Pakistan
Pakistan was the second worst-hit country by terrorism in 2025, according to the Global Terrorism Index, as the number of deaths in terrorist attacks rose by 45 percent.[1] Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan were the worst-affected regions, where most of the year’s terrorist attacks occurred. Pakistan’s deteriorating ties with the Taliban regime over the presence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan,[2] lack of a coherent counter terrorism policy balancing soft and hard strategies,[3] challenges in managing the porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran, and growing state-society gap, contributed to a volatile security situation.[4] The South Asian nation’s internal security challenges were also linked to the absence of substantive international counter terrorism assistance, despite the revival of security cooperation with the United States (US).[5]
Introduction
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal’s open-source database, Pakistan suffered as many as 893 terrorist attacks, including 22 suicide bombings, in the first 10 months of 2025, resulting in 3,285 casualties.[6] The number of violent incidents for the corresponding period in 2024 was 650, accounting for 1,648 fatalities.[7] While terrorist attacks rose year-on-year by 243 in Pakistan, the number of casualties almost doubled, with a surge of 1,637.[8] The Pakistani state’s insistence on imposing a militaristic solution on Balochistan’s ethnic and socioeconomic grievances as well as its political tensions with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over counter terrorism tactics, will likely increase militant violence in 2026.[9] The politicisation of key security policies and the state-society polarisation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have allowed terrorist groups to manipulate these fissures.[10]
Coupled with that, Pakistan’s internal security situation is closely linked to its evolving and conflict-prone ties with Afghanistan and India.[11] If Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions over the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) persist,[12] the security situation will deteriorate further. Similarly, Pakistan’s conflict with India following the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir also leaves space open for tensions.[13] While agreeing to a ceasefire in May 2025, India announced that another cross-border terrorist attack from Pakistan would be considered “an act of war”.[14] Such hostile posturing has kept South Asia on edge, while creating multiple regional fault lines for terrorist groups, especially Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), to exploit.
Trends
Terrorists’ Use of Drones and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
The most alarming trend in 2025 was the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and artificial intelligence (AI) by Pakistani terrorist networks across the ideological spectrum. The affordable prices, commercial availability, and diffusion of drones and AI have made them low-hanging fruit for Pakistani terrorist networks.[15] Furthermore, the transfer of knowledge, expertise and funds from the Taliban and AQ to the TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG) has been equally important in the weaponisation of drones.[16]
While almost all terrorist networks in Pakistan have used drones for surveillance and propaganda operations, only factions affiliated with the TTP and the HGBG have used them for attacks.[17] According to The Khorasan Diary, a digital news and research portal which tracks militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, around 83 drone attacks by militants were reported until October 2025, compared to six quadcopter strikes for the same period in 2024.[18] Furthermore, all the drone attacks by militants in 2025 took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[19]
It is important to mention that while terrorist networks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were carrying out drone attacks in 2024 as well, they were not claiming them, fearing public backlash.[20] However, this changed when Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), a militant alliance of the HGBG, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Harkat Inqilab-i-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), started claiming them in early 2025. It also forced the TTP to openly claim drone attacks.[21] HIIP is a new militant group comprising former operatives of AQ’s 313 Brigade, founded by Ilyas Kashmiri (more in The Emergence of New Militant Groups section below).
Other terrorist groups, such as ISK and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), have not deployed drones for attacks so far.[22] This is despite the fact that ISK was the first terrorist group in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to share five drone manuals on its encrypted social media channels. Likewise, even though the BLA and other Baloch separatist groups possess and use drones for propaganda and surveillance operations, they have not weaponised them for two possible reasons.[23] First, it is quite likely that they do not have the requisite expertise to use UAS for kinetic operations. Second, it is also possible that weaponising drones does not add any value to their existing insurgent toolkit, i.e., it does not advance their relative advantage against the Pakistani state.[24] Balochistan forms 44 percent of Pakistan’s geographical landmass and is sparsely populated, which hinders the weaponisation of drones.[25] Furthermore, the loud noise emissions, low battery timings and limited payload capacities of commercially available drones, along with the province’s open spaces, make it possible for the Pakistani security forces to spot and shoot down drones with greater ease.
