 24, 2025, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/01/24/07564691/residivisme-teroris-dan-ancaman-kombatan-pulang.
[67] Verdict of Abdul Halim alias Halim alias Abu Sakinah bin Alimudin Raja Maka, North Jakarta District Court, 2025, no. 302/Pid.Sus/2019/PN Jkt.Utr, https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/4e1b8266706142663a7e6bf0d484360c.html.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Seven homemade explosives were found at the school, but only four detonated. The bombs were made from potassium chloride and nails, cased in different materials including plastic gallon jugs, soda cans, and steel pipes. Two bombs exploded inside the school mosque, triggered remotely by a 6-V transmitter and receiver system. Two more bombs detonated in the school’s waste bank after the suspect directly lit the fuses. Of the 96 injured, around 66% suffered from hearing loss, while the remaining 30% (29 individuals) had burns and shrapnel wounds. See more in Indonesian National Police, “Polisi Jelaskan Mekanisme dan Jenis Bom di SMAN 72 Jakarta,” Tribrata News, November 12, 2025, https://tribratanews.polri.go.id/blog/nasional-3/polisi-jelaskan-mekanisme-dan-jenis-bom-di-sman-72-jakarta-94972; “7 Hal Terbaru Ledakan SMAN 72 Jakarta: Kondisi Korban hingga Dugaan Pelaku,” Detik News, November 9, 2025, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8201285/7-hal-terbaru-ledakan-sman-72-jakarta-kondisi-korban-hingga-dugaan-pelaku.
[70] “Explosion at Mosque in Jakarta Injures 55 People, Teen Suspect Identified,” CNA, November 7, 2025 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/jakarta-explosion-mosque-school-complex-injured-5453006
[71] Kristina Hummel, “The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 18, 2019, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/christchurch-attacks-livestream-terror-viral-video-age/; Elisabetta Povoledo, “‘Racial Hatred’ Cited After African Immigrants Are Shot in Italy,” The New York Times, February 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/world/europe/macerata-italy-shooting.html; Dan Bilefsky, “Alexandre Bissonnette Sentenced to 40 Years Without Parole for Quebec Mosque Killings,” The New York Times, February 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/08/world/canada/alexandre-bissonnette-sentence.html
[72] 14 Words refer to the popular white supremacist slogan “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.” See more in Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “14 Words,” ADL, accessed November 11, 2025, https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/14-words; For Agartha refers to a mythological subterranean civilization that has been incorporated into esoteric strands of neo-Nazism. See more in Kieran Press-Reynolds, “TikTok Brainrot Is Normalizing Alt-Right Ideologies,” Pitchfork, April 30, 2025, https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/tiktok-brainrot-is-normalizing-alt-right-ideologies/.
[73] Wildan Noviansah, “Densus 88 Ungkap Fenomena ‘Memetic Violence’ di Ledakan SMAN 72 Jakarta,” Detik News, November 11, 2025, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8205881/densus-88-ungkap-fenomena-memetic-violence-di-ledakan-sman-72-jakarta
[74] Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD), “Memetic Violence: How the True Crime Community Generates Its Own Killers,” ISD, October 2, 2025, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/memetic-violence-how-the-true-crime-community-generates-its-own-killers/
[75] “Densus 88 Tangkap 5 Perekrut Anak dan Pelajar ke Jaringan Terorisme,” CNN Indonesia, November 18, 2025, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20251118131500-12-1296699/densus-88-tangkap-5-perekrut-anak-dan-pelajar-ke-jaringan-terorisme.
[76] “Seberapa Masif Upaya Teroris Merekrut Anak-Anak Melalui Medsos dan Gim Daring?” Kompas, November 20, 2025, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/seberapa-masif-upaya-teroris-merekrut-anak-anak-melalui-medsos-dan-gim-daring.
[77] For the number of youths involved in terrorism between 2002 and 2005, see Jamhari Makruf and Mutiara Pratiwi, “Youth and Jihadi Terrorism in the Indonesian Public Attention (1999 – 2011),” in Youth and Terrorism: A Selection of Articles, ed. Datin Paduka Rashidah Ramli (Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012): 63-77.
[78] This percentage is based on the total number of publicly reported arrests between 2021 and 2025 which mentioned the suspect’s age (n=275).
