Philippines
The terrorism threat landscape in Mindanao has declined, but underlying risk factors persist. There were no major attacks in 2025, and the terrorist surrender rate has plateaued. This suggests that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)’s kinetic operations, combined with the implementation of Executive Order 70, have stabilised violence in Mindanao. Consequently, local terrorist groups remain fragmented. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to rejuvenate the dispersed groups independently. There are also concerns over surrendered combatants, as they face financial and psychological insecurity. Overall, while terrorist groups in Mindanao are operationally weak, incomplete reintegration and persistent grievances are risk factors that the government should address.
Introduction
Terrorism in the Philippines has been concentrated in Mindanao in the southern Philippines. However, Mindanao is not a homogeneous region, and its ethno-religious diversity has historically contributed to complex social dynamics and periodic conflict.
[1] The indigenous population of Mindanao is primarily Muslim. Among this populace, the Maguindanao are the largest Muslim ethnic group. Terrorist groups in Mindanao can be understood through the T3 Nexus (i.e., the nexus between Terrorist Group, Tribe and Territory), whereby terrorist group formation is largely determined by ethnicity and ancestral lands.[2]
Overall, terrorist activities in Mindanao have decreased significantly in recent years, with no major terrorist attacks occurring in 2025. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have enjoyed high rates of terrorist surrenders since 2020.[3] This is primarily because of the military’s efforts to eliminate the leaders of terrorist groups to instil a sense of disillusionment within the local terrorist groups (LTGs). Nevertheless, the surrender rates plateaued in 2025, which may indicate one of two trends: 1) there are no longer enough terrorists to surrender; or 2) the demoralising effect of the Philippines’ counter terrorism efforts is waning. Remnants of terrorist groups in Mindanao demonstrated resilience last year despite the exodus from local threat networks.
2025 also marked the first Bangsamoro elections since the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed in 2014. These elections were critical for the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), a political party linked to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a former rebel group which now leads the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).[4] The polls served as a litmus test for the population’s support for the MILF government after the 2014 CAB.[5] Early indicators highlighted the ethnic fragmentation of political support, with some commentators arguing the UBJP only represented the Maguindanao people and not the wider indigenous population.[6] Census data in Mindanao also indicated that locals trust the Manila government more than the Bangsamoro authorities, highlighting the precarious state of the UBJP.
The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)
The CAB was the final peace agreement between the Aquino administration and the MILF, signed in 2014 and ratified in 2019. Through the CAB, signatories agreed to end hostilities between the Bangsamoro population, otherwise known as the “normalisation track”, and to allow for the transition to self-governance of the BARMM, also known as the “political track”.
A plebiscite for the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), which mapped out a charter for the proposed BARMM, was concluded in January 2019. While most provinces voted affirmatively, Sulu rejected the BOL by a slim margin.[7] With this vote, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was abolished and replaced by the BARMM in February 2019. The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) was then established to oversee the transition to a new autonomous government. The first Bangsamoro elections were initially scheduled for May 2022. However, both the MILF-led BTA and the Philippine government agreed that more time was required to build BARMM institutions. Manila subsequently agreed to postpone the Bangsamoro elections to May 2025.[8]
In a related development, the Bangsamoro Electoral Code was passed in April 2023. One of the functions of the electoral code was the allocation of electoral districts. In April 2023, the BARMM districts included Cotabato City, Maguindanao del Norte, Maguindanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Basilan and Sulu. However, in September 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that Sulu should not be compelled to be a part of the BARMM because they had voted against the BOL.