At the same time, all major terrorist networks in Pakistan have started using AI for propaganda operations, such as preparing infographics, animated pictures and video recordings of their operations to exaggerate their impact, as well as translating their bulletins into multiple regional languages.[26] On their encrypted channels, terrorist groups have also been encouraging their social media operatives to become well versed in the use of AI by signing up for free online courses. In future, compared to the current rudimentary use of AI, its more advanced use will allow them to create tailored recruitment strategies which appeal to individuals and groups based on their ideological preferences, political leanings, social orientations and cognitive biases.[27] Such AI-enabled recruitment strategies will not only improve their online security due to anonymity, but will also enhance their reach by enabling them to approach diverse audiences online.[28]
A Passenger Train’s Hijacking in Balochistan and the Evolution of the Baloch Insurgency
In March 2025, the BLA’s suicide squad, the Majeed Brigade, hijacked a passenger train with more than 450 passengers on board, including serving army personnel.[29] The Majeed Brigade demanded the release of Balochistan’s “political prisoners” in return for freeing the hostages. However, the government rejected its demands and carried out an operation to end the hostage crisis after a 30-hour siege. The BLA killed at least 64 passengers, including 18 soldiers, and injured 38 others.[30] During the clearance operation, 33 militants were eliminated as well. The train hijacking was one of the worst security failures in Pakistan’s history and brought into sharp focus the evolving nature of the separatist insurgency in Balochistan.
The Baloch separatist groups, especially the BLA, have improved their operational strength. From hitting low-profile targets like gas pipelines, power pylons and railway tracks in the past, they are now carrying out more daring attacks on security checkposts and military camps and convoys.[31] They have also started blocking major highways to disrupt traffic to and from the rest of the country and create the impression that the government is losing control over Balochistan’s main road networks.[32] During these roadblocks, Baloch separatists carry out spot checks and kill ethnic Punjabis – after identifying them through their identity cards – on suspicion of working for the military.[33] They allege that Punjabis travelling to Balochistan on public transport disguised as labourers either serve in the military or work as government spies.[34]
The hijacking of the passenger train in Balochistan was the second incident of its kind in South Asia. In 2009, sword-wielding Maoist insurgents briefly hijacked a train in India’s Jharkhand state during national elections.[35] The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the pacification of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal through a reconciliation process and the significant weakening of the Maoist movements in India’s Northeast, have made the BLA South Asia’s most organised and powerful insurgent group.[36] Over the years, the Pakistani state’s overmilitarised counterinsurgency framework, extrajudicial abductions and killings of Baloch dissidents, imposition of handpicked governments with no grassroots legitimacy and neglect of genuine socioeconomic grievances, along with the rise of an educated middle class, have transformed the Baloch insurgency from a tribal to an urban guerrilla movement.[37] The new generation of Baloch separatists is better educated and social media savvy, subscribes to a more radical form of Baloch nationalism, and sees separatism rather than autonomy as its ultimate goal.[38] The alienation of Baloch youth, who make up more than 70 percent of Balochistan’s population, has afforded steady recruitment to the Baloch separatist groups and has compounded security challenges for the Pakistani state.[39]
The Formation of Militant Alliances and Their Turf Battles
Another key trend in 2025 was the formation of inter-group militant alliances, with mergers of smaller factions into larger militant networks, and their turf battles to win the loyalties of smaller outfits. This tussle also revolved around their efforts to expand their respective areas of operation to outdo each other.[40] However, no violent clashes or propaganda warfare was witnessed between them.
In January, the inter-group competition between the TTP and the HGBG intensified after talks of a possible merger collapsed.[41] Since becoming the TTP’s chief, Nur Wali Mehsud has focused on building alliances with like-minded jihadist factions to forge a unified struggle under a “one group, one emir” policy to bring about a Taliban-style shariah state in Pakistan.[42] He extended an offer to both LI and the HGBG to merge with the TTP. However, ethno-tribal differences hindered their merger, even though all are Deobandi groups, operate in geographically congruent areas, share identical goals and have a common enemy, i.e., the Pakistani military.[43]
On January 18, the HGBG and LI announced a formal alliance with a two-fold objective. First, to carry out joint attacks against the Pakistani security forces. Second, to insulate themselves from the TTP’s growing influence in their traditional strongholds, i.e., Khyber and North Waziristan districts.[44] Nonetheless, the TTP’s ingress into Khyber and North Waziristan has continued unabated.[45] In February, the TTP secured the loyalty of a key HGBG commander, Ali Dawar.[46] In retaliation, the HGBG poached an important TTP faction from South Waziristan, the Hamkeemullah Mehsud Karwan.[47] The HGBG and LI also formed another coalition, IMP, with HIIP. The latter emerged in March, comprising former elements of AQ’s 313 Brigade.[48] As the turf battles have intensified, these militant networks have taken steps to consolidate their existing network strength and then expand.[49]
On its part, the TTP has continued to expand its networks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and other parts of Pakistan. It is the largest and most organised militant network in the country, so, naturally, smaller militant factions are attracted to it. Joining the TTP enhances their power, prestige and worth within Pakistan’s ever-evolving and competitive jihadist landscape. Since July 2020, more than 85 Pakistani militant groups have merged with the TTP.
