Philippines
The general terrorism threat landscape in the Philippines has improved significantly. Through military and non-military interventions, terrorist elements across the country have retreated and surrendered. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has maintained its leadership decapitation strategy, killing significant leaders like Abu Zacariah and Pasil Bayali in 2023. The surrender of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)’s leader, Abu Turaife, also marked a significant development. Nonetheless, the threat still persists, as illustrated by the December 2023 deadly bomb attack at a gymnasium in Marawi City, and amid the persistence of factors such as the entrenched rido (clan wars) culture, the impending Bangsamoro elections and the persistence of poor conditions of vulnerable communities in conflict-afflicted Mindanao.
Introduction
The terrorist threat landscape in the Philippines significantly improved in 2023. The year saw a significant decrease in terrorist attacks, an increased number of combatant surrenders, the retaking of terrorist-held territories and the removal of key terrorist leaders from the southern conflict theatre. Overall, while the terrorist threat has reduced significantly, militant groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continue to survive and pose a security concern in Mindanao, southern Philippines.
Decline of the ASG Threat
Aggressive military operations involving the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)’s 11th Infantry Division (11ID) have forced the ASG, a key threat actor, out of its longtime stronghold in Sulu province. This marks the culmination of efforts since 2018, when the AFP first established a permanent military presence in Sulu to address the persistent ASG threat. The military, local government units and civil society organisations (CSOs) have also worked alongside the authorities in a coordinated and multipronged effort that eventually allowed Governor Abdulsankar Tan to declare Sulu an “Abu Sayyaf-free” area on September 6, 2023.[1]
The AFP 11ID has adopted a holistic approach to reduce the ASG’s presence in Sulu, increasingly emphasising peace-building and livelihood improvement over just military confrontation. Critical to their success has been the improved civil-military relations, which embed military operations into the “Balik Barangay” programme.[2] This programme aims to bring internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by the conflict between the AFP and ASG back to their original villages. Through a coordinated approach by the AFP, local government units (LGUs) and CSOs, they have been able to: 1) protect civilians from the ASG’s atrocities; 2) limit the space ASG members can operate in; and 3) demoralise ASG members.[3]
Following the death of former leader Hajan Sawadjaan in July 2020, the rank-and-file members of the pro-Islamic State (IS) ASG faction in Sulu began to surrender to the AFP at a significant rate. These included members who had originally surrendered to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the late 2000s.[4] Surrendered combatants in Sulu are held in the AFP’s facilities and are closely monitored. They also receive religious rehabilitation through the Al Wasatiyyah Islam programme on religious moderation jointly organised by the Kapatut Bangsasut, a civil society group, and the Sulu Ulama Council for Development (SUCD).[5]
Hajan Sawadjaan’s nephew, Mundi Sawadjaan, was purported as the next leader of the pro-IS ASG faction in Sulu. While sources claimed that Mundi was not viewed as leadership material, he continued to be a threat due to his bomb assembling skills and role as a bomb-maker in the Jolo Cathedral suicide bombing in January 2019.
According to assessments by police sources, Mundi declined to take on the leadership role and subsequently fled Sulu to Sumisip, south of Basilan Island. It was believed he had been holed up there since 2020. He later attempted to link up with and join the pro-IS BIFF faction’s leader, Abu Turaife, but to no avail.[6] Based on intelligence sources, the authorities had been attempting to convince Mundi to surrender.[7] He was later killed while trying to evade military operations in Basilan on December 2, 2023.[8]
While the government’s claim that Sulu is “Abu Sayyaf-free” is largely accurate, it must not be interpreted as representing a complete eradication of ASG elements from the wider territory. Today, ASG continues to operate in the neighbouring island of Basilan. While areas in northern Basilan, like Isabella City and Lamitan City, are generally safe from the ASG’s influence, ASG elements maintain a presence in southern Basilan, particularly in the Sumisip area. Pasil Bayali, who was reportedly killed on October 6, 2023, had apparently been the main ASG leader in the area.[9]
In southern Basilan, much effort has been made to reintegrate ASG members into society. Jul Adnan Hataman, the mayor of Sumisip, introduced the Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) model to provide a whole-of-society approach to reintegrating former combatants into the community.[10] However, while the AFP acknowledges the surrender of ASG members in Sumisip, their efforts have not been recognised by the Philippines National Police (PNP) as there are outstanding criminal charges against some surrendered ASG members in Basilan.[11] Such differences between the PNP and AFP are still being worked out.[12]
Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group: Weakened but Persistent
In Lanao del Sur, there were significant developments involving the IS-linked DIMG network, particularly involving the death of its prominent leader, Abu Zacariah.[13] On May 26, 2023, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) captured four youth members from DIMG.[14] One of them was DIMG’s designated spokesperson, Muhammad Nasif alias Abu Rasas.
