Situating Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya’s Emergence in Bangladesh’s Threat Landscape
The Al-Qaeda (AQ)-centric new Bangladeshi militant group, Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS),[1] poses a significant asymmetric threat to Bangladesh and the neighbouring region. Despite key leaders’ arrests and the group’s apparent weakening, the prevailing instability and collapse of policing in Bangladesh in the chaotic wake of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster and installation of an interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, raise concerns about its potential resurgence. Against this backdrop, this article examines the origins and evolution of JAFHS and Bangladesh’s response. Operating from remote training camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and collaborating with groups such as the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), a Christian insurgent group, JAFHS aims to establish a self-styled caliphate through insurgent violence. Although the group was banned in August 2023 and its leaders have been detained, its advanced training capabilities, strategic alliances and ongoing radicalisation efforts continue to represent a serious security threat. While Bangladesh reforms its police, the country needs to maintain its zero-tolerance policy and restore its counter terrorism capabilities to check the re-emergence of militancy.
Introduction
The activities of Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqia (JAFHS), an Al-Qaeda (AQ)-aligned Bangladeshi terrorist group, came to light in October 2022, when the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the Bangladesh police’s elite counter terrorism unit, was investigating the disappearance of seven youths from south-eastern Comilla district. Later, RAB discovered a list of 55 JAFHS trainees, mostly youth from across the country.
Since then, the RAB and the Dhaka Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crimes Unit (CTTCU) have arrested most of the JAFHS leaders and trained members in joint operations in the hills in the south-eastern region and other parts of the country, including the capital Dhaka.[2] These arrests and subsequent investigations have revealed preliminary data covering various aspects, including the group’s structure and operational strategies.
Formed in 2017 by extremist inmates of a high-security prison, JAFHS has been involved in fund-raising, weapons acquisition and propaganda. It has received training and support from the AQ-linked Ansar al Islam (AAI) and formed strategic alliances with non-Islamist groups like the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF).
JAFHS seeks to establish a self-styled caliphate in Bangladesh and potentially extend its activities to India, Pakistan and Myanmar through armed struggle and attacks on key targets.[3] The group adheres to the eschatological narrative of “Ghazwatul Hind” (the Great Battle of India), aiming for the conquest of India’s eastern region.[4]
Bangladeshi authorities consider JAFHS a significant threat due to its advanced asymmetric combat capabilities and sophisticated operational tactics. The group is well funded, with connections to local and foreign sources, and operates through various business ventures.[5] Some JAFHS members have used legitimate jobs as a cover for their activities. The group’s long-term aim includes emerging as a powerful militant organisation in the region.[6]
The formation of JAFHS is a survival tactic of the older AQ-centric terrorist groups in Bangladesh, and, unlike its parent organisations, JAFHS is more focused on carrying out violence to reach its political goal. Keeping this in view, this article explores JAFHS’ political and strategic aims, its formation and activities, as well as Bangladesh’s response and the group’s future trajectories.
Formation and Leadership
Though Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)’s Muhammad Shamin Mahfuz officially founded JAFHS in 2019, the idea of its formation was conceived as early as 2015 when he was in jail. AAI’s Mainul Islam (aka Hasan aka Roxy) and Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B)’s leader Maulana Abu Sayeed were also instrumental in JAFHS’ formation. JAFHS emerged on Bangladesh’s threat landscape when other jihadist groups were being suppressed by law enforcement agencies after the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack, giving it prominence. To fill the emerging vacuum, JAFHS used its platform to unite the remnants of other Bangladeshi jihadist groups.[7]
Sayeed, who is currently on death row for his involvement in the August 21, 2004 Dhaka grenade attack, reportedly advised Mahfuz and Islam to operate under a new name in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region.[8] Reportedly, Abdullah Maymun, who later served as the head of JAFHS’ dakwah (missionary) unit, suggested the name JAFHS with the aim of “assisting the larger Muslim Ummah”.[9]
Mahfuz recruited nearly 100 JAFHS members across Bangladesh, established training camps in CHT and forged alliances with the KNF before his arrest in June 2023.[10] In April 2020, JAFHS and KNF negotiated a deal of mutual non-interference at Hotel Bay Wanders, Cox’s Bazar. According to the police, JAFHS also agreed to cover KNF’s expenses and pay KNF trainers for imparting training on raids, ambushes, the use of improvised explosive devices, submachine guns and AK–47 assault rifles.[11]
Under Mahfuz’s coordination, JAFHS planned several attacks in Bangladesh to be carried out in 2024. Though it is not clear why this period was chosen, the January 2024 elections might have been a factor as the jihadists viewed democracy as “un-Islamic”. Despite his arrest and JAFHS’ subsequent ban in August 2023, Mahfuz’s network remains a serious security concern as the group is likely to reorganise amidst Bangladesh’s ongoing political unrest.
