Malaysia
The terrorist threat landscape in Malaysia remains muted. In 2023, there were no reported terrorism-related arrests. Nevertheless, the Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) remains vigilant against a range of threats to the country. The continued threat of online radicalisation, the use of the country as a safe haven and transit point for terrorist elements, and the proliferation of hate speech remain trends to look out for.
Domestic Threat Landscape
Continued Lull in Terrorist Activity
There were no reported terrorism-related arrests in 2023 in Malaysia. This points towards a decreasing trend of terrorist activity in the country. There are several possible reasons for this. First is the relative weakening of groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) in conflict hot zones such as Iraq and Syria compared to the 2013-2019 period.[1] External developments, particularly within the Muslim world such as in the Middle East, have always had a strong influence on the Malaysian threat environment. The Arab Spring in 2011, the subsequent Syrian Civil War and the rise of IS shortly after were key pull factors that attracted Malaysians to join IS in the Middle East in the 2013-2019 period.[2] The fall of the IS caliphate in 2019 and its subsequent weakening in Syria has reduced its appeal among Malaysians.[3]
While IS remains active in Africa, there is currently little evidence that points towards Malaysian militants having an interest in IS’ African affiliates and wanting to travel there. This may be due to the unfamiliarity of the land and language, unlike the Middle East, which is a popular destination for travel and study among Malaysians. Likewise, there also seems to be little indication at present of Malaysian nationals wanting to travel to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to join either AQ or IS and their affiliates there.
The second factor for the drop in terrorist activity is the lack of terrorist leaders. The terrorism threat landscape in Malaysia has been primarily driven by key charismatic personalities who are able to recruit, galvanise and mobilise support among local militants.[4] In the early 2000s, during the peak of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s activity in the region, there were several key Malaysians involved with the group. These included Dr Azahari Husin, Noordin Mat Top and Wan Min Wan Mat.[5] Similarly, with the rise of IS, significant Malaysian personalities who were members of the group included Muhammad Wanndy Mohd Jedi, Akel Zainal, Fudhail Omar, Fadhlan Shahidi and Zainuri Kamaruddin. With the elimination of these influential terrorist leaders, the terrorist landscape in Malaysia has become leaderless and diffuse. The absence of a key leader who is able to recruit and mobilise has contributed to the reduced terrorist threat in the country.
The decline in terrorist activity in the country can also be partly attributed to the effects of the pandemic. The economic hardship wrought by COVID-19 resulted in a substantial segment of the population losing their jobs and suffering other adverse economic consequences.[6] This caused them to shift their attention to bread-and-butter issues to ensure their survival and reduced their proclivity to engage in radicalism. However, with the effects of the pandemic subsiding, there may well be a reversal to this.
IS Returnees
There are currently 54 Malaysians previously linked to IS who are believed to be in Syria.[7] Out of these, 19 are male and 11 are female. A further 22 are below the age of 12 and two are between 13-21 years old.[8] The Malaysian government maintains an open-door policy towards returnees and continues to engage in repatriation efforts of its citizens from conflict zones. As of 2022, 17 Malaysians have been repatriated from the Syria-Iraq theatre.[9]
However, the government faces several challenges associated with repatriation. First is the unwillingness of some individuals to be repatriated. While several Malaysians in the displacement camps in Syria have willingly engaged the Malaysian authorities, some have avoided repatriation for fear of arrest and prosecution back home. The Malaysian government also faces diplomatic hurdles given they do not recognise the authorities in charge of the displacement camps in Syria. This adds an extra layer of complexity to the repatriation process. Finally, the exact number and identity of Malaysians in Iraq and Syria are unknown. There may be individuals who are there but remain under the radar. Unless they bring themselves forward, identifying and repatriating them will remain a problem.
The repatriation process is a multi-agency effort that involves the MSB, Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and several others. It is divided into five phases: investigation, assessment, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration.[10] Male returnees are prosecuted under terrorism laws in Malaysia before being put in rehabilitation programmes, while females and children undergo rehabilitation and assessments that may take anywhere between one and four months before they are reintegrated into society.
Maritime Security – Sabah
The level of activity of terrorist groups in Sabah, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and other pro-IS affiliates, has declined. The weakening of pro-IS groups in the southern Philippines has contributed to the reduction of terrorist activity in Sabah. However, illegal immigration, particularly through the porous maritime borders in the region, remains a concern.[11] Radicalisation and recruitment among disenfranchised migrant communities also remain security risks.