This operation resulted in retaliation from DIMG as they threatened to “carry out bombings and sow violence” throughout Marogong village if the four youth members were handed over to the AFP. In response, the AFP, PNP and MILF jointly conducted an evacuation operation in Marogong village within the space of three hours.[15] By then, the hunt for Abu Zacariah, the then declared emir of IS in Southeast Asia, had also intensified.
Abu Zacariah visited Marawi City on June 14, 2023. He and his lieutenant, Abu Morsid, rented an apartment in Marawi City. However, due to the unpopularity of DIMG in Marawi City, citizens tipped off the authorities almost immediately after they sighted Abu Zacariah.[16] This resulted in a joint operation between the AFP and PNP to arrest Abu Zacariah. However, because Abu Zacariah resisted arrest, he was eventually killed along with his lieutenant on the same day of his arrival in Marawi City.[17]
The death of Abu Zacariah resulted in an uproar amongst the rank-and-file members of DIMG. They called for revenge and threat escalation, promising retribution on the citizens of Marawi City. Through text messages circulated in IDP camps, DIMG promised that because a “fellow Maranao”[18] had betrayed them, they would outdo the 2017 Marawi Siege.[19] Moreover, they claimed that DIMG had thoroughly infiltrated Marawi City and actively participated in public gatherings and political activities.[20] They also called for the killing of political figures in Southeast Asia, such as Ibrahim Murad (leader of the MILF), Ferdinand Marcos Jr (President of the Philippines), Joko Widodo (President of Indonesia) and Halimah Yacob (then President of Singapore).[21] However, there was little evidence to suggest that these threats were credible.
However, an attack took place at the Mindanao State University (MSU)’s gymnasium on December 3, 2023.[22] The gymnasium was being used by a Catholic congregation in Marawi for their Sunday mass service. According to local sources, the IS-linked attack, which killed four mass attendees and injured 50 others,[23] was masterminded by Arsani Membisa and Wahab A Macabayao (alias Wabie/Mortaba Marangit), who planted an improvised explosive device (a 60mm mortar).[24] Wabie had allegedly surrendered in the first quarter of 2018 but returned to DIMG afterwards.[25]
Similar to Sulu and Basilan, much has been done to reintegrate former combatants from DIMG into society. The main organisation overseeing the reintegration efforts of former DIMG members is Project Sindao.[26] However, unlike reintegration initiatives in Sulu and Basilan, which involve participants of a wider age range, Project Sindao primarily focuses on rehabilitating and reintegrating youths from DIMG due to the younger demographic of DIMG members.[27] The critical thrust of Project Sindao is to provide youths with education on religious moderation and a sense of belonging and empowerment to combat the urge to join local terrorist groups.[28]
The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
Today, the BIFF continues to be the largest terrorist group in Mindanao. There are three BIFF factions, but only one has pledged allegiance to IS.[29] In the middle of 2023, a culmination of events led to the false declaration of Abu Turaife, the pro-IS BIFF leader, as the emir of Dawlah Islamiyah Philippines.[30] However, Abu Turaife was reported to have surrendered to the AFP in Maguindanao.[31]
The surrender of Abu Turaife was unexpected. On the one hand, Abu Turaife had indicated interest in becoming the “leader of jihad” in Southeast Asia during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.[32] Moreover, after the killing of Abu Zacariah in Marawi City, the Turaife-led BIFF faction launched a retaliatory attack on the evening of his death against the PNP.[33] Hence, there seemed to be clear intent on Turaife’s part to become the emir of Dawlah Islamiyah Philippines.
