Jemaah Islamiyah’s Affiliated Pesantrens: Legacy and Influence After Its Dissolution
The formal dissolution of the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in mid-2024 does not mark the end of terrorism in Indonesia. Rather, the development signals the beginning of a new phase in the evolving transformation of jihadist networks in the country. Going forward, the organisation’s ideology will likely undergo a metamorphosis, adapting to changing circumstances and continuing to spread through various channels, particularly its network of Islamic boarding schools and the exploitation of digital technology.
Introduction
In December 2024, as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) made rapid territorial advances in Syria, a video featuring an Indonesian militant celebrating jubilantly was circulated online by the Islamist social media account Arrahmah.id. It later emerged the Indonesian militant, believed to be based in Syria, had several years prior studied at the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-affiliated Al Muttaqin pesantren in Jepara, Central Java. His example, amongst others, exemplifies the role of JI-affiliated pesantrens in advancing global jihad, particularly in the past decade.[1] Since 2013, 66 JI recruits, many from these pesantrens, have sharpened combat skills and strengthened transnational connection ties in Syria.[2]
Pesantrens or Islamic boarding schools hold a special place in the JI ecosystem. While JI rarely owned or directly funded pesantrens, they nevertheless served multiple functions for the organisation. These included allowing JI to exert ideological influence through the placement of JI members as teachers, connecting JI to a support base for potential recruitment, and preparing chosen students for global jihad.[3] Because pesantrens have held such a key role in JI’s history, analysing the role of JI-affiliated pesantrens – post-JI’s dissolution – is instrumental to understanding the group’s future trajectory. The challenge going forward is whether counterterrorism efforts should dismantle the ideological foundations of these institutions, or allow them to pursue reform and rehabilitation.
This article explores JI’s post-dissolution shift and argues that without systematic reform, the JI pesantren system will likely continue fostering global jihad ideology. It will discuss the challenges of implementing reforms and propose educational strategies to disrupt the proliferation of radical thought. The article will conclude by emphasising the need for comprehensive ideological and educational reforms in the years ahead.
JI’s Strategic Shift and the Metamorphosis of Ideology: Influence Beyond 2024
Despite JI’s formal dissolution on June 30, 2024,[4] its ideological influence among segments of Indonesian society is likely to endure. This is particularly relevant for the vast network of Islamic boarding schools or Forum Komunikasi Pondok Pesantren (FKPP), that is, JI-affiliated pesantrens[5] around the country. FKPP is a consortium of pesantrens that standardises curricula, trains teachers, and distributes educational resources. It expands organically through alumni networks, primarily via Pesantren Darusy Syahadah in Boyolali, Central Java, with leadership largely JI-affiliated, despite many holding diverse administrator backgrounds. All FKPP pesantrens operate legally, with state intervention limited to cases of clear extremist activity.
The fact that 42 pesantrens sent representatives to attend JI dissolution events in recent months, in which JI seniors communicated the reasons for the organisation’s disbandment and participants pledged loyalty to the Indonesian state, underscores the pesantrens’ continued recognition of JI’s movement and its ideas.[6] Detachment 88 estimates that over 100 schools affiliated with JI are currently operating across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara, and educate approximately 18,000 students. This vast network ensures the persistence of JI’s ideological legacy and poses ongoing challenges for counterterrorism efforts in the region.[7]
This assessment was echoed by Arif Siswanto, JI’s caretaker leader in 2019. In an interview with this author, he described the lingering influence of radical teachings within JI-affiliated pesantrens as a “distant threat” that necessitates a multi-stakeholder approach.[8] He further acknowledged that while JI’s leadership may have stepped back from its operational role, the ideological seeds planted within these institutions can take root for generations, reinforcing extremist worldviews long after the group’s official demise.
