Pakistan
Pakistan’s diverse security landscape became more volatile in the absence of a coherent counter terrorism response in 2023. The interlocking political and economic crises and the Taliban’s reluctance to dismantle Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s sanctuaries in Afghanistan further worsened the security situation. Pakistan has entered a new phase of extremist violence where old trends persist even as new ones are emerging. Presently, the country is confronted with a three-front situation from a resurgent TTP, a persistent ethno-separatist insurgency in Balochistan, and a resilient Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK). In Punjab’s heartland, the Barelvi radical group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) continues to shape extremist trends through blasphemy activism. Ahead of the general election in February 2024, TLP’s participation in electoral politics, ISK’s so-called “battle against democracy” to target the polling process, and TTP’s ideological narrative against the parliamentary system and in favour of the self-styled Islamic Emirate combined would undermine Pakistan’s democracy. The Pakistani state’s failure to anticipate the real consequences of supporting the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has given the militant networks an edge over it.
Trends
Since the Taliban’s takeover, violence has surged in Pakistan by 73 percent.[1] According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2023, as the seventh most-impacted country by terrorism, Pakistan has two active conflict fault lines with TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the ethno-separatists in the south-western Balochistan provinces, respectively.[2] For the third consecutive year, the year-on-year attacks and casualties continued to increase in Pakistan. The security forces bore the brunt of these attacks, losing 345 security personnel from the military and police, the highest terrorism-related casualties in eight years.[3] As the asymmetric conflicts escalated in Pakistan, disturbing new security trends emerged while old ones persisted.
Enduring Old Trends
Resurgent TTP
In September, TTP launched a massive incursion into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Chitral district after amassing hundreds of its fighters in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nuristan provinces.[4] Since its resurgence, this was TTP’s first serious attempt to take territory in Pakistan.[5] The attack was repulsed after intense fighting spanning four to five days.[6] Currently, TTP lacks territorial control and some form of support in the population to transform into an insurgency.[7] In its bid to win local public support, TTP has tried to embrace Pashtun nationalism, which traditionally has been a secular movement, and even reached out to the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement’s leader, Manzur Pashteen[8] for a dialogue.[9]
Despite lacking territory and public support, TTP is following a discriminatory targeting strategy, that is, attacking the security forces and avoiding soft targets. In other words, TTP is behaving like an insurgent group without controlling territory or enjoying public support. Beliakova, Berger and Moghadam (2014) classify such groups as “proto-insurgents” or “hybrid terrorist groups”.[10] Furthermore, TTP has rhetorically distanced itself from Al-Qaeda (AQ) to a point where it disowns the latter’s role in creating, financing and ideologically guiding the former in the past.[11] TTP has repeatedly reiterated its Pakistan-centric focus and even signalled to the international community that it is fighting the Pakistani state for the creation of a Taliban-like shariah state.[12]
TTP has been able to articulate these narratives through its resuscitated propaganda arm, Al-Umar Media, indicating the group’s savviness with information warfare.[13] Al-Umar Media has an elaborate presence across digital and social media platforms. The linguistic and editorial quality of TTP’s propaganda has substantially improved since Qari Munib Jutt, the chief propagandist of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), joined the group. Now, TTP regularly publishes three monthly magazines (including one for women discussed in the emerging new trends section), infographics and statements, and runs bi-weekly podcasts as well as different video series.[14]
Moreover, TTP has remodelled its organisational structure from an umbrella movement to a more centralised framework along the Taliban’s insurgency model, dividing its militant campaign in Pakistan into two zones: the north and the south.[15] Likewise, it has announced seven shadow ministries;[16] intelligence, suicide and training units; a three-layer court system; an Islamic jurisprudence institute; and 12 wilayat (provinces).[17]
TTP is using its cross-border sanctuaries in Afghanistan and presence in the ex-FATA region as a force multiplier to expand its existence in mainland Pakistan. It bears mention that TTP has successfully expanded its footprint into Balochistan’s Pashtun-majority areas and carried out several high-profile attacks in 2023.[18] TTP’s expansion efforts come on the heels of more than 40 militant factions that have pledged their oaths of allegiance to the group, boosting its operational and organisational strength.[19]
Taking advantage of several factors,[20] TTP is showcasing a Taliban-like shariah system as an alternative to the failing democratic governance in the country. Critically, the second and third generations of TTP militants are being educated in the Taliban-run madrassas of Afghanistan,[21] unlike TTP’s first generation, which studied in Pakistan’s Deobandi madrassas.[22] Consequently, the new generation of TTP militants will be more radical, closely aligned with the Taliban’s ideology and with a weak association with Pakistan.[23]
Resilient ISK
Facing a hostile crackdown from the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISK has relocated some of its fighters to Pakistan, where it is fighting a battle of survival and relevance. As ISK’s visibility and attacks have shrunk in Afghanistan, they have correspondingly increased in Pakistan, more particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur and Balochistan’s Mastung districts. Despite ISK’s declining attacks in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s claims of decimating the group’s network seem premature. Since its creation as an IS franchise in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in 2015, ISK has gone through two contraction-expansion periods. For instance, between August 2018-2019, the group carried out 400 attacks, which steeply declined to 157 between August 2019-2020. However, ISK bounced back between August 2020-2021 and August 2021-2022 with 275 and 314 attacks, respectively. ISK is now going through another contraction period as the attacks have declined to 69 during the August 2022-2023 period.[24]
