Myanmar
In 2025, Myanmar’s conflict deepened without a decisive shift, returning to a strategic stalemate defined by fluid frontlines, intensified drone warfare, and mounting manpower and morale pressures. Anti-junta forces expanded operations in Chin, Kayah and Sagaing, challenging the military’s Dry Zone grip, while the military responded with mass conscription, air and artillery power, and urban entrenchment, reclaiming limited territory in Shan, Kachin and Kayah. In Western Myanmar, the Arakan Army (AA) seized nearly all of Rakhine State and established a parallel government, prompting the junta to form a tactical alliance with previously adversarial Rohingya militants to oppose the AA. Political manoeuvres, including ending the state of emergency, staging elections and courting foreign partners, further heightened polarisation amid a worsening humanitarian crisis. Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and people’s defence forces (PDFs) have remained tactically effective but strategically fragmented, while the military has regained short-term momentum, although its sustainability remains uncertain.
Trends
In 2025, the conflict in Myanmar deepened without producing a decisive shift. The country remains locked in a multi-faction struggle with fluid frontlines and high civilian costs. Three key trends emerged over the year. First, the strategic landscape reverted to a stalemate. Anti-junta forces expanded their presence in Chin, Kayah and Sagaing, eroding the military’s grip on the Dry Zone,
[1] while the junta fortified urban centres using airpower, artillery and scorched earth tactics. Targeted counteroffensives, supported by mass conscription, enabled the military to reclaim select territories, notably in Shan, Kachin and Kayah States. Second, technological adaptation intensified. Drone warfare became a defining feature of combat, with the resistance adopting swarming and precision strike tactics, and the junta reportedly using imported drones and anti-jamming systems. Third, both sides continued to face manpower and morale pressures. The military’s expanded conscription highlighted its vulnerabilities, while resistance groups, though coordinated tactically, remained divided by political and ethnic fault lines.
In Western Myanmar, the Arakan Army (AA) continued consolidating power in Rakhine State, prompting Rohingya militant groups to unify and ally with the military. Against this backdrop, the junta’s decision to end the national state of emergency and push ahead with elections further polarised the political landscape, raising questions about legitimacy, governance and prospects for prolonged instability.
Evolving Strategic Landscape
2024 marked a significant evolution of the strategic landscape due to territorial losses suffered by the military,[2] with a BBC study indicating that it controlled fully only 21 percent of Myanmar’s territory by late 2024.[3] In 2025, this trend shifted back towards the stalemate seen in previous years. While anti-junta forces consolidated their presence beyond frontier ethnic states, the military launched multiple counteroffensives, enabled by escalated conscription, allowing partial recovery of lost territory.
Resistance Gains in Non-Rakhine Regions
Outside Rakhine, anti-junta forces continued to challenge the military’s dominance in the Dry Zone and upland frontier states. According to the Myanmar Conflict Map[4] published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), regions with frequent conflict events included Central Tanintharyi, Central Kayin, East and Southwest Bago, South Kachin, Central Mandalay, North Magway, South and West Sagaing, and North and Central Rakhine. Yangon City remained a hotspot for improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Notably, conflict hotspots in Upper Myanmar shifted southwards over the year, encroaching on key military strongholds and moving steadily towards the military’s centre of power in Naypyidaw. Based on the IISS data, while hotspots in the Dry Zone remained west of Mandalay, new hotspots also emerged, particularly around Ngape, Salin and Nyaung-U Townships.[5]
In Sagaing, one of the conflict’s fiercest engagements occurred in Katha District in March,[6] when local people’s defence forces (PDFs) captured dozens of soldiers[7] and cut off reinforcements to Indaw Township.[8] In September, anti-junta forces seized Banmauk, a mining and timber hub near Sagaing’s border with Kachin State,[9] in a battle that anti-junta forces claimed was led by PDFs, while the military attributed it to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).[10] In Chin State, the fall of Falam after months of fighting consolidated control by the Chin Brotherhood, dealing another setback to junta authority in the northwest.[11] In Salin Township, anti-junta forces carried out a major attack on the Tanyaung Power Plant, which supplies electricity to key military factories, likely causing significant damage to the region’s military production.[12] Fighting in the surrounding areas has continued, with the military tightening security to suppress frequent anti-junta attacks.[13] Lastly, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has remained engaged in a fierce struggle with military forces along the Thai-Myanmar border in Kayin State, around a series of military bases.[14] These episodes highlight the continued capacity of both PDFs and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to coordinate large-scale assaults and inflict substantial damage on the military’s ability to operate outside urban strongholds.