Since its inception, JI has never been a monolithic group, constantly evolving its strategy and persisting through fractures and splinters. Under Para Wijayanto’s decade-long leadership until 2019, JI shifted its ideological and operational strategy, adopting the ‘Ahlul Qibla’ doctrine. The doctrine prohibits violence against fellow Muslims and repositions Indonesia as a logistical and ideological hub for global jihad.[9] JI’s stance of not considering the Indonesian government as an enemy of their organisation arguably can be interpreted as not necessarily eliminating threats toward foreigners, particularly non-Muslims, such as diplomats or businesspeople from Western or other non-Muslim countries present in Indonesia.
With senior leaders like Para Wijayanto and Abu Rusydan refraining from condemning international jihad in the group’s recent dissolution announcement, this strategic shift is expected to persist, allowing JI to continue facilitating recruitment, resource mobilisation, and propaganda for jihadist efforts in conflict zones such as Syria and Yemen.[10] As such, while the immediate domestic threat may diminish, JI’s involvement in transnational jihad – particularly through graduates of its pesantrens connected to Middle Eastern networks – highlights the need for a broader, proactive counterterrorism strategy beyond Indonesia.[11]
The JI Pesantren System: A Trojan Horse for Radicalisation?
Indonesia’s pesantrens have long been pillars of religious education, particularly in rural areas.[12] Traditionally, they serve as centres of Islamic learning, where students study under clerics and scholars.[13] At the same time, militant recruitment within these pesantrens predates JI’s official establishment in 1992. As early as the mid-1980s, certain teachers, such as Abdurrohim aka Abu Husna in Al Mukmin Pesantren in Ngruki were actively scouting promising students and facilitating their enrolment in military training camps in Pakistan.[14]
This practice laid the foundation for a generation of Indonesian jihadists who later played key roles in JI’s militant operations. Following the precedent set by Darul Islam (DI) – which sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia – JI embedded its ideological strategy within pesantrens, transforming them into recruitment hubs and ideological training grounds.
Thomas Hegghammer’s concept of “Jihadi Culture” helps explain how JI used pesantrens to instil a deep sense of belonging and purpose among young recruits.[15] Historically, these institutions normalised radical views, making them fertile ground for indoctrination.[16] Importantly, radicalisation often took place outside formal classroom settings – through study groups, extracurricular activities, and private mentorship – making it difficult for authorities like the Ministry of Religious Affairs to detect and counter these influences.[17] Even after JI’s structural disbandment, the radical subculture it cultivated persists within certain pesantrens, reinforcing extremist narratives.[18]
A common misconception is that JI owns a vast network of Islamic boarding schools. In reality, JI’s strength lay not in physical infrastructure, but in the human resources within these institutions. Arif Siswanto emphasised that the organisation’s most valuable assets were its people – students, teachers, and religious scholars who carried its ideology forward, even when JI as an organisation was weakened.[19] Although JI did not directly own or fund most of these pesantrens, it maintained strong informal ties with them, particularly through influential members who served as alumni, teachers, or religious leaders within the pesantren system.[20] This network allowed JI to exert ideological influence without the need to control the institutions outright.
This strategy mirrored the early operational framework of JI, which categorised the broader Muslim population into four distinct groups. The first group, Multazim, represented the core of JI’s movement, consisting of fully committed members who actively participated in its activities and jihadist struggle. The second group, supporters, included individuals who were not formal members but sympathised with JI’s cause and provided support. The third group, sympathisers, consisted of those who aligned with JI’s ideological goals but contributed selectively. Finally, the neutrals were individuals who neither supported nor opposed JI’s ideology.[21]
JI’s ultimate goal was to create a neutral societal environment, where individuals were either sympathetic to the cause or passive, neither supporting nor opposing the group’s goals.[22] Through its pesantren networks, JI expanded its influence, recruited future members, and sustained its ideological base across generations.
Recruitment Patterns in JI-Affiliated Islamic Boarding Schools
An analysis of court documents on 21 convicted JI recruits reveals a clear pattern of recruitment and ideological indoctrination through JI-affiliated pesantrens such as Al Muttaqien (Jepara), Baitus Salam (Solo), Baitussalam (Semarang), Darusy Syahadah (Boyolali), and Al Muhsin (Metro-Lampung). Individuals like Jundi Al Muhlis, Ahmad Ulul Albab, and Qowie Muqimudin exemplify this connection.