The TTP Factor in Afghanistan-Pakistan Tensions
Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions peaked to unprecedented levels in October over the TTP’s presence on and use of Afghan soil for cross-border attacks in Pakistan.[50] On October 9, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) targeted a vehicle carrying TTP leaders in Kabul. Concurrently, Pakistan also struck multiple militant camps in Khost, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Paktika provinces.[51] In retaliation, the Taliban struck multiple Pakistani checkposts across the entire stretch of the 2,640 kilometre-long shared border.[52]
Pakistan’s decision to target the TTP and other Pakistan-centric militant networks’ camps in Afghanistan was preceded by a last-ditch diplomatic effort through Chinese mediation to convince the Taliban regime to act against the TTP.[53] In April, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul to revive the stalled diplomatic relations. It was the first trip by a high-level Pakistani official since February 2023.[54] In May, the Taliban regime issued a directive banning its nationals from fighting beyond Afghanistan’s border, to no avail.[55] Afghan nationals continued to participate in TTP-led attacks in Pakistan, stirring tensions between the two neighbours.[56]
For now, tensions have subsided following the intervention of Qatar and Turkey.[57] Taliban and Pakistani delegations held three rounds of talks in Doha and Istanbul to come up with a workable formula to resolve the TTP challenge. Though a tenuous ceasefire was reached and has largely held,[58] the talks in Turkey remained inconclusive.[59] The Taliban want Pakistan to recognise the TTP as a legal entity, allow it to operate as a political party and negotiate with it. On the contrary, Pakistan is asking the Taliban regime to fulfil its commitment under the Doha Agreement 2020 and ensure its soil is not used to launch cross-border terrorism in Pakistan.[60] It is also important to mention that the Taliban deny the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan and allegations of supporting it.[61] Their official stance is that the TTP is Pakistan’s internal matter, and the Taliban can only help the two sides to negotiate if they are willing.[62]
Keeping in view the Taliban’s stance on the TTP, Pakistan has warned that the existing ceasefire will not hold if the Taliban do not take measures to stop the TTP’s cross-border attacks. As soon as an attack from Afghanistan’s soil takes place in Pakistan, the Pakistani security forces will immediately retaliate.[63] Turkish mediators are likely to return to Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that both sides reach a workable mechanism to address the TTP challenge.[64]
The stalemate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan peace talks has benefited the TTP. It has been exploiting the border tensions and the ethnic grievances of tribal Pashtuns living along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to expand its ideological influence. Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, the TTP has grown stronger with every year.[65] It has imitated the Taliban’s insurgency model by announcing self-styled wilayats (provinces), shadow ministers and military zones in Pakistan. Reportedly, the TTP overhauls its organisational structure every year to cope with the evolving operational environment and counter terrorism challenges.[66]
The Emergence of New Militant Groups
Pakistan also witnessed the emergence of several new militant groups in 2025, which are reincarnations of old terrorist networks, such as AQ, the TTP and the HGBG, with new nomenclatures. Most of these groups emerged when Pakistan confronted the Taliban regime with evidence of the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan, demanded action against the group in accordance with the Doha Agreement 2020 and threatened retaliation in case of inaction.[67]
The new factions have allowed the long-standing terrorist networks to conceal their involvement in cross-border terrorism in Pakistan.[68] At the same time, their emergence in an already overcrowded threat landscape potentially complicates operational understanding among the security forces involved in counter terrorism.[69] These new factions also allow the TTP and the HGBG to maintain plausible deniability in navigating Pakistani pressure on the Taliban regime for supporting and sheltering them while continuing their cross-border attacks.[70]
Since Pakistan confronted the Taliban with evidence of the TTP’s presence on and use of Afghan soil for terrorism in Pakistan, the terror group has stopped claiming attacks through its official propaganda arm, Umar Media. This has happened in the past as well. In 2022, the TTP stopped officially claiming attacks when it engaged in peace talks with Pakistan. Instead, a new jihadist group, Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), carried out suicide attacks across Pakistan on the TTP’s behalf.[71] As a precondition for peace talks, the TTP was under an obligation to maintain a ceasefire.[72] However, it was also facing pressure from more radical factions to continue violence to strengthen its negotiation position. The TTP thus covertly allowed its radical factions to continue attacks through TJP.[73]
The first group to emerge in 2025 was HIIP, which is a front group of AQ’s 313 Brigade.[74] Since the Taliban’s return to power, AQ has been embedding itself with local jihadist groups in Pakistan to continue its activities. For instance, some factions of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) have joined the TTP. The head of the TTP’s Umar Media, Chaudhry Muneeb Jutt, is a former AQ propagandist.[75]
Other militant proxies of the TTP which emerged during the Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions include Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan Force, Tahaffuz Imarat Islami Force, Lashkar-e-Difa al-Quds, Ansarul Sharia Pakistan and Ansarul Jihad.[76] Two factions, Jaish Tahrir Hind and Jaish-ul-Hind, belong to the HGBG.[77]
Responses
