Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture
Recent events in India have highlighted the presence of an Extreme Right subculture in the Hindutva movement, mainly within online digital ecosystems. This subculture, whose members are known locally as ‘trads’, eschews the Hindutva mainstream in India, and instead promotes extremist ideology within online communities on various social media platforms. These ‘trads’ regularly circulate extremist content using vulgar humour, based on themes such as denigrating women, caste supremacy, and encouraging the genocide of minorities. ‘Trad’ communities are identified, and distinguished from mainstream Hindutva communities, via three core traits: their use of vulgar humour to trivialise extremism, coded language to form an ‘in-group’, and uncompromising distrust of any ‘out-groups.’ The core traits work together to encourage radicalisation of those exposed to extremist content, and to ensure that ‘trads’ are not beholden to mainstream ethical norms. The growth of this subculture presents distinct extremist threats beyond those posed by the Hindutva mainstream.
Introduction
Following its rise in the 2014 Indian general election, the right-wing Hindutva movement has been mistaken by many observers as a monolithic entity,[1] unified under the leadership of the Hindu far-right, the Bharata Janata Party (BJP) and its para-militant wing, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).[2] Such unity is generally thought to extend into multiple issues including national development, religious coexistence, and even socio-cultural issues such as gender and caste.[3] Despite the efforts of scholars to prove that the Hindutva ‘monolith’ is a myth created by actors within the movement,[4] this misidentification remains a key facet of how the Hindutva movement is defined from both within and without.[5]
However, recent events in India have shed light on the existence of Hindutva extremists who subscribe to far-right ideology so extreme that they are unable to operate even within the BJP-RSS mainstream. These extremists, identified by some observers as ‘trads’[6], are modelled after foreign Extreme Right online movements and often operate within the same digital ecosystems.[7] While their existence had previously been largely glossed over due to narratives of Hindutva unity, the identification of two ‘trads’ by the Indian police as the main perpetrators of the much-publicised ‘Bulli Bai’ and ‘Sulli Deals’ criminal cases in 2021, where Muslim women were subjects of mock online ‘auctions’, have brought these extremists to the fore of Indian politics.[8]
Other recent events have highlighted a conflictual relationship between these extremists and the Hindutva mainstream, such as the BJP’s November 2021 repeal of controversial farm laws in the face of protests in Punjab, to which extremists responded by criticising the BJP for appeasing non-Hindutva actors.[9] These responses indicate a fracture within the Hindutva movement, highlighting the existence of an extremist subculture that presents threats different from those posed by the Hindutva mainstream.
This article highlights the existence of these ‘trad’ communities and provides a framework to differentiate members of these communities as separate from the Hindutva mainstream. It begins by examining the type of extremist content circulated within ‘trad’ online communities. Then, it highlights three core traits exhibited in such content that set these communities apart from the Hindutva mainstream. Finally, it considers the potential impact of these growing ‘trad’ communities within India’s digital spaces on the socio-political and security landscape.[10]
Context
‘Trad’ subculture eschews the institutions of the BJP-RSS mainstream in favour of a decentralised digital ecosystem that does not owe allegiance to any political party. This digital ecosystem is both organic and self-sustaining, resulting in a community of extremists that operates more as a subculture than a single political entity.[11] As with similar Extreme Right ‘digital hate communities’ across the world, a surface glance at this ecosystem seems to suggest that its denizens only engage in online ‘trolling,’[12] but a deeper examination reveals that it plays a key role in encouraging political violence offline.
This digital ecosystem comprises separate online communities, whose members are drawn together through two categories of reasons. Firstly, some of these communities are formed around non-mainstream individuals who curate extremist content online. These individuals can range from persons who go by their actual identities, such as activists who have amassed sizeable followings on their social media pages,[13] or those who keep their identities hidden, such as the administrators of political ‘meme pages’ on Facebook.[14] Secondly, some of these communities are formed around forums, websites, or messaging platforms focused specifically on hosting extremist Hindutva content. These digital spaces are fluid and often outlive their original hosted locations – they are able to migrate to different online platforms if their original location is shut down due to their extremist content.
These communities are varied in their reasons for existence, choice of platforms, and in most cases do not interact with one another directly. Furthermore, it should be noted that not all members of these online communities would identify themselves as ‘trads’. However, many members of these communities share certain traits that identify them as part of ‘trad’ subculture: namely, their use of vulgar humour to trivialise extremism, coded language to form an ‘in-group’, and uncompromising distrust of any ‘out-groups’.