During the contraction periods, ISK has managed to adapt to hostile environments[25] and has also adjusted its strategic goals, ideological ambitions, operational strategies and propaganda messaging.[26] The group exploits pre-existing sectarian, political and socioeconomic fault lines, which are numerous in Pakistan,[27] to advance its interests.[28]
To navigate the ongoing contraction period, ISK has fixed its eyes on Pakistan’s election in February 2024 under its so-called “battle against democracy”.[29] The upcoming elections in Pakistan will offer numerous opportunities for the group to hit soft targets and dispel the impression of its decline. Already, the group has targeted religious[30] and political rallies and politicians in different parts of the country. For instance, ISK attacked Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUIF) leader Hafiz Hamdullah in Mastung district in September, which he narrowly escaped, and the party’s worker convention in Bajaur in July, leaving 44 people dead and over 100 injured.[31] The Bajaur suicide attack was preceded by 23 targeted assassinations of JUIF workers and local leaders by ISK. The ISK-JUIF tussle is grounded in their sectarian rivalry straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in Bajaur district.[32]
ISK’s emerging footprint is concerning for Pakistan for the following three reasons:
First, ISK’s aspiration for external operations, particularly in the West, is a worrying development. The terror group is trying to imitate AQ, the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which have successfully carried out overseas attacks. So far, around 15 terrorist plots, nine in very advanced stages, to target Western embassies, consulates and worship places have been traced to ISK in Afghanistan.[33] The United States (US) Annual Threat Assessment 2023 noted that “ISK almost certainly retains the intent to conduct operations in the West and will continue efforts to attack outside Afghanistan”.[34] Unlike ISK, AQ, IS and AQAP possessed safe havens to plot and train for attacks. Yet, despite lacking stable sanctuaries in Afghanistan, ISK’s external arms capability has grown due to its local-foreign structural duality. ISK’s inner layers comprise around 80 foreigners who plot overseas attacks, and it remains obscure and mobile.[35] Meanwhile, the outer layer is composed of local militants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian states, and the Taliban’s crackdown has damaged that outer layer.[36] If ISK moves some components of its inner layer to Pakistan, it could bring the country into the crosshairs of global counter terrorism discussions once more as a country of concern.
Second, ISK’s inroads into vulnerable segments of Pakistan’s educated middle- and upper-middle-class youth are even more alarming. Due to political instability, the economic meltdown and a growing state-society gap, the unemployed educated youth feel dispossessed by a broken system which only caters to an exploitative elite. Amid an identity crisis, the youths’ search for a sense of belonging and meaning in life leaves them vulnerable to ISK’s ideological propaganda, easily accessible through social media.[37]
Lastly, ISK’s indiscriminate attacks against religious minorities and its ideological rivalries with the Deobandi and Barelvi communities could push the more extreme TTP elements to cross over to the former. Consequently, any ISK or TTP efforts to carry out large-scale attacks to outdo each other, would further undermine an already fragile security situation in Pakistan.
Majoritarian Barelvi TLP
The Barelvi radical group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is entrenched in Pakistan’s Barelvi community, which is 60 percent of the population.[38] Hence, TLP’s radicalism takes a majoritarian shape in Pakistan. Since TLP operates in the country’s mainstream politics, participates in elections and eschews violence, it is more dangerous than TTP and ISK. Traditionally, the anti-Shia Deobandi militant group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and its political front, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, had dominated Punjab’s militant landscape until recently. Now, TLP has taken over by exploiting the Barelvi community’s victimhood narrative centred around blasphemy politics.
Drawing its legitimacy from Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, TLP acts as the self-appointed guardian of Prophet Muhammad’s honour and finality.[39] In doing so, TLP has not only positioned itself as the anti-minority and anti-secular group in Pakistan, but its blasphemy politics has also sharpened the intra-Sunni rivalry between the Barelvi and Deobandi subsects of the Hanafi school of thought.[40]
TLP views that blasphemers should be given the death penalty and that those trying to amend the blasphemy laws are also blasphemers.[41] TLP considers Pakistan’s mainstream political parties as well as fellow Barelvi political organisations advocating for reforms in anti-blasphemy laws as agents of Western liberal lobbies.[42] In TLP’s view, reformation of blasphemy laws would pave the way for Pakistan’s secularisation and mainstreaming of the Ahmadiyya community.[43]
TLP’s blasphemy activism, apart from posing a clear danger to minorities, is concerning for two reasons. First, TLP operates in mainstream politics and, hence, notwithstanding its poor electoral performance, has a greater societal outreach.[44] Also, participation in politics gives a semblance of legitimacy to its incendiary ideological rhetoric.[45] Second, TLP’s majoritarian discourse has shrunk the space for critical discourse on the role of religion in Pakistan’s politics and contested national character (the Islamic versus a moderate Muslim state debate).[46] At the same time, it has also undermined efforts to foster moderation, tolerance and respect for religious diversity and harmony in Pakistan.[47]
TLP views the Barelvi community as a suppressed group which has been ruled by a corrupt, indifferent and extractive elite against its will.[48] TLP maintains that these corrupt elites have been imposed on the masses against their will to serve the geopolitical interests of their foreign paymasters, including mainstreaming of the Ahmadiyya community and reformation of the anti-blasphemy laws.[49] The group also holds corrupt elites responsible for empowering Deobandi groups in politics to the detriment of the Barelvi community.