Apart from the Islamist milieu, Sabah faces a significant threat from separatist groups such as the Royal Sulu Force (RSF). The RSF is linked to the heirs of the Sulu Sultanate, who claim that parts of Sabah belong to them; it is the group that carried out the invasion of Lahad Datu in 2013.[12] The RSF is believed to have a significant amount of support from the Sulu diaspora in Sabah. Another group of concern is the Sultan Sulu Darul Islam (SSDI).[13] Although the leadership structure of this group is unclear, it is believed they too have support among the Sulu diaspora in Sabah. In the past, the SSDI issued its own identification cards in an attempt to assert influence and proclaim sovereignty.[14] Although the Malaysian government won the legal dispute with the Sulu Sultanate over the latter’s claim of land in Sabah,[15] the possibility of a second Lahad Datu-style invasion by the RSF or any of its affiliated factions cannot be ruled out.
Sabah remains a hotspot for illegal smuggling activities.[16] Examples of smuggled goods include oil, petrol, diesel, contraband, drugs and firearms. The hotspots for smuggling activities are Sandakan and Semporna in the eastern coastal region. Smuggling networks are usually linked to militant networks and the profits gained from smuggling activities are believed to be used to fund militant groups in the region.[17] Kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) activity by ASG factions has largely ceased owing to the weakening of the group in the southern Philippines. However, the emergence of smaller criminal networks in the region that might carry out KFR must be watched closely.[18]
Non-Violent Extremism
Within the non-violent extremist milieu, Hizb ut-Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) remains active in the country. HTM is one of approximately 40 Hizb ut-Tahrir affiliates active worldwide. HTM rejects secular democracy, the West and any un-Islamic influences. It advocates for the institution of an Islamic state with shariah (Islamic law) in the country. The group’s goal is the formation of a transnational khilafah (Islamic caliphate) through a political struggle as opposed to militant means. HTM remains steadfast in achieving its goal without the use of violence.
In the past, HTM recruited its members from among university students, lecturers and businessmen.[19] The official number of group members remains unknown. HTM is active in carrying out recruitment drives, ceramah (public speaking) sessions and demonstrations. In January 2023, HTM carried out a public demonstration in front of the Swedish and Dutch embassies in Kuala Lumpur in response to the Quran burning and desecration incidents in Sweden and the Netherlands, respectively.[20] The group has not engaged in any form of violence thus far.
Malaysia has also seen a rise in the use of hate speech and divisive racial and religious rhetoric by certain political parties for political leverage and to galvanise support among segments of the population.[21] Much of such speech and rhetoric has been strongly exclusivist in nature. During the 15th General Election (GE15) in November 2022, and amid a surge in political chatter online, the Malaysian Islamist Party (PAS) was seen as the biggest amplifier of race-based narratives.[22] Social media platforms, particularly Tik Tok, were found to have the most inflammatory content.[23] The recent state elections in August 2023 also saw a rise in political content on social media platforms such as Tik Tok.[24]
Responses
Although the terrorist threat appears to be low for the moment, the Malaysian security apparatus continues to remain vigilant. Since the fall of the so-called IS caliphate in Syria in 2019, the MSB has shifted its counter terrorism focus from operational activities to preventive measures.[25] These include early intervention measures, rehabilitation and reintegration, and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) initiatives. While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to counter terrorism, this modified approach seems to be the most optimal in dealing with the threat given the current threat landscape.
The MSB continues to carry out monitoring of violent extremist and terrorist content online. Most of the online investigations in 2023 were linked to IS- or pro-IS-related accounts.[26] Other investigations were linked to groups such as AQ and the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO).[27]
On the east coast, the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) has remained vigilant and engaged in several measures to deal with the threat in Sabah.[28] ESSCOM continues to carry out land and sea patrols in the waters surrounding the state to mitigate the threat from groups attempting to carry out KFR, smuggling and illegal migration into Sabah.[29] In July 2023, ESSCOM carried out operations under a campaign titled “Ops Gasak Laut”, targeting the illegal pump boats that are often used in KFR, robbery and smuggling activities.[30] In the same month, ESSCOM announced the setting up of a drone unit within its air wing.[31] The use of drones in the region is aimed at strengthening ESSCOM’s response to intrusion and other criminal activities in the waters.[32] In August 2023, another operation aimed at curbing illegal immigration in Lahad Datu, called “Ops Bersepadu”, was carried out.[33]
Outlook
The MSB continues to classify the current terrorism threat in Malaysia as “possible”.[34] This implies that while a terrorist attack is possible in the country, credible intelligence indicates that there is limited intention or capability by terrorist groups to conduct attacks in the country. The terrorist threat landscape in Malaysia remains leaderless and diffuse. Until and unless a charismatic leader who is able to mobilise support emerges, the threat will likely remain neutered.
The biggest threat comes from lone-actor terrorism. The most plausible scenario of an attack would be from a lone actor or a decentralised cell who may or may not have direct links to a terrorist group, and who is inspired as opposed to centrally directed. In this regard, online radicalisation plays an important role and is a point of concern. The role of the internet has always played a crucial role in the radicalisation process of Malaysians. Upwards of 75 percent of Malaysians who had been involved with IS cited the internet as a primary source of radicalisation.[35] The Malaysian authorities continue to monitor the online space closely in this regard.