At the same time, however, Abu Turaife had also expressed clear hesitation in taking on the role of the leader of Dawlah Islamiyah Philippines. After the death of Hajan Sawadjaan in 2020, Abu Turaife’s deputy, Salahuddin Hassan, was nominated as the leader of Dawlah Islamiyah Philippines despite the former’s seniority. Moreover, Abu Turaife had been actively campaigning for a certain “Abu Erhabee” to take on the role of emir, based on discussions in the East Asia Knights messaging channel.[34]
The surrender of Abu Turaife was intended to be kept a secret by both the AFP and PNP.[35] The authorities had initially feared that the public announcement of Abu Turaife’s surrender would lead to an outcry from Dawlah Islamiyah members across Mindanao, resulting in an increase in retaliatory attacks against civilian populations.[36] Additionally, they had intended to leverage Abu Turaife’s cooperation to completely demobilise the BIFF before announcing his surrender.[37] At present, it remains unclear how the revelation of Abu Turaife’s surrender would affect the rank-and-file members of Dawlah Islamiyah.
Continued Threat
Despite the optimistic outlook for the terrorist threat landscape in the Philippines, there are persistent challenges. The attack at MSU’s gymnasium highlights the ongoing threat of terrorism in Mindanao. The Philippines must continue to address these challenges to keep the threat at a reduced level.
First, the rido culture of the Mindanao region tends to protract violence between families and kinship networks of ethnic Muslim groups in the region.[38] Many of these inter- and intra-ethnic clan feuds continue to persist within Mindanao, and largely go unreported.[39] Such a persistent culture of violence creates an industry for small arms and weaponry, which can negatively impact the threat landscape in Mindanao if left unchecked. While efforts have been made to educate the population and dissuade them from continuing to uphold rido, the authorities also recognise the difficulty of changing this long-entrenched culture.
Second, electoral violence is a staple in Mindanao. With the barangay elections happening in 2023-2024 and the upcoming Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) elections slated for 2025, some level of violence can be expected in the region.[40] It is, however, unclear if electoral violence will be motivated by terrorist intent.[41]
The third challenge concerns the delivery of public goods. IDPs from Sulu and Marawi continue to suffer from a lack of basic public goods, including access to clean drinking water, electricity, stable internet access and jobs.[42] The authorities conduct frequent visits to affected areas to deliver water rations to the community, but more can be done.[43] Beyond the provision of basic public goods, IDPs need psychological and mental support that is often not rendered immediately.[44]
Despite the prevailing poor socioeconomic environment, residents from Marawi and Sulu are resilient against terrorist narratives and recruitment.[45] But while it is unlikely for Islamist terrorist groups like the ASG and DIMG to recruit individuals suffering from harsh living conditions, separatist sentiments against the government may appeal to the affected residents.
About the Author
Kenneth Yeo is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
[1] Aaron Recuenco, “Finally! Sulu Declared as Abu Sayyaf-free,” Manila Bulletin, September 7, 2023, https://mb.com.ph/2023/9/7/finally-sulu-declared-as-abu-sayyaf-free.
[2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Naka-Uwi Na Kami’: Thousands in Sulu Finally Return Home, November 27, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/ph/21963-nov2020-enews-sulu.html.
[3] ICPVTR field notes.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Fahrudin Alwi and Yon Machmudi, “Moderation of The Islamic Movement in Peace Implementation Between The Government of The Republic of The Philippines and The Moro Nation in The South Philippines,” Journal Middle East and Islamic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2022), p. 4.