Online Extremist Content within ‘Trad’ Communities Online
With the worldwide growth of online Extreme Right movements over the past decade, Violent Extremism (VE) scholarship has increasingly recognised the key role played by online content in enabling extremist rhetoric and narratives.[15]
Content circulating within ‘trad’ communities often focus on affecting a humorous tone to obscure extremist ideology as humour inherent to the subculture, usually in the form of picture-based memes or in-jokes. Some themes covered by such content align with extremist and far-right themes found within the Hindutva mainstream, such as Islamophobic content denigrating Islamic religious symbols[16], or discourse criticising liberal culture.[17] Other themes contrast with the Hindutva mainstream’s less extreme stances, such as the mainstream’s attempts at recognising women’s rights[18] and its progressive discourse on caste supremacy.[19]
Some of the content, while theoretically aligned with mainstream Hindutva ideology, is simply too extreme for mainstream consumption. Jokes about killing non-Hindus, particularly Muslims, are commonly circulated within these communities. On heavily moderated platforms, such content is concealed using codewords such as ‘cauliflower farming,’[20] and references to past anti-Muslim violence such as alluding to the 2002 Gujarat riots, which involved widespread violence against the Muslim community that some observers have since labelled as a pogrom.[21]
Less-moderated platforms allow for open calls for genocide and killings. This is the case with the Indiachan.io imageboard, which is part of the ‘Chan’ imageboard digital ecosystem infamous for its extremist content.[22] Here, content threads are regularly created with titles such as “KILL ALL MUSLIMS”[23] or “Genocide appreciation”[24] and are thus structured in such a manner that encourages the circulation of pro-genocide and neo-Nazi content. Examples include memes depicting a cartoon Hindu soldier killing Indian minorities in a gas chamber[25] and calls for the Hindutva movement to deploy a genocidal “final solution” against Indian Muslims.[26]
Finally, ‘trad’ subculture mimics foreign Extreme Right movements in its glorification of certain extremist individuals who are shunned by the mainstream for their actions.[27] Similarly, memes glorify similar figures in Indian history, including Nathuram Godse, Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin and a Hindu fundamentalist,[28] Gopal Chandra Mukhopadhyay, the mastermind of anti-Muslim attacks during the 1946 Calcutta riots,[29] and Dara Singh, a Hindu fundamentalist who led the burning of a Christian missionary in 1999.[30]
Trivialisation of Extremism
An examination of extremist content shared within ‘trad’ communities indicates that its members are intent on using vulgar humour as the vehicle for extremist themes – yet it begs the question as to why such a strategy is preferred. Prior to the creation of the pro-Hindutva forum bakchodi.org,[31] one of the creators of the website responded to a series of questions on another forum, indicating that “if things get too extreme, then normal regular users will censor themselves by not participating at all,”[32] or by democratically censuring such content through downvoting.[33] This approach of moderating content according to what is normalised melds with the extreme-right’s strategy of trivialising extremism, encouraging the radicalisation of communities.
In the ‘Daily Stormer Style Guide,’ Andrew Anglin, a prominent anti-Semitic activist who serves as editor for a popular extreme-right online media outlet, provides insight into this strategy.[34] Anglin instructs that “the unindoctrinated should not be able to tell if we are joking or not”, as “most people are not comfortable with material that comes across as vitriolic, raging, non-ironic hatred”.[35] This then serves as a central “ploy” allowing the Daily Stormer to function as an outreach platform for readers “at first drawn in by curiosity or the naughty humour”, and who are then radicalised by the normalisation of the extremist content concealed behind the humour.[36]
In the case of the Hindutva movement, while mainstream discourse on extremist themes generally focuses on the need for political action tied to the Sangh Parivar, the mobilisation of these themes by ‘trads’ instead focuses on what Baishya (2021) terms as ‘light critique’ – criticism that does not offer direct political resistance but rather uses its nature as a ‘fun’ activity to normalise content within a community.[37] As such, the triviality of the ‘trad’ subculture’s approach allows its discourse to push past social boundaries that the mainstream remains beholden to.
Turning back to the case of bakchodi.org, we see that this strategy thrives within platforms that practise content moderation based on a community consensus – as extremist content is increasingly circulated due to its humorous nature, what is permissible expands as the community shifts further towards the extreme. This phenomenon is repeated within other similar online platforms.