The MILF-backed UBJP was anticipating an election that held much promise for the party. In May 2025, UBJP-backed candidates defeated entrenched political families at the provincial government polls, demonstrating widespread support for the UBJP in Maguindanao-dominated provinces.[9] Hence, the UBJP attempted to adjust the electoral districts in August 2025 to redistribute seats from Sulu to the rest of BARMM to ensure that the Bangsamoro elections proceeded as usual. However, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed changes in the electoral districts as they had been made during the campaigning period. This led to the Bangsamoro elections being rescheduled to March 2026.[10]
In March 2025, Ebrahim Murad was removed as chief minister of the BARMM and was replaced by Abdulraof Macacua.[11] Although both individuals are from the MILF, the MILF rejected the appointment of Macacua as it disregarded resolutions of the BOL passed in 2019.[12] This abrupt handover potentially strained relations between Murad and Macacua and could be a flashpoint for violence within the MILF.
Concurrently, the MILF’s central committee suspended the decommissioning of former MILF fighters, citing lapses in the decommissioning process from the Philippine government.[13] It was reported that the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace (OPAPRU) had failed to deliver on its socioeconomic programmes, which resulted in the BTA’s inability to support the MILF combatants’ reintegration into society. While the threat landscape in Mindanao is stable today, the suspension of the decommissioning process could be another potential flashpoint that requires monitoring.
Inducing Surrender: Executive Order 70
The mass surrenders of terrorists have contributed significantly to the decline in the terrorist threat landscape in Mindanao. Executive Order 70 (EO70), implemented in 2018 by then President Rodrigo Duterte, was instrumental in creating a framework for terrorists to surrender.[14] EO70 was initially introduced to demobilise the communist terrorist groups (CTGs) in the Philippines. However, AFP units operating in areas combatting LTGs adopted the same framework to demobilise the LTGs.
EO70 differs from the earlier demobilisation efforts negotiated between Manila and the MILF. In 2012, both parties concluded the aforementioned CAB, under which the MILF agreed to demobilise 40,000 combatants from the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force (BIAF) – the MILF’s armed unit.[15] However, due to disagreements over the negotiated terms among the leadership, some BIAF members splintered off to form the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) under the leadership of Ameril Umbra Kato.
EO70, in today’s context, offers a bottom-up mechanism for demobilisation. Active combatants wishing to lay down their arms are given the opportunity to surrender themselves in exchange for protection and livelihood support. Individuals surrendering under EO70 must undergo an assessment by the Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee (JAPIC), led by the AFP and co-chaired by the Philippine National Police (PNP).[16] The JAPIC certifies the authenticity of former rebels before livelihood assistance is disbursed to the surrendered combatants. However, there have been accusations that the process of obtaining JAPIC certification remains opaque.[17]
While EO70 was implemented in 2018, combatants only began to surrender in large numbers in 2020. Many were members of LTGs inspired by the Islamic State (IS), such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the BIFF and the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG). Anecdotal evidence suggests that waves of surrenders often followed the deaths of terrorist leaders. For example, 110 ASG members surrendered in Sulu in the months following the death of Hajan Sawadjaan in July 2020.[18] Similarly, the DIMG experienced three waves of surrenders following the killings of senior figures. The first occurred after October 2017, when both Maute brothers, who had been the leaders of the 2017 Marawi Siege, were killed.[19] The subsequent waves were prompted by the April 2019 killing of Owayda Benito Marohombsar (also known as Abu Dar) in an airstrike,[20] and by the July 2023 death of Faharudin Hadji Satar (also known as Abu Zacariah).[21] The surrender of Esmael Abdulmalik (also known as Abu Turaife) in 2023 also prompted the surrender of the BIFF from the Turaife faction.[22]
Despite the provision of livelihood support, surrendered combatants continue to face unique challenges. First, former combatants may find it difficult to reintegrate into their communities. Livelihood stipends provided by the Philippine government are often temporary and insufficient. Although the Manila administration offers vocational education to surrendered combatants, many lack the skills to find employment or start local businesses, having often been child soldiers with little experience interacting with civilians outside a conflict environment.