Malaysia also continues to be a favoured transit point and safe haven for persons of interests linked to terrorist groups, including AQ affiliates. Among other activities, some individuals have used Malaysia as a location to organise member gatherings and plan strategies, and as a temporary residence headquarters. One of the reasons for this could be Malaysia’s visa-free policy, which encompasses a wide range of countries particularly in the Middle East. In March 2023, four Uzbek nationals linked to the Central Asian militant group Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) travelled from Turkey and transited in Malaysia before proceeding on to Indonesia.[36] Apart from peninsular Malaysia, Sabah is also a popular transit point and safe haven owing to its strategic location and geographical proximity to the southern Philippines and Indonesia.
JI in Indonesia remains a key driving force in the violent extremist milieu in Southeast Asia. However, the group seems to have pivoted away from violence and moved towards political infiltration.[37] Most of the Malaysians who had been involved with JI in the early 2000s were either arrested or killed. Those who have been released remain under supervision by the MSB. The current status of JI activity in the country remains unclear, but has to be continuously monitored owing to the historical links the group has with the country.
Apart from the terrorist threat, non-violent extremist groups and the proliferation of divisive narratives by political parties remain key concerns. The increase in hate speech and political rhetoric along racial and religious lines has the potential to exacerbate racial polarisation and sow the seeds of radicalism and extremism. While there has been no evidence of this escalating into violence thus far, it certainly has the potential to lead to detrimental consequences if left unaddressed.
About the Author
Rueben Dass is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
[1] Pierre Boussel, “ISIS Keeps Dwindling in Syria,” GIS Reports, June 13, 2023, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/syria-isis-terrorism/; Daniel Byman, “Whatever Happened to Al Qaeda?” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/31/al-qaeda-zawahiri-death-strength-decline-terrorism/.
[2] Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate: Mapping Malaysian Foreign Fighter Networks in Iraq and Syria from 2012-2019,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2022), pp. 1-34, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2059352.
[3] Interview with a subject matter expert, July 2023.
[4] Dass and Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate.”
[5] The trio were among the key Malaysian members of JI during the height of the group’s activity and prominence in the early 2000s.
[6] Stewart Nixon, “Commentary: Resurgent Pandemic Sparks Unemployment Crisis Among Malaysia’s Most Vulnerable Workers,” Channel News Asia, June 10, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/malaysia-covid-19-economy-mco-johor-worker-graduate-jobs-skills-1843201.
[7] Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia: Handbook for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) (Putrajaya: United Nations Development Programme, 2022), p. 8, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-03/%5BFA%5D%20UNDP%20PVE%20Publications_Handbook%20for%20CSOs_High%20Res_210323_0.pdf.
[8] Ibid., p. 8.
[9] Ibid., p. 8.
[10] Ahmad El-Muhamaddy, Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families: Malaysian Experience (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2023), pp. 7-11.
[11] “Sabah Immigration Department Has Deported 10,000 Illegal Immigrants since 2021,” New Straits Times, March 29, 2023, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/03/894091/sabah-immigration-department-has-deported-10000-illegal-immigrants-2021; Juwan Riduan, “APMM Thwarts Attempt by Nine Undocumented Filipino Immigrants Crossing Sabah Waters,” New Straits Times, August 3, 2023, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2023/08/938322/apmm-thwarts-attempt-nine-undocumented-filipino-immigrants-crossing.
[12] “Malaysia Classifies Fuad A Kiram as a Terrorist,” New Straits Times, April 11, 2023, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/04/898644/malaysia-classifies-fuad-kiram-terrorist. In February 2013, more than 200 militants linked to the Sulu Sultanate and its affiliate groups invaded Kampung Tanduo in Lahad Datu to assert territorial claims over parts of the state. The invasion escalated into a military conflict that lasted for more than a month. The incident was a precursor for the formation of the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM).
[13] Hafiza Nur Adeen Nor Ahmad et al., “Tackling Sabah’s Sulu Threat,” New Straits Times, September 20, 2022, https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/letters/2022/09/832735/tackling-sabahs-sulu-threat.
[14] Ahmad Fadhlullah Adnan, “MHO Dakwa Waris Sulu Sedang Aktif Rekrut Rakyat Sabah,” Utusan Malaysia, July 26, 2022, https://www.utusan.com.my/nasional/2022/07/mho-dakwa-waris-sulu-sedang-aktif-rekrut-rakyat-sabah/.
[15] Sebastian Strangio, “Malaysia Wins Court Battle Over $15 Billion Sulu Heirs Award,” The Diplomat, June 7, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/malaysia-wins-court-battle-over-15-billion-sulu-heirs-award/.
