Islamic State Resurgence in a Beleaguered Middle East
Since losing its last territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria in 2019,[1] the Islamic State (IS) has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and evolve. In the present context, the group is once again resurgent[2] in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq. Ongoing conflicts, including the Gaza war and political instability in Syria, have created a conducive environment for the terrorist group to regroup and potentially expand its influence. This article will assess the state of IS, its operational strengths and its continued threat in the Middle East.
Introduction
Various Islamic State (IS) branches around the world have become more active over the past year. The group continues to inspire lone-actor violence, such as the New Orleans attack in January 2025. In the Middle East, ongoing Israeli military actions in Gaza, coupled with rising regional tensions which have diverted resources from counter-IS operations, have created a more advantageous operational environment for IS. The group has sought to leverage the widespread anger in the Arab world over the Gaza conflict to its benefit. It is actively calling for terrorist operations within Arab nations – a strategy that is likely to escalate crises and security challenges. This is particularly significant given the dismantling of IS-linked cells in countries such as Libya,[3] Morocco,[4] Algeria,[5] Lebanon,[6] Tunisia[7] and others in the region, following the October 7, 2023 attacks[8] by Hamas.
It is worth mentioning that IS’s initial reaction to the Hamas attacks in Israel was notably delayed by several days. The first mention came on October 12, 2023, in Issue No. 412 of al-Naba, the group’s key propaganda platform. In an article titled “Supporting Muslims”,[9] IS did not express solidarity with Hamas or other Palestinian factions.[10] Instead, it called for a global jihad that transcends the conflict. Almost a week later, on October 19, IS released another issue titled “Practical Steps to Fight the Jews”,[11] this time framing the conflict as an opportunity to recruit new members.
Besides the conflict in Gaza, IS has also capitalised on governance failures in countries such as Syria, particularly following the collapse of the former Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 and the subsequent rise[12] of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa. IS has rejected al-Sharaa’s transformation from a jihadist leader to a political figure, viewing his rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra into HTS and his current role as president as deceptive tactics. In Issue No. 488 of al-Naba, published on March 27, 2025, and titled “Al-Julani Between Two Walls”,[13] IS described al-Sharaa as a “deceptive tyrant” and an agent of the United States (US). Conversely, its own fighters, the “mujahideen”, are depicted as the sole proponents of true Islamic law, thereby legitimising their actions and ideology. IS also described Arab leaders as “tyrants” protecting Israel and thus deserving of condemnation and opposition.
IS Re-Establishing Itself in a Fragmented Syrian Landscape
While HTS has rebranded and sought to present itself as a more civilian-oriented administration, its members still face critical challenges in consolidating power amid rebel group infighting, legitimacy issues and the country’s dire economic conditions.[14] The internal situation in Syria remains highly fragmented, with different areas controlled by various factions,[15] each pursuing their own goals with the support of different international powers.[16] This division has been a key feature of the Syrian conflict since it began in 2011 and fragmentation has become even more pronounced under the interim government.
Against this backdrop, the resurgence of IS activities is increasingly evident in northern and eastern Syria, particularly in the rural areas spanning Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakah Governorates. This escalation has occurred amid a complex security and political landscape and has coincided with the repositioning of international coalition forces led by the US, as well as intensified efforts to repatriate displaced persons and refugees from the al-Hol camp to their home regions.
An IS attack[17] on June 1, 2025, involving a guided explosive missile, targeted a vehicle belonging to the Internal Security Forces of North and East Syria, briefly known as Asayish, along the Raqqa-Hasakah Road in northeastern Syria. The attack resulted in the deaths of three members and seriously injured a fourth. Hours later, IS released a video recording of the operation, explicitly claiming responsibility. This act was interpreted as a direct response to security campaigns[18] conducted last April by Asayish within the al-Hol camp, aimed at dismantling active IS cells there.
