‘Operation Sindoor’: Will India’s Military Strikes in Pakistan Curb Cross-Border Terrorism?
A recent terrorist attack at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir targeting tourists prompted India to launch drone, missile and airstrikes on terrorist camps and military bases in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The strikes marked a significant escalation from the kinetic operations India launched in 2016 and 2019 in response to Pakistan-linked terrorist attacks in India. This article explores the impact of the latest strikes on cross-border terrorism.
Introduction
On April 22, a terrorist attack at Pahalgam in India’s Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) left 26 people dead. It evoked widespread outrage in India as those killed were unarmed civilians and mostly tourists. They were reportedly targeted for being Hindu; non-Muslim men were singled out and shot dead at point-blank range before their wives and children.[1] This was the deadliest terrorist attack on civilians in India since the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 that claimed the lives of 166 people, and the most lethal in Kashmir since the February 2019 suicide attack by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) on a vehicle carrying paramilitary personnel at Pulwama that left 40 soldiers dead. A little-known terrorist group, The Resistance Force (TRF), claimed the attack but subsequently retracted.[2] TRF is said to be an affiliate of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), or an amalgam of LeT, JeM and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen remnants in J&K.[3] India banned TRF in January 2023 and, following the Pahalgam attack, efforts are underway to get the outfit proscribed by the United Nations Security Council.[4]
The Indian government’s response to the Pahalgam attack was swift. It drew attention to the “cross-border linkages of the terrorist attack” and blamed Pakistan.[5] Pakistan denied involvement in the attack and asked for an independent inquiry, which India refused.[6] Hard-hitting speeches by Indian leaders indicated that India would respond with force. “India will identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers. We will pursue them to the ends of the earth,” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said at a public rally two days after the attack.[7] Although Modi did not name Pakistan in his speech, it was evident that he was referring to ‘terror havens’ in Pakistan. Two weeks later, India launched military strikes on ‘terrorist camps’ in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Against this backdrop, this article examines ‘Operation Sindoor’, India’s punitive and pre-emptive military strikes on targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir in response to the Pahalgam attack. The strikes are not the first time that New Delhi has resorted to kinetic operations against Pakistan in response to Pakistan-linked terrorist attacks in India. The article will look at how Operation Sindoor marks a new chapter in India’s strategy to fight cross-border terrorism. It will argue that the military strikes, while degrading terrorist infrastructure, may not deter Pakistan from continuing to support anti-India terrorist groups.
India’s Cross-Border Terrorism Problem
Contrary to the perception that India’s problem with cross-border terrorism is a post-1989 phenomenon, Pakistan’s use of armed non-state actors to further its territorial ambitions against India can be traced back to the first India-Pakistan War of 1947-48, when it infiltrated tribal militias in the then princely state of J&K. Since then, Pakistan has pushed ‘irregulars’ across the Line of Control (LoC), a border demarcation that divides Kashmir into Indian- and Pakistani-administered parts, into J&K to foment unrest – even an uprising – as in 1965 during Operation Gibraltar.[8]
In 1989-90, a powerful anti-India insurgency erupted in J&K, and thousands of Kashmiri youth crossed the LoC into Pakistan-administered Kashmir, where they were provided with arms and training by Pakistan’s military establishment and infiltrated back into J&K.[9] The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) set up scores of militant groups, including the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Predominantly Kashmiri in composition, HM was Islamist in ideology and owed its allegiance to Pakistan, and therefore served as the Pakistani establishment’s main sword arm – not only to weaken the pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF),[10] but also to bleed the Indian Army in J&K. Since 2000, the predominantly Pakistani-Punjabi LeT and JeM, which are jihadist but not anti-Pakistan, have emerged as the main executors of the Pakistani establishment’s anti-India strategy, carrying out attacks not only in J&K, but also other parts of India.[11]
So, how did India respond to Pakistan-linked terrorist attacks? India’s approach to insurgencies elsewhere in the country was guided by the perception that, as these were “political problems that require a political solution”, the use of “military force” would be “limited to creating the conditions for the political process to resume”.[12] This was not the approach to the Kashmir militancy. Perceived by the Indian state as a ‘proxy war’ being waged by Pakistan, it was dealt with by deploying higher levels of coercive – even military – force.[13] Still, in the 1990s and 2000s, India relied more on non-kinetic measures to deal with cross-border terrorism, including “diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally, economic penalties related to terror financing, and pressure on Islamabad to crack down on terror networks”.[14] Even after the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, India focused on building dossiers on the LeT and the Pakistani establishment’s role in the attacks to get terror outfits and their leaders included in the United Nations (UN)’s blacklist, and convincing the international community to pressure Pakistan to shut off support for terrorists. While the measures India took in this period were largely non-kinetic, the Indian Army was said to have carried out “limited-calibre, target-specific, counter-terrorist operations” across the LoC.[15] However, India avoided overt military retaliation against cross-border terrorist attacks.