The Junta’s Counter-Strategy and Partial Recovery of Territory
The Tatmadaw nevertheless showed resilience, regaining territory in several contested theatres. In Shan State, the military recaptured Nawnghkio in July[15] and regained control of Lashio through a settlement with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), reportedly mediated by the Chinese government,[16] alleviating pressure north of Mandalay. In Kachin, counteroffensives around Hpakant restored access to jade mines,[17] depriving the KIA of a key revenue source, while the army retook the 366th Artillery Battalion headquarters near Bhamo in August.[18] In Kayah, the recapture of Moebye[19] and Demoso[20] in mid-2025 allowed the junta to re-establish partial control of supply routes linking Kayah to southern Shan. The military also entrenched itself selectively in key urban centres and transport corridors, including the Asia Highway near Myawaddy, granting it substantial control over movements in the area.[21]
These operations reflect the Tatmadaw’s reliance on airstrikes, heavy artillery and scorched earth tactics to depopulate contested areas. The counteroffensives underscore a strategy of holding strategic nodes while peripheral areas remain contested, and their success largely stems from the mobilisation of allied EAOs. This highlights the military’s ability to exploit divisions among EAOs to regain momentum.[22]
Western Myanmar
The Arakan Army’s Consolidation of Power in Rakhine State
By late 2025, the AA had become the dominant military and political force in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, largely due to strategic gains in 2024.[23] The AA solidified control over approximately 90 percent[24] of the region, encompassing all but three townships: the state capital of Sittwe, the strategically vital port town of Kyaukphyu and Manaung Island.[25]
The AA established a parallel government through its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), actively collecting “taxes” and providing administrative services to the local population.[26] This transition from insurgent force to aspiring political entity was a key development of 2025.[27]
The AA’s military strategy in 2025 focused on besieging the remaining junta strongholds, with the most significant offensives targeting Sittwe and Kyaukphyu.[28] Although the AA has not fully captured these cities, it has encircled them, placing immense pressure on the junta. The battle for Kyaukphyu has been particularly important, as the city hosts a deep-sea port which serves as the terminus for a critical China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, a key component of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[29]
In response to the AA’s relentless advances, the junta has resorted to increasingly desperate tactics. Its scorched earth campaign, including indiscriminate aerial and artillery attacks on civilian areas, indicates military overstretch.[30] To compensate for heavy losses, the junta has relied on conscription laws to bring in tens of thousands of new and often allegedly poorly trained recruits.[31] It is noteworthy that the AA also enacted mandatory conscription in May 2025 and enforced a travel ban of eligible persons out of the state. The move has been criticised by human rights observers.[32]
The AA’s expansion has had direct regional and international implications, affecting neighbouring Bangladesh, with reports of the group entering Bangladeshi waters and demanding unauthorised taxes on goods.[33] The AA reportedly abducted at least 235 Bangladeshi fishermen from January to September 2025.[34] The AA also expanded its network of alliances throughout 2025. As a key member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance,[35] the AA has continued to provide training and resources to other resistance groups. In 2025, its influence extended to the Chin, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady Regions.[36]
The advances by the AA and the junta’s brutal response have deepened the humanitarian crisis in the region. There have been growing accusations of mass abuses by the AA against the Rohingya population, including reports of forced labour,[37] mass displacement[38] and increased intercommunal tensions. As the AA consolidates power, the humanitarian and security situation in Western Myanmar will remain unstable.