To balance its kinetic and non-kinetic counter terrorism responses, Pakistan announced a new National Prevention of Violent Extremism (NPVE) Policy in 2025.[78] Given resource scarcity and capacity issues, coupled with governance deficit, Pakistan’s non-kinetic responses have not complemented kinetic counter terrorism gains, thus compromising the latter. The main purpose of the new NPVE Policy is to sustain kinetic counter terrorism achievements through concurrent non-kinetic policy interventions.[79] The NPVE comprises a “Five-R” framework: 1) revisit (educational curriculum); 2) reach out (to the public with counternarratives against extremist ideologies through mainstream and social media); 3 reduce risk (of violent extremism); 4) reinforce (the message of peace and tolerance); and 5) reintegrate (deradicalisation and rehabilitation of former fighters and conflict-affected communities).[80] Though the NPVE has an elaborate implementation framework, the real challenge will be its judicious execution. Similar policies, such as the National Internal Security Policies (NISP 2014-2018 and 2019-2023) as well as the National Security Policy (NSP 2022-2026), had previously been announced; however, their implementation remained the real challenge.[81]
Following the NPVE’s launch, Punjab province passed the Punjab Centre of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism Act 2025 in June. A new eponymous think tank was also created to curb the spread of violent extremism in Punjab.[82] Following this, all four provinces in Pakistan have now passed preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) legislation. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the most affected by terrorism in Pakistan, was the first province to pass P/CVE legislation in 2021 and establish a centre of excellence.[83] Balochistan approved P/CVE legislation in October 2024 under the anti-terrorism regime,[84] and Sindh followed suit in May 2025.[85] However, except for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, none of the provincial P/CVE centres are operational.[86] As mentioned before, the real challenge lies in the political will and institutional coherence to translate policy into practice.
Meanwhile, to further strengthen and lend credence to its narrative warfare against faith-based militant networks, a conference of religious scholars was convened in Islamabad in April, during which it was declared that violence in the name of jihad is unlawful.[87] It was part of Pakistan’s efforts to build a legitimate counternarrative, grounded in religious doctrine, against extremist ideologies. The conference endorsed the killing of rebels by the security forces for instigating militant violence while declaring them as “Khawarij” (rebels or outcasts).[88] The conference’s declaration also noted that militant campaigns by non-state violent actors, under the cloak of Islam, spread discord (Fasad fil-Ardh).[89] It bears mention that the Pakistan Army describes militant groups which carry out attacks in Pakistan as “Fitna al-Khawarij”.[90]
In addition, to improve civil-military counter terrorism coordination, the National Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre (NIFTAC) was inaugurated in May.[91] As the central body for counter terrorism strategy, the NIFTAC will combine over 50 federal and provincial departments and agencies into a unified intelligence and threat management system.[92] It will operate as a federal institution and will directly link six Provincial Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centres (PIFTACs), including those in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Reportedly, the NIFTAC will be supported by a centralised national database.[93]
On the external front, Pakistan revived its counter terrorism partnership with the United States (US) in 2025 by assisting with the arrest of ISK operative Mohammad Sharifullah, the mastermind behind the 2021 Kabul airport attack.[94] Though this resuscitated counter terrorism cooperation is not the same following the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, it is nevertheless important to address the threat posed by AQ and ISK in Afghanistan.[95] At the same time, it also creates opportunities for both countries to forge cooperation against Pakistan-centric threat groups like the TTP and the BLA.
Since 2019, the BLA has been on the US’s list of Specially Designated Terrorist Groups (SDTGs).[96] In August 2025, the US State Department listed the BLA and the Majeed Brigade as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).[97] The move underscored the alignment of US-Pakistan security interests in the region. It will pave the way for greater operational coordination and intelligence sharing under the counter terrorism framework.[98] In the same month, the US and Pakistan held a counter terrorism dialogue in Islamabad and reaffirmed their joint commitment to indiscriminately fight all forms of terrorism.[99] Both countries agreed to develop effective approaches to fight terrorist groups, including ISK, the TTP and the BLA. Moreover, there was a consensus between both nations to build institutional frameworks to counter the use of emerging technologies for terrorist purposes.[100]
Outlook
Terrorist violence in Pakistan will not only persist but expand further in 2026. Pakistan’s flawed Afghan policy of banking on the Taliban to address the TTP challenge has played a major part in reviving several jihadist networks in the country. The Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions over the TTP, due to the Taliban’s inaction, will be a major vector of instability in Pakistan. The broader chaos ensuing from these tensions will create multiple openings for transnational terrorist groups like AQ and ISK to exploit. Newer militant factions, acting as front groups of larger militant networks, will also emerge to obfuscate the latter’s culpability in cross-border terrorism.
The foregoing brings into sharp light the complexity of Pakistan’s threat landscape. The country will have to combine an internal security policy which balances kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of counter terrorism with adroit diplomacy with Kabul to overcome its security challenges. The way Islamabad approaches ties with Kabul and New Delhi, manages governance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and addresses the growing state-society gap, will shape the contours of its internal security landscape in 2026.