This changed after the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Narendra Modi came to power. In September 2016, when JeM militants attacked the Indian Army brigade headquarters at Uri, killing 18 soldiers, commando teams were dispatched across the LoC to carry out “surgical strikes” – these were more in the nature of raids – on terrorist “launch pads” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.[16]
Then, in 2019, following the attack at Pulwama, an Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft targeted a JeM camp at Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. While the outcome of the Balakot strike was questionable, it marked a significant escalation in India’s response to Pakistan-linked terror attacks. If in 2016, commando teams crossed the LoC, in 2019, an Indian fighter aircraft crossed the international border (IB). For the first time since the 1971 India-Pakistan War, India used airpower inside undisputed Pakistani territory, signalling escalation.[17] The 2016 strikes indicated New Delhi’s “clear political intent” to respond militarily in the face of terrorist attacks. The 2019 strikes “raised the stakes, further reinforcing the political intent in New Delhi to abandon strategic restraint”.[18] Operation Sindoor marks the next stage of escalation in India’s military response to cross-border terrorism.
India’s Operation Sindoor
India’s immediate response to the Pahalgam attack consisted of a string of non-kinetic, punitive measures against Pakistan. These included holding “in abeyance with immediate effect” the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), visa cancellations, border closures and scaling down Pakistan’s diplomatic staff in New Delhi.[19] Then, on the night of May 6-7, India launched Operation Sindoor. Indian airstrikes and missiles hit nine terrorist camps, including the headquarters of LeT and JeM, in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. [20]
Pakistan hit back, inflicting heavy losses on the IAF and striking at targets in Indian territory.[21] For four days thereafter, India and Pakistan engaged in escalating military exchanges involving drones, loitering munitions, missiles, artillery and fighter aircraft, until they agreed to a ceasefire on May 10. Unlike the strikes on May 6-7, which India said had targeted only terrorist infrastructure, its strikes on subsequent days hit the Pakistan Air Force’s nine bases.[22] The IAF struck across not only the LoC and IB to hit terrorist camps deep inside Pakistan – JeM’s Bahawalpur headquarters is around 100 kilometres from the international border – but also targeted them in the politically important Punjab province. Significantly, the IAF hit the strategic Nur Khan airbase, located near the headquarters of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which oversees and protects the country’s nuclear arsenal; Rawalpindi, where Pakistan’s military is headquartered; and Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital.
Operation Sindoor thus marks a major escalation in India’s military response to cross-border terrorism. Its missile strikes on Pakistan have grown in scale, crossed new thresholds, expanded into more geographies, used new technologies, and triggered new and larger cycles of violence and counterviolence.[23] It brought the two nuclear-armed countries to the brink of war.