The Arakan Army’s Drugs-for-Weapons Economy
The AA’s military expansion has been financed by transnational drug trafficking. According to a September 2025 report by a Bangladeshi newspaper, the AA uses profits from the sale of narcotics, like yaba and crystal meth, to purchase weapons and supplies.[39] Its operations are centred in the “Black Triangle”, a remote border region that serves as a safe haven for smugglers.[40] The AA has established its own drug empire, operating at least 20 specialised syndicates. It both charges other groups for safe passage and runs its own smuggling rings.[41]
Due to increased land-based security on the Bangladeshi side, most drug smuggling has shifted to sea routes. About 80 percent of the drugs from Myanmar now enter Bangladesh via the Bay of Bengal and the Naf River, transported on fishing trawlers. The AA reportedly uses vulnerable Rohingya refugees as couriers, often disguising them as fishermen. The trade is a two-way operation, with Bangladeshi goods, such as food and building materials, smuggled into Myanmar in exchange for drugs.[42]
Rohingya Militant Realignment
The political and security landscape for Rohingya militant groups was significantly reshaped in 2025, driven largely by the AA’s near-total control of Rakhine State and its alleged abuses against the Rohingya population. In a major strategic realignment, the Rohingya militant groups – the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) – ended internal conflicts[43] and formed a unified “Four Brothers Alliance” to counter the AA. This alliance marked a sharp reversal of historical trends, with these groups now fighting alongside Myanmar’s military junta – their traditional adversary – against their shared enemy, the AA.[44]
The RSO has emerged as a key militia allied with the military, with an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 fighters.[45] Throughout 2025, the RSO actively engaged in combat with the AA in northern Rakhine State. In addition to its combat role, a March 2025 report by Fortify Rights detailed serious human rights violations committed by the RSO in Bangladeshi refugee camps, including killings, abductions and torture. The report also accused the RSO and ARSA of forcibly recruiting Rohingya youth from the camps to fight on behalf of the junta in Myanmar’s internal conflict.[46]
Similarly, ARSA has shifted its focus from infighting with other Rohingya groups to fighting the AA directly. The Fortify Rights report noted that ARSA and the RSO are actively fighting alongside the junta against the AA.[47] ARSA has also been accused of committing war crimes in Bangladeshi refugee camps, including killings, abductions and torture of Rohingya refugees.[48] The group’s direct engagement with the AA was evidenced by a January 2025 claim that it had attacked an AA camp in northern Maungdaw Township.[49] In September 2025, ARSA claimed a major victory in the intensifying hostilities against the AA in Maungdaw, asserting that its forces had killed 35 AA fighters and captured a large base near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.[50] This unverified assault marked a dangerous escalation in the volatile region.
It is noteworthy that ARSA’s commander-in-chief, Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi, along with five associates, was arrested by the Bangladeshi authorities on March 18, 2025.[51] After the arrest, ARSA attempted to revive operations under a new acting leader, Maulana Borhan.[52] As of March 2025, ARSA was estimated to have around 5,000 fighters.[53]
The formation of the Four Brothers Alliance represents a major strategic shift, ending years of infighting and creating a unified opposition to the AA’s dominance.[54] For decades, competition for recruits, funding and recognition among these groups had effectively silenced a unified Rohingya political voice.[55] The new alliance is a direct response to the AA’s alleged human rights violations against the Rohingya, which have generated a new wave of support for the armed groups among the Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh.[56]
This alliance between Rohingya groups and the Myanmar military is a significant development in the broader civil war. It underscores the mutual desperation of both the junta and the Rohingya groups, who have entered a tactical alliance despite their long history of animosity.