Second, there remains the perennial risk of retaliation, as surrendered combatants are often perceived by their former comrades as traitors. The risk of retaliation by these former comrades is one of the main reasons why some combatants have hesitated to surrender even when the opportunity was present. Combatants must ensure both their own safety and that of their families before approaching the AFP. For example, Ustaz Bahang – allegedly a former radical preacher – surrendered to the 45th Infantry Battalion stationed at Basilan in February 2025. However, the AFP reported that he was killed in October 2025 by unknown elements, underscoring the persistent presence of retributive violence in Basilan despite the overall downward trend.[23]
Many combatants appear to have decided to surrender because of personal connections with specific AFP soldiers.[24] According to field observations, however, soldiers in the AFP are not stationed permanently in one area and may be redeployed to other units. When this happens, surrendered combatants often reassess the viability of surrender and may rejoin another armed group for protection.
Third, there have been claims that psychosocial support has not been consistently delivered to surrendered combatants.[25] This issue is particularly acute for combatants who have surrendered in the island provinces, as it is difficult to deploy experts from mainland Mindanao to nearby Sulu and Basilan. According to local sources, the AFP currently treats the provision of financial and livelihood assistance as a form of psychosocial support. However, counselling services – widely regarded as an important component of such support – have not been extended to surrendered combatants.[26]
Additionally, efforts to support former combatants have often been compared to Manila’s attempts to compensate victims of terrorism. For example, the Marawi Compensation Board (MCB) was established to compensate victims of the Marawi Siege in 2017.[27] Eight years after the siege, however, the MCB still has not fully compensated the victims. Similarly, victims of the January 2019 Jolo Cathedral suicide bombings received only hospitalisation assistance from the Bangsamoro government in August 2020 and have yet to receive psychological counselling.[28]
Operational Environment
Terrorist groups in Mindanao today are generally uncoordinated and directionless, as there is no overall leader of the Dawlah Islamiyah movement. In Central Mindanao, Esmael Abdulmalik (also known as Abu Turaife), the leader of a faction of the BIFF, negotiated with the AFP and agreed to lay down his arms in July 2023.[29] While this weakened the BIFF, the group continues to be operational, with the Salahuddin faction continuing to fight. Today, the BIFF’s Salahuddin faction is led by a certain “Muhammad Usman”. Sources claim that Muhammad Usman is attempting to rebuild the faction’s strength through familial networks along the marshes of the SPMS Box, a cluster of adjacent townships in Maguindanao province.[30]
To the north of Central Mindanao, the DIMG also suffers from a leadership vacuum. After military and police forces jointly killed leader Abu Zacariah in June 2023, a significant number of DIMG members surrendered to the military.[31] Unlike other groups in Mindanao, most surrendered DIMG members were under 18 years old and had allegedly participated in the 2017 Marawi Siege, indicating that the DIMG was more willing to recruit children under 10 compared to other terrorist groups in the Philippines. Informants also claim that the DIMG has not been eradicated, with efforts underway to rebuild the group in Piagapo municipality, located along the borders of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte provinces.[32]
Similar trends have been observed in the island provinces. In Sulu, the leader of the ASG, Radullan Sahiron, had long disagreed with IS’s ideology and rejected the recruitment of foreign fighters to fight for local causes. While individuals such as Isnilon Hapilon and Hajan Sawadjaan pledged allegiance to IS and led their own splinters to break away from the ASG, Sahiron continued to command respect among combatants in the island provinces. In late 2022, he ordered remnants of the ASG to return to their communities. Yet, despite their surrenders, former ASG members from the Sahiron faction have continued to be isolated from the mainstream population in Sulu.