Objectives of Operation Sindoor
Political considerations played a role in the BJP government’s decision to opt for overt military strikes in response to the Pahalgam attack. The BJP and its fraternal organisations have always adopted a muscular posture on the Kashmir issue and Pakistan. They have often derided the opposition Congress Party for its “weak and soft” approach when in power during the 1990s and 2004-2014 in dealing with cross-border terrorism.[24] Following the Pahalgam attack, the BJP government had to prove its “nationalist” credentials and “tough on terrorism” claims.[25] Also, the post-Pahalgam strikes had to be more muscular than the 2016 and 2019 strikes in order to “energize” the BJP’s nationalist support base.[26]
Indeed, there were counter terrorism objectives to be achieved as well. Following Operation Sindoor’s launch, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said that although a fortnight had passed since the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan had taken “no demonstrable step” to dismantle “the terrorist infrastructure on its territory or on territory under its control”. Indian “intelligence monitoring of Pakistan-based terrorist modules indicated that further attacks against India were impending. There was thus a compulsion both to deter and to pre-empt.”[27] After the May 10 ceasefire, the Indian government said that Operation Sindoor was “conceived to punish perpetrators and planners of terror”, and “destroy terror infrastructure across the border”.[28]
An important component of Operation Sindoor was the signal to Pakistan and the international community on India’s response to future attacks from Pakistan-based terrorist groups. Delhi would carry out military strikes on an increasing expanse of Pakistan “regardless of the consequences”, and even “without consulting or convincing the international community”.[29] Besides, India did not feel the need to provide irrefutable evidence of Pakistan’s role in the terrorist attack. “Insofar as there are terrorist organisations in Pakistan that have attacked India – which have not been brought to justice by Islamabad – that is evidence enough for establishing Pakistani complicity.”[30] Finally, India said that any future “act of terror” emanating from Pakistani soil would be considered an “act of war” against India, and would be responded to accordingly.[31]
Broadly, then, the strikes were to punish terrorists who planned and carried out attacks in India, to eliminate terrorists and to destroy terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This was to weaken their capacity for future attacks. The messages from the strikes, which underscored Delhi’s resolve to respond militarily, were aimed at deterring terrorists and, more importantly, the Pakistan military, from carrying out or enabling future terrorist attacks.
Deterring the Pakistan Military?
Dissuading Pakistan’s military establishment from supporting anti-India terrorism is an objective that is not – as India has known for decades – possible to achieve whether through non-kinetic or kinetic measures. Pakistan’s use of terrorist proxies as a foreign policy tool against India is rooted in its state.[32] Analysts have pointed out that “for the Pakistan Army and its terrorist partners, violence against India is not a rational instrument of policy, but a core organising principle, foundational to their identity and political legitimacy. They will persist with the campaign of sub-conventional provocations regardless of – or in some cases, even enticed by – the prospect of Indian retaliation.”[33]
Reforming the Pakistani state cannot be achieved through Indian military strikes, or even a military defeat. Following the 1971 war, the Pakistan military’s image was in tatters, having lost half of the country’s territory to Bangladesh and losing the war to India. Yet, within years of that blow, the military was back in the saddle after staging a coup. The military’s grip over the state in Pakistan can be loosened, but that is a project for the Pakistani people and political parties, not India.
Operation Sindoor, especially the strikes on key Pakistani military installations and sites, may have rattled the military. Its defensive and offensive capabilities against India have been undermined. However, it has emerged from the strikes with its stature and popularity enhanced in Pakistan. Military nationalism is on the upswing in Pakistan.[34] The military can be expected to use the recent India-Pakistan face-off to justify enhanced budgetary allocations to the forces.[35] It could embolden the military to persist with its patronage of cross-border terrorism.