[6] ICPVTR field notes.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Al Jacinto, “Sayyaf Leader Killed in Basilan Encounter”, The Manila Times, December 3, 2023, https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/12/04/regions/sayyaf-leader-killed-in-basilan-encounter/1922672.
[9] Anti-Radicalism and Violent Extremism, “WANTED!!! Pasil Bayali,” Facebook, December 20, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/ANTIRVE/photos/a.1846431845596332/3166297640276406/; Zam Yusa, “Terrorist Leader ‘Dies’ of Injuries, 14 of His Men Surrender to Philippine Army,” SEA Militancy, October 6, 2023, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/terrorist-leader-dies-of-injuries.
[10] Joseph Franco, Unpacking Violent Extremism: Dynamics in the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Resolve Network, 2020), https://doi.org/10.37805/pn2020.2.sea.
[11] Ellson Quismorio, “Hataman Checks Mayor Isko on Unsavory Basilan Statement,” Manila Bulletin, November 15, 2019, https://mb.com.ph/2019/11/14/hataman-checks-mayor-isko-on-unsavory-basilan-statement/?amp.
[12] ICPVTR field notes. Such differences are being worked out by the new intelligence commander of PNP Region 9 (the police division that has jurisdiction over the cluster of islands from Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga Peninsula) and AFP 11ID.
[13] Zam Yusa, “A New Filipino Leader for Southeast Asia’s Islamic State,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/a-new-filipino-leader-for-southeast-asias-islamic-state/.
[14] Merlyn Manos, “Hundreds Evacuate in Lanao del Sur Over Dawlah Islamiyah Threat,” Rappler, 28 May 2023, https://www.rappler.com/nation/mindanao/hundreds-evacuate-lanao-del-sur-over-dawlah-islamiyah-threat/; Froilan Gallardo, “2,000 Residents Flee Lanao del Sur’s Marogong Town,” MindaNews, May 28, 2023, https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2023/05/2000-residents-flee-lanao-del-surs-marogong-town/; Edwin O. Fernandez and Richel V. Umel, “Lanao del Sur Families Flee As Armed Group Warns of Attack,”INQUIRER.net, May 29, 2023, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1776002/lanao-sur-folk-flee-as-armed-group-warns-of-attack.
[15] Ibid.
[16] ICPVTR field notes.
[17] Bianca Dava, “ISIS-Southeast Asia Leader Killed in Marawi Encounter, Says Military,” ABS-CBN, June 14, 2023, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/14/23/isis-southeast-asia-leader-killed-in-marawi-military.
[18] The informant who reported Abu Zacariah’s position to the AFP was also a member of the ethnic Muslim Maranao clan.
[19] ICPVTR online monitoring.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Joel Guinto and Virma Simonette, “Mindanao: Four Killed in Explosion at Catholic Mass in Philippines,” BBC News, December 3, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67604592.
[23] “Bomb Blast During Mass Kills 4, Wounds 50 at Mindanao State University,” INQUIRER.net, December 3, 2023, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1869861/bomb-blast-during-mass-kills-4-wounds-50-at-mindanao-state-university.
[24] ICPVTR local sources.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Project Sindao is a combination of two Maranao words: sindaw (light) and ndao (teaching). The project’s founder, Jalilah Hadji Sapiin, explained that she created this project because she believes there is a brighter future in teaching former combatants the ways of religious moderation.
[27] This may be due to the demographic of combatants who join DIMG. Based on ICPVTR online monitoring, members of DIMG tend to be adolescents.
[28] Based on local research conducted by Project Sindao, they found that Maranao youth join terrorist groups because of a sense of belonging and empowerment. During the leadership of Abu Dar (2018-2019), youth were given the responsibility to lead religious prayers and take key appointments in the organisation.
[29] Note that some may consider the “Hassan Faction” as a separate faction. However, Salahuddin Hassan only led the faction for approximately a year. He is also known to be the lieutenant of Abu Turaife, and most of the attacks conducted by the “Hassan Faction” are linked to the Turaife Faction.
