Malaysia
The terrorism threat in Malaysia persists but remains contained. The 2025 arrest of an Islamic State (IS)-linked Bangladeshi network indicates ongoing recruitment and fund-raising activities in the country. Additionally, the discovery of a Malaysian foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) in Somalia underscores continued Malaysian involvement in external conflict zones. Although no terrorist plots against the country were reported last year, the threat from isolated actors cannot be dismissed.
Domestic Threat Landscape
Terrorism Financing Networks
Between April and June 2025, the Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) arrested 36 Bangladeshi nationals aged 25 to 35 for alleged links to the Islamic State (IS).
[1] The individuals were reportedly members of a self-proclaimed group, Gerakan Militan Radikal Bangladesh (GMRB), which maintained ties to IS. The group was involved in recruitment and fund-raising among Bangladeshi nationals in Malaysia.[2]
Investigations revealed that members of Malaysia’s estimated one-million strong Bangladeshi diaspora – particularly those working in factories, construction sites and petrol stations – were targeted for recruitment.[3] The group used Facebook to spread radical and extremist ideologies associated with IS and employed encrypted messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram to “circulate propaganda, coordinate processes and organise activities in secret, including ta’lim (religious instruction) sessions and member meetings”.[4]
Each group member was made to pledge a bai’ah (oath of allegiance) to IS before being accepted and to pay an annual membership fee of RM500.[5] Mobile payment applications such as Touch ‘n Go and bKash were used to collect funds for the group,[6] which were then reportedly channelled to IS networks in Syria and Bangladesh. The network was believed to extend beyond the 36 individuals who were arrested, with sources estimating the involvement of some 100 to 150 members in the wider network.[7] There was no evidence that the group was plotting attacks in Malaysia, though some reports indicated that it intended to conduct subversive operations in Bangladesh.[8]
Legal and preventive actions were swiftly taken by the Malaysian authorities against the 36 individuals arrested. Five have since been charged in court, 15 handed over to the Immigration Department and 16 detained under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA), as of July 2025.[9] Three individuals were subsequently deported to Bangladesh.[10]
In a separate incident, Indian media reported fund transfers from Malaysia to members of The Resistance Front (TRF), a group linked to the 2024 Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir, India.[11] TRF is believed to be a front for the Pakistan-based, Al-Qaeda (AQ)-linked terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). One of the suspects in the attack, identified as Yasir Hayat, was alleged to have received instructions from Malaysia-based militant Sajjad Ahmed Mir to transfer funds to a third individual, Shafat Wani.[12] Both Hayat and Wani were known to have previously travelled to Malaysia.[13]
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)
In July 2025, a Malaysian national identified as Dr Hakeem Ubeyda was reportedly killed in a counter terrorism operation in Puntland, Somalia.[14] Ubeyda was described as the Islamic State in Somalia Province (IS-Somalia)’s “chief medical officer”, who “oversaw battlefield treatment for wounded fighters and managed medical logistics for IS operatives in the region”.[15] IS-Somalia reportedly includes a large contingent of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Several other key IS leaders from Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan and Morrocco, including the head of the foreign fighters division, the explosives division chief, the leader of the group’s policing department (hisba) and a key foreign liaison, were also killed in the operation.[16]
This was the first reported case of a Malaysian national being involved with IS-Somalia. As the chief medical officer, Ubeyda appeared to be a high-ranking figure within the group. Further details about him remain limited. The only other Malaysian known to have operated in Somalia was Ahmad Mustakim Abdul Hamid, who was linked to Al-Shabaab and was the first Malaysian to be charged by the Somali government for assisting the group in 2021.[17] Ahmad Mustakim had reportedly travelled to Somalia via Kenya in September 2009, after completing his studies in Yemen.[18]
The presence of Southeast Asian militants in Africa – a conflict theatre that is both difficult to access and historically hostile to outsiders – is surprising. The discovery reinforces the continued presence and threat of FTFs not only in traditional conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, but also in regions beyond the Middle East.