Their origins – Solo, Magetan, Kudus, Sukoharjo, Klaten, and Metro-Lampung – are historically JI strongholds, reinforcing the geographical concentration of radical networks. Born mostly between 1991 and 1998, these recruits were likely exposed to JI ideology during their formative years through pesantren-based education. While the number of JI members directly recruited from affiliated pesantrens has been relatively small compared to those recruited from outside these institutions, the recruitment process nevertheless became more structured under the leadership of Para Wijayanto.
Under Para Wijayanto, JI established the Multazim bin Multazim (MBM) programme. The term “Multazim,” meaning a fully committed JI member, referred to those who actively participated in the organisation’s activities. “Bin,” meaning “the child of” in Arabic, described a kinship-based recruitment model in which parents indoctrinated and enrolled their children into JI-affiliated pesantrens.[23] This programme required members to enrol at least one son in the family in an FKPP-JI pesantren, ensuring the ideological and operational continuity of JI’s mission across generations. This familial cycle reinforced JI’s long-term resilience.[24]
Through the MBM programme, students were subjected to a covert selection process to determine their eligibility for recruitment. Only a few were chosen for specialised training, while the majority were sent back to their pesantrens for regular education. After graduation, MBM students underwent further training to assess their commitment, with those who passed sent for specialised training programmes, while others were returned to their pesantrens. Not all MBM students became JI members; this depended on a screening process led by JI-appointed selectors.[25] Despite its covert nature, the MBM programme raised concerns as it allowed JI to infiltrate neutral educational environments and prepare future recruits for global jihad. The pesantrens served as ideological incubators, producing successive generations of individuals aligned with JI’s vision of a global Islamic state governed by Sharia law. The scale of this influence was alarming: JI’s International Relations Division sent over 120 Indonesian recruits to Syria, some of whom came from JI’s MBM programme.[26]
Although the formal dissolution of JI may prevent the organisation from sending its cadres to join the global jihad cause, it cannot eliminate the spirit of jihad fuelled by “the imagined solidarities” of ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic brotherhood) – especially if Muslims worldwide continue to face violence and oppression.[27] This sentiment is not limited to JI members alone; it is shared by Islamic activists more broadly, even those outside JI’s sphere.
The case of Palestine, widely supported by various Islamic activist groups, demonstrates that the ideology of jihad transcends JI’s organisational structure and may continue to inspire future generations of jihadists.[28] A recent tabligh akbar (mass preaching) event was held at Al Ikhlas Pesantren in Lamongan, East Java, on March 1, 2024, with the theme “Jaga Persatuan dan Jangan Lupakan Palestina” (Preserve Unity and Don’t Forget Palestine). Al Ikhlas Pesantren, known for its JI ties, was led by Azhari Dipo Kusumo, who was arrested for his involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings. The event’s main speaker, Mas’ud Izzul Mujahid, is also linked to JI-affiliated institutions. This example highlights how JI-affiliated pesantrens use the Palestinian cause to foster solidarity and advance their agenda, potentially radicalising individuals by tapping into Muslim grievances.
Breaking the Cycle: Can Pesantren Be Reformed?
While the government has taken steps to dismantle JI’s formal network, the ongoing influence of certain pesantrens complicates efforts to rehabilitate former extremists and prevent future radicalisation. These efforts to intervene in JI-affiliated Islamic boarding schools should focus on promoting a more moderate interpretation of jihad that aligns with the Indonesian context.[29] For instance, since JI is integrated within the Republic of Indonesia, it should refrain from sending cadres to conflict zones abroad or establishing funding networks to support Muslims in those areas. Instead, such matters should be left to the Indonesian government or channelled through official institutions designated by the state.