One popular meme on Indiachan warps a popular children’s cartoon in India – Chhota Beem – by depicting an alternate narrative where one of the characters develops into a caricature of Adolf Hitler named “Rajulf Hadler”, who then goes on to commit genocide against the religious minorities.[38] The absurdity present in this meme conceals the violent extremism inherent in such content, and it has subsequently been normalised as a continuing in-joke rather than a serious call for violence. Yet, the imagery used in the original joke has leaked into other memes that similarly call for violence against minorities, normalising them as well.[39] Thus, the original spread of a meme due to its humorous nature has encouraged further production of memes sharing its extremist theme – of Nazi Germany and genocide – all the while concealing the spread and normalisation of these themes as a ‘fun’ trivial activity.[40]
Violence is normalised through the creation of narratives, which manufactures enemies, and the dissemination of these narratives, which manufactures consent for violence.[41] Furthermore, one way iconography manufactures consent is through taking advantage of the “popular sensibilities of people in its original context.”[42] Building in turn upon this concept, the ‘trad’ strategy of trivialising extremism creates a form of de-facto consent not built upon theoretical principles, but rather as a shared ‘fun’ activity within the subculture – thus, as a popular sensibility within the context of ‘trad’ subculture. Having manufactured consent, extremist content creators within the subculture normalise violence by ensuring that the narratives manufacture the relevant ‘enemy,’ an act that is achieved via the use of in-group/out-group dynamics.[43]
Coded ‘In-Group’ Language
Another core trait showcased in the content circulating within ‘trad’ communities is the use of a coded language to form an ‘in-group’. Coded language not only serves as a creative method for extremists within these communities to bypass filters on platforms with content moderation,[44] but also acts as a ‘dog-whistle’ signalling and cohering the group identity of the community.[45] In doing so, the development of a coded language via memes and other vehicles for humorous extremist content thus becomes a shared activity – “a form of laughing with a certain community of ideological peers.”[46]
Members of the ‘trad’ communities explored in this study purposefully use the shock value generated by the language in their shared content – such as the use of the term “mudslimes” to indicate Muslims, or the use of the Nazi-related term “final solution” as code for genocide – as an identifier differentiating them from even the Hindutva mainstream. Such language provokes a strong reaction from outsiders who are not desensitised to its extremist connotations, serving as a gatekeeping mechanism that demands outsiders either join in the shared activity – thus radicalising themselves – or to remain an outsider.[47]
Lone individuals disconnected from social institutions such as those provided by the RSS are particularly susceptible to being drawn into the subculture via these ‘in-group’ dynamics.[48] However, familiarisation with such coded language is not exclusive to such individuals. Some political figures have demonstrated adroitness in their understanding of such language, to find favour with these communities.
Yogi Adityanath, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, and a politician some observers have predicted as the next Indian Prime Minister[49], is a key example of this phenomenon. Yogi, who is well-received by ‘trads’ due to his extremist position within the Sangh Parivar,[50] has been idolised by the subculture, which regularly produces memes connecting him with anti-Muslim symbology.[51] Yogi, in response, has played up this symbolic connection, increasing his popularity with the Hindutva extremists.[52] Further examples of ‘trad’ influence leaking out from its digital ecosystem and into the general political landscape of India can be expected given Yogi’s success in mobilising such coded language into political support.
Uncompromising Distrust of ‘Out-Groups’
Conversely, those in the Hindutva movement who do not accommodate the vulgar humour and coded language of these extremist ‘trad’ communities are demonised via an approach that demonstrates little compromise or nuance. This has resulted in many ‘trad’ communities exhibiting an intense distrust of ‘out-groups’ within the mainstream that support a moderate approach to Hindutva ideology.