Impact on Terrorist Infrastructure
As for the damage on and destruction of terrorist infrastructure, India claimed that around 100 terrorists were killed on the night of May 6-7, including high-value terrorists who had masterminded major terror attacks in India.[36] JeM’s chief Masood Azhar confirmed he had lost 10 family members in the strikes.[37] Satellite images of terrorist camps, including the LeT’s Muridke headquarters, revealed “extensive structural damage”.[38] Several camps that suffered damage had played a role in training and planning attacks in India. For example, terrorists who carried out attacks at Sonamarg and Gulmarg in 2024, and at Pahalgam recently, were trained at the Sawai Nala camp. Facilities like the Syedna Bilal Camp and the Barnala Camp provided weapons, explosives and jungle survival training. The LeT’s Muridke headquarters was where terrorists who carried out the 2008 Mumbai attacks were trained.[39] By targeting these camps, the Indian security forces were able to avenge some past terrorist attacks, eliminate terrorists and damage infrastructure at these camps.
However, terrorist numbers may not have fallen much because of the strikes. Anticipating the Indian strikes, terrorists were reportedly vacated from launchpads near the LoC.[40] It is unlikely that senior leaders and strategists would have remained in known terror hubs and headquarters; rather, they would have moved to safe houses in crowded civilian areas in cities. Losses in terms of leaders and cadres would therefore not debilitate the terror groups targeted. Besides, the damage caused by the strikes is “unlikely to have any lasting impact”.[41] They can be expected to regroup and rebuild in a few months. In fact, India’s military strikes on terrorist camps can be expected to boost recruitment of fighters. Terrorist leaders have already stepped up anti-India propaganda.[42] This will not only boost cadre morale but also draw youth to pick up arms.
Increase in Terrorist Attacks
India’s previous military strikes did not prevent terrorist attacks. The 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ did not prevent the Pulwama attack and the 2019 Balakot airstrike did not deter terrorists or their handlers from massacring civilians in Pahalgam. Besides these high-profile terror attacks, there have been hundreds of small and major terrorist attacks on Indian security forces, security installations and civilians in the intervening period. This has prompted some analysts to argue that India’s escalating military strikes are not a deterrent.
Indeed, terrorist attacks can be expected to increase in the coming months. Terrorist leaders will seek to project their groups’ continuing relevance and capabilities to impress their financial backers and to boost the morale of cadres. They have reportedly already promised revenge, and “at least some will act on these threats”.[43] In the past, when the Pakistan military and its intelligence suffered defeats and loss of face, as after the Kargil conflict of 1999, there was a surge in attacks on security forces; 763 military and police personnel were killed in J&K in 1999, another 788 in 2000 and 883 in 2001.[44] On November 29, 2016, JeM carried out a suicide attack on the Indian Army’s Nagrota camp in Jammu. It was the “seventh targeted attack on the security forces in J&K” in the period after the ‘surgical strikes’.[45]
Attacks on civilians, especially Hindus, in J&K and other parts of India, can be expected in the coming months. Since its formation in late 2019, TRF has targeted security forces and also civilians, including Kashmir’s religious minorities – Hindus and Sikhs – and non-Muslim migrant labourers from other parts of India.[46] As mentioned earlier, the Pahalgam attack targeted Hindu men. Following the incident, the Indian government claimed that the attack was carried out with “an objective of provoking communal discord, both in J&K and the rest of the Nation”.[47] In the days after the attack, Hindu extremists and trolls demonised India’s Muslims, especially Kashmiri Muslims living outside J&K, in mainstream and social media, and violently attacked, even killed, some on the streets. The government took no action against the violence and vilification campaigns.[48] This could serve to validate the narrative of anti-India groups and could prompt TRF and other groups to replicate the Pahalgam strategy to fuel Muslim radicalisation in India.