Technological Trends
Technology was further entrenched as a defining feature of Myanmar’s conflict in 2025, with both resistance forces and the military adapting tactics through drone warfare and improvised systems. Resistance groups have increasingly used drones for offensive operations, ranging from swarm tactics to precision ambushes and targeted strikes on junta convoys and outposts. These capabilities have allowed lightly armed PDFs to offset disadvantages in heavy weaponry and to strike effectively in urban peripheries and contested transport corridors.[57]
The military has responded by expanding its drone fleet and integrating imported systems.[58] Reports from Karenni State[59] describe junta units using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and deploying counter-drone technologies, such as anti-jamming modules,[60] enabling more precise strikes on resistance positions and civilian areas. This trend highlights the junta’s reliance on external suppliers, including China and Russia,[61] to sustain its technological edge.[62]
Alongside drones, 3D-printed weaponry remained a feature of the battlefield. While rarely decisive, such weapons were used in training and to produce components for IEDs and drone munitions, demonstrating how local actors have continued to adapt under supply constraints.[63]
Morale and Internal Dynamics
The military faced mounting strain in maintaining manpower, prompting reliance on sweeping conscription measures. Reports indicate the recruitment of older men, prisoners and even individuals deemed mentally unfit for combat, reflecting the severity of personnel shortages.[64] Even the military high command was affected, with an untested general appointed as chief of general staff in late 2024.[65] While such practices underscore a force stretched thin, they also demonstrate the junta’s determination to sustain operational capacity. This has proved effective, with an IISS report estimating some 16 new batches of recruits by August 2025, totalling around 60,000 to 80,000 men. The report linked the military’s renewed ability to launch counteroffensives in 2025 to these recruitment drives.[66]
Defections persisted, aided by initiatives such as the resistance’s “People’s Embrace” programme, which offers incentives for soldiers and police officers to desert.[67] Despite this attrition, cohesion has remained intact among senior officers and core units, allowing the military leadership to retain control over strategy and resources.[68]
On the resistance side, morale was buoyed by battlefield successes and improved tactical coordination, particularly in joint operations across Sagaing and Chin States. However, deep divisions also persisted. The absence of a consensus on a federal framework[69] beyond battlefield cooperation left many EAOs sceptical of the National Unity Government (NUG)’s promises of inclusivity.[70] This strategic disunity continued to impede broader anti-junta consolidation.
China-brokered ceasefires with groups like the MNDAA[71] further exposed the fragility of inter-group solidarity, as Beijing sought to manage conflict along its borders. Meanwhile, social media played an outsized role in sustaining morale and solidarity among disparate resistance groups, fostering narratives of shared struggle across ethnic and ideological divides.[72] These dynamics reveal a resistance movement capable of tactical adaptation yet constrained by deep-rooted political fault lines.
Political and Humanitarian Issues
In July 2025, the junta formally ended the state of emergency imposed since the coup and announced elections for December.[73] Framed as a step towards civilian governance, these polls were widely viewed as a façade to secure legitimacy rather than a genuine transition.[74] Resistance groups, such as the NUG and most EAOs, rejected the process outright, while the AA vowed to block voting in its territories.[75] In some areas, smaller armed groups controversially agreed to provide security for the polls, further highlighting their divisive nature.[76]
Internationally, the junta sought to bolster its standing through lobbying and diplomatic outreach. Senior officials courted Russia, China and India, signing nuclear and space cooperation agreements in Moscow,[77] while retaining a United States (US)-based lobbying firm to improve ties with Washington.[78] Meanwhile, Beijing’s balancing act – mediating along the Chinese border while advancing BRI projects – illustrated the broader geopolitical manoeuvring that limits resistance options.[79]
Humanitarian conditions deteriorated sharply in 2025. A March earthquake killed thousands and disrupted aid,[80] while the World Food Programme reduced rations for over a million people amid funding gaps.[81] Ongoing airstrikes destroyed clinics and schools, intensifying mass displacement and economic collapse.