Another key JAFHS leader is its emir (leader) and founding member, Md Anisur Rahman Mahmud. He was appointed by Mahfuz as emir in 2021 after the group’s first emir Mainul Islam was arrested.[12] Mahmud’s focus was on domestic attacks, including planning armed assaults on law enforcement institutions. He forged tactical links with other extremists to secure weapons and training resources. Arrested in July 2023, he was also involved in recruiting members, producing propaganda videos and raising funds.[13]
In early 2023, Bangladeshi police recovered propaganda videos from JAFHS showcasing their operational activities, including training camps in remote areas. The videos, confessional statements of arrested militants and documents seized from JAFHS hideouts, led police to assess the group as a significant security threat compared to other militant organisations. The videos revealed plots to attack Kashimpur Central Jail to free high-profile militants and potential attacks on government and law enforcement targets.[14]
Training and Recruitment Strategy
JAFHS focuses on offline operations and avoids ideological propagation, preferring to conduct armed training discreetly, like the AQ-linked AAI. In January 2023, the RAB discovered that JAFHS members were being radicalised in Bangladeshi jails and were actively recruiting other prisoners. A case in point is Masukur Rahman Masud, who was detained on robbery charges. During his incarceration, Masud connected with JMB militants and maintained these connections after his release.[15] Later, he became JAFHS’ shura (council) member and head of the military wing. In January 2023, Masud and his associate Bashar were apprehended in a Rohingya camp in Cox’s Bazar following a gunfight.
In 2020, police launched a crackdown against JAFHS’ hideouts in Cox’s Bazar, forcing the group to move its training camps to the hills in Chaikhyang Para, Remakri Union, Thanchi and Bandarban districts. During the training, in addition to weapons handling, militants also learned survival strategies in hostile environments.[16] According to the RAB, after basic training, the recruits were sent to the mountains for advanced armed training, such as bomb manufacturing and guerrilla tactics.[17]
Drivers of Recruitment
JAFHS members come from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, ranging from lower-middle class families to some very poor households.[18] Some are blue-collar workers, while others are madrassa (religious schools) or regular schoolteachers. JAFHS often targets these individuals with promises of benefits and religious governance. Prospective recruits are often taken to various mosques, where they are given lectures and shown videos on provocative topics, such as the persecution of Muslims in neighbouring countries. Essentially, by speaking against the country’s judicial system and law enforcement agencies, their latent anger can be incited.[19]
This has led to many youth leaving their homes to embark on hijrah (the Islamic concept of emigration for the sake of faith) and join the group in secret.[20]
Primarily, JAFHS recruits from Bangladeshi prisons, where extremist detainees hold bi-weekly religious rituals and group discussions. These gatherings are used by extremists to indoctrinate other inmates.
The pathway towards JAFHS is also due to social networks. Some of the youth reported that they were inspired to join JAFHS by their friends, relatives or acquaintances. Later, JAFHS encouraged them to emigrate and tempted them with promises of jobs, eventually leading them to the hills.[21]
Women’s Branch
Reportedly, JAFHS has a women’s branch that is involved mostly in fund-raising, dakwah activities, recruiting female militants and supporting militant families, particularly those families where the male members have moved to training camps or performed so-called hijrah.[22] The RAB has identified at least six female militants, though the exact number is still unclear.[23] Wives of some of the group’s members are also part of the women’s branch, which had gradually been expanding before the arrests took place during 2022-2023.[24] However, no women have been found participating in the military wing, and most have performed secondary and assisting roles.[25] Law enforcement agencies say that extremists have used women to encourage male family members to leave home and move to training camps.[26] There has been at least one case where a radicalised mother sent her 15-year-old son to a militant training camp in the hills.[27]
Finances
JAFHS is a well-funded group as finances come from local and external sources, including legitimate businesses.[28] The JAFHS financial stream revolves around self-funding, charitable projects, diaspora donations and contributions from other organisations. JAFHS has received support from Bangladeshi expatriates in the United Kingdom (UK), Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Pakistan (via zakat, or almsgiving money), alongside monthly donations from its members and fund-raising activities under the guise of aiding Rohingyas.[29] According to the RAB’s investigation, the detained head of the dakwah branch, Abdullah Maymun, initially raised Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) 5 million (US$42,000 approximately) through donations from individuals abroad, other groups and his own resources.[30] Other key contributors included Emir Mahmud, who donated BDT 1.8 million (US$9,000 approximately) from selling his house, and JAFHS’ shura member and militant wing leader Masud, who contributed BDT 500,000 (US$4,200 approximately) from his pension and the proceeds from selling his car.[31]