About the Author
Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Aa Dil on Pexels
Citations
[1] Global Terrorism Index 2025 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025), 23, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2025.
[2] Zuha Noor-Sylvia and Noah Sylvia, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Conflict and the Question of Cross-Border Terrorism,” Royal United Services Institute, November 12, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/pakistan-afghanistan-conflict-and-question-cross-border-terrorism.
[3] Mariam Shah, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Beyond Azm-e-Istehkam,” Royal United Services Institute, July 1, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/pakistans-counterterrorism-strategy-beyond-azm-e-istehkam.
[4] Umer Farooq, “The Poor Of Pakistan And God-Fearing Political Class,” The Friday Times, February 16, 2025, https://www.thefridaytimes.com/16-Feb-2025/the-poor-of-pakistan-and-god-fearing-political-class.
[5] “Joint Statement on U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue,” U.S. Department of State, August 12, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/joint-statement-on-u-s-pakistan-counterterrorism-dialogue.
[6] “Datasheet – Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed November 15, 2025, https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan.
[7] Ibid.
[8] “Militants Thrive Amid Political Instability in Pakistan,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, December 12, 2024, https://acleddata.com/report/militants-thrive-amid-political-instability-pakistan.
[9] Farzana Sheikh, “Why Brute Force Will Not End Pakistan’s Balochistan Insurgency,” Chatham House, September 3, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/09/why-brute-force-will-not-end-pakistans-balochistan-insurgency.
[10] The military wants to launch a major operation in the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) to blunt the resurgence of militant networks, which the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government opposes, fearing large-scale displacement of people. The latter also questions the utility of similar major military operations in the past. Furthermore, the Pakistani military’s decision to target the TTP and other militants’ hideouts in Afghanistan is seen with fear and scepticism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. People fear that it will complicate things rather than pave the way for a durable solution. They believe that they will have to face the blowback of the Pakistani military’s unilateral strikes in Afghanistan.
[11] Sami Omari, “The Return of the Great Game: India and Pakistan’s Shadow War in Afghanistan,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 17, 2025, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-return-of-the-great-game-india-and-pakistans-shadow-war-in-afghanistan/; Tom Hussain and Sarmad Iqbal, “India-Pakistan Conflict Risks Surge Amid Terror Attacks, Afghan Proxy War Claims,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3332728/india-pakistan-conflict-risks-surge-amid-terror-attacks-afghan-proxy-war-claims.
[12] Ilhan Khan and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Borderland Struggles: The Consequences of the Afghan Taliban’s Takeover on Pakistan,” The Round Table 11, no. 1 (2025): 34-51.
[13] Dan Strumpf, Tooba Khan and Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “Explosion in India, Pakistan 24 Hours Apart Raise Tensions,” Bloomberg, November 12, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-11/blasts-rock-capitals-of-india-and-pakistan-heightening-tensions?embedded-checkout=true.
[14] “Any Future Terror Act Will Be Considered ‘Act of War’ Against India: Government Sources,” The Hindu, May 10, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/any-future-terror-act-will-be-considered-act-of-war-against-india-government-sources/article69560805.ece.
[15] Rueben Dass and Abdul Basit, “Nascent Adoption: Emerging Tech Trends by Terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, June 18, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/06/18/nascent-adoption-emerging-tech-trends-by-terrorists-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/.
[16] Mushtaq Ali and Asif Shahzad, “Pakistani Islamist Militants Use Drones to Target Security Forces, Officials Say,” Reuters, July 21, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistani-islamist-militants-use-drones-target-security-forces-officials-say-2025-07-21/.
[17] “Militants Use Drones to Target Pakistani Security Forces, Officials Say,” Arab News, July 21, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2608892/pakistan.
[18] Data compiled by The Khorasan Diary, accessed November 7, 2025.
[19] Hammad Waleed and Muhammad Shoaib, “Quadcopters Have Become the Taliban’s New Weapon – And Pakistan Is Not Ready,” Small Wars Journal, September 3, 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/03/quadcopters-have-become-the-talibans-new-weapon-and-pakistan-is-not-ready/.
[20] Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Drone Challenge,” Dawn, August 10, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1929884.
[21] Ibid.
[22] “Emerging Technologies and the Future of Counter Terrorism Operations in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Areas” (panel discussion, Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, September 25, 2025), https://www.irs.org.pk/Events.php.
[23] Abdul Basit, “Emerging Technologies Are Reshaping Pakistan’s Militancy Landscape For the Worse,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute, September 17, 2025, https://ipripak.org/emerging-technologies-are-reshaping-pakistans-militancy-landscape-for-the-worse/.
[24] Dass and Basit, “Nascent Adoption.”
[25] “About Balochistan,” Government of Balochistan, accessed November 15, 2025, https://balochistan.gov.pk/about/about-balochistan/.