Conclusion
India’s Operation Sindoor is likely to have mixed implications for India’s efforts to curb cross-border terrorism. While it has damaged terrorist infrastructure and eliminated terrorists, these are not difficult to replace or rebuild. Additionally, the gains of the strikes – damage to terrorist capabilities – are far outweighed by the costs the strikes have inflicted on India, in terms of loss of fighter jets and damage to military and civilian infrastructure and lives. Operation Sindoor also resulted in the United States (US) brokering the ceasefire agreement, a setback to India’s long-standing opposition to third-party involvement in the Kashmir issue. If damage to infrastructure was the main gain of Operation Sindoor, such damage can be achieved through other kinetic means, such as covert operations. Such operations may not enthuse the BJP’s hawkish supporters, but they would serve to reduce the costs of military strikes for India. Frustrating as it is, India will have to work with the international community to put pressure on Pakistan. Global powers, even India’s friends, have not been reliable or robust partners in India’s fight against cross-border terrorism. Yet, India will need to persist with diplomacy and dialogue.
Importantly, India must address the political and domestic roots of militancy in Kashmir by addressing Kashmiri alienation from the Indian state and restoring their confidence in democracy and India’s secular constitution. In the weeks after the Pahalgam attack, Kashmiris came out in large numbers to protest against Pakistan-backed terrorism. This opens space for India. It must shift away from its collective punishment of the Kashmiris to win Kashmir.
About the Author
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent political and security analyst based in Bengaluru, India. She has written extensively on South Asian peace and conflict issues. She can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Sajid Ali on Pexels
Citations
[1] Vijaita Singh, “Pahalgam Terror Attack: Terrorists Asked Name and Religion of Male Tourists, Shot Them, Says Survivor,” The Hindu, April 24, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/terrorists-kept-firing-for-25-30-minutes-recalls-pahalgam-eyewitness/article69483296.ece.
[2] “As Pressure Mounts, TRF Denies Involvement in Pahalgam Attack,” The Hindu, April 26, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/as-pressure-mounts-trf-denies-involvement-in-pahalgam-attack/article69495143.ece.
[3] Abdul Basit, “What is TRF, the Terror Group That Brought India and Pakistan to the Brink of War?” The Diplomat, May 16, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/what-is-trf-the-terror-group-that-brought-india-\ and-pakistan-to-the-brink-of-war/.
[4] “LeT Proxy TRF Banned, Chief Tagged ‘Terrorist’,” The Times of India, January 6, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/let-proxy-trf-banned-chief-tagged-terrorist/articleshow/96776322.cms; Shubhajit Roy, “Indian Team Set to Meet UN Committee in Push to List TRF As Terror Outfit,” The Indian Express, May 15, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-sends-team-un-push-terror-tag-lashkar-linked-trf-10006796/.
[5] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Statement by Foreign Secretary on the Decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS),” April 23, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39442.
[6] Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said Pakistan had “no connection” with the attack, adding that it does not support terrorism in any form anywhere. Shemrez Nauman Afzal, “Pakistan on High Alert as Indians Clamour for Retribution After Terrorists Kill 26 in Pahalgam,” The Friday Times, April 23, 2025, https://thefridaytimes.com/24-Apr-2025/pahalgam-terror-attack-kashmir-trf.
[7] Himanshu Harsh and Vikas Pathak, “In First Comments After Pahalgam Attack, Modi Spells It Out: ‘We Will Pursue Terrorists to the Ends of the Earth’,” The Indian Express, April 25, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/modi-first-speech-pahalgam-attack-2025-9963537/.
[8] Pakistani operations in J&K in the pre-1989 period, however, were carried out by small numbers of covert operatives, the scale of whose armed activities was by today’s standards trivial.
[9] For an overview of the militancy in J&K in the 1990s, see Navnita Chadha Behera, State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh (Manohar, 2000), 64-205; and for Pakistan’s role in it, see Happymon Jacob, “Conflict in Kashmir: An Insurgency with Long Roots,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf (USIP, 2014), 37-40.
[10] A Kashmiri nationalist organisation, the JKLF has sought the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. In 1993, a militarily weakened JKLF renounced violence as a means to achieve its goal.
[11] Based in Pakistan’s Punjab province and predominantly Punjabi, these groups profess a jihadist ideology and goals. The LeT wages jihad not only to liberate Kashmir, but also to restore Islamic rule across India. It has carried out attacks in J&K and New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Varanasi, etc. “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed May 15, 2025, https://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.