Conclusion
The conflict in 2025 highlighted deepening fragmentation, a persistent stalemate and accelerating technological adaptation rather than decisive gains. Resistance forces expanded in Chin, Sagaing and Kayah, but remained hampered by the absence of strategic unity. The junta demonstrated resilience, relying on forced conscription, scorched earth tactics and external support to restore a degree of control. Looking ahead to 2026, key variables include the military’s ability to sustain its manpower and airpower edge, the level of coordination among EAOs and PDFs outside Rakhine, international efforts to curb resupply, and the humanitarian consequences of contested elections and mass displacement.
About the Authors
Benjamin Mok is an Associate Research Fellow and Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Citations
[1] The Dry Zone is a group of regions located in central Upper Myanmar, which has historically and currently served as the centre of government for the country.
[2] Benjamin Mok and Iftekharul Bashar, “Myanmar,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 1 (2025): 26-31, https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CTTA-Annual-2025.pdf.
[3] Rebecca Henschke et al., “Soldier-Spies in Myanmar Help Pro-Democracy Rebels Make Crucial Gains,” BBC News, December 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c390ndrny17o.
[4] International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Myanmar Conflict Map,” accessed September 22, 2025, https://myanmar.iiss.org/.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Kachin News Group, “Fierce Fighting Outside Katha Town in Sagaing Region,” Burma News International, March 18, 2025, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/fierce-fighting-outside-katha-town-sagaing-region.
[7] “Over 100 Junta Soldiers, Including Division Commander, Arrested in Indaw Battle,” Myanmar Peace Monitor, April 10, 2025, https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/en-news/over-100-junta-soldiers-including-division-commander-arrested-in-indaw-battle/.
[8] “Myanmar Junta Suffers Heavy Losses in Northern Sagaing Fighting,” The Irrawaddy, March 18, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-suffers-heavy-losses-in-northern-sagaing-fighting.html.
[9] “Armed Resistance Takes Control of Banmauk, Sagaing Region,” Myanmar Now, September 23, 2025, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/armed-resistance-takes-control-of-banmauk-sagaing-region/.
[10] “Behind KIA’s Claim That PDFs Led the Banmauk Capture,” CNI Myanmar, October 3, 2025, https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/31925-behind-kia-s-claim-that-pdfs-led-the-banmauk-capture.
[11] “Chin Brotherhood Takes Over Last Junta Base in Chin State Town,” Myanmar Now, April 9, 2025, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/chin-brotherhood-takes-over-last-junta-base-in-chin-state-town/.
[12] “Power Plant Supplying Myanmar Junta’s Military Factories Hit by PDF Attack,” Mizzima, April 10, 2025, https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/04/10/21208.
[13] “Junta Tightens Security in Salin after Positions Attacked,” Myanmar Peace Monitor, May 25, 2025, https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/en-news/junta-tightens-security-in-salin-after-positions-attacked/.
[14] “KNLA, Allies Retake Base Near Myanmar-Thai Border from Junta,” The Irrawaddy, June 4, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/knla-allies-retake-base-near-myanmar-thai-border-from-junta.html.
[15] “Myanmar Military Claims Recapture of Strategic Town from Rebel Force,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/18/myanmar-military-claims-recapture-of-strategic-town-from-rebel-force.
[16] Jack Myint and Han Thu Ya, “Lashio Handover: The China Factor and the Impact on Broader Resistance,” US-ASEAN Business Council, May 2, 2025, https://www.usasean.org/article/lashio-handover-china-factor-and-impact-broader-resistance.
[17] “Myanmar Junta Makes Gains in Embattled Jade Mining Hub,” The Irrawaddy, September 18, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-makes-gains-in-embattled-jade-mining-hub.html.
[18] Myo Pyae, “Myanmar Junta Retakes Bhamo Battalion HQ,” The Irrawaddy, August 8, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-retakes-bhamo-battalion-hq.html.
[19] “More Civilian Homes Set on Fire in Moebye After Recapture by Military Junta,” Burma News International, July 8, 2025, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/more-civilian-homes-set-fire-moebye-after-recapture-military-junta.