For this reform to succeed, the government must collaborate closely with Islamic boarding school leaders to design educational reforms that prioritise peacebuilding, tolerance, inclusivity, respect for diversity, and critical engagement with Pancasila as Indonesia’s unifying ideology. This could include the development of educational programmes that promote tolerance, pluralism, and democratic values while actively preventing the spread of extremist narratives. A key focus should be ideological shifts, particularly with regard to Wala’ wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal), which was once used to justify rejecting the Indonesian state as “un-Islamic” but is now being reinterpreted to support coexistence within the national framework.
The reliance on religious prophecies to frame contemporary conflicts by some JI-affiliated pesantrens also needs to be addressed. Extremist groups have long exploited eschatological narratives, such as the Malhamah Kubra (the final war), the black banners from Khorasan, and the coming of Imam Mahdi (Messiah), to justify violent jihad and instill a sense of urgency among recruits.[30] These interpretations oversimplify complex geopolitical conflicts, fostering a binary “us versus them” worldview that makes individuals susceptible to radicalisation, particularly global jihad narratives.
Beyond curriculum changes, it is also crucial to foster critical thinking skills and resilience among students, enabling them to recognise and reject extremist propaganda. Additionally, teacher training programmes should be established to help educators detect early signs of radicalisation and equip them with the necessary tools to address ideological extremism in the classroom. This effort must extend beyond directly affiliated JI schools and encompass the wider educational ecosystem to prevent the spread of extremist ideology. Establishing partnerships with civil society organisations and local communities dedicated to promoting an inclusive, non-violent interpretation of Islam is essential to this initiative.
Fighting Ideology with Education: Progress So Far
In response to these concerns, the Indonesian government, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, has initiated significant early intervention efforts. One such initiative was a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) between the Directorate of Early Education and Islamic Boarding Schools and representatives from FKPP-JI, alongside academics and Detachment 88. Held in Jakarta on August 28, 2024, this discussion aimed to explore strategies for curriculum reform. During the event, the Director of Islamic Boarding Schools at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Basnang Said, emphasised the need for a new curriculum designed to foster patriotism among young students and strengthen their commitment to the Republic of Indonesia.[31]
FKPP-linked pesantrens, which historically viewed Indonesia as a non-Islamic entity, are undergoing reforms that distinguish between the nation-state and its governance. Additionally, theological interpretations – especially regarding takfir (excommunication) and Islamic governance – are being revised to align with mainstream religious discourse. However, these efforts must extend beyond JI-affiliated schools and encompass the broader educational ecosystem to prevent the continued spread of extremist ideology.
This effort will require extensive follow-up and long-term commitment, and it will be particularly challenging amid President Prabowo’s massive government cuts, including within the Ministry of Religious Affairs.[32] The primary challenge lies in the disparity in understanding between the central Ministry of Religious Affairs and its regional offices. While the central government has clear policies to address extremist threats, regional authorities – particularly in areas with strong Islamic conservatism – may resist or fail to enforce these measures. Pesantrens, often influential in local communities, can exploit their religious status to avoid scrutiny. This misalignment leads to inconsistent responses, allowing radical pesantrens to thrive where local governments are unwilling or unable to act effectively. Additionally, variations in human resources and budgets across regions present further hurdles. As a result, initiatives pioneered at the central level may not be easily replicated or implemented at the regional level.
Additionally, programmes should explore the effective use of digital platforms to combat online radicalisation.[33] As some individuals who are linked to JI increasingly leverage the internet for recruitment and spreading propaganda, it is essential that Islamic boarding schools and their leaders are equipped with digital literacy to counter extremist narratives in cyberspace. By aligning educational reform with a broader anti-terrorism strategy, Indonesia can strengthen its position as a model for addressing both domestic extremism and transnational jihadist networks. A comprehensive and accessible digital platform will also help to bridge gaps in programme implementation across regions.
Conclusion
For years, JI-affiliated pesantrens have served as safe spaces for families sympathetic to JI’s ideology, allowing radical beliefs to be passed down across generations. While the dissolution of JI has weakened its formal organisational structure, there remains a need to ensure that its ideological influence does not persist in continuing to shape the perspectives of former members and the future community. A critical aspect of addressing this challenge lies in reforming JI-affiliated teaching systems. Without intervention, JI’s legacy will continue to shape Indonesia’s security dynamics, subtly influencing future threats.