This hostility is best represented by popular ‘trad’ memes titling Modi as ‘Maulana Modi’ due to his perceived appeasement of Indian Muslims. These memes not only attack Modi for what they perceive as appeasement of minorities to gain votes in certain states[53] but, at times, accuse Modi of working with non-Hindutva interests to decrease Hindu influence within Indian society.[54] For example, the BJP’s decision in June 2022 to suspend its spokeswoman Nupur Sharma for her controversial televised remarks against Prophet Muhammad[55] has resulted in significant backlash by ‘trads’ specifically targeting Modi, with some accusing him of enforcing the suspension in order to gain Indian Muslim votes and others accusing him of doing so to appease Muslim countries.[56]
Similar allegations are also regularly levelled at pro-Hindutva communities operating within the mainstream – members of this political demographic are labelled by ‘trads’ as ‘raitas’[57] and are generally seen as members of the Hindutva movement who lack true commitment to the ideology.[58]
What purpose then does such uncompromising distrust serve, especially considering that it comes at the cost of creating fractures within the larger Hindutva movement? In considering the motivations behind this strategy, Anglin’s “Daily Stormer Style Guide”, which contains a section titled “100% Black and White”, is useful. Here, Anglin contends that no room for nuance must be left within Extreme Right propaganda, and that it must deal with moderates by “portraying them as on our side, but at the same time prodding them to do more and go further.”[59] There is thus, consciously or otherwise, motive behind this demonisation of the Hindutva mainstream – by targeting and ridiculing its perceived placatory tendencies, Extreme Right discourse serves to push the mainstream towards extremism.
‘Trad’ Subculture – Isolated, Radicalised and Self-Sustaining
In the case of ‘trad’ subculture, manufactured consent for violence only matters within the isolated ‘fringe’ that comprises these communities.[60] Populist narratives succeed based on how their creators define the ‘majority’ to which they are meant to appeal – even if this constructed ‘majority’ is actually a ‘fringe’ community.[61] The definition of majority/minority is a pretence, it is in fact closer to the notion of ‘in-group’. Rather than seeking the approval of the Hindutva mainstream, the ‘trad’ subculture’s construction of itself as the ‘in-group’ enables it to treat the mainstream as outsiders, who are only worthy of inclusion if they adopt the subculture’s shared language and extremist activities.
Herein lies a core difference between the Hindutva mainstream and its ‘trad’ extremists. Those operating within the Hindutva mainstream must navigate the perceptions of the national and global mainstream due to the serious nature of their discourse; they are thus constrained by their struggle with larger society over ensuring consent for their violent ideology.[62] On the other hand, ‘trads’ are under no such obligation to justify their open calls for genocide and violence according to mainstream norms, due to the three core traits described in the preceding paragraphs of this article. The ‘light critique’ presented by the extremist content circulated by ‘trads’ is immune to serious criticism due to its trivial nature.[63] At the same time, ‘trad’ subculture’s strong in-group identity and its distrust of the out-group ensure that any serious criticism is ridiculed as stemming from mainstream culture that does not understand the subculture.
These three core traits thus work together to form a subculture that is not only isolated and radicalised, but also self-sustaining. It does not require the political support of any one organisation to grow in its influence, nor is it subject to moderation by any one political actor – it is purely beholden to the decentralised, majority influence of the subculture’s members.
Conclusion
Further research is needed to determine the actual size of this subculture in relation to the larger Hindutva movement. Some observers claim that ‘trad’ subculture is smaller than its online presence might suggest, as many of its members allegedly use multiple accounts to bolster its numbers.[64] On the other hand, the novelty of the internet as an ecosystem in which extremist ideology can flourish requires that Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) scholars examine more closely how ‘fringe’ elements interact with the Hindutva mainstream.[65] Should enough of the subculture leak into the mainstream, it might shift the movement itself more towards extremism. On the other hand, there is also potential that these isolated communities will lead to an increase in alienated and radicalised individuals willing to carry out lone actor attacks.[66]
All these point to a need for increased vigilance within the PCVE space. Content moderation spearheaded by government institutions and online platforms is effective to a certain extent.[67] However, the fluid and opaque nature of this subculture also highlights a need to better understand the different aspects of its digital ecosystem and how it functions – an understanding that the framework of identification provided in this paper seeks to encourage within our PCVE efforts.
About the author:
Benjamin Mok is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Danny Meneses on Pexels
Citations
[1] Najeeb Mukarbi, “The Sangh’s Hindutva-Hindustan idea pits a monolithic majority against monolithic Muslims,” The Economic Times, August 19, 2014, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/Ragtime/the-sangh-s-hindutva-hindustan-idea-pits-a-monolithic-majority-against-monolithic-muslims1/.
[2] Both the BJP and the RSS are a part of the Sangh Parivar, a conglomerate of Hindu nationalist organisations that forms the backbone of the Hindutva movement. See also Sudha Ramachandran, “Hindutva Violence in India: Trends and Implications,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 12, Issue 4, (June 2020), p.15 https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CTTA-June-2020.pdf.
[3] “Hindutva speaks for unity amongst Hindus while Hinduism divides on caste,” The Print, August 21, 2018, https://theprint.in/india/governance/hindutva-speaks-for-unity-amongst-hindus-while-hinduism-divides-on-caste/102490/.