TLP sees the minority Ahmadiyya and Christian communities as an imminent risk to the Barelvi way of life and values. As such, TLP weaponises incendiary narratives to ostracise and dehumanise Ahmadis and Christians, and normalise violence against them.[50]
In 2023, around 34 attacks on Ahmadis’ worship places and graves were reported in Pakistan involving workers and supporters of the TLP.[51] Likewise, an angry mob burned Christian churches and properties in August in Faisalabad district’s Jaranwala area, following fake blasphemy charges. TLP’s workers and supporters joined the foray as soon as the disinformation spread on social media and engaged in ransacking and vandalism. TLP also used mosque loudspeakers to incite violence.[52]
Persistent Ethno-Separatism
In 2023, the ethno-separatist insurgency in Balochistan showed no sign of abating amid worsening living conditions. While the insurgency remains stalemated on the battlefield, the absence of a political process is contributing to its lethality and longevity.[53] The state has shown no political will to reach out to insurgents to start a negotiation process.[54] At the same time, the Baloch insurgents are equally disinterested in reconciliation and a political compromise. The result is greater militarisation from both sides, leaving the Baloch masses in the crosshairs of a never-ending cycle of insurgent-counterinsurgent violence.[55]
The current (fifth) wave of insurgency in Balochistan is the largest and most lethal as compared to the previous four waves: 1948, 1958-59, 1962-93 and 1973-77.[56] The Baloch insurgents’ alliances and mergers have enabled them to achieve lethality and resilience.[57] The state’s indifference to the Baloch community’s political and socioeconomic grievances and continued harassment, such as the arrests of Baloch students from different universities in Punjab, have pushed the educated Baloch youth towards separatism.[58] The suicide bombing by Sumaiya Qalandarani Baloch, the second by a female suicide bomber in as many years, brought into sharp focus a disturbing reality that the recruitment has now expanded from Baloch men to women as well (further discussion in the emerging new trends section).[59]
Alarmingly, the conflict has shifted from one generation to another who has grown up in an atmosphere of intimidation, ethnic discrimination and social injustices.[60] The new generation of Baloch insurgents spearheading the movement are from an educated middle-class rather than tribal background.[61] The new insurgent generation is more radical, has no tribal baggage and embraces more extreme tactics like suicide terrorism.
Emerging New Trends
New trends are by-products of the evolution of pre-existing trends, and highlight the worrying expansion and intensification of asymmetric militant threats in Pakistan.
New Group – Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan
A little-known militant group, Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), has emerged on Pakistan’s militant landscape, pointing to potential expansion of conflict actors. The group carried out high-profile suicide attacks against the security forces in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[62] TJP’s spokesperson Mullah Qasim announced its formation on X, formerly Twitter, and claimed that it had fought in Afghanistan; after the US exit in 2020, it has now shifted its focus to Pakistan for the creation of a shariah state.[63]
Based on available open-source information and circumstantial evidence, TJP seems to be a front group of TTP, carrying out suicide bombings on its behalf. TTP and TJP’s targets seem to be similar: security forces. Likewise, TJP has not attacked soft targets, which is also consistent with TTP’s selective targeting strategy. TJP’s emergence in Balochistan also coincides with TTP’s ingress in the province. In July, TTP was compelled to reveal that TJP is a brother jihadi organisation, following a war of words with its dissident commander, Asad Afridi, after he claimed an attack for which TJP also accepted responsibility.[64]
Furthermore, TJP belongs to the Deobandi school of thought, as it claims in its social media postings. Given the sophistication and geographical spread of its suicide attacks between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, it consists of experienced militants with considerable combat exposure.[65] Interestingly, TJP claimed some attacks in Balochistan for which the Islamic State of Pakistan (ISP) also accepted responsibility. Ostensibly, TJP seems to be undermining ISP’s footprint in Balochistan.[66]
TJP also has some members of the Taliban and AQ in its ranks who were keen to continue militancy in Pakistan for the creation of a shariah state following the US exit from Afghanistan. Hence, TJP was created as TTP’s front group to conceal the organisational identities of these militants.[67] It bears mention that the Taliban regime has instructed its fighters not to fight outside of Afghanistan without Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada’s permission. Likewise, under the Doha Agreement 2020, the Taliban are under obligation to ensure that Afghanistan’s soil will not be used by AQ, among other groups, for terrorism against other countries.
Female Suicide Bombers and Women-Focused Radical Propaganda
A miniscule but concerning trend of women’s participation in terrorist attacks, coupled with concerted efforts by TTP and Baloch separatist groups to produce women-focused propaganda, was also prominent in 2023. On July 25, Sumaiya Qalandrani Baloch, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)’s second female suicide bomber, targeted a security convoy in Turbat, Balochistan.[68] Subsequently, BLA’s propaganda arm, Hakkal, published several articles and reports eulogising the two female suicide bombers to boost women recruitment.[69] BLA’s suicide wing, the Majeed Brigade, claims that following the female suicide bombings, several Baloch women have enlisted for self-sacrificing missions.