In Syria, over 40 Malaysians linked to IS, including women and children, are currently detained in centres such as the al-Hol and al-Roj refugee camps and Hasakah prison.[19]
East Malaysia
There were no reported instances of terrorist activity in East Malaysia in 2025. This is largely due to the significant weakening of terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG) and other IS-linked offshoots in the southern Philippines. Groups such as the ASG have been substantially degraded as a result of counter terrorism operations by both the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) and the Philippine authorities.[20] These groups have also experienced large-scale surrenders that have further diminished their capabilities.[21]
East Malaysia – particularly Sabah – shares porous maritime borders with the Philippines, and continues to face security issues such as human trafficking, illegal immigration and smuggling.[22] The possibility that Sabah will continue to serve as a transit point and rest area for militants affiliated with foreign terrorist groups cannot be ruled out.
Responses
The MSB has remained proactive and vigilant in addressing the terrorist threat in Malaysia. This is evidenced by the recent dismantling of the Bangladeshi terrorist cell and several other pre-emptive arrests across the country. Following the Ulu Tiram attack in May 2024, the MSB conducted a series of inter-state operations which resulted in the arrests of several individuals who had pledged support to IS. Some were reportedly plotting attacks within Malaysia,[23] and many have since been charged in court. MSB officials also continue to maintain contact with and monitor former detainees.
The Malaysian authorities have also continued to repatriate FTFs. In December 2024, the government announced the repatriation of Mohammed Nazir bin Lep and Mohammed Farik bin Amin from Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba.[24] Both men were arrested in 2003 in Thailand and spent several years in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s custody before being transferred to Guantanamo in 2006 as “high-value detainees”.[25]
They were alleged to have assisted high-profile Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali) in evading capture and to have acted as conduits for fund transfers to suspects involved in the 2002 Bali bombings.[26] They also admitted to having received training at AQ camps in Afghanistan in 2000.[27] The duo agreed to plead guilty and testify against Hambali in exchange for repatriation to Malaysia.[28]
The Malaysian authorities stated that Lep and Amin will undergo a comprehensive rehabilitation programme.[29] This three-phase programme includes a transition phase, a family integration phase and a continuity phase, designed to facilitate their reintegration into society. During this process, the MSB will continue to monitor and engage both men, who are also subject to an overseas travel ban for five years.[30]
The Malaysian authorities continue to maintain an open-door policy towards the repatriation of IS-linked FTFs. To date, the government has repatriated over 25 individuals from Syria and remains engaged in further repatriation efforts.[31]
Separately, the MSB has expanded its public outreach efforts through the organisation of public awareness programmes. In July 2025, as part of National Unity Week, the E8 Counter Terrorism Division held a public exhibition on terrorism and counter terrorism in Penang.[32] The exhibition aimed to raise awareness of the dangers of terrorist involvement, emphasise community cooperation in prevention efforts and educate the public on recognising the early signs of radicalisation.[33] It featured live displays of seized terrorist materials, multimedia presentations on counter terrorism operations and interactive sessions with E8 officers.[34]
On the eastern front, ESSCOM continues to play a pivotal role in safeguarding coastal entry points and preventing kidnapping, smuggling and militant activities.[35] In a recent statement, ESSCOM commander Datuk Victor Sanjos reported that no ASG-linked kidnappings have occurred in Sabah since 2020, attributing this success to enhanced strategies, strengthened security measures and close inter-agency cooperation.[36] The Malaysian home minister also noted that recent ESSCOM operations have successfully curbed the smuggling of illegal goods worth millions of ringgit.[37]
The region has also benefited from the incorporation of technological advancement and ongoing military modernisation. ESSCOM and regional security forces have adopted unmanned aerial systems (UAS), advanced coastal radar systems and closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring in their operations.[38] A notable development is the introduction of the Multi-Purpose Command Platform (MPCP) – a mobile sea base that serves as a launch point for Quick Reaction Force teams, with the capability to operate helicopters, interceptor boats, UAS and unmanned surface vehicles.[39]
Outlook
The threat level in Malaysia is assessed by the authorities to be “possible”, indicating that while Malaysia could be a target of a terror attack, local terrorist networks currently show limited intention or capability. From a threat perspective, several key areas remain of concern.
First, the threat of self-radicalised “isolated actors” persists and poses a security risk.[40] These are lone offenders or small cells of radicalised individuals inspired to carry out attacks on behalf of extremist groups. They may or may not have direct links to militants and tend to operate independently. Social media and online radicalisation play a crucial role in facilitating this trend.