[16] Durie Rainer Fong, “GOF Intercepts over RM600K of Smuggled Goods at Sabah Checkpoint,” The Star, June 30, 2023, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/06/30/gof-intercepts-over-rm600k-of-smuggled-goods-at-sabah-checkpoint.
[17] Interview with a subject matter expert, August 2023.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ben Tan, “Johor Police Chief: 17 Reports Lodged against Hardline Islamist Movement Hizbut Tahrir,” Malay Mail, October 1, 2020, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/10/01/johor-police-chief-17-reports-lodged-against-hardline-islamist-movement-hiz/1908468.
[20] Shahrin Aizat Noorshahrizam, “Dozens of Muslims, Including Children, Gather in Front of Swedish Embassy in KL to Protest Quran Burning in Stockholm,” Malay Mail, January 27, 2023, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/01/27/dozens-of-muslims-including-children-gather-in-front-of-swedish-embassy-in-kl-to-protest-quran-burning-in-stockholm-video/52107; Radzi Razak, “After Protesting at Swedish Embassy in KL, Islamist Group Heads over to Dutch Embassy for Apology over Torn Quran,” Malay Mail, January 27, 2023, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/01/27/after-protesting-at-swedish-embassy-in-kl-islamist-group-heads-over-to-dutch-embassy-for-apology-over-torn-quran/52165.
[21] Shannon Teoh, “Malaysian Polls in November Saw Surge in Hate Speech on Social Media: Study,” The Straits Times, June 1, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-polls-in-november-saw-surge-of-hate-speech-on-social-media-study.
[22] Social Media Monitoring of Malaysia’s 15th General Elections (Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Independent Journalism Malaysia, 2023), https://cijmalaysia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GEM-Report-ENG.pdf.
[23] Nuurrianti Jalli, “How TikTok Became a Breeding Ground for Hate Speech in the Latest Malaysia General Election,” The Conversation, March 23, 2023, http://theconversation.com/how-tiktok-became-a-breeding-ground-for-hate-speech-in-the-latest-malaysia-general-election-200542.
[24] Pauline Pooi Yin Leong, “Political Polarisation Marked Malaysia’s Recent State Elections,” ISEAS Perspective, No. 84 (2023), p. 4, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2023-84-political-polarisation-marked-malaysias-recent-state-elections-by-pauline-pooi-yin-leong/.
[25] Rueben Dass and Thomas Koruth Samuel, “Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Malaysia in a Post-Pandemic Environment,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2023), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-15-issue-03/.
[26] Malaysian Special Branch, “Malaysia: Update on Regional Threat Landscape” (presentation, 15th Terrorism Analyst Training Course, Singapore, July 25, 2023).
[27] Ibid.
[28] “ESSCom Continues to Boost Readiness for Threat,” The Borneo Post, April 1, 2023, https://www.theborneopost.com/2023/04/01/esscom-continues-to-boost-readiness-for-threat/.
[29] Roy Goh, “Continued Land, Sea Patrols to Be Maintained in Eastern Sabah Safety Zone,” New Straits Times, June 28, 2023, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/06/925096/continued-land-sea-patrols-be-maintained-eastern-sabah-safety-zone.
[30] Lagatah Toyos, “Esscom Crackdown on Pump Boats Under ‘Ops Gasak Laut’,” Daily Express Malaysia, July 12, 2023, https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/216091/esscom-crackdown-on-pump-boats-under-ops-gasak-laut-/.
[31] Yun Mikail, “Police to Use Drones to Enhance Security at Sabah East Coast,” New Straits Times, July 28, 2023, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/07/935966/police-use-drones-enhance-security-sabah-east-coast.
[32] Durie Rainer Fong, “Drone Unit to Be Set up in Esszone,” The Star, July 28, 2023, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/07/28/drone-unit-to-be-set-up-in-esszone.
[33] Azmie Lim, “Ops Bersepadu: Esscom Periksa 870 Individu,” Daily Express Malaysia, August 26, 2023, https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/218883/ops-bersepadu-esscom-periksa-870-individu/.
[34] Malaysian Special Branch, “Malaysia: Update on Regional Threat Landscape.”
[35] Samuel Henkin et al., Divergent Dimensions of Radicalization Risk: Migration and Violent Extremism in Sabah, Malaysia: Desk Study Report to the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations, U.S. Department of State (Maryland: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2020), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/Sabah_Desk_Study_Final.pdf.
[36] Nodirbek Soliev, “Four Uzbek Islamists Detained in Indonesia; KTJ Denies Alleged Links,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 21, No. 14 (2023), https://jamestown.org/program/four-uzbek-islamists-detained-in-indonesia-ktj-denies-alleged-links/.
[37] Amy Chew, “JI’s Infiltration of State Institutions in Change of Tactics,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2023), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-15-issue-03/.