[26] Amira Jadoon, Joey Moran and Saif Tahir, “Strategic Messaging,” The Durand Dispatch, June 9, 2025, https://www.duranddispatch.com/p/durand-dispatch-strategic-messaging-newsletter-1775.
[27] Muhammad Irfan and Iftikhar Firdous, “The Future Conflict: Artificial Intelligence Posing Real Threat In Countering Terrorism,” The Khorasan Diary, March 18, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/03/18/the-future-conflict-artificial-intelligence-posing-real-threat-in-countering-terrorism.
[28] Sirwan Kajjo, “IS Turns to Artificial Intelligence for Advanced Propaganda Amid Territorial Defeats,” Voice of America, May 23, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/is-turns-to-artificial-intelligence-for-advanced-propaganda-amid-territorial-defeats/7624397.html.
[29] Abid Hussain, “Deadly Pakistan Train Hijack: What Happened, Who Was Rescued, What’s Next?” Al Jazeera, March 11, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/11/deadly-pakistan-train-hijack-what-happened-and-whats-next.
[30] Saleem Ahmed and Saad Sayeed, “Pakistan Military Ends Train Standoff, Says 21 Hostages and Four Troops Killed,” Reuters, March 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-rescues-155-hostages-train-dozens-still-held-sources-say-2025-03-12/.
[31] Ayush Verma, Imtiaz Baloch and Valle Riccardo, “The Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, Tactics, and Regional Security Implications,” CTC Sentinel 18, no. 4 (2025): 27-40, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042025_article-3.pdf.
[32] Imtiaz Baloch, “The Killer Highways of Balochistan,” Dawn, March 5, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1895508.
[33] “Baloch Militants Kill Nine Passengers From Punjab in Southwest Pakistan,” The New Indian Express, July 11, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2025/Jul/11/baloch-militants-kill-nine-passengers-from-punjab-in-southwest-pakistan; Arjun Sengupta, “Why Baloch Militants Targeted Punjabi Travellers in Recent Attack Which Killed 23,” The Indian Express, August 27, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/baloch-militants-targeted-punjabi-travellers-in-recent-attack-which-9534077/.
[34] “Gunmen in Pakistan Kidnap, Kill Nine Bus Passengers, Officials Say,” Al Jazeera, July 11, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/11/gunmen-in-pakistan-kidnap-kill-nine-bus-passengers-officials-say; Muhammad Amir Rana, “Problem with Punjab CNIC,” Dawn, September 1, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1856116.
[35] Nityanand Shukla,” Maoists Briefly Hijack Indian Train,” Reuters, April 22, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/maoists-briefly-hijack-indian-train-idUSTRE53L102/.
[36] Abdul Basit, “The BLA Becomes South Asia’s Most Effective Insurgent Group,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, October 22, 2025.
[37] Sajid Aziz, “Counterinsurgency Dynamics in Balochistan: Examining Militant Surrenders and Resurgences,” 9DASHLINE, February 20, 2024, https://www.9dashline.com/article/counter-insurgency-dynamics-in-balochistan-examining-militant-surrenders-and-resurgences.
[38] Shoaib Baloch, “Changing Face of Insurgency in Balochistan,” The Geopolitics, March 11, 2025, https://thegeopolitics.com/changing-face-of-insurgency-in-balochistan/.
[39] Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Shah Meer Baloch, “He Only Wanted Revenge: The Bloody Insurgency in Balochistan Gaining Lethal Momentum,” The Guardian, March 24, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/24/he-only-wanted-revenge-the-bloody-insurgency-in-balochistan-gaining-lethal-momentum.
[40] Abdul Basit, “Implications of TTP-Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group Competition for Pakistan’s Internal Security,” The Diplomat, February 25, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/implications-of-ttp-hafiz-gul-bahadur-group-competition-for-pakistans-internal-security/.
[41] Iftikhar Firdous, “Territorialism and Tribal Rivalry: Inside the Power Struggle Between TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group,” Khabar Kada, January 29, 2025, https://khabarkada.com/territorialism-and-tribal-rivalry-inside-the-power-struggle-between-ttp-and-hafiz-gul-bahadur-group/.
[42] Amira Jadoon and Sara Mahmood, “Fixing the Cracks in the Pakistani Taliban’s Foundation: TTP’s Leadership Returns to the Mehsud Tribe,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 11 (2018): 21-25, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CTC-SENTINEL-122018.pdf.
[43] Firdous, “Territorialism and Tribal Rivalry.”
[44] “Emergence of ‘Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan’: A New Militant Alliance Challenges TTP’s Monopoly,” Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, April 18, 2025, https://www.picss.net/latest-reports/emergence-of-ittehad-ul-mujahideen-pakistan-a-new-militant-alliance-challenges-ttps-monopoly-weekly-report-11-17-april2025/.