Although areas in Basilan, such as Lantawan, were declared to be ASG-free in June 2024, the province remains a hotspot for violence.[33] For example, an ambush was carried out against a United Nations Developmental Programme (UNDP) team in Sumisip in January 2025. The attack was allegedly led by Najal Buena and Oman Hajal Jalis, both believed to be MILF members.[34] This incident marked the most serious breach of the 2014 CAB.[35] Local sources also note the presence of other MILF splinter groups that are violent. The recent killing of the surrendered radical preacher Ustaz Bahang further highlights the instability in the area.[36] Moreover, surrendered ASG combatants in Basilan have refused to give up their arms, citing the need for protection from rido (clan violence).[37]
Conclusion
The terrorism threat landscape in Mindanao remains stable, with no major attacks from terrorist groups in 2025, and a plateau in terrorist surrender rates. This stability can be primarily attributed to the security forces’ efforts to eliminate terrorist leaders while inducing surrenders through EO70. However, drivers of radicalisation persist in Mindanao, as efforts to regroup and recover continue.
One of the most pressing concerns facing Mindanao is the reintegration of former combatants. These individuals struggle to adjust to civilian life after years of conflict. Threats of retaliation and the lack of psychosocial support increase the risk of recidivism. Moreover, the perceived preferential treatment of surrendered combatants compared to victims of terrorism may aggravate community resentment and discourage further surrenders.
Despite the weakened operational capacity of terrorist groups in Mindanao, fragmented attempts to recruit and revive violent activities persist. In mainland Mindanao, Muhammad Usman is attempting to rebuild the BIFF, while the DIMG continues to operate in Lanao. The situation in the island provinces remains largely stable, though unaddressed combatant grievances and security risks persist. Hence, while there is no longer a centralised or coordinated terrorist network active in Mindanao, the enduring challenges of reintegration and localised violence will continue.
About the Author
Kenneth Yeo is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Ancheta K. Tan, “The Need for Two Bangsamoro Regions,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 17, 2024, https://opinion.inquirer.net/177628/the-need-for-two-bangsamoro-regions.
[2] Kenneth Yeo, “Geography, Governance, Guns: Characterising Islamist Terrorist Sanctuaries in Maritime Southeast Asia (2014-2021),” Asian Security 19, no. 1 (2022): 82-101, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2022.2132854.
[3] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Philippines,” United States Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2023/philippines.
[4] Tomas Buenaventura, “Clan Violence in the Southern Philippines: Rido Threatens Elections and Peace in Bangsamoro,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), May 9, 2025, https://acleddata.com/report/clan-violence-southern-philippines-rido-threatens-elections-and-peace-bangsamoro.
[5] Anton Chan, “‘Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro’ – A Roadmap to Peace in the Southern Philippines?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 6, no. 3 (2014): 25–30.
[6] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections,” IPAC Report no. 97 (2024), https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-97-Philippines-Avoiding-a-Zero-Sum-Game-in-the-2025-BARMM-Elections-pdt.pdf.pdf.
[7] Sofia Tomacruz, “Sulu Rejects Bangsamoro Law,” Rappler, January 24, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/221802-plebiscite-results-sulu-votes-against-bangsamoro-law.
[8] Bangsamoro Information Office, “Duterte Signs Law Extending Transition Period in BARMM Until 2025,” Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, October 29, 2021, https://bangsamoro.gov.ph/news/latest-news/duterte-signs-law-extending-transition-period-in-barmm-until-2025/.
[9] Ferdinand Cabrera, “MILF Bets Win Big in Maguindanao Sur and Norte, Tawi-Tawi and Cotabato City,” MindaNews, May 17, 2025, https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2025/05/milf-bets-win-big-in-maguindanao-sur-and-norte-tawi-tawi-and-cotabato-city/.
[10] Office of the Spokesperson, “Press Briefer: October 1, 2025,” Supreme Court of the Philippines, October 1, 2025, https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/press-briefer-october-1-2025/.
[11] Keith Bacongco, “Ebrahim Speaks Out about BARMM Leadership Change,” Manila Bulletin, September 27, 2025, https://mb.com.ph/2025/09/27/ebrahim-speaks-out-about-barmm-leadership-change.
[12] “BARMM Leadership Dispute: MILF Rejects Macacua’s Appointment,” Daily Tribune, March 17, 2025, https://tribune.net.ph/2025/03/16/barmm-leadership-dispute-milf-rejects-macacuas-appointment.