Compounding this challenge is JI’s inherent lack of cohesion. Historically, JI has functioned more as a network than a monolithic organisation, adapting and splintering in response to external pressures. While its official structure may have been dismantled, its ideology remains fluid and capable of evolving into new forms. Future splinters – whether small and localised or more structured – could emerge, driven by ideological persistence, generational indoctrination, or shifts in the regional security landscape.[34] Understanding this adaptive nature is crucial for anticipating long-term threats.
To counter this, Indonesia must integrate geopolitical literacy into Islamic boarding school curricula, equipping students with critical thinking skills to analyse conflicts beyond religious dogma.[35] Encouraging a nuanced understanding of history, politics, and economics will help dismantle extremist narratives and promote resilience against ideological manipulation. Additionally, fostering interfaith dialogue, pluralism, and alternative educational pathways will further disrupt the cycle of radical indoctrination.
By addressing these ideological legacies and preparing for potential splinter groups, Indonesia can disrupt the intergenerational spread of extremism and cultivate a generation that is informed, tolerant, and resistant to radicalisation. A holistic approach – combining educational reform, nuanced conflict analysis, and strengthened community engagement – will be key to ensuring a more peaceful and resilient future.[36]
About the Author
Noor Huda Ismail is a Visiting Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Mufid Majnun on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Noor Huda Ismail, “Unpacking the Role of Prophecy in Extremist Narratives,” RSIS Commentary, December 11, 2014, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/unpacking-the-role-of-prophecy-in-extremist-narratives/.
[2] Callistasia Wijaya, “Rekrutmen ‘Ketat’ Jemaah Islamiyah Disebut Libatkan Pesantren: Kemenag Minta Masyarakat Lapor Kegiatan Tak Biasan,” BBC News, December 29, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-55426562.
[3] Noor Huda Ismail, “Navigating Pro-JI Pesantrens,” RSIS Commentary, April 20, 2022, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/navigating-pro-ji-pesantrens/#.Yp76eS8RpmA.
[4] Denny Armandhanu, “Terrorist Group Jemaah Islamiyah’s Top Leaders Say It Is Dissolved. How Should Its Ex-Members, Indonesia Authorities Move Forward?,” Channel News Asia, July 4, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-jemaah-islamiyah-dissolved-terrorism-splinter-4457446.
[5] Aisyah Llewellyn, “Jemaah Islamiyah Resmi Telah Bubar, Tetapi Masih Tancapkan Pengaruh Melalui Pesantren,” BenarNews Indonesia, July 24, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/analisis-alasan-ji-bubar-07242024103730.html.
[6] M. Khory Alfarizi, “2 Pertemuan Petinggi Jamaah Islamiyah Sebelum Deklarasi Pembubaran JI,” Tempo, September 28, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/arsip/2-pertemuan-petinggi-jamaah-islamiyah-sebelum-deklarasi-pembubaran-ji-4868.
[7] An interview with an analyst at Indonesia’s Counter Terrorism Force Special Detachment 88.
[8] An interview with Arif Siswanto.
[9] Sentot Prasetyo, JI Untold Story: Perjalanan Kisah Jemaah Islamiyah (Elex Media Komputindo, 2024).
[10] Aqil Hamzah and Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Ex-JI Members in S-E Asia Should Abide by Dissolution, Says Terror Group’s Former Chief,” The Straits Times, October 30, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/former-ji-members-in-s-e-asia-should-abide-by-dissolution-former-chief-of-terror-group.
[11] Rakyan Adibrata and Jasminder Singh, “Recent Arrest Puts Jemaah Islamiyah Back in the Spotlight,” The Diplomat, February 13, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/237678/.