[12] Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” paper presented at India Seminar: National Security, no. 599, July 2009, https://india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_rajesh_rajagopalan.htm.
[13] Gurmeet Kanwal, “Kargil,” paper presented at India Seminar: Something Like a War, no. 479, July 1999, https://india-seminar.com/1999/479/479%20kanwal.htm.
[14] Stanly Johny, “A New Normal in India-Pakistan Ties,” The Hindu, May 10, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a-new-normal-in-india-pakistan-ties/article69557361.ece.
[15] Anand Mishra and Sheela Bhatt, “Cross-LoC Operations in Past Too, Strikes Made Public as Part of Strategy, S Jaishankar Tells Panel,” The Indian Express, October 19, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/surgical-loc-strikes-border-attack-past-s-jaishankar-panel-meeting-proof-uri-3090729/.
[16] Sudha Ramachandran, “‘Surgical Strikes’ Mark Change in India’s Stance on Cross-Border Attacks,” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 21 (2016): 3-5, https://jamestown.org/program/surgical-strikes-mark-change-indias-stance-cross-border-attacks/.
[17] Sudha Ramachandran, “India and Pakistan on the Brink,” The Diplomat, February 28, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/india-and-pakistan-on-the-brink/.
[18] Happymon Jacob, “The Many Messages in Operation Sindoor,” Hindustan Times, May 7, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/the-many-messages-in-operation-sindoor-101746633710775.html.
[19] Shubhajit Roy, “Govt Suspends Indus Treaty, Expels Pak Advisors, Cancels Visas, Closes Attari,” The Indian Express, April 24, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/atari-border-closed-indus-waters-treaty-scrapped-no-visas-to-pakistani-nationals-mea-after-pahalgam-terror-attack-9961627/.
[20] Other targets in Pakistan’s Punjab province were the Sarjal Camp and the Mehmoona Joya Camp in Sialkot. In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the LeT’s Sawai Nala Camp and the JeM’s Syedna Bilal Camp in Muzaffarabad, the LeT’s Gulpur Base Camp and Abbas Camp in Kotli, and the Barnala Camp in Bhimber suffered damage. For details see “Operation Sindoor: Full List of Terrorist Camps in Pakistan, PoJK Targeted by Indian Strikes,” The Hindu, May 7, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/operation-sindoor-full-list-of-terrorist-camps-in-pakistan-pojk-targeted-by-indian-strikes/article69547986.ece.
[21] Eve Sampson, “The Indian Aircraft Pakistan Says It Shot Down,” The New York Times, May 7, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/07/world/asia/india-pakistan-downed-aircraft.html.
[22] Garvit Bhirani, “Operation Sindoor: 8 Pakistani Air Force Bases India Wreaked Havoc on with ‘Precision Strikes’,” Mint, May 13, 2025, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/operation-sindoor-8-pakistani-air-force-bases-india-wreaked-havoc-on-with-precision-strikes-11747108396931.html.
[23] Arzan Tarapore, “Operation Sindoor and the Evolution of India’s Military Strategy Against Pakistan,” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/operation-sindoor-and-the-evolution-of-indias-strategy-against-pakistan.
[24] “Congress’ Approach Towards Terrorism Weak and Soft: Nirmala Sitharaman,” The Hindu, May 11, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/congress-approach-towards-terrorism-weak-and-soft-sitharaman/article68164708.ece.
[25] “Strikes Steel PM Modi’s Iron Man Credentials,” The Times of India, May 8, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/strikes-steel-pm-modis-iron-man-credentials/articleshow/120975650.cms.
[26] Debashis Chakrabarti, “Pahalgam: The Grief is Real; So is the Theatre,” Frontline, May 6, 2025, https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/modi-pahalgam-attack-rhetoric-response-nationalism-politics-grief/article69544218.ece.