This type of operation suggests that IS frequently employs tactics using explosive devices and light weapons in open areas, a strategy it has effectively used for many years. IS’s threats are not limited to a single incident; it has been reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) thwarted another two attacks[19] in May 2025 in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor. In one instance, the group targeted an SDF military outpost in Al-Shuhail, employing RPG shells and machine guns. This led to prolonged clashes between the two factions, though no confirmed casualties were reported.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported a significant increase in IS operations in the Syrian desert in 2024,[20] resulting in 646 fatalities from more than 227 attacks. Since early 2025,[21] another 114 attacks have been recorded in Deir ez-Zor alone, involving ambushes, detonations and armed assaults against SDF posts, checkpoints and vehicles. This marks a significant escalation compared to IS’s previous resurgence in the territory in 2023. Recent reports[22] indicate that 2,500 IS fighters[23] remain active in the Syrian desert,[24] primarily operating in sleeper cells.[25]
The increase in IS attacks, primarily involving lone-wolf attacks, has raised concerns for the Syrian interim government. On August 7, 2025, security forces dismantled[26] a suspected IS cell in Idlib province in northwestern Syria which was accused of assassinating five Iraqi nationals. An earlier concerning development was the suicide attack[27] inside St. Elias Church near Damascus on June 22, 2025, which killed at least 25 people. The attack was reportedly linked[28] to IS following the discovery of the terrorist group’s hideouts, which contained weapons and explosives. Saraya Ansar al-Sunna (SAA),[29] a Salafi-jihadist group ideologically linked to IS, claimed[30] responsibility for the attack.
SAA was formed in February 2025 after a split from HTS. Its military structure is characterised by decentralised lone-wolf teams operating in independent cells, which lack central command and knowledge of one another’s identities and locations.[31] SAA seeks to establish a presence in rural areas outside HTS’s control, potentially in preparation for a military confrontation. During the 34th Arab Summit in Baghdad held last May, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani warned[32] of the continued threat posed by the terrorist group, stating that it is attempting to foster instability.
IS Maintains Presence in Iraq
IS’s recent operations have also extended to Iraq. While IS no longer controls territory there, it has transitioned into a resilient insurgency. On June 26, 2025, two IS members were killed during a clash[33] in Kirkuk Governorate in northern Iraq. This incident occurred shortly after the aforementioned IS suicide bombing inside St. Elias Church. Later, on August 10, 2025, Iraqi intelligence dismantled[34] a network linked to IS which had sought to carry out terrorist operations against participants in religious events. The operation resulted in the arrests of 23 suspects. These incidents suggest the ongoing presence and operational capacity of IS cells in both countries since their shared borders reopened[35] on June 14, 2025.
Despite the military setbacks suffered by IS in late 2017 at the hands of Iraqi forces and the international coalition, the group has continued to persist in its activities, both ideologically and through covert operations and sporadic attacks. Although it has lost its formal structure, estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 IS members remain active in Iraq,[36] operating in sleeper cells and small groups, particularly in provinces such as Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Nineveh, as well as along the border with Syria.
The security vacuums in Syria and Iraq have provided opportunities for IS to establish its presence, recruit fighters and expand its influence. The group has also taken advantage of the confrontations[37] between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). This situation has also allowed IS to seek opportunities to liberate detainees[38] from SDF-run prisons and camps, where approximately 9,000 IS fighters and over 40,000 of their family members are being held.[39] In addition, there are 17,700 Iraqi nationals and 8,600 individuals from other countries who have alleged connections to IS.[40]
Youth Radicalisation
The al-Hol camp in Syria, where IS members and their families, including children, are detained, continues to pose a complex challenge. The potential release of these individuals could trigger a new cycle of violence and enhance the group’s recruitment efforts, particularly among the young people[41] being held there. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, IS reportedly smuggled weapons[42] into the camp and facilitated the exfiltration of individuals,[43] using methods such as transport trucks with hollowed-out seats and waterways to move children.[44] These children, many of whom were born in the camp and have known no other life, are reportedly being recruited by IS to become the “cubs of the caliphate”. Camp directors have consistently highlighted the critical lack of rehabilitation facilities and psychological support necessary to deradicalise these youths.[45] Over 60 percent of al-Hol camp residents – approximately 22,000 children – exhibit distrust towards outsiders, throwing stones at personnel and attempting to damage equipment such as cameras.[46]
Foreign Fighters Remain Potential Asset for IS
The terrorist group has significantly leveraged the recruitment of foreign fighters,[47] integrating them deeply into its military framework. These individuals were drawn to IS by its ideology and the promise of establishing a global Islamic caliphate and became a cornerstone of its operational capabilities. The group continues to employ sophisticated propaganda and social media strategies to attract individuals globally, who often contribute diverse skills, financial resources and a readiness for extreme violence, thereby enhancing its operational capabilities.