[4] Gautam Mehta, “Myth of the Monolith: Contested Nationalisms within the Sangh Parivar,” India in Transition, December 4, 2017, https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/gautammehta.
[5] Bhabani Shankar Nayak, “Towards monolithic society, centralized state? Imposing’ Hindi, Hindutva, Hindustan,” Counterview, April 15, 2022, https://www.counterview.net/2022/04/towards-monolithic-society-centralized.html.
[6] While this article adopts the term ‘trad’ due to its common usage by Indian media outlets to describe the subculture, it should be noted that the subculture can be identified as part of a larger phenomenon termed by Julia Ebner as the “Extreme Right”, given that it exhibits at least three of the five characteristics necessary for the label: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state advocacy. For details see, Julia Ebner, Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 288.
[7] Divya Arya and Vineet Khare, “Trads vs Raytas: The young Indians spreading hate online,” BBC Hindi, February 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60321129.
[8] Prabhash K. Dutta, “Who are Trads, the dangerous group Bulli Bai founder belongs to?” India Today, January 11, 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/trads-dangerous-group-bulli-bai-founder-sulli-deals-1898457-2022-01-11.
[9] “Protests se bills pass hoge abse,” (From now on the protest bills will pass), Reddit, November 19, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20211119061032/https://www.reddit.com/r/Chodi/comments/qx9uim/protests_se_bills_pass_hoge_abse/.
[10] Further research is needed to fully explore the origins, motivations, and impact of ‘trad’ communities online; the modest focus of this article is to draw attention to the presence of such communities in India, with the view of increasing vigilance considering their continued growth.
[11] Alishan Jafri and Naomi Barton, “Explained: Trads vs Raitas and the Inner Workings of India’s Alt-Right,” The Wire, January 11, 2022, https://thewire.in/communalism/genocide-as-pop-culture-inside-the-hindutva-world-of-trads-and-raitas.
[12] Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir define the act of ‘trolling’ as the “practice of writing deliberately inflammatory comments designed to elicit outrage from one’s targets” in order to deliberately offend targets. For details see, Edwin Hodge and Helga Hallgrimsdottir, “Networks of Hate: The Alt-right, Troll Culture, and the Cultural Geography of Social Movement Spaces Online,” Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 35, Number 4, (February 2019), p.576, https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2019.1571935.
[13] Anshul Saxena, “Home,” Facebook, July 2, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/AskAnshul, accessed April 12, 2022.
[14] K. Bhattacharjee, “Hindutva is here to stay, say the creators of Dharmic Memes for Hindu Teens,” OpIndia, August 20, 2018, https://www.opindia.com/2018/08/hindutva-is-here-to-stay-say-the-creators-of-dharmic-memes-for-hindu-teens/.
[15] Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed, “It’s not funny anymore. Far-right extremists’ use of humour,” Radicalisation Awareness Network, February 15, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-03/ran_ad-hoc_pap_fre_humor_20210215_en.pdf.
[16] “Picture depicting the Kaaba as a toiletbowl,” Indiachan.io, accessed April 27, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/1Snloml.
[17] Pratyush Ranjan, “Adarsh Liberal vs Adarsh Bhakt: Hashtag war on Twitter,” Hindustan Times, March 11, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/adarsh-liberal-vs-adarsh-bhakt-hashtag-war-on-twitter/story-YNYDAwu4nUwdwE4D5LXejM.html.
[18], “Picture listing various sexist statements encouraging rape of women,” Indiachan.io, accessed April 27, 2002, https://imgur.com/a/9V2UszU. In contrast with content such as that shown in this source, Hindutva mainstream ideology has generally adopted a progressive stance that is at least overly non-sexist and respectful of women. For details see, EPW Engage, “How Has Women’s Participation in the Hindutva Movement Expanded Its Reach?” Economic & Political Weekly, February 10, 2021, https://www.epw.in/engage/article/how-has-womens-participation-hindutva-movement.
[19] “Birth based Brāhmaṇas have always proved themselves to be top notch bureaucrats, statesman, scientists, warriors,” Indiachan.io, April 19, 2022, https://indiachan.io/pol/res/2354.html.
[20] ‘Cauliflower farming’ and related terms reference an incident during the 1989 anti-Muslim riots in Bhagalpur, during which 116 Indian Muslims were killed and their bodies buried in a cauliflower patch. For details see, “Court convicts Hindus for killing 116 Muslims in Bhagalpur,” Reuters, July 13, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-30362020070618.