Founder and chief coordinator Mahfuz played a crucial role in funding the group’s operations, including weapons training and bomb-making.[32] The organisation under his leadership garnered financial support through ostensibly benign projects like mosque construction and Islamic outreach, while avoiding overt references to militant activities. Members often self-finance their involvement through personal accounts or support from acquaintances.[33] Furthermore, JAFHS has received millions of BDT from domestic and expatriate donors via mobile banking and suspected illegal channels like hawala and hundi.[34] The militant organisation purchased foreign firearms worth BDT 1.7 million (US$14,500 approximately) and paid around BDT 300,000-400,000 (US$2,500-3,500 approximately) every month for training to the KNF.[35]
Some of the group’s members have reportedly used legitimate businesses and professions as a cover for their militant activities. For instance, JAFHS’ chief recruiter, Rana Sheikh, worked at an insurance company until his arrest in May 2024.[36]
Plans to Establish a Naval Unit
JAFHS also harboured plans to establish a naval unit in south-central Bangladesh’s Patuakhali district for its members who possessed military training. The naval unit was designed to serve as a refuge in times of heightened law enforcement operations.[37] The plan to create a naval unit in Patuakhali,[38] a riverine district in south-central Bangladesh adjacent to the Bay of Bengal, reveals the group’s strategy to enhance operational security and prepare for law enforcement confrontations. By focusing on members with military training and utilising the district’s location and topography, they aimed to ensure a secure refuge and leverage natural features for tactical advantage in times of heightened pressure. The responsibility for the unit was assigned to a Patuakhali resident, Kazi Saraz Uddin, who had joined JAFHS from the Bangladesh chapter of the Pakistan-based militant group Harkatul Jihad al Islami (HuJI).[39] The RAB disclosed that AAI was the financier behind JAFHS naval unit.
State Response
According to the RAB, from October 2022 until July 2023, as many as 82 individuals affiliated with JAFHS were arrested across Bangladesh, including CHT. The leader of the group Mahmud was arrested in Munshiganj along with two associates. The authorities also seized firearms, bomb-making materials, extremist literature and cash from his hideout. Earlier, the group’s founder Mahfuz and his wife were arrested in Dhaka, where a pistol and explosives were recovered.[40] In these raids, the RAB also discovered weapons, explosives, communications devices and documents. Concurrently, around 17 KNF leaders have also been detained for allegedly assisting the JAFHS militants in training and other activities in the hills.
In August 2023, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Home Affairs banned JAFHS, citing public safety concerns, and mandated financial institutions to sever ties with the group.[41] Soon after the ban, the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit issued a directive directing that all financial institutions and businesses, including banks, insurance companies, money changers and legal professionals, halt any financial dealings with JAFHS.[42]
Future Trajectories
RAB officials have reported that 12 to 15 individuals associated with JAFHS are still at large, with about 10 missing after their training in CHT. Some of the uncaptured leaders are notorious for their bomb-making and explosive-handling expertise. At any rate, JAFHS faces difficulties in reactivation due to its relative newness, with many members seeking to rejoin previous organisations like JMB, HuJI or AAI.[43]
Despite the significant setbacks faced by JAFHS, including the arrests of key leaders and the official ban on the group, it remains a serious security threat to Bangladesh and the broader region. Recent political upheaval in Bangladesh, marked by major jailbreaks and a weakening of the country’s policing and counter terrorism capabilities, has created an environment that could be exploited by extremist groups.
In a concerning development, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), the respective official franchises of AQ and the Islamic State in South Asia, have recently issued detailed statements in Urdu aimed at capitalising on the political uncertainty in Bangladesh. For instance, AQIS chief Usama Mahmood praised the resistance against corruption and secularism in Bangladesh, while calling for the establishment of an Islamic system and unity against oppression.[44] Conversely, ISK’s statement encouraged jihad and preparation for conflict with India, emphasising divine rewards for their efforts.[45] This strategic messaging could attract disaffected individuals, including JAFHS militants who are currently on the run. These militants might be lured by the promises and ideological appeal of AQIS and ISK.
These developments may provide JAFHS with opportunities to regroup and increase its influence. The group’s capability to unite various militant factions and its established network of training camps and strategic alliances enhance its potential for resurgence.