Separately, TTP has increased its focus on producing women-focused propaganda material through Al-Umar media. For instance, in July 2023, the group started publishing a monthly Urdu-language magazine for women, Banat-e-Khadijat-ul-Kubra (Daughters of Khadija, Prophet Muhammad’s first wife).[70] So far, the group has published two issues of this magazine. This is TTP’s second attempt to publish women-focused propaganda material. The first attempt was in 2017-2018 when it brought out two issues of the English-language magazine Sunnat-e-Khaula (The Way of Khaula, a historical female fighter known for her bravery).[71] In sum, TTP has reinforced its ideological worldview in these periodicals centred around patriarchal social values, urging women to be the nurturers of future generations of jihadists and heavily attacking liberal feminist lobbies in Pakistan.[72]
In September, five female militants belonging to ISK were arrested in Punjab’s Lahore and Sheikhupura cities. These arrests, seen together with the discovery of a 17-member pro-ISK cell, of which 12 were girls, in Islamabad, underscore ISK’s focus on recruiting women through social media platforms from Pakistan’s urban centres. In the past, women belonging to ISK were also arrested in Karachi and Lahore, among others.
Despite women’s limited participation in terrorism in Pakistan, the groups’ increasing focus through propaganda material points to their renewed interests in harnessing females’ potential for different roles in their organisational structures, such as propagandists, recruiters, informers, matchmakers, nurturers of future generations of militants, icons and mentors for would-be female radicals and, in extreme cases, as suicide bombers.[73]
Unclaimed and Contested Terrorist Attacks
In Pakistan’s fiercely competitive threat landscape, it is rare for militant groups not to claim terrorist attacks. However, no group claimed responsibility for some high-profile attacks in Pakistan, including suicide bombings, in 2023. Likewise, there were a few attacks which were simultaneously claimed[74] by different militant groups.[75]
At the same time, there were conflicting responsibility claims where more than one group took credit for the same attack. The majority of these attacks involved TJP, as discussed above, which claimed responsibility for attacks owned by ISP to undermine its footprint in Balochistan. For instance, TJP claimed responsibility for the March 6 suicide bombing targeting a vehicle of the paramilitary Frontier Corps in Balochistan’s Bolan district, which ISP also owned.[76] Similarly, the July 12 raid on a garrison post in Balochistan’s Zhob district was simultaneously claimed by TJP and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a dissident faction of TTP.[77]
The contested and unclaimed attacks reveal the evolving rivalries and relationships between different militant groups in a fluid threat environment. Though TTP has centralised its structure, it remains a conglomerate of more than 40 factions of varying sizes. Terrorist groups shy away from claiming attacks if they do not serve their strategic goals.[78] Likewise, sometimes groups do not take credit for attacks due to unintended consequences, such as mass casualties or fear of a stronger counter terrorism backlash.[79] For instance, TTP distanced itself from the Peshawar suicide bombing in February, which killed over 100 people, on the grounds that it was a violation of its code of conduct. JuA perpetrated the attack and claimed it independently as revenge for the killing of its leader Omar Khalid Khorasani, which brings to the fore the agent-principal problem, that is, the central group does not own an attack officially if it is conducted without prior permission.[80]
State Responses and Challenges
To mitigate the rapidly evolving terrorist threats, Pakistan took a number of key decisions in 2023. After two failed ceasefire agreements with TTP in November 2021 and June-September 2022,[81] the government shelved the option of negotiations. However, the two botched ceasefires allowed TTP to regain space and resurrect its network in Pakistan.[82] At any rate, the Pakistani security institutions, keeping in view the financial and political limitations, tried to contain the threat through intelligence-based operations in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[83]
Following a 72 percent rise in terrorism in the past two years, the government revitalised the Apex Committees in February at the federal and provincial levels for better coordination across different security and government institutions. Since Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is facing the brunt of TTP’s attacks, the Apex Committee decided in February to create a headquarters for the Counter Terrorism Department in the province.[84] Likewise, the National Action Plan and the National Counter Terrorism Authority were also revived. At the same time, the government is also taking steps to empower the police to effectively perform counter terrorism tasks.[85]
Pakistan has also engaged the Taliban regime with a two-fold demand without much avail: 1) disarm and neutralise TTP; or 2) expel the group to Pakistan.[86] As TTP’s attacks from its havens in Afghanistan continued unabated, Pakistan decided in October to expel about 1.6 million illegal Afghan refugees with a one-month deadline. In a press conference, Pakistan’s caretaker Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti maintained that 14 of the 24 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2023 were carried out by Afghan nationals.[87]
Three visible asymmetric challenges confront the Pakistani state with long-term security implications.
First, the new generation of insurgents and militants who are more radical and violent in their tactics. As discussed, the second and third generations of TTP jihadists are being educated and mentored in the Taliban-run madrassas in Afghanistan.[88] With weaker association with Pakistan, in the next eight to 10 years, the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban’s younger fighters will become almost distinguishable. Similarly, the Baloch separatists’ new generation has grown up in an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust, leading them to categorically espouse separatism and embrace suicide terrorism, without carrying the tribal baggage of their predecessors.[89] Likewise, ISK, despite recent setbacks, continues to make inroads through social media platforms into the educated middle-class youth of Pakistan’s urban centres.[90]
Second, the state lacks the capacity and sophistication to fight TTP on the discursive and operational fronts. Since the TTP’s propaganda has moved to cyberspace and networks have shifted to Afghanistan, the state’s ability to effectively manage the threat has shrunk.
Finally, the intersectionality of TLP’s violence and the hybrid nature of its organisational structure as a party-movement that keeps it in the political mainstream pose a twin challenge to the state.[91] If the state lowers its threshold of violent extremism to ban radical groups like TLP, it runs the risk of unintentionally pushing its members towards violence. On the contrary, if the state does not revisit the violent extremism threshold, radical groups like TLP will continue to stay in the political mainstream.
