Middle East’s Evolving Militant Landscape After Israel-Iran War
Recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East, Israel’s ongoing conflicts with Palestine and Iran and Syria’s takeover by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), will have a far-reaching impact on the regional jihadist landscape. Though the global epicentre of jihadist militancy has moved from Iraq and Syria to Africa’s Sahel region, the evolution of jihadism in the Middle East is consequential for the militancy-affected regions around the world, including in Asia.
On the one side, HTS’ takeover of Syria after the Taliban’s August 2021 return to power in Afghanistan is a monumental development, especially due to the regional and global recognition it has received unlike the latter. On the other, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) terrorist groups’ ideological rivalry points to the potential emergence of a new intra-jihadist fault line in the region. Concurrently, the weakening of Iran-backed militant groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, along with top leaders’ decapitation has created security vacuums to be exploited. At the same time, HTS’ inability to manage ethnic and sectarian fissures witnessed in the post-war Syria and continued humanitarian crisis in Palestine will provide enough ideological fuel and resentment to groups like IS and Al Qaeda to recruit, radicalise, fundraise and incite violence.
Against this backdrop, the current issue includes three articles looking at the status of the Iranian proxies in the Middle East following the 12-day Iran-Israel war, the impact of HTS’ rise to power in Syria on the regional jihadist landscape and IS’ recent manoeuvres to resurge.
The first article by Amin Saikal examines the various Iranian proxies in the Middle East, amid the region’s evolving balance of power dynamics. The first section assesses Israel’s strategy to weaken Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and operations in relation to Syria’s new government. Secondly, it details the 12-day Iran-Israel war which has contributed to a highly volatile regional picture. The final section discusses the potential repercussions of the controversial “Greater Israel” plan. According to the author, the prospect of a resolution to the long-running Israel-Palestine conflict remains moot, while the resumption of skirmishes between Tel Aviv and Tehran cannot be ruled out. This could re-energise non-state violent actors backed by the Iranian regime who, while degraded, retains the capacity to defend itself. Al Qaeda, IS and various emerging militant nationalist Palestinian, Arab and Islamist groups opposing Israel could also have fertile ground to widen their activities.
Next, Umar Farooq analyses the potential lessons other jihadist groups, notwithstanding the ideological reservations and rivalry between Al Qaeda and IS, will draw from HTS’ takeover of Syria. Underscoring this is the manner in which Ahmad al-Sharaa has managed expectations of regional and global stakeholders with pragmatism unlike the Taliban’s rigid outlook in Afghanistan. The author notes that for now, major global powers are optimistic that Syria is no longer a security concern that needs to be managed. However, the long-term impact of the HTS takeover on global jihadist movements remains uncertain. Several local armed groups in Syria have welcomed the news, even agreeing to submit to the new government’s authority, and some of those outside the region are watching the developments in Syria as a model for their own respective situations. But other groups look at HTS with great distrust due to how quickly it has mended ties with major powers, seeing the success of the new Syrian government as proof of its abandonment of jihadist ideology.
Finally, Ghada Soliman assesses the prospects of the IS reemerging in the Syria-Iraq theatre. According to the author, ongoing conflicts including the Gaza war, political instability in Syria, as well as weak border and governance issues and a complex geopolitical climate, have created a conducive environment for the terrorist group to regroup and potentially expand its influence. In Syria, IS’ resurgence is widely interpreted as a failure of the al-Sharaa government and deep-seated distrust and illegitimacy that plagues various governing entities in the country. This has created fertile ground for IS to exploit power vacuums, capitalise on local grievances, and re-establish its presence. In addition, IS’ own propaganda efforts, which have particularly targeted youth, continue to pose a security concern.