The interim government under al-Sharaa is reportedly working to integrate thousands of foreign fighters into the SNA, a move that has been approved by Washington. However, these fighters – particularly those with Salafi-jihadist ideologies – present a persistent threat to Syrian security due to their potential disagreements with the more pragmatic stance of HTS and their susceptibility to recruitment by IS.
It has been reported that on April 27, 2024, the Iraqi government[48] arranged for the return[49] of approximately 700 Iraqi citizens, predominantly women and children, from the al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria. These individuals, some of whom are relatives of suspected IS fighters, arrived at the al-Jadaa camp near Mosul, Iraq.
IS Taking Advantage of Weak Border Controls
Through displaced and radicalised individuals and weak border controls, IS continues to raise financial resources in Iraq and Syria in 2025, even after losing control of the territories it once held. Its primary sources of funding in Iraq include extortion, collection of local royalties, smuggling and illicit trafficking. In addition, the group utilises digital platforms and cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, for financial operations. This digital approach, combined with traditional sources of funding, allow the group to conceal the sources and destinations of its funds.
The group is also believed to possess financial reserves estimated between US$10 and US$20 million, primarily held in cash and other liquid assets.[50] The group takes advantage of weak border controls and remote desert areas to facilitate these activities. The border regions between Iraq and Syria remain particularly vulnerable, as they provide opportunities for IS fighters to move between the two countries, resupply and regroup. Despite its territorial losses in Iraq, IS remains a significant threat due to its adoption of a “decentralised networks” model. This model grants individual members greater autonomy in planning and executing terrorist operations, adapting to local conditions.
Conclusion
IS continues to present a complex challenge that is likely to intensify in 2025. These threats are exacerbated by geopolitical developments, regional conflicts, weak borders and governance, as well as IS’s own propaganda efforts, particularly those aimed at recruiting youth.
The resurgence of IS in Syria is widely interpreted as a failure of al-Sharaa’s government. This is largely due to the deep-seated distrust and illegitimacy affecting various governing entities in Syria, stemming from the group’s extremist past and the resulting fragmentation of control. This environment creates fertile ground for IS to exploit power vacuums, capitalise on local grievances and re-establish its presence.
By recruiting displaced refugees from places such as al-Hol and leveraging its decentralised networks, IS continues its aggression. Its adoption of low-cost terrorism, particularly lone-actor attacks, which minimise its operational footprint as well as the need for complex planning, allows IS to evade security and intelligence agencies that attempt to infiltrate it and prevent its attacks.
The international operations against IS have indeed achieved significant successes over the past decade. However, these efforts are undermined by a lack of international cooperation and investment in solutions which address both the immediate humanitarian crisis faced by the many displaced in Syria and the underlying security threats. In the meantime, IS continues to engage in a new, cross-border phase of terrorism that exploits Syria’s fragmented communities, which remain deeply divided along religious, ethnic and tribal lines, amid ongoing socio-political challenges.
About the Author
Ghada Soliman is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She can be reached at [email protected]
Thumbnail photo by Mahmoud Sulaiman on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “Islamic State Group Defeated as Final Territory Lost, US-Backed Forces Say,” BBC, March 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157.
[2] “UN Experts: ISIS and Al-Qaida Threat is Intense in Africa, with Growing Risks in Syria,” Asharq Al-Awsat, August 1, 2025, https://www.msn.com/en-ae/news/other/un-experts-isis-and-al-qaida-threat-is-intense-in-africa-with-growing-risks-in-syria/ar-AA1JDPfA?ocid=BingNewsSerp.