[20] “Myanmar Military Recaptures Demoso After Fierce Clashes,” Grand Pinnacle Tribune, August 21, 2025, https://evrimagaci.org/gpt/myanmar-military-recaptures-demoso-after-fierce-clashes-492461.
[21] “Myanmar Junta Regains Asia Highway in Myawaddy but Blocks Civilian Travel,” Burma News International, September 26, 2025, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/myanmar-junta-regains-asia-highway-myawaddy-blocks-civilian-travel.
[22] “The Junta’s Strategy for Retaking Lost Towns: Critical Factors to Watch,” Myanmar Peace Monitor, July 31, 2025, https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/cover-story-eng/the-juntas-strategy-for-retaking-lost-towns-critical-factors-to-watch/.
[23] The key strategic gains include the capture of Buthidaung in May 2024 and Maungdaw and Ann in December 2024.
[24] Aung Thura Ko Ko, “Arakan Army’s triumph ripples through China, India, Bangladesh,” Asia Times, February 20, 2025, https://asiatimes.com/2025/02/arakan-armys-triumph-ripples-through-china-india-bangladesh/.
[25] Khaing Lu Hla (Roma Mray), “Elections to Be Held in Only Three Rakhine Townships,” Narinjara News, August 12, 2025, https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/68a75a41d2ee722facdc308a.
[26] Michael Martin, “Arakan Army Posed to ‘Liberate’ Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 20, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/arakan-army-posed-liberate-myanmars-rakhine-state.
[27] Ibid.
[28] “Arakan Army Closing in on Capital of Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Radio Free Asia, February 18, 2025, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2025/02/18/myanmar-sittwe-rakhine-fighting-arakan-army/; “Arakan Army’s Three Strategic Calculations for Territory Control,” The Irrawaddy, August 19, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/arakan-armys-three-strategic-calculations-for-territory-control.html.
[29] Martin, “Arakan Army Posed to ‘Liberate’.”
[30] “Myanmar Military Air Strike in Rakhine Kills and Wounds Dozens of Students,” TRT World, September 13, 2025, https://www.trtworld.com/article/68196ff97c79.
[31] Aye Aye Mon, “Myanmar’s Forced Conscription: How the Junta Targets Young Men for Military Service,” Radio Free Asia, January 30, 2025, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2025/01/30/military-coup-junta-fourth-anniversary-forced-recruitment/; Zsombor Peter, “Myanmar’s Rebels Closing in Around Junta into Fifth Year of Civil War,” Radio Free Asia, January 31, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-s-rebels-closing-in-around-junta-into-fifth-year-of-civil-war-/7958145.html.
[32] “Arakan Army Begins Recruitment Drive By Placing Travel Ban on Youth in Rakhine State”, Democratic Voice of Burma, May 24, 2025, https://english.dvb.no/arakan-army-begins-recruitment-drive-by-placing-travel-ban-on-youth-in-rakhine-state/.
[33] “Arakan Army Denies Rohingya Forced Labour,” The New Humanitarian, September 2, 2025, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2025/09/02/arakan-army-denies-rohingya-forced-labour; “Bangladesh, Arakan Army: Establish Humanitarian Corridor for War-Affected Civilians in Myanmar,” Fortify Rights, March 12, 2025, https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-2025-03-12/.
[34] Mokammel Shuvo and Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Arakan Army Threat Grows Along the Border,” The Daily Star, November 2, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/arakan-army-threat-grows-along-the-border-4024781.
[35] The Three Brotherhood Alliance is made up of the AA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).
[36] Khaing Wuntha (Lae Myo Myi), “What is Happening in the Kyaukphyu Battle?” Narinjara News, September 9, 2025, https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/68c01af3268ac2ee042ac90b; The Irrawaddy, “Arakan Army’s Three Strategic Calculations for Territory Control”; Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar, “O’ Northern Roads…, Rakhine: A De Facto Rival Power Center,” ISP On Point no. 26 (2025), https://ispmyanmar.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/OP26-ENG-17072025.pdf.