Outlook
Due to TTP’s cross-border sanctuaries in Afghanistan, coupled with political and financial constraints hindering a large-scale counter terrorism offensive, various asymmetrical conflicts in Pakistan are likely to persist and violence will increase further. Within the existing political and financial bounds, the state can aim to contain the threat until such a time that it has the bandwidth for an offensive counter terrorism posture. Pakistan’s future counter terrorism challenges are now intricately linked to its evolving relationship with the Taliban regime, and, without finding a viable working formula to address the TTP challenge in Afghanistan, its current counter terrorism policy will only deliver a temporary respite. Pakistan’s myopic policy of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan has backfired and the country has become a victim of its own contradictory policy of the “good” versus the “bad” Taliban.
About the Author
Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
[1] “Terror Attacks Increased by 73 Percent in Pakistan Since Taliban Takeover,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies, May 31, 2023, https://www.pakpips.com/article/7646.
[2] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2023 (Sydney, Institute for Economics & Peace, 2023), p. 27, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf.
[3] “Security Forces Witness Highest Casualties in 8 Years,” The Express Tribune, September 30, 2023, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2438480/security-forces-suffer-highest-casualties-in-8-years-report.
[4] Chitral is strategically located closer to Gilgit-Baltistan, the starting point of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, shares a border with Tajikistan via the Wakhan Corridor, and is located closer to Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which abuts China’s Xinjiang province.
[5] Abubakar Siddique and Majeed Babar, “Pakistani Taliban Attempts Land Grab To Boost Insurgency Against Islamabad,” Radio Free Europe, September 16, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistani-taliban-land-grab-insurgency-islamabad/32595679.html.
[6] Iftikhar Shirazi, “7 Terrorists Killed, 6 Critically Injured by Security Forces in Chitral: ISPR,” Dawn, September 10, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1775116.
[7] Public opinion in the ex-FATA and Malakand regions, where TTP wreaked havoc during its first peak between 2008 and 2014, is very hostile. In 2021, when a few hundred TTP militants were repatriated to their native areas under a secret peace deal with the military (on the condition of disarmament and a peaceful conduct), people in different parts of the ex-FATA and Malakand regions organised massive anti-TTP rallies (or peace marches) to oppose the group’s return.
[8] Mufti Abu Hasham Tariq, “Concerning Rallies Against Terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” Mujallah Tehreek-e-Taliban, January 2023, pp. 7-8.
[9] The Pashtun nationalists in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not accept the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as an internationally recognised frontier. They call it a British colonial imposition which has divided the Pashtun families living across the border. Furthermore, they believe Pakistan’s Pashtun-dominated areas up to Attack district belong to Afghanistan.
[10] Assaf Moghadam et al., “Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labelling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 8, No. 5 (2014), pp. 2-17.
[11] Abdul Sayed, “The Evolution and Future of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/21/evolution-and-future-of-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-pub-86051.
[12] Though the international community consistently raises its concerns about TTP’s rising attacks from Afghanistan against Pakistan, it has not pressed the Taliban to dismantle TTP’s network in Afghanistan.
[13] Abdul Sayed, “Resurgence of Umar Media Boosts Pakistani Taliban,” BBC Monitoring, January 13, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2040oi5.
[14] Abdul Basit, “Afghanistan-Pakistan’s Radical Social Media Ecosystem: Actors, Propaganda Comparison and Implications,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2023), pp. 9-16, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CTTA-September-2023.pdf.
[15] A military commission comprises six or seven TTP militants, including a director and his deputy, and oversees the wilayat.
[16] Tasked with specific responsibilities, the seven ministries include: information and broadcasting; welfare; political affairs; defence; accountability; education; and finance.
[17] Of the 12 wilayat across Pakistan, seven are in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, two each in Punjab and Balochistan, and one in Gilgit-Baltistan. See Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2023), pp.1-12, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/CTC-SENTINEL-052023.pdf.
[18] Muhammad Akba Notezai, “Why TTP Is Opening Another Front in Balochistan,” Dawn, July 15, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1764840.
[19] TTP has benefited from the Taliban’s prison breaks at the time of the takeover, freeing thousands of its members as well as the mergers adding hundreds of militants to its ranks.
[20] These are: 1) Pakistan’s failure to fulfil the promises it made to the people of ex-FATA at the time of the region’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; 2) the Taliban’s return and provision of sanctuaries to the group in Afghanistan; and 3) the ongoing political and socioeconomic instability in the country.
[21] “War On Education: Taliban Converting Secular Schools Into Religious Seminaries,” Radio Free Europe, June 25, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-secular-schools-converted-madrasahs-education/31914672.html; “The Taliban Rule and the Radicalisation of Education in Afghanistan,” Global Campus on Human Rights, November 24, 2022, https://gchumanrights.org/preparedness-children/article-detail/the-taliban-rule-and-the-radicalisation-of-education-in-afghanistan-4945.html.
[22] Zia ur-Rehman, “Where Afghanistan’s New Taliban Leaders Went to School,” The New York Times, November 25, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/25/world/asia/pakistan-taliban-afghanistan-madrasa.html.
[23] Saqalain Eqbal “Taliban Calls Suicide Bomber Brigade Pride of Group,” Khama Press, August 29, 2022, https://www.khaama.com/taliban-calls-suicide-bomber-brigade-pride-of-group-364752/;
Lily Hamourtziadou, “Afghanistan: Taliban plans for Suicide Brigade Reveal Changing Nature of Warfare in 21st Century,” The Conversation, January 31, 2021, https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-taliban-plans-for-suicide-brigade-reveal-changing-nature-of-warfare-in-21st-century-174829.