[13] Darryl John Esguerra, “Gov’t Laments MILF Delay in Final Decommissioning Phase,” Philippine News Agency, July 31, 2025, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1255588.
[14] Malacañan Palace, Executive Order No. 70 (December 2018): Institutionalizing the Whole-of-Nation Approach in Attaining Inclusive and Sustainable Peace, Creating a National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, and Directing the Adoption of a National Peace Framework, https://lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo2018/eo_70_2018.html.
[15] Jamal Ali, “Philippines’ Bangsamoro Peace Process Normalization Track Hits Some Bumps,” United States Institute of Peace, September 6, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/philippines-bangsamoro-peace-process-normalization-track-hits-some-bumps.
[16] Office of the National Administrative Register, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Administrative Order No. 10, s. 2018 (A.O. No. 10, s. 2018) as Amended by Administrative Order No. 25, s. 2020 (A.O. No. 25, s. 2020, https://law.upd.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Revised-IRR-Administrative-Order-No-10-Series-of-2018-as-Amended.pdf.
[17] Of the more than 300 surrendered ASG combatants, only 33 received the JAPIC certification. ICPVTR field notes, August 2025.
[18] Nurhati Tangging and Kenneth Yeo, “Reintegrating Former Terrorist Combatants in Mindanao,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 15, no.3 (2023): 31–36, https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CTTA-June-2023.pdf.
[19] Local researchers surveyed more than 100 Maute Group surrenders after the Marawi Siege. See Leah Wilfreda Pilongo and Chona R. Echavez, “Stories of Maute Returnees,” (unpublished report).
[20] Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, Decapitation, Retaliation, and the Indicators of Escalation in Mindanao (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2023), https://doi.org/10.19165/2023.2.10.
[21] ICPVTR field notes, August 2025.
[22] Ibid.
[23] 45IB-Gallant Troopers, “Peace Must Live On: 45IB Condemns the Killing of Ustaz Bahang,” Facebook, October 22, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/Tropang45ibGallant/posts/pfbid02GaiAn2MiyLWvmRGGP7TguUNhvu8oA98xp7Py2L3vRdNaNqSbAZhLikCMfQJYDQVKl.
[24] ICPVTR field notes, August 2025.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] “Publication of Approved Claims – August 30, 2025,” Republic of the Philippines Office of the President: Marawi Compensation Board, August 30, 2025, https://mcb.gov.ph/publication-of-approved-claims-august-30-2025/.
[28] Bangsamoro Information Office, “Jolo Blasts Victims Received Full Hospital Assistance from BARMM’s AMBAG,” Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, September 15, 2020, https://bangsamoro.gov.ph/news/latest-news/jolo-blasts-victims-received-full-hospital-assistance-from-barmms-ambag/.
[29] ICPVTR field notes, August 2025.
[30] The SPMS Box is an abbreviation of the territories, Shariff Aguak, Pagatin, Mamasapano and Datu Salibo. It has been the stronghold of the BIFF due to its marshlands, which renders it difficult for security forces to penetrate. For more information, see SAFE WARN, “The SPMS Box,” Facebook, June 22, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2390631071195805&set=a.2390631031195809.
[31] ICPVTR field notes, August 2025.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Roel Pareño, “Abu Sayyaf’s Birthplace in Southern Philippines Declared Militant-Free,” Benar News, June 6, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/abu-sayyaf-birthplace-militant-free-06062024125336.html.
[34] Teofilo Garcia, “4 Killed, 12 Hurt in Basilan Clash,” Philippine News Agency, January 23, 2025, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1242416.
[35] Herbie Gallardo, “Basilan Ambush: MILF Launches Probe into Peace Deal Breach,” Rappler, January 25, 2025, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/mindanao/basilan-ambush-milf-probe-peace-deal-breach/.
[36] 45IB-Gallant Troopers, “Peace Must Live On.”
[37] ICPVTR field notes, August 2025.