[3] “Libya: Intelligence Dismantles 3 ISIS cells,” Al Arabiya, August 2, 2025, https://www.alarabiya.net/north-africa/2025/08/02/%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%83-3-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4.
[4] “Terrorist Cell Dismantled Part of Daech’s Sahel Strategy to Establish a Branch in Morocco,” MSN, March 4, 2025, https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/terrorist-cell-dismantled-part-of-daechs-sahel-strategy-to-establish-a-branch-in-morocco/ar-AA1zH7mW?ocid=BingNewsSerp.
[5] “Algeria Announces the Thwarting of a French Intelligence Operation on its Territory Aimed at Recruiting a Former Member of ISIS,” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, December 10, 2024, https://www.alquds.co.uk.
[6] “The Lebanese Army Arrested a Cell Supporting ISIS That Had Planned to Target the Army Itself,” Al Arabiya, July 24, 2025, https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2025/07/24/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A4%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%87.
[7] “Thwarting a Terrorist plot in Tunisia,” Asharq Al-Awsat, May 26, 2025, https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7/4349181-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%C2%AB%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%C2%BB-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3.
[8] The October 7, 2023 attacks, referred to by Hamas as “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”, was a coordinated assault by Hamas and involved breaches of the Gaza-Israel barrier and widespread incursions into southern Israeli communities. This resulted in significant casualties and the taking of hostages. The attacks initiated the current Gaza war and were widely condemned by many countries as acts of terrorism.
[9] “Supporting Muslims,” al-Naba, October 12, 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1R7vyNp9EmE2n9Vk7tM-fBcHO5QZ7JzPO/view?usp=sharing.
[10] IS believes that the Palestinian factions’ goals or strategies are not sufficiently aligned with its interpretation of Islamic law. It also perceives them as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”.
[11] “Practical Steps to Fight the Jews,” al-Naba, October 19, 2023, https://drive.google.com/file/d/101asc8U45jswDeO9Ze4_ilXC_4mVc439/view?usp=sharing.
[12] Sebastian Usher, “Who Are the Rebels in Syria?” BBC News, December 8, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce313jn453zo.
[13] “Al-Julani Between Two Walls,” al-Naba, March 27, 2025, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ks71y6BNwd5B3xpbWyVVK0s4bQyglSis/view?usp=sharing.
[14] Tanya Mehra, “The Threat of ISIS in a Fragmentated Syria,”Internaiional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, May 16, 2025, https://icct.nl/publication/threat-isis-fragmentated-syria.
[15] “Local Factions, Turkey and the US Among Many Vying for Power in Syria After the Fall of Bashar Al-Assad,” Sky News, December 10, 2024, https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/global-affairs/local-factions-turkey-and-the-us-among-many-vying-for-power-in-syria-after-the-fall-of-bashar-alassad/news-story/98e15f3dcb9a744c7950fc1561c5376d.
[16] Ibid.
[17] “ISIS Claims Deadly Attack on Asayish Patrol in NE Syria,” North Press Agency, June 2, 2025, https://npasyria.com/en/126323/.
[18] “Security Campaign in Al-Hawl Camp Two Days On: 16 People Accused of ‘Belonging to ISIS Cells’ Arrested by SDF-Backed Security Forces,” The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, April 19, 2025, https://www.syriahr.com/en/360257/.
[19] “SDF Successfully Thwarts Two ISIS Attacks in the Eastern Countryside of Deir Ez-Zor,” ANF NEWS, May 8, 2025, https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/sdf-successfully-thwarts-two-isis-attacks-in-the-eastern-countryside-of-deir-ez-zor-79248.
[20] “ISIS Resurgence in 2024,” The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, December 29, 2024, https://www.syriahr.com/en/352568/.
[21] “114 Attacks Since Early 2025,” The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, July 27, 2025, https://www.syriahr.com/en/366672/.