[45] “TRAC Reports Clash Between Pak Groups TTP and HGB,” Security Risks Asia, January 24, 2025, https://www.security-risks.com/post/trac-reports-clash-between-pak-groups-ttp-and-hgb.
[46] Riccardo Valle, “A Profile of Jaish-ul-Usrah,” Militancy Chowk, February 28, 2025, https://www.militancychowk.com/p/a-profile-of-jaish-ul-usrah.
[47] Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: Pashtun Militant Fostering Jihadist Factional Unity Along Pakistan’s Durand Line,” The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor 15, no. 10 (2025), https://jamestown.org/hafiz-gul-bahadur-pashtun-militant-fostering-jihadist-factional-unity-along-pakistans-durand-line/.
[48] “TKD Monitoring: Three Pakistani Taliban Factions Announced Ittehadul Mujahideen,” The Khorasan Diary, April 12, 2025, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2025/04/12/tkd-monitoring-three-pakistani-taliban-factions-announced-ittehadul-mujahideen.
[49] Jawad Yousafzai, “TTP vs Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen: A New Power Struggle in the Militant Landscape,” Daily Times, April 17, 2025, https://dailytimes.com.pk/1288118/ttp-vs-ittihad-ul-mujahideen-a-new-power-struggle-in-the-militant-landscape/.
[50] “Tensions Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Spike As Truce Is Extended,” Al Jazeera, October 17, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/17/tensions-between-pakistan-and-afghanistan-spike-as-truce-about-to-expire.
[51] Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban Leader Thought to Be Targeted in Airstrike on Afghan Capital,” FDD’s Long War Journal, October 10, 2025, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/10/pakistani-taliban-leader-thought-to-be-targeted-in-airstrike-on-afghan-capital.php.
[52] “Border Clashes Erupt Between Pakistan and Afghanistan – Again,” The Economist, October 16, 2025, https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/10/16/border-clashes-erupt-between-pakistan-and-afghanistan-again.
[53] Abid Hussain, “Pakistan, Afghanistan Move Towards ‘Restoring Ties’ in Talks With China,” Al Jazeera, May 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/23/pakistan-afghanistan-move-towards-restoring-ties-in-talks-with-china.
[54] “Dar in Kabul,” Dawn, April 22, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1905824.
[55] Abdul Sayed, “The Dynamics Behind the Taliban’s Ban on Afghans Fighting in Pakistan,” The Oxus Watch, June 12, 2025, https://oxuswatch.com/content/dynamics-behind-taliban-ban-afghans-fighting-pakistan.
[56] “Pakistan Says Islamabad, South Waziristan Bombers Were Afghan Nationals,” Al Jazeera, November 13, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/13/pakistan-says-islamabad-south-waziristan-bombers-were-afghan-nationals.
[57] Umair Jamal, “What Does Doha and Ankara’s Mediation Mean for Pakistan’s Fight Against TTP?” The Diplomat, October 22, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/what-does-doha-and-ankaras-mediation-mean-for-pakistans-fight-against-ttp/.
[58] Asif Shahzad, Mohammad Yunus Yawar and Mushtaq Ali, “Pakistan and Afghanistan Agree to Immediate Ceasefire After Peace Talks in Doha,” Reuters, October 19, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghanistan-pakistan-hold-peace-talks-doha-after-fierce-fighting-says-afghan-2025-10-18/.
[59] “Taliban Says Peace Talks With Pakistan Collapse But Cease-Fire Will Hold,” Radio Free Europe, November 8, 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks-pakistan/33584788.html.
[60] Arooj Fatima, Huzaifa Qamar and Usaid Siddiqui, “Updates: Afghanistan’s Taliban, Pakistan Say Border Clashes Killed Dozens,” Al Jazeera, October 12, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/10/12/live-afghanistans-taliban-pakistan-claim-inflicting-losses-in-fighting.
[61] “Taliban Deny Presence of Pakistani Taliban During Istanbul Talks,” Afghanistan International, October 27, 2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202510270019.
[62] “TTP a Matter Pakistan Must Take Up, Not Afghanistan: Taliban Spokesman,” Geo News, August 28, 2021, https://www.geo.tv/latest/367651-ttp-a-matter-pakistan-must-take-up-not-afghanistan-taliban-spokesman.
[63] Lorraine Mallinder, “Pakistan Says Ceasefire Hinges on Afghanistan Curbing Armed Groups,” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/20/pakistan-says-ceasefire-hinges-on-afghanistan-curbing-armed-groups.
[64] “Turkey Launches New Mediation Effort to Revive Pakistan-Afghan Taliban Peace Talks,” The Nation, November 10, 2025, https://www.nation.com.pk/10-Nov-2025/turkey-launches-new-mediation-effort-revive-pakistan-afghan-taliban-peace-talks.