[37] “Arakan Army Denies Rohingya Forced Labour,” The New Humanitarian; “Bangladesh, Arakan Army,” Fortify Rights.
[38] “1.5 Lakh Rohingyas Arrived in Months,” The Daily Star, May 21, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-influx/news/15-lakh-rohingyas-arrived-months-3899611.
[39] Moinuddin Shahed, “80% of Drugs Are Entering the Country by Sea,” Ajker Patrika, September 23, 2025, https://www.ajkerpatrika.com/amp/bangladesh/coxs-bazar/ajp1qx6ig7pld.
[40] The Black Triangle is a remote, mountainous area spanning approximately 30,000 square kilometres on the border where Myanmar, Bangladesh and India meet. It is notorious for its rugged geography and lack of government control. Due to this lawlessness, it has become a major hub for transnational criminal activities, especially drug trafficking.
[41] Selim Muhammad, “Target Bangladesh: Arakan Army’s Drug Empire, 20 Syndicates Behind It, Organisation Runs on Money,” Bangladesh Pratidin, September 20, 2025, https://www.bd-pratidin.com/first-page/2025/09/20/1159301.
[42] In response, the Bangladeshi authorities have intensified their crackdown, with joint operations leading to major drug seizures. Since July 2024, they have seized over US$112 million worth of narcotics. This crackdown has also highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the trade, as nearly half of the individuals arrested on drug charges in the Cox’s Bazar jail are Rohingya refugees.
[43] “Rohingya Man Killed in Ukhiya,” The Daily Star, March 18, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/rohingya-man-killed-ukhiya-3850736.
[44] International Crisis Group, “Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency,” Asia Report no. 348 (2025), https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/348-bangladesh-myanmar-rohingya.pdf; Shafiur Rahman, “Dil Mohammed: The Smuggler Shaping a War in Arakan,” Dhaka Tribune, February 16, 2025, https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/373800/dil-mohammed-the-smuggler-shaping-a-war-in-arakan.
[45] Rajeev Bhattacharyya, “Bangladesh’s Lethal Gameplan in Myanmar’s Arakan,” The Diplomat, August 24, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/bangladeshs-lethal-gameplan-in-myanmars-arakan/.
[46] “Bangladesh: Hold Rohingya Militants Accountable for War Crimes, Cooperate with International Mechanisms,” Fortify Rights, March 18, 2025, https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-2025-03-18/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Wuntha, “What is Happening in the Kyaukphyu Battle?”
[50] Hafizur Rahman, “ARSA Claims Capture of Arakan Army Base in Maungdaw Amid Intensifying Border Clashes,” Rohingya Khobor, September 26, 2025, https://rohingyakhobor.com/arsa-claims-capture-of-arakan-army-base-in-maungdaw-amid-intensifying-border-clashes/.
[51] “ARSA Leader Ataullah Arrested in Narayanganj,” The Financial Express, March 18, 2025, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/crime/arsa-leader-ataullah-arrested-in-narayanganj.
[52] Mokammel Shuvo and Mohammad Jamil Khan, “New Leader Takes Charge of ARSA in Rohingya Camps,” The Daily Star, March 21, 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/top-news/news/new-leader-takes-charge-arsa-rohingya-camps-3853651.
[53] Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Bangladesh: ARSA and Change of Reign – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, April 4, 2025, https://www.eurasiareview.com/04042025-bangladesh-arsa-and-change-of-reign-analysis/.
[54] International Crisis Group, “Bangladesh/Myanmar.”
[55] Azeem Ibrahim, “Myanmar Alliance Marks a Turning Point for Rohingya,” Arab News, October 19, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2619476/%7B%7B.
[56] “Arakan Army Denies Rohingya Forced Labour,” The New Humanitarian.
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