Recommendations
While Bangladesh reforms its police under a new interim administration, the country needs to maintain its zero-tolerance policy and restore its counter terrorism capabilities to check any re-emergence of militancy. There have been worrying indications as some of the pro-AQ militants are operating openly and reaching out to the public. JAFHS is likely to reactivate its network in the short term, especially as some of its leaders are believed to have escaped during the recent jailbreaks in the country. Bangladeshi authorities therefore need to maintain rigorous monitoring and conduct thorough investigations on JAFHS. There must be a concerted effort to address the group’s financial sources and implement a comprehensive preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programme. At the same time, a comprehensive and adaptive approach is also needed to combat the evolving threat of JAFHS, including strengthening counter terrorism operations, improving prison management and addressing radicalisation both within and outside of the correctional system.
About the Author
Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Fikri Rasyid on Unsplash
Citations
[1] This article uses the spelling used in Bangladeshi media. Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (abbreviated here as JAFHS) literally translates as “the Supporters’ Group in Eastern India”. The meaning of the term Ansar is “helpers” or “supporters”, but it is often used by militant or extremist groups to signify their role as defenders or champions of their causes. These groups adopt the term to frame themselves as modern-day “helpers” supporting their version of ideological, political or religious goals.
[2] “Is Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya Nipped in the Bud?” Dhaka Tribune, October 5, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/285665/is-jama-atul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-nipped-in.
[3] Shariful Islam, “Biggest Militant Threat Country Has Ever Faced,” The Daily Star, January 31, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/biggest-militant-threat-country-has-ever-faced-3234716.
[4] The “Ghazwatul Hind” narrative is utilised by jihadist groups to describe an apocalyptic conflict anticipated to occur in the Indian subcontinent.
[5] Islam, “Biggest Militant Threat Country Has Ever Faced.”
[6] “Anisur Gave All the Money from Selling Land and Houses to the Terrorist Organisation,” Ajker Patrika, July 24, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4atkp2cn.
[7] Interview with a Bangladeshi security official, April 2024.
[8] Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region comprises rugged mountains and dense forests with a history of conflict and unrest. Jihadist groups like Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) have taken advantage of the area’s remote locations to establish militant bases. The region’s natural cover and isolation allows these groups to evade security forces and exert influence amid ongoing ethnic and political tensions. Additionally, CHT’s proximity to India and Myanmar makes it a significant area for cross-border smuggling and insurgent activities. See “New Militant Group: Its Formation Was Planned inside Prison,” The Daily Star, October 28, 2022, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/new-militant-group-its-formation-was-planned-inside-prison-3154041.
[9] Documents reviewed by the author.
[10] “Militant Group Jamatul Ansar’s Founder Shamin Mahfuz Arrested in Dhaka,” bdnews24.com, June 23, 2023, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/sl8n4qr23v.
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Who Is Militant Group Founder Shamin Mahfuz?” Dhaka Tribune, June 24, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/314230/who-is-militant-group-founder-shamin-mahfuz.
[13] “RAB Arrests Chief of Militant Group Jamatul Ansar in Munshiganj,” bdnews24.com, July 24, 2023, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/m3egkkufez.
[14] Animesh Roul, “Jamaatul Ansar: A Terrorism Threat in Bangladesh before the 2024 Elections?” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 21, No. 13 (2023), https://jamestown.org/program/jamaatul-ansar-a-terrorism-threat-in-bangladesh-before-the-2024-elections/; “RAB Recovers Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya’s Video in Bandarban,” BSS, January 24, 2023, https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/106967; “Jama’atul Ansar: Secretariat, Jail on Shortlist of Targets,” The Daily Star, January 26, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/jamaatul-ansar-secretariat-jail-shortlist-targets-3230841; Tipu Sultan, “Militants Targeted Jail for Attack,” Prothom Alo English, January 26, 2023, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime-and-law/6up6gpbd8h.
[15] “Militants Recruitment of Jamaatul Ansar Starts in Jail: RAB,” Daily Observer, January 25, 2023, https://www.observerbd.com/news.php?id=404003.
[16] “Militants Were Taking Advanced Training in Hills: RAB,” Financial Express, November 5, 2022, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/national/militants-were-taking-advanced-training-in-hills-rab-1667570341.
[17] “Militants Receive Various Arms Training in Remote Hills: RAB,” Prothom Alo English, October 22, 2022, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/city/4vqd02mp6w.