[22] “Defeat ISIS Mission in Iraq and Syria for January-June 2024,” U.S. Central Command, July 16, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3840981/defeat-isis-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-for-january-june-2024/.
[23] Ibid.
[24] “Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh,” Security Council Report, February 7, 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/02/counter-terrorism-briefing-on-the-secretary-generals-strategic-level-report-on-isil-daesh-8.php.
[25] “ISIS Claims Deadly Attack on Asayish Patrol in NE Syria,” North Press Agency, June 2, 2025, https://npasyria.com/en/126323/.
[26] “Syria Dismantles Suspected ISIS Cell Accused of Killing Iraqis,” RÛDAW, August 7, 2025, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/070820252.
[27] Abdul Rahman Shaheen and Kareem Chehayeb, “Suicide Bomber Kills at Least 22 in Greek Orthodox Church in Syria during Divine Liturgy,” Associated Press, June 23, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/syria-church-attack-damascus-mass-da2ed505d6625fce1fc9de9e88c200a3.
[28] “Syria Says the Islamic State Group was Behind the Deadly Attack on a Damascus Church,” AP, June 25, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/syria-christians-church-bombing-islamic-state-c66a81b6b9eadfa870c7107056a5eb4a.
[29] “Ansar Al-Sunna: New Terror Group Aims Chaos in Syria, Lebanon,” Türkiye Today, June 25, 2025, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/region/terrorist-group-saraya-ansar-al-sunna-claims-damascus-church-bombing-3203402.
[30] Ibid.
[31] “Saraya Ansar Al-Sunna: An Emerging Jihadist Threat to Syria’s Transitional Stability,” DN, July 14, 2025, https://daynewsnow.com/2025/07/14/.
[32] “Al-Jubeir Stresses Saudi Support to Syria as Shaibani Warns of Attempts to Stoke Strife,” Asharq Al-Awsat, May 18, 2025, https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5144301-al-jubeir-stresses-saudi-support-syria-shaibani-warns-attempts-stoke-strife.
[33] “2 ISIS Members Killed in Northern Iraq,” Qatar News Agency, June 26, 2025, https://qna.org.qa/en/news/news-details?id=2-isis-members-killed-in-northern-iraq&date=26/06/2025.
[34] “Iraqi Authorities: An ISIS Network That Planned to Target Shiite Visitors Has Been Arrested,” Asharq Awsat, August 10, 2025, https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5173751-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9.
[35] “Iraq Reopens Syria Crossing for Trade and Passenger Traffic,” The Straits Times, June 14, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/iraq-reopens-syria-crossing-for-trade-and-passenger-traffic.
[36] Philip Loft and Louisa Brooke-Holland, Countering Islamic State/Daesh in Africa, Syria and Iraq 2025 (United Kingdom Parliament House of Commons Library, 2025), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9613/.
[37] “Kurdish-Led Forces Push Back Turkish-Backed Syrian Rebels,” Voice Of America, December 24, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/kurdish-led-forces-push-back-turkish-backed-syrian-rebels/7913011.html.
[38] “Escaping ISIS Detainees from Syria’s Al-Hol Camp Sparks Security Concerns,” Kurdistan24, February 22, 2025, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/826227.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] “ISIS Recruits Children and its Danger is Increasing in Al-Hawl Camp,” Al-Thawra, March 20, 2025, https://thawra.sy/?p=634763.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] “Syria: 20,000 Children in Al-Hawl Camp Need Intellectual Rehabilitation,” Alhurra, February 10, 2025, 2 min., 58 sec., Bing Videos.
[46] Ibid.
[47] New Research: Best Practices for Reintegrating the Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, 2023), https://www.unomaha.edu/ncite/news/2023/03/reintegration-report.php.
[48] “Iraq Returns 700 Individuals Associated with ISIS from Al-Hawl Camp,” Al-Araby, April 29, 2024, https://www.alaraby.com/news/%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-700-%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84.
[49] Ibid.
[50] “Fact Sheet: Countering ISIS Financing,” United States Department of the Treasury, February 27, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Fact-Sheet-Countering-ISIS-Financing-2-27-24.pdf.