A notable example is the 2024 Ulu Tiram attack. The attacker, Radin Luqman, and his family formed an isolated cell that had cut off contact with the outside world. His father, Radin Imran, had radicalised the family – including Luqman – and served as a catalyst for Luqman’s eventual actions. Cases where potential attackers are completely isolated, with little or no communication with other extremists, pose significant challenges for counter terrorism intelligence and early detection efforts.
There have also been cases of isolated actors attempting to manufacture explosives and carry out attacks in Malaysia. One example is Mohammad Aabid Zarkasi, a repeat offender who was arrested for plotting IS-linked attacks and attempting to produce explosives.[41] His instructions and materials for bomb-making were likely obtained from overseas online contacts.
In this context, the threat of recidivism and prison radicalisation remains a concern. Several recent IS-linked terrorism arrests and convictions have involved recidivists, some of whom were radicalised while incarcerated.[42] Overcrowding in Malaysian prisons exacerbates this issue, contributing to the spread of extremist ideologies alongside other challenges.[43]
Third, the uncovering of IS-linked Bangladeshi and Indian networks suggests the presence of terrorism financing and recruitment activities in the country. In the past, Malaysia served as a transit point for militants moving to and from the region. Proactive efforts by the MSB to dismantle such networks must therefore continue. Vigilant monitoring of online spaces, social media and encrypted messaging platforms remains essential in this regard.
The recent killing of IS-Somalia-linked Dr Hakeem Ubeyda also highlights the threat posed by Malaysian FTFs operating in overseas conflict zones. These individuals – particularly those who have remained under the intelligence radar – pose a risk of reimporting networks, battlefield expertise and extremist ideology if they return undetected.
Malaysia has also witnessed an increase in far-right sentiments, particularly online. Rising Malay-Muslim conservatism has the potential to deepen social divides and fuel exclusivism or even extremism.[44] The “glocalisation” of far-right ideologies to reflect local sentiments is evident in memes and social media content across Southeast Asia, including in Malaysia.[45] Coupled with extensive social media exposure, this trend could contribute to radicalisation and isolated actor attacks.
Overall, the terrorist threat in Malaysia – particularly from IS – remains present but contained. Beyond limited terrorist-related activities such as fund-raising and recruitment among foreign nationals, the broader threat remains low. Nevertheless, the persistent threat of isolated actors attempting low-tech attacks using knives or improvised explosives cannot be discounted. This reflects the global shift in terrorism from large-scale, centrally coordinated operations to small-scale, inspired attacks employing simple means. While the threat is contained, it must continue to be taken seriously. Sufficient resources should be allocated to the relevant security agencies to ensure they remain agile and equipped to address the evolving challenges posed by terrorist groups.
About the Author
Rueben Dass is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Shafiqa Azami, “PDRM Tumpas Gerakan Militan di Malaysia, Tahan 36 Warga Bangladesh,” Astro Awani, June 27, 2025. https://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/pdrm-tumpas-gerakan-militan-di-malaysia-tahan-36-warga-bangladesh-526990; Nor Azizah Mokhtar, “Tangkapan Militan Warga Bangladesh: PDRM Guna SOSMA, Sebahagian Sudah Diusir,” Berita Harian, June 30, 2025, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/kes/2025/06/1414024/tangkapan-militan-warga-bangladesh-pdrm-guna-sosma-sebahagian-sudah.
[2] Farik Zolkepli, “Bangladeshi Militant Group Was Nabbed for Funding IS Cells, Says IGP,” The Star, July 4, 2025, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2025/07/04/bangladeshi-militant-group-was-nabbed-for-funding-is-cells-says-igp.
[3] Muhammad Yusry, “IGP: Malaysia Risks Becoming Terror Transit Hub as IS-Linked Bangladeshis Recruit Migrant Workers via Social Media,” Malay Mail, July 4, 2025, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2025/07/04/igp-malaysia-risks-becoming-terror-transit-hub-as-is-linked-bangladeshis-recruit-migrant-workers-via-social-media/182796.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Zolkepli, “Bangladeshi Militant Group.”
[6] Yusry, “IGP: Malaysia Risks Becoming Terror Transit Hub.”
[7] Zolkepli, “Bangladeshi Militant Group.”
[8] Azami, “PDRM Tumpas Gerakan Militan di Malaysia.”
[9] Zolkepli, “Bangladeshi Militant Group.”