[18] “Militant Activity: Some Left Their Homes 4 Years Ago, While Others Did So 6 Months Ago,” Prothom Alo, January 28, 2023, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/16db2bfcid.
[19] “New Extremist Group Caught by RAB, Who Are They?” bangla.bdnews24.com, October 6, 2022, https://bangla.bdnews24.com/bangladesh/lqf1otuu2t.
[20] “New Militant Outfit Discovered with the Arrest of Missing Youths: RAB,” The Business Standard, October 6, 2022, https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/new-militant-outfit-discovered-arrest-missing-youths-rab-509294.
[21] “Mother’s Plea Leads to Surrender of Four Militants,” Ekattor TV, August 10, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/32wfke2a.
[22] “New Militant Organizations Also Have Women Working in Their Recruitment Branches,” Bangla Tribune, November 4, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/yck555y2.
[23] “Women Are Flocking to Hindal Sharqiya Active in Recruiting Members and Fundraising,” Jagonews24, November 4, 2022, https://www.jagonews24.com/national/news/807413.
[24]“The Founder of Jamaat-ul-Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, the Notorious Militant Shamin Mahfuz, Has Been Arrested Along with His Wife,” DMP News, January 24, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/243k2tch.
[25] Jagonews24, “Women Are Flocking to Hindal Sharqiya.”
[26] “New Militant Organizations Are Entering the Field Targeting Women,” Somoy News, November 26, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/5f5zy6aa).
[27] “Collecting Donation to Fund Militancy,” The Daily Star, November 10, 2022, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/collecting-donation-fund-militancy-3165196.
[28] Islam, “Biggest Militant Threat Country Has Ever Faced.”
[29] Interview with a Bangladeshi security official, April 2024.
[30] “According to RAB, the Head of the Dawah Branch of ‘Sharqiya’ Had Connections with the Militant Zia,” Prothom Alo, May 9, 2023, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/kk3w7q3osa.
[31] “New Militant Platform: Selling Homes and Donating All Pension Money to Militant Organizations,” Samakal, January 30, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/ydd8p59s.
[32] “RAB Says 55 Youths Left Home to Join New Militant Outfit,” October 10, 2022, bdnews24.com, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/ow3mryu2jc.
[33] Touhiduzzaman Tanmay, “Arms Training in the Mountains: Militant Shamin Used to Take Money by Claiming to Build Mosques for the Devout,” Jagonews24, July 10, 2023, https://www.jagonews24.com/national/news/867940.
[34] Shariful Islam, “Operation of Jama’atul Ansar: Officials Trace Transaction of Over Tk 1.5cr,” The Daily Star, November 10, 2022, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/operation-jamaatul-ansar-officials-trace-transaction-over-tk-15cr-3164886.
[35] “Anisur Donates All the Money from Selling Land and Property to the Militant Organization,” Ajker Patrika, July 24, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4atkp2cn.
[36] Shamima Rita, “A Militant Leader in the Guise of Insurance Company Manager,” Dhaka Tribune, August 17, 2024, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/militancy/346524/a-militant-leader-in-the-guise-of-insurance.
[37] Riyadh Talukder, “RAB: Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya Planned to Form Naval Unit,” Dhaka Tribune, August 3, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/321576/rab-jama-atul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-planned.
[38] Patuakhali district, being in the south-central region and close to water bodies, is likely chosen for its strategic advantages, such as potential escape routes or logistical benefits. The region’s geography may provide natural cover or facilitate movement away from areas of heightened law enforcement activity. This strategy encompassed targeting the large rivers between Patuakhali and Bhola, with intentions to settle in the chars (river islands) that could be accessed by crossing the large rivers.
[39] Talukder, “Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya Planned to Form Naval Unit.”
[40] “Hindal Sharkiya’s Amir Arrested, Firearms and Bomb-Making Equipment Seized,” Dhaka Times, July 24, 2023, https://www.dhakatimes24.com/2023/07/24/317633.
[41] “Bangladesh Bans Militant Group Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya,” Dhaka Tribune, August 10, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/322164/bangladesh-bans-militant-group-jama-atul-ansar-fil.
[42] “BFIU Issues Directive to Stop Financial Relations with Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya,” Dhaka Tribune, August 22, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/323224/bfiu-issues-directive-to-stop-financial-relations.
[43] Talukder, “Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya Planned to Form Naval Unit.”
[44] “Bangladesh: The Emerging Hope of Supporting Islam,” As Sahab Media (The Subcontinent), August 2024.
[45] “Message for the Muslims of Bangladesh,” Al-Azaim Media Foundation, August 2024.