[27] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Statement by Foreign Secretary: OPERATION SINDOOR,” May 7, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39473/Statement_by_Foreign_Secretary_OPERATION_SINDOOR.
[28] Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, “Operation SINDOOR: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force,” May 14, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128748.
[29] “Any future terror act will be considered ‘act of war’ against India: Government sources,” The Hindu, May 10, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/any-future-terror-act-will-be-considered-act-of-war-against-india-government-sources/article69560805.ece.
[30] Jacob, “The Many Messages.”
[31] “Any Future Terror Act Will Be Considered ‘Act of War’ Against India: Government Sources,” The Hindu, May 10, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/any-future-terror-act-will-be-considered-act-of-war-against-india-government-sources/article69560805.ece.
[32] See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani State (Oxford University Press, 2017); and Ashish Singh, “A State of Strategic Hostility: Terrorism as the Grammar of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” Radical Politics, May 9, 2025, https://radicalpolitics.org/2025/05/09/a-state-of-strategic-hostility-terrorism-as-the-grammar-of-pakistans-foreign-policy/.
[33] Tarapore, “Operation Sindoor and the Evolution.”
[34] Ayesha Siddiqa, “Even Imran Khan is Praising Pakistan Army Now. Military Nationalism is Back in the Country,” The Print, May 20, 2025, https://theprint.in/opinion/even-imran-khan-is-praising-pakistan-army-now-military-nationalism-is-back-in-the-country/2631487/.
[35] Allocation for defence in the 2025 budget is 20 percent higher than the previous year. See Jon Grevatt and Haridass Sankar, “Pakistan Announces Defence Budget Increase,” Janes, June 12, 2025. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/industry/pakistan-announces-defence-budget-increase.
[36] Manoj C. G., “Operation Sindoor: At Least 100 Terrorists Killed, Rajnath Singh Tells Parties; Opposition Pledges Full Support,” The Indian Express, May 8, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/operation-sindoor-at-least-100-terrorists-killed-all-party-meet-9990398/.
[37] “Militant Group Chief Says Relatives Killed in India Strike,” BBC News, May 8, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjewen7w192o.
[38] “Operation Sindoor: Satellite Images Reveal Extensive Damage to Terror Camps in Pakistan’s Bahawalpur, Muridke,” The Hindu, May 8, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/operation-sindoor-satellite-images-reveal-extensive-damage-to-terror-camps-in-pakistans-bahawalpur-muridke/article69552124.ece.
[39] The Hindu, “Operation Sindoor: Full List of Terrorist Camps.”
[40] Bharti Jain, “Pahalgam Fallout: Fearing India Hit, Pakistan Empties Out Terror Launch Pads off LoC,” The Times of India, May 3, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pahalgam-fallout-fearing-india-hit-pakistan-empties-out-terror-launch-pads-off-loc/articleshow/120834528.cms.
[41] Sudha Ramachandran, “Ajai Sahni on India’s Military Strikes on Pakistan,” The Diplomat, May 12, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/ajai-sahni-on-indias-military-strikes-on-pakistan/.
[42] “Masood Azhar THREATENS ‘Merciless Revenge’ after Indian Missiles Kill His Family, Jaish Terrorists,” The Times of India, May 7, 2025, YouTube, 3 min., 47 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNcRUM31IXY.
[43] Ramachandran, “Ajai Sahni on India’s Military Strikes.”
[44] Praveen Swami, “From His Lair, JeM Chief Masood Azhar Calls on Jihadists to Fight for Vengeance Against India,” The Print, May 9, 2025, https://theprint.in/world/from-his-lair-jem-chief-masood-azhar-calls-on-jihadists-to-fight-for-vengeance-against-india/2620177/.
[45] Ajai Sahni, “Counter-Terrorism Measures Have to be Proactive,” Hindustan Times, December 2, 2016, https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/counter-terrorism-measures-have-to-be-proactive/story-rJM9L0d0D9RO6UG0T4Wn7I.html.
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