[65] Shahzad Akhtar and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Understanding the Resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 16, no. 3 (2023): 285-306.
[66] Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover,” CTC Sentinel 16, no. 5 (2023): 1-12, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/CTC-SENTINEL-052023.pdf.
[67] “Numerous Pakistani Taliban Factions Emerge as Proxies, Claiming Attacks for TTP and TTG,” The Khorasan Diary, October 7, 2025, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2025/11/07/numerous-pakistani-taliban-factions-emerge-as-proxies-claiming-attacks-for-ttp-and-ttg.
[68] Under the Doha Agreement 2020, the Taliban are bound to make sure that Afghanistan’s soil will not be used for terrorism against other countries.
[69] Abdul Basit Khan, “Pakistan’s Militancy Surge Amid Wider Regional Tensions,” Arab News, November 14, 2025, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2622577.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Iftikhar Firdous, “Does Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) Actually Exist?” The Khorasan Diary, April 29, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2023/04/29/does-tehreek-e-jihad-pakistan-actually-exist.
[72] “Pakistani Taliban Militants Announce Indefinite Ceasefire With Islamabad,” BBC News, June 3, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61681128.
[73] Firdous, “Does Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) Actually Exist?”
[74] Syed Moazzam Hashmi, “Rogue Selling Old Jihadist Wine In New Bottles,” The Friday Times, April 4, 2025, https://www.thefridaytimes.com/04-Apr-2025/rogue-selling-old-jihadist-wine-in-new-bottles.
[75] Iftikhar Firdous, Riccardo Valle and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, “The Resurrection of the TTP,” Dawn, July 10, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1763805.
[76] “Numerous Pakistani Taliban Factions Emerge as Proxies,” The Khorasan Diary.
[77] Ibid.
[78] National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy 2024 (Government of Pakistan, 2024), 4-18, https://www.nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/National-Prevention-of-Violent-Extremism-Policy.pdf.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Abid Hussain, “Can Pakistan’s New Anti-Extremism Policy Defeat Rising Armed Attacks?” Al Jazeera, February 22, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/25/can-pakistans-new-anti-extremism-policy-defeat-rising-armed-attacks.
[82] Sher Ali Khalti, “Punjab Assembly Passes Bill to Counter Violent Extremism,” The News International, June 17, 2025, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1322087-punjab-assembly-passes-bill-to-counter-violent-extremism.
[83] Muhammad Amir Rana, “Punjab’s Belated Countering Violent Extremism Act Step,” Dawn, June 29, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1920903.
[84] The Balochistan Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism Act 2024, Act No. IV of 2024 (Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat, 2024), https://pabalochistan.gov.pk/storage/7140/6740333b697fb_THE-BALOCHISTAN-CENTER-OF-EXCELLENCE-ON-COUNTERING-VIOLENT-EXTREMISM-ACT,2024.pdf.
[85] The Sindh Center for Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism Act, 2025 (Provincial Assembly of Sindh, 2025), https://www.pas.gov.pk/acts/details/33/617.
[86] Rana, “Punjab’s Belated.”
[87] Jawad Yousafzai (@JawadYousufxai), “A joint conference of the Islamic scholars in Islamabad forbids taking up arms against Islamic governments in the name of jihad,” X, April 11, 2025.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Naimat Khan, “Pakistan’s Anti-Terror Body Warns of Militant Threat to Opposition Protest in Islamabad,” Arab News, November 23, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2580476/pakistan.
[91] “PM Inaugurates National Intelligence Fusion & Threat Assessment Centre,” Radio Pakistan, May 6, 2025, https://www.radio.gov.pk/06-05-2025/pm-inaugurates-national-intelligence-fusion-threat-assessment-centre.
[92] Ibid.
[93] “Threat Assessment Centre Set Up to Effectively Counter Terrorism,” Dawn, August 13, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1930540.
[94] Abid Hussain, “Kabul Bombing Suspect Arrested: What It Means for US-Pakistan Relations,” Al Jazeera, March 5, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/5/kabul-bombing-suspect-arrested-what-it-means-for-us-pakistan-relations.
[95] “Pakistan Is Critical in the Fight Against Islamic State Terrorism,” The Economist, August 21, 2025, https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/08/21/pakistan-is-critical-in-the-fight-against-islamic-state-terrorism.
[96] “Executive Order 13224,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 15, 2025, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224.
[97] “Terrorist Designation of The Majeed Brigade,” U.S, Department of State, August 11, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/terrorist-designation-of-the-majeed-brigade.
[98] Sajid Aziz, “U.S. Designation of BLA As Terror Outfit: A Win for Pakistan, But Not a Panacea,” South Asian Voices, September 16, 2025, https://southasianvoices.org/geo-m-pk-n-bla-designation-pakistan-09-16-2025/.
[99] “Joint Statement on U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue,” U.S. Department of State.
[100] Ibid.