[24] Aaron Y Zelin, “ISKP Goes Global: External Operations from Afghanistan,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 11, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan.
[25] Amira Jadoon et al., “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s Survival under Afghanistan’s New Rulers,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 8 (2023), pp. 8-15, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CTC-SENTINEL-082023.pdf.
[26] Zelin, “ISKP Goes Global.”
[27] For instance, when the group lost its territorial holdings in the eastern Nangarhar province in 2019, it devolved from a centralised to a decentralised structure comprising numerous cells, and instead of (re)capturing territory, it shifted its focus to high-profile urban attacks. Similarly, when the Taliban intensified their attacks on Salafi madrassas and mosques across Afghanistan to undermine ISK’s influence, the group shifted its recruitment to the country’s universities.
[28] Antonio Giustozzi, “An Unfamiliar Challenge: How the Taliban Are Meeting the Islamic State Threat on Afghanistan’s University Campuses,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 2023, pp. 8-10, https://static.rusi.org/rusi-emerging-insights-how-taliban-meeting-is-threat-on-afghan-university-campuses.pdf.
[29] Osama Ahmad, “ISKP Attacks Pakistan’s Religious Political Parties for Participating in Elections,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 15, 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/iskp-attacks-pakistans-religious-political-parties-for-participating-in-elections/.
[30] Zia ur-Rehman and Christina Goldbaum, ”Blast Kills at Least 52 at a Religious Gathering in Pakistan,” The New York Times, September 29, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/world/asia/pakistan-bombing.html.
[31] Syed Ali Shah, “JUI-F’s Hafiz Hamdullah Survives Bomb Attack,” The Express Tribune, September 14, 2023, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2435806/jui-fs-hafiz-hamdullah-survives-bomb-attack; Javid Hussain and Umar Bacha, “At Least 44 killed, over 100 Injured in Suicide Blast at JUI-F Convention in KP’s Bajaur,” Dawn, July 30, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1767493.
[32] As a Deobandi organisation, JUIF has close links with the Taliban regime and several of its workers were part of a crackdown against ISK in the eastern Nangarhar province. In retaliation, ISK started targeting JUIF workers in Bajaur and other parts of the country, and the rivalry is ongoing. For details, see Zia Ur Rehman, “Why Is the Militant ISKP Attacking the JUI-F in Bajaur?” Dawn, August 2, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1767919; Iftikhar Firdous et al., “The Persistent Threat of Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) Against Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) in Bajaur,” The Khorasan Diary, August 2, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2023/08/02/tkd-analysis-the-persistent-threat-of-islamic-state-khorasan-iskp-against-jamiat-e-ulema-e-islam-fazl-jui-f-in-bajaur-2.
[33] Dan Lamothe and Joby Warrick, “Afghanistan has Become a Terrorism Staging Ground Again, Leak Reveals,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/.
[34] Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: ODNI, 2023), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
[35] Atal Ahmadzai, “IS-Khorasan: Organizational Structure, Ideological Convergence with the Taliban, and Future Prospects,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2022), pp. 2-19, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27168613.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Huma Yusuf, “University Radicalization: Pakistan’s Next Counterterrorism Challenge,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2016), pp. 4-8, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss29.pdf.
[38] This is not to suggest that Pakistan’s entire Barelvi community subscribes to TLP’s incendiary rhetoric. Indeed, the Barelvi community in Pakistan is quite vast and diverse with multiple political and ideological shades. However, TLP’s entrenchment in the majority faith community proportionally increases the risk accordingly. See Jawad Syed, “Barelvi Militancy in Pakistan and Salman Taseer’s Murder,” in Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan, eds. Jawad Syed et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 231-272.
[39] Roohan Ahmed, “Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan: An Emerging Right-Wing Threat to Pakistan’s Democracy,” Atlantic Council, January 15, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/tehreek-e-labbaik-pakistan-an-emerging-right-wing-threat/.
[40] The Hanafi school of thought has two sub-denominations, Deobandis and Barelvis. Deobandis follow a more literal and puritanical interpretation of Islam. Barelvis follow a more inclusive, benevolent and plural interpretation of Islam. TLP blames Deobandis for the Barelvi community’s political marginalisation and attacks against major Sufi shrines across Pakistan. For details, see Zulqarnain Sewag, “The Intra-Sunni Conflicts in Pakistan,” in Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan, eds. Jawad Syed et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 313–344; Syed, “Barelvi Militancy in Pakistan and Salman Taseer’s Murder.”
[41] Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “How Islamist Fundamentalists Get Away With Murder in Pakistan,” Foreign Policy, December 8, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/08/pakistan-blasphemy-killing-priyantha-kumara-islam/.
[42] Asad Hashim, “Pakistan Clears Christian Woman in Landmark Blasphemy Case,” Al Jazeera, October 31, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/31/pakistan-clears-christian-woman-in-landmark-blasphemy-case.
[43] “Who Are the Pakistani Islamists Vowing Death to Blasphemers?” Reuters, August 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/who-are-pakistani-islamists-vowing-death-blasphemers-2023-08-21/.
[44] Rizwan Shehzad, “TLP Stages Political Comeback,” The Express Tribune, June 17, 2023, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2422229/tlp-stages-political-comeback.