[21] “What they Want,” Twitter, November 20, 2021, https://twitter.com/pj77in/status/1462041257820110855. For details on the 2002 Gujarat riots see, Ashutosh Varshney, “Gujarat 2002 was independent India’s first full-blooded pogrom. Delhi 1984 was a semi-pogrom,” The Print, February 26, 2020, https://theprint.in/opinion/gujarat-2002-was-independent-indias-first-full-blooded-pogrom-delhi-1984-was-a-semi-pogrom/371684/.
[22] Blythe Crawford and Florence Keen and Guillermo Suarez de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence within Chan Cultures,” Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, December 2020,
[23] “Kill all Muslims,” Indiachan.io, April 17, 2022, https://archive.ph/KnFDu.
[24] “Genocide appreciator,” Indiachan.io, April 14, 2022, https://archive.ph/PxSv5.
[25] “Picture depicting Muslims being killed in a gas chamber by cartoon soldier wearing Hindu symbols,” Indiachan.io, accessed April 27, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/qHDEfQQ.
[26] “Genocide appreciator razario,” Indiachan.io, April 16, 2022, https://archive.ph/OZwyf.
[27] Stephane J. Baele and Lewys Brace and Travis G. Coan, “The tarrant effect: what impact did far-right attacks have on the 8chan forum?” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, (December 2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2020.1862274
[28] “Picture depicting Mahatma Gandhi with caption titled ‘Shot by Nathuram Godse,” Bakchodi Discord Channel, accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/Sswwbwx.
[29] “Picture depicting Gopal Chandra Mukhopadhyay in a heroic fashion,” Bakchodi Discord Channel, accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/nhPskZ9.
[30] “Picture depicting Dara Singh with caption implying that readers should burn those arguing with them,” Bakchodi Discord Channel, accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/0q1Il6w.
[31] An online forum originating from the Reddit digital ecosystem, bakchodi.org migrated in early 2022 to a private hosting server when its predecessor – r/Chodi – was banned by Reddit for hate speech. The forum is known for its content characteristic of the ‘trad’ subculture, consisting of vulgar, trivial humour mixed with extremist themes – as hinted at by the name of the website, which is an offensive term that roughly translates to ‘pointless talking’.
[32] “Let’s not get divided,” communities.win, March 26, 2022, https://communities.win/c/bakchodi/p/15HIAdoYP2/.
[33] “Dhamma-The Community Etiquette of bakchodi.org,” bakchodi.org, April 1, 2022, https://bakchodi.org/post/787.
[34] Andrew Anglin, “Daily Stormer Style Guide,” https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4325810/Writers.pdf
[35] Ibid, p.11.
[36] Ibid, p.10. This strategy can thus be construed as an attempt to shift the Overton Window – what is considered as acceptable political discourse – via changing social norms regarding humour online. For further examples of how the Extreme Right attempts to shift the Overton Window, see, Daniel L. Byman, “How hateful rhetoric connects to real-world violence,” Brookings, April 9, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/09/how-hateful-rhetoric-connects-to-real-world-violence/.
[37] Anirban K. Baishya, “The conquest of the world as meme: memetic visuality and political humor in critiques of the Hindu right wing in India,” Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 43, Issue 6, (September 2021), p.1132, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0163443720986039.
[38] “The Lore of Chotta Bheem Universe: RAJULF HALDER,” Indiachan.com, June 8, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210807004133/https://indiachan.com/pol/res/266914.html.
[39] “Picture depicting a character from the ‘Rajulf Hadler’ meme assaulting a Muslim individual in a context outside of the original meme,” Bakchodi Discord Channel, accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/hcPwGck.
[40] For further examples on how extremist memes use humour to normalise the spread of extremist themes, see Blythe Crawford and Florence Keen and Guillermo Suarez de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence within Chan Cultures,” p.16.
[41] Irm Haleem, “How violence is normalized,” in Normalization of Violence: Conceptual Analysis and Reflections from Asia, ed. Irm Haleem (Oxon: Routledge, 2020), p.8.
[42] Irm Haleem, “How violence is normalized,” p.24.
[43] Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Blyth Crawford and Valentin Wutke, “Rise of the Reactionaries: Comparing the Ideologies of Salafi-Jihadism and White Supremacist Extremism,” The Program on Extremism at George Washington University, December 2021, p.5-6, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Rise%20of%20the%20Reactionaries.pdf.