[30] Zam Yusa, “Who is Abu Turaife, Filipino Terrorist Touted As New Emir of IS Southeast Asia?” SEA Militancy, July 14, 2023, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/who-is-abu-turaife-the-touted-filipino.
[31] Rommel Banlaoi, “Terrorist Threats in the Philippines 22 Years After 9/11: Declining But Not Disappearing – Analysis,” The Eurasia Review, September 11, 2023, https://www.eurasiareview.com/11092023-terrorist-threats-in-the-philippines-22-years-after-9-11-declining-but-not-disappearing-analysis/.
[32] “BIFF Commander Claims Leadership of Jihad in Mindanao, Calls for Recruits,” SITE Intelligence Group, August 19, 2020, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Southeast-Asia/biff-commander-claims-leadership-of-jihad-in-mindanao-calls-for-recruits.html.
[33] Rommel Rebollido and Ferdinandh Cabrera, “2 Cops Killed, 4 Wounded in Maguindanao Del Sur Ambush,” Rappler, June 15, 2023, https://www.rappler.com/nation/mindanao/cops-killed-ambush-maguindanao-del-sur-june-14-2023/.
[34] Kenneth Yeo, “Rebranding the East Asian Knights: A Reflection of Dawlah Islamiyah’s Effort to Learn,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNet), March 1, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/03/01/rebranding-the-east-asia-knights-a-reflection-of-dawlah-islamiyahs-effort-to-learn/.
[35] ICPVTR field notes.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] The rido culture advocates for revenge against acts which dishonour the family. For example, if a family member is dishonoured, it is a cultural obligation for the family of the dishonoured party to kill the entire family of the perpetrator. There are slight differences between how each ethnolinguistic tribe executes rido. For example, the Tausug excludes violence against female members of the perpetrator’s family, while the Maranao does not. See Maria Bernadette L. Abrera, “Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao,” ed. Wilfredo Magno Torres III, Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints, Vol. 64, No. 2 (2016), pp. 329-332.
[39] Richard Falcatan, “Man Killed As Basilan Rido Violence Spills Over Into Zamboanga,” Rappler, July 26, 2023, https://www.rappler.com/nation/mindanao/death-basilan-rido-violence-spills-over-zamboanga-july-25-2023/.
[40] Cheng Xu and Jacques Bertrand, “Barangay Elections in the Bangsamoro: A Crucial Test for the Future of the BARMM,” The Diplomat, June 23, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/barangay-elections-in-the-bangsamoro-a-crucial-test-for-the-future-of-the-barmm/.
[41] ICPVTR field notes. Residents reflected on the dilemma of an MILF administration with little experience in governance and the potential for an MILF wipe out. They fear that if the MILF no longer holds power within the BARMM, it may resort to violence to take over the BARMM. Yet, locals also support the MILF despite their lack of administrative competence because they are perceived to be the representatives of the indigenous Maranao and Maguindanao people.
[42] Ibid. In the context of Marawi, IDPs expressed the need for a “livelihood”. As the Maranao people are merchants, equipping them with vocational skills may not be relevant to their culture. Instead, they desire access to markets to trade products. Ultimately, infrastructure investments in Marawi should fit the needs of the local culture.
[43] Ibid. The authorities deliver water to the IDP camps twice every week. However, due to the erratic weather conditions of Marawi, floods and landslides may affect service delivery within the city.
[44] Ibid. Individuals affected by the 2019 Jolo Cathedral attack only received mental health support three years after the incident. Access to mental health support may be due to the improved security situation in Sulu.
[45] In the context of Sulu, 2023 is the first time many civilians have experienced peace. They no longer need to live in fear of the ASG and have begun to blame it for the imposition of Sulu curfews in the past. In the context of Marawi, IDPs blame DIMG for destroying their homes and looting generations of wealth from their homes.