[45] Currently, the Pakistani state is too weak and lacks legitimacy to reform the blasphemy laws and sensitise the public about the procedural lacunae which are exploited to settle personal vendettas. Since TLP’s emergence on the political scene in 2017, every time the group has come out on the streets to protest, the state has signed an appeasement agreement with the group. For details, see “Pakistan’s Religious Extremists are Holding the Government to Ransom,” The Economist, April 24, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/04/24/pakistans-religious-extremists-are-holding-the-government-to-ransom; Amir Wasim, “PPP Leaders Term Govt-TLP Agreement ‘Surrender by the State’,” Dawn, November 2, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1655398.
[46] Ihsan Yilmaz and Raja M Ali Saleem, “A Quest for Identity: The Case of Religious Populism in Pakistan,” European Center for Populism Studies, 2021, p. 9, https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0007.
[47] Ecaterina Matoi, “Thereek-e-Labbaik Pakistan: A Rising Extremist Force, or Just the Tip of Larger Radicalised Iceberg in the AfPak Region,” Scientific Research and Education in the Air Force, 2021, pp. 203-222, https://www.afahc.ro/ro/afases/2021/26-EcaterinaMATOI.pdf; Imran Ahmed and Hatizah Rashid, “Church Attacks in Jaranwala and the Issue of Religious Intolerance in Pakistan,” Institute of South Asian Studies, September 5, 2023, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/church-attacks-in-jaranwala-and-the-issue-of-religious-intolerance-in-pakistan/.
[48] Fizza Batool et al., “Contest Between Leaders of the Ummah: Comparing Civilizational Populisms of PTI and TLP in Pakistan,” Populism & Politics (P&P), European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), February 15, 2023, p. 7, https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0020.
[49] “A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group, September 5, 2022, pp. 9-12, https://www.crisisgroup.org/327/asia/south-asia/pakistan/new-era-sectarian-violence-pakistan.
[50] “From Exclusion to Violence: The Case of Religious Minorities in Pakistan,” Minority Rights Group International, Report No. 327, August 23, 2022, https://minorityrights.org/2022/08/23/pakistan-forb-2022/.
[51] Abid Hussain, “Pakistan’s Ahmadis Living in Fear as Graves, Religious Sites Attacked,” Al Jazeera, September 27, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/pakistans-ahmadis-living-in-fear-as-graves-religious-sites-attacked.
[52] Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Muslim Mob Attacks Christian Churches, Property over Blasphemy Charges,” VoA, August 16, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-muslim-mob-attacks-christian-churches-property-over-blasphemy-charges/7227449.html.
[53] Amir Rana, “An Insurgency Restructured,” Dawn, March 20, 2022, https://www.dawn.com/news/1680914.
[54] Muhammad Amir Rana, “Missing Political Approaches,” Dawn, July 12, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1568507.
[55] Shah Meer Baloch, “Balochistan: The Conflict that Pakistan Media Ignores,” London School of Economics, June 8, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2020/06/08/balochistan-the-conflict-that-pakistan-media-ignores/.
[56] Shakoor Ahmad Wani, “The Changing Dynamics of the Baloch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan: From Autonomy toward Secession,” Asian Survey, Vol. 56, No. 5 (2016), pp. 807-832.
[57] Ibid.
[58] “Baloch Student Picked up by Police from Punjab University,” Dawn, October 28, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1784288/baloch-student-picked-up-by-police-from-punjab-university; Surabhi Singh, “Pakistan Arrests Students for Demanding Internet Before Online Exams,” The Diplomat, July 2, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/pakistan-arrests-students-for-demanding-internet-before-online-exams/.
[59] Behram Baloch and Saleem Shahid, “Cop Martyred in Turbat Bombing,” Dawn, June 25, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1761630.
[60] M Ilyas Khan, “The Middle-Class Pakistani Students Fighting for a Homeland Dream,” BBC News, July 31, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53540851.
[61] For instance, the two main insurgent leaders, the Baloch Liberation Front’s Dr Allah Nazar Baloch and the Baloch Liberation Army’s Bashir Zeb, hail from the middle class. For details, see Mahvish Ahmad, “Balochistan: Middle-Class Rebellion,” Dawn, June 5, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/723987/balochistan-middle-class-rebellion.
[62] Ayaz Gul, “Militants Raid Pakistan Army Base; 12 Soldiers, Civilian Die in Clashes,” VoA, July 12, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-army-base-comes-under-deadly-militant-attack/7177403.html.
[63] KN Pandita, “Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan, The ‘New Kid On The Block’ Emerges As A Big Threat To China’s CPEC,” The Eurasian Times, July 23, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/tehreek-e-jihad-pakistan-the-new-kid-on-the-block-emerges/.
[64] Afridi alleged that TJP is a fiction that TTP has created to disown attacks carried by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA). The two factions have been at loggerheads since the killing of JuA chief Omar Khalid Khorasani. For details, see The Khorasan Diary (@khorasandiary), “Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) is a Cover of the TTP,” X, July 18, 2023, https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1681289597547065344.
[65] Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “TJP: A Front Group for the Pakistani Taliban?” The Jamestown Foundation, August 21, 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/tjp-a-front-group-for-the-pakistani-taliban/.
[66] Iftikhar Firdous, “Does Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan Actually Exist?” The Khorasan Diary, April 29, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2023/04/29/does-tehreek-e-jihad-pakistan-actually-exist.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Baloch and Shahid, “Cop Martyred in Turbat Bombing.”
[69] “Who’s Sumaiya Qalandrani Baloch?” The Balochistan Post, June 27, 2023, https://thebalochistanpost.net/2023/06/who-is-sumaiya-qalandrani-baloch-tbp-report/.