[10] “3 Bangladeshis Deported from Malaysia Jailed on Return Home,” Free Malaysia Today, July 5, 2025, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2025/07/05/3-bangladeshis-deported-from-malaysia-jailed-on-return-home.
[11] Ahana Bhattacharya, “TRF Funded through Hawala from Malaysia and Pakistan before Pahalgam Terror Attack: NIA,” The CSR Journal 17 (2025), https://thecsrjournal.in/trf-funded-hawala-malaysia-pakistan-pahalgam-terror-attack-nia/; Bhavatosh Singh, “463 Phone Calls, Funds from Malaysia and Gulf: NIA Builds FATF Case against Pakistan over TRF,” Times Now, September 3, 2025, https://www.timesnownews.com/india/463-phone-calls-funds-from-malaysia-and-gulf-nia-builds-fatf-case-against-pakistan-over-trf-article-152649445.
[12] Neeraj Chauhan, “NIA Probes Phone with Terror-Linked Contacts in TRF Funding Probe,” Hindustan Times, September 2, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nia-probes-phone-with-terror-linked-contacts-in-trf-funding-probe-101756751940958.html.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “Puntland Reveals Identities of ISIS Leaders Killed in Bari Mountains Operation,” FTL Somalia, July 7, 2025, https://www.ftlsomalia.com/puntland-reveals-identities-of-isis-leaders-killed-in-bari-mountains-operation/; “Somalia: Puntland Says Key ISIS Leaders Killed in Calmiskaad Offensive, New Phase Underway,” Garowe Online, July 5, 2025, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-puntland-says-key-isis-leaders-killed-in-calmiskaad-offensive-new-phase-underway.
[15] Ibid.
[16] “Puntland Federal Member State Government Unveils Identities, Nationalities of Key ISIS Figures Eliminated in Bari Region Assault,” Mustaqbal Media, July 6, 2025, https://mustaqbalmedia.net/en/puntland-federal-member-state-government-unveils-identities-nationalities-of-key-isis-figures-eliminated-in-bari-region-assault/.
[17] “Malaysian Man Sentenced to 15 Years’ Jail for Assisting Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group,” The Star, September 24, 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/09/24/malaysian-man-sentenced-to-15-years039-jail-for-assisting-al-shabaab-terrorist-group; R. Ravichandran, “Detained Malaysian Man in Somalia Receiving Fair Trial – Embassy,” BERNAMA, September 22, 2021, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2005767.
[18] Muzliza Mustafa and Noah Lee, “Malaysia Confirms Citizen Arrested in Somalia on Suspicion of Joining Al-Shabaab Militants,” Benar News, September 20, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/malaysian-arrested-somalia-al-shabaab-09202021150928.html.
[19] Observations from Terrorism Analyst Training Course, Singapore, July 15-19, 2024.
[20] Fahmy A. Rosli, “Ex-Esscom Commander: Intelligence Sharing Key to Neutralising Abu Sayyaf,” New Straits Times, April 20, 2025, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2025/04/1204666/ex-esscom-commander-intelligence-sharing-key-neutralising-abu-sayyaf.
[21] Jacob Zenn, “Abu Sayyaf Surrenders Indicate Growing Dysfunction,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 21, no. 11 (2023), https://jamestown.org/program/brief-abu-sayyaf-surrenders-indicate-growing-dysfunction/; Teofilo Garcia Jr, “Basilan Declared ASG-Free after Remaining Members Surrender,” Philippine News Agency, December 27, 2024, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1240649.
[22] Stephanie Lee, “Marine Police Foil Human Smuggling, Nab 10 Illegal Immigrants in Sandakan,” The Star, February 6, 2025, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2025/02/06/marine-police-foil-human-smuggling-nab-10-illegal-immigrants-in-sandakan; Ersie Anjumin, “600,000 Undocumented Migrants Working in Sabah,” New Straits Times, May 14, 2025, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2025/05/1216128/600000-undocumented-migrants-working-sabah; Sandra Sokial, “Sabah GOF Seizes over RM200mil Worth of Smuggled Goods in First Six Months of 2025,” The Star, July 3, 2025, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2025/07/03/sabah-gof-seizes-over-rm200mil-worth-of-smuggled-goods-in-first-six-months-of-2025.
[23] Austin Camoens, “Eight Arrested Over IS-Linked Threats Against King, PM,” New Straits Times, June 24, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2024/06/1067761/updated-eight-arrested-over-linked-threats-against-king-pm.