[44] Gabriel Weimann and Ari Ben Am, “Digital Dog Whistles: The New Online Language of Extremism,” International Journal of Security Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1, (February 2020), https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=ijoss.
[45] Mathilda Åkerlund, “Dog whistling far-right code words: the case of culture enricher on the Swedish web,” Information, Community & Society, Vol. 1, Issue 18, (February 2021) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1889639.
[46] Anirban K. Baishya, “The conquest of the world as meme,” p.1132.
[47] Jason Wilson, “Hiding in plain sight: how the ‘alt-right’ is weaponizing irony to spread fascism,” The Guardian, May 23, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alt-right-online-humor-as-a-weapon-facism.
[48] Luke Munn, “Alt-right pipeline: Individual journeys to extremism online,” First Monday, Volume 24, Issue 6, (June 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i6.10108.
[49] Unnati Sharma, “Talk about Yogi Adityanath as a future PM candidate is ‘natural, Amit Shah says,” The Print, March 1, 2022, https://theprint.in/politics/talk-about-yogi-adityanath-as-a-future-pm-candidate-is-natural-amit-shah-says/853246/.
[50] “ELECT BALD BOI FROM UP TO PM,” Indiachan.io, April 18, 2022, https://indiachan.io/pol/res/1404.html#q2342.
[51] “Modified image showing Yogi alongside a bulldozer with text encouraging violence,” Twitter, March 31, 2022, https://mobile.twitter.com/jimmyjvyas/status/1509406409624289286.
[52] Manish Sahu, “Explained: Not just bulls, how bulldozers made it to election lexicon in UP,” Indian Express, March 8, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-not-just-bulls-how-bulldozers-made-it-to-election-lexicon-in-up-7804167/.
[53] “Tweet discussing Modi,” Twitter, February 27, 2022, https://twitter.com/Erlogical21/status/1497620846285705218.
[54] “Tweet alleging Modi is part of a conspiracy,” Twitter, December 24, 2021, https://twitter.com/HinduResponse/status/1474378325573668866.
[55] “BJP suspends Nupur Sharma, expels Naveen Kumar Jindal over inflammatory remarks,” Times of India, June 5, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kanpur-clash-bjp-suspends-nupur-sharma-and-naveen-kumar-from-partys-primary-membership/articleshow/92019088.cms.
[56] “Tweet attacking Modi as ‘maulana’ for his perceived appeasement towards Muslim countries,” June 6, 2022, https://twitter.com/Koenraad_Elst/status/1533508985080397826.
[57] Rahul Roushan, “Who are Trads and Raitas and what is the supposed internal strife in the Right Wing?” OPIndia, January 7, 2022, https://www.opindia.com/2022/01/trads-vs-raitas-and-rw-fights/.
[58] “CMV: Raita wingers have no love for Hinduism,” Reddit, October 7, 2019, https://www.reddit.com/r/bakchodi/comments/dee80e/cmv_raita_wingers_have_no_love_for_hinduism/.
[59] Andrew Anglin, “Daily Stormer Style Guide,” p.12.
[60] Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Blyth Crawford and Valentin Wutke, “Rise of the Reactionaries,” p. 32.
[61] Irm Haleem, “How violence is normalized,” p.20.
[62] Sudha Ramachandran, p.17.
[63] Rob May and Matthew Feldman, “Understanding the Alt-Right: Ideologues, Lulz and Hiding in Plain Sight,” in Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: Online Actions and Offline Consequences in Europe and the US, Maik Fielitz and Nick Thurston (eds.,) (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2018), p.35.
[64] Archis Chowdhury, “In The Dark World Of Edgelord Trads, Genocide And Rape Memes Are Fun,
Boom, January 11, 2022, https://www.boomlive.in/decode/impact/bulli-bai-sulli-deals-trads-rayta-right-wing-nationalists-bjp-modi-arrest-16338.
[65] Edward Anderson and Arkotong Longkumer, “Neo-Hindutva: evolving forms, spaces, and expressions of Hindu nationalism,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 4, (December 2018) p.376, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1548576.
[66] Cathrine Thorleifsson and Joey Düker, “Lone Actors in Digital Environments,” Radicalisation Awareness Network, October, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-10/ran_paper_lone_actors_in_digital_environments_en.pdf.
[67] Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed, p.13.