[70] Sarah Zaman, “Pakistani Taliban Release New Magazine Geared Toward Women,” VoA, July 19, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistani-taliban-release-new-magazine-geared-toward-women/7187254.html.
[71] Mehwish Rani, “TTP’s Online Women’s Magazine has a Different Message for Their Female Jihadi Audience than Rumiyah,” Vox Pol, July 8, 2018, https://www.voxpol.eu/ttps-online-womens-magazine-has-a-different-message-for-their-female-jihadi-audience-than-rumiyah/; Anna SANSOM, “Pakistani Taliban Launch Women’s Magazine for Would-Be Jihadists,” France 24, August 8, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20170808-pakistan-taliban-women-magazine-jihad-weapons-islamic-state-group.
[72] Amira Jadoon and Sara Mahmood, “Militant Rivalries Extend to Female Recruitment in Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 14, 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/ctc-perspectives-militant-rivalries-extend-to-female-recruitment-in-pakistan/.
[73] Sheharyar Khan, “Gendered Analysis of Push and Pull Factors Towards Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” Pakistan Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2021), pp.1-26, https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Vol-III-Issue-II-July-Dec-2021.pdf.
[74] Sayantani Biswas, “Pakistan: Second Suicide Bombing Reported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Death Toll Surges to 57,” Live Mint, September 29, 2023, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/pakistan-news-bomb-blast-hits-nation-in-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-second-in-a-day-11695982791019.html.
[75] To quote a few examples, the February 19 targeted assassination of a religious scholar Mawlana Ijaz Ahmed Haqqani in Peshawar remained anonymous. Similarly, no group owned the suicide attack targeting Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Siraj-ul-Haq in Balohictsan’s Zhob district, which he escaped unhurt on May 19. Likewise, the September 29 suicide attack on an Eid Milad procession to commemorate Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in Mastung, Balochistan also went unclaimed. The case of a near-simultaneous suicide attack targeting a mosque in Hangu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was no different.
[76] “IS Claims Responsibility For Bolan Attack,” The Express Tribune, March 8, 2023, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2404952/is-claims-responsibility-for-bolan-attack.
[77] Iftikhar Firdous and Riccardo Valle, “The Perplexing Credit Taking Dynamics within Militant Organizations,” The Khorasan Diary, July 13, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2023/07/13/the-perplexing-credit-taking-dynamics-within-militant-organizations.
[78] Aaron M Hoffman, “Voice and Silence: Why Groups Take Credit for Acts of Terror,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 5 (2010), pp. 615-626, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310376439.
[79] “Why do Terrorists Claim Credit For Some Attacks But Not Others?” The Economist, February 1, 2019, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/02/01/why-do-terrorists-claim-credit-for-some-attacks-but-not-others.
[80] Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “What Peshawar Suicide Blast Signals about Terrorism in Pakistan,” South China Morning Post, February 3, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3208908/what-peshawar-suicide-blast-signals-about-terrorism-pakistan. TTP also disowned the Peshawar mosque bombing because it is more sensitive about its public image as it is trying to win public support to evolve from a terrorist to an insurgent group.
[81] Tahir Khan, “TTP Ends Ceasefire With Govt, Orders Its Militants to Carry out Attacks in Entire Country,” Dawn, November 28, 2022, https://www.dawn.com/news/1723647; Abid Hussain, “Pakistan Taliban Ends Ceasefire with Gov’t, Threatens New Attacks,” Al Jazeera, November 28, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/28/pakistan-taliban-ends-ceasefire-with-govt-threatens-new-attacks.
[82] Iftikhar A Khan, “TTP Used ‘Peace Talks’ to Swell Its Ranks: Nacta,” Dawn, December 9, 2022, https://www.dawn.com/news/1725422.
[83] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Military to Pursue Terrorists Via Intelligence-Based Operations,” Dawn, February 1, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1734724.
[84] Sanaullah Khan, “Apex Committee Affirms Elimination of Terrorism Linked to Political Stability, Economic Recovery,” Dawn, February 24, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1738907.
[85] Tariq Pervez, “Revamping Nacta,” Dawn, February 14, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1731552.
[86] Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Turns Up Heat Over Cross-Border Attacks,” VoA, October 5, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-turns-up-heat-over-cross-border-attacks-/7298839.html.
[87] “Pakistan Wants Undocumented Migrants to Leave by November 1 Or Get Deported,” Al Jazeera, October 3, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/3/pakistan-wants-undocumented-migrants-to-leave-by-november-1-or-get-deported.
[88] Daud Khattak, “Taliban Takeover In Afghanistan Bolsters Pakistan’s Insurgency,” Radio Free Europe, January 13, 2022 https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-taliban-bolsters-pakistan-insurgency/31652664.html.
[89] Muhammad Amir Rana, “Balochistan’s Youth in Focus,” Dawn, February 20, 2022, https://www.dawn.com/news/1676082
[90] Iftikhar Firdous and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, “Creeping Ideology; The ‘Generation-Z’ Freelancers of the ISKP,” The Khorasan Diary, August 31, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/2023/08/31/creeping-ideology-the-generation-z-freelancers-of-the-iskp/.
[91] From a social movement theory lens, TLP is simultaneously a party and a movement, or a party-movement. It operates in the system through a formal political structure and outside the system through an informal social structure. TLP uses street pressure through social movement structure to compensate for its weak political clout and to pressurise the state to accept its political demands.