[24] “IGP: Two Malaysians Held in Guantanamo for 18 Years Safely Repatriated,” Malay Mail, December 19, 2024, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2024/12/19/igp-two-malaysians-held-in-guantanamo-for-18-years-safely-repatriated/160374.
[25] “The Guantánamo Docket,” The New York Times, May 18, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/guantanamo-bay-detainees.html.
[26] Carol Rosenberg, “Malaysian Prisoners Plead Guilty to Conspiring in 2002 Bali Bombing,” The New York Times, January 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/us/politics/bali-bombing-case.html; Carol Rosenberg, “Pentagon Repatriates Malaysian Prisoners Who Pleaded Guilty to War Crimes,” The New York Times, December 18, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/18/us/politics/malaysian-prisoners-repatriated-gitmo.html.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] “Two Malaysian Detainees from Guantanamo Bay Have Arrived Safely – IGP,” BERNAMA, December 18, 2024, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2375071.
[30] “Malaysian Bali Bombing Suspects Released from Gitmo Now on Travel Ban Here,” New Straits Times, May 8, 2025, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2025/05/1213322/malaysian-bali-bombing-suspects-released-gitmo-now-travel-ban-here.
[31] Observations from Terrorism Analyst Training Course, Singapore, July 15-19, 2024.
[32] “PDRM Anti-Terrorism Exhibition at Batu Kawan National Unity Week,” The Sun, July 17, 2025, https://thesun.my/malaysia-news/pdrm-anti-terrorism-exhibition-at-batu-kawan-national-unity-week-II14492569.
[33] “Police’s Special Branch Holds Anti-Terrorism Exhibition,” New Straits Times, July 17, 2025, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2025/07/1246343/polices-special-branch-holds-anti-terrorism-exhibition.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Stephanie Lee, “Esscom in Top Form in Sabah’s East Coast,” The Star, March 25, 2025, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2025/03/25/esscom-in-top-form-in-sabahs-east-coast.
[36] “No Abu Sayyaf Kidnaps Past Five Years: Esscom,” Daily Express Malaysia, February 16, 2025, https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/252271/no-abu-sayyaf-kidnaps-past-five-years-esscom/.
[37] Lee, “Esscom in Top Form.”
[38] Fuad Nizam, “New Sea Base, Tech Upgrades for Sabah’s Op Pasir,” New Straits Times, August 4, 2025, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2025/08/1254956/new-sea-base-tech-upgrades-sabahs-op-pasir; “Maritime Security in Sabah East Coast Beefed-Up with Comprehensive Approach – Deputy Minister,” BERNAMA, March 12, 2025, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2401582.
[39] Nizam, “New Sea Base.”
[40] Rueben Dass, “The IS Resurgence in Malaysia: Assessing the Threat and Implications,” The Diplomat, July 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/the-is-resurgence-in-malaysia-assessing-the-threat-and-implications/.
[41] “Court Sets 10 Days to Hear Factory Operator’s Trial for Supporting Terrorist Group,” BERNAMA, October 23, 2024, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2355489.
[42] Dass, “The IS Resurgence in Malaysia.”
[43] “Choosing a Better Future: Rehabilitation for Extremist Offenders in Malaysia’s Prisons,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, April 7, 2025, https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/malaysia/2025/04/extremist-offenders-prisoners/story.html.
[44] Murali Krishnan, “Malaysia Grapples with Growing Religious Conservatism,” Deutsche Welle, July 13, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/malaysia-grapples-with-growing-religious-conservatism/a-73197747; James Iocovozzi, “The Green Wave: Malaysia’s Conservative Political Shift,” Central European Institute of Asian Studies, November 12, 2024, https://ceias.eu/the-green-wave-malaysias-conservative-political-shift/.
[45] Saddiq Basha, “Glocalisation of Far-Right Extremism in Southeast Asia,” Center for the Study of Organized Hate, September 4, 2025, https://www.csohate.org/2025/09/04/far-right-extremism-in-southeast-asia/; Jonathan Suseno Sarwono, “‘Yup, Another Far-Right Classic’: The Propagation of Far-Right Content on TikTok in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, November 8, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/11/08/yup-another-far-right-classic-the-propagation-of-far-right-content-on-tiktok-in-malaysia-indonesia-and-the-philippines/.