[12] Ardhitacahyaghani Aulia Arsya, Siti Azizah and Umi Wisaptiningsih Suwandi, “The Role of Islamic Boarding School as Agent of Development in Sheep Farming Development, Ngawonggo Village, Tajinan, Malang District, Indonesia,” International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Development, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2021), https://ijsred.com/volume4/issue2/IJSRED-V4I2P31.pdf.
[13] Alya Nurazika Lestari, “Metode Pendidikan Pesantren,” Pusat Riset Pendidikan Indonesia, May 21, 2020, https://www.purisdiki.or.id/2020/05/metode-pendidikan-pesantren.html.
[14] Noor Huda Ismail, “Schooled for Jihad,” The Washington Post, June 26, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2005/06/26/schooled-for-jihad/8a2a2208-bad4-4f04-a07d-0919aa13105c/.
[15] Thomas Hegghammer, Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists (Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/jihadi-culture/4789CC01AC481729A8677486B2F3588B.
[16] Ismail, “Navigating Pro-JI Pesantrens.”
[17] An interview with Hadi Masykur in Yogyakarta in August 2024.
[18] Hegghammer, Jihadi Culture.
[19] Arif Siswanto’s exact statement was “Our real assets are not physical buildings but people—students, teachers, preachers, and those who listen to our da’wah. JI as an institution never built or owned pesantren. However, individual JI members may work in or be affiliated with these schools.” An interview with Arif Siswanto in Semarang in September 2024.
[20] An interview with Arif Siswanto in Semarang in September 2024.
[21] An interview with Hadi Masykur in Yogyakarta in September 2024.
[22] An interview with Arif Budi Setyawan in Yogyakarta in August 2024.
[23] Unaesah Rahmah and Haula Noor, “Intergenerational Influence: The Pathway to Radicalisation,” RSIS Commentary, March 22, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/intergenerational-influence-the-pathway-to-radicalisation/.
[24] Sulastri Oman, “Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010), pp. 157-175, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/12755.
[25] An interview with Hadi Masykur.
[26] An interview with Karso in Semarang in August 2024.
[27] Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2005), pp. 891-908, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017816.
[28] Tom Facchine, “Intersectionality and Palestine Solidarity: Why Muslims Need to Lead the Gaza Protests,” Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research, June 21, 2024, https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/post/intersectionality-and-palestine-solidarity-why-muslims-need-to-lead-the-gaza-protests.
[29] Abdulhakim Allahdad, “Perception and Interpretation Problems of Contemporary Approaches of the Concept to Jihad,” Talim: Journal of Education in Muslim Societies and Communities, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2019), pp. 7-30, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/993140.
[30] Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman, “Religious Extremism: Challenging Extremist and Jihadist Propaganda,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2021), p. 115, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26979991?seq=4.
[31] “Kementerian Agama Bahas Kurikulum Pondok Pesantren Eks Jamaah Islamiyah,” Ministry of Religious Affairs Indonesia, August 28, 2024, https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/kementerian-agama-bahas-kurikulum-pondok-pesantren-eks-jamaah-islamiyah-dvn33.
[32] Muhammad Marjan Madyansyah, “Anggaran Dipotong Rp14T, Kemenag Cari Solusi Agar Program Tidak Terhambat,” Ministry of Religious Affairs Indonesia, February 4, 2025, https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/anggaran-dipotong-rp14t-kemenag-cari-solusi-agar-program-tidak-terhambat-EzXAo.
[33] Ali Abdullah Wibisono, Rachel Kumendong, and Iwa Maulana, “Indonesia’s Handling of Terrorists’ Cyber Activities: How Repressive Measures Still Fall Short,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2024), pp. 134-160, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/23477970241298764.
[34] Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “JI’s Decision to Disband Is for Real,” Indonesia at Melbourne, July 31, 2024, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/jis-decision-to-disband-is-for-real/.
[35] Tianyang Liu and Tianru Guan, “A Critical Study of Space in the Geopolitics of Terrorism,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2021), pp. 126-140, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21624887.2021.1875713.
[36] “A Holistic Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism,” Alliance for Peacebuilding, accessed February 6, 2025, https://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/afps-event-calendar/holistic-approach-pve62922.
