Social Relations, Radicalisation, and Disengagement in the Pro-Islamic State Group in Bima
This article examines the role of social relations in facilitating the emergence, sustainment and eventual fragmentation of the pro-Islamic State (IS) group in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia. While social relations played a strong role in the group’s formation and consolidation, they subsequently had a limited capacity to facilitate disengagement, even after the group’s key leaders denounced the ideology and left between 2021 and 2024. Although the majority of pro-IS supporters remained ideologically committed, a small number of individuals chose to disengage.
Disengagement was enabled through selective high-trust relations, in which individuals prioritised personal ties over group pressure. At the same time, while social relations created trust and opened space for dialogue, disengagement required additional conditions, including ideological justification, opportunities for sustained discussion, physical separation such as incarceration, and appropriately timed decisions to leave the group. The limited cases of disengagement also demonstrated the continued ideological commitment of many pro-IS supporters, although their influence has declined compared with earlier periods.
Introduction
Social relations play an important role in facilitating individuals’ participation in terrorist groups.[1] In this article, social relations refer to interpersonal ties, including kinship, peer networks, discipleship and neighbourhood ties. While scholars differ on how and to what extent social relations influence radicalisation, they broadly operate through several mechanisms: introducing individuals to radical actors and ideas; intensifying beliefs and commitment; providing skills and access for action;[2] and enabling formal membership. These processes are made possible because social ties imply loyalty, purpose and emotional support, while also isolating individuals from alternative ideas once they become embedded in the group.[3]
Aside from the radicalisation process, scholars also argue that new and alternative social relations outside radical groups can function as pull factors in facilitating individuals’ exit from the group[4] and, more importantly, in sustaining disengagement and preventing recidivism.[5] However, far less attention has been paid to cases in which pre-existing group ties facilitated an exit despite strong group pressure. Under what conditions did this occur and why did it work? These questions are relevant for counter terrorism policy in contexts characterised by dense, network-based groups, in which individuals often share kinship and long-standing social ties.
Bima was chosen as the case study, having long been associated with terrorist networks. It served as a site of recruitment, safe haven and supplier of manpower in the conflict in Poso,[6] a former radical hotspot in Central Sulawesi. The pro-Islamic State (IS) group in Bima, particularly in the urban village (kelurahan) of Penatoi, at its peak resembled a “village” in which seven out of 12 neighbourhood units (rukun tetangga, or RT) reportedly supported the group.[7] These factors provide a fitting basis to examine not only group members, but also families and wider social ties who became part of the network.
The data used for this article was collected through in-depth interviews with former leaders, members and supporters of the pro-IS group in Bima. These were conducted in January and March 2025. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents; however, their names are presented under pseudonyms to protect their privacy, even though some are available online or have been published elsewhere.
Social Relations and Pro-IS Group Formation
While this article focuses on social relations in facilitating individuals’ participation in radical groups, it does not dismiss other factors that also explain the group’s emergence, such as grievances, limited economic access and the historical presence of Darul Islam (DI) in Bima.[8]
A distinctive feature of the pro-IS group in Penatoi was its members’ ability to stay close to one another and live in the same neighbourhood. They also built a school—Abu Bakar As-Shiddiq School—to educate their children, with some members serving as teachers. The group was further able to take over a public mosque, Istiqomah Mosque, which later became the centre of their activities. These three elements played a key role in normalising radical ideas and practices through everyday interactions, effectively preventing members from encountering alternative perspectives. The network also developed structured activities for its cadres to gain knowledge and skills to sustain the network in the face of challenges, including the arrest of its key leaders.
Additionally, while the exact number of individuals belonging to the pro-IS group as members, supporters or sympathisers is unclear and varies across sources, the group was able to attract a significant number of individuals over time. Interviews suggest that the group comprised around 25 to 30 percent of the total population in Penatoi,[9] while other reports have recorded between 50 and 60 families and stated the group covered seven out of 12 RT in Penatoi.[10]
A key development was the return of AQ (pseudonym), a former leader of the group, to Bima in 2004. He was a disciple of Aman Abdurrahman—an ideologue of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) —and had a family history linked to jihadist movements through his father, who had been involved in DI and had fled to Malaysia with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.[11] Upon his return, AQ began teaching in Kampung Nae, Bima City, where he attracted a number of followers, including Sofyan (pseudonym), who later became one of his loyal disciples. Beyond the teacher-student relationship, AQ assisted Sofyan in finding a job and a marriage partner. Sofyan subsequently married a woman whose parents were also AQ’s followers, further extending his relationship from a teacher-student one to one based on kinship. Before his marriage, Sofyan also studied at the Umar bin Khattab (UBK)[12] School to deepen his knowledge, where he met several individuals who later also joined AQ in Penatoi.
After his marriage, Sofyan moved to Penatoi, where he became active as a teacher in the school and mosque.[13] AQ’s entry into Penatoi had been facilitated by his brother-in-law, who was originally from the area[14] and was already active as a preacher at Istiqomah Mosque. This venue later became the base of the pro-IS group. Through this connection, AQ was invited to preach alongside his brother-in-law and AA, a local preacher with a Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) background. However, after speaking with AQ, AA decided to leave JI and join AQ’s group, which at the time did not have a name.[15] Together, these three individuals became important figures in expanding the pro-IS group in Penatoi across three key periods leading up to 2021.
Before 2009, support for Aman’s teachings was evident in the warm reception he received that year from some residents in Penatoi.[16] Aman even spent several months there preaching.[17] In 2014, despite AQ’s first arrest in 2013, the group were still able to mobilise people at Istiqomah Mosque for the declaration of allegiance to IS, which reportedly attracted around 200 attendees.[18] Prior to 2021, even after the arrest of its key leaders, the group remained strong until AQ denounced its takfir (excommunication) ideology and decided to leave in 2021, after which fragmentation ensued.
The expansion of the network was also closely linked to kinship and peer networks. AQ’s first marriage had been facilitated through a JI religious discussion group, where female members introduced him to his future wife. His wife, who had initially not been inclined towards Aman’s teachings, ultimately agreed to follow her husband’s path, and later became an important figure in organising and teaching religious discussions for female followers and children.[19]
Other examples of marriage ties linked to AQ include the widow of Bachtiar—a man who was shot by the police in Dompu, Sumbawa, in 2013[20] —who then moved to Penatoi through her second marriage. AA also married his daughter to a man who later became involved in plotting an attack on a local election in Bima City.[21] Peer networks were also important, as exemplified by the case of Putra (pseudonym), who later became one of the perpetrators of a school shooting targeting the police in Bima City. Putra had been introduced to the group through his childhood friend, who persistently encouraged him to attend religious discussions at Istiqomah Mosque.[22]
The group sustained itself through several structured activities. First, it established a school for children’s education, allowing members’ children to be socialised from an early age into shared values and ideology. Second, routine activities, such as religious discussions and preaching at the mosque, reinforced commitment among members.[23] Third, physical training, including swimming, hiking and martial arts, was organised to build physical strength.[24] Fourth, the group operated a hisbah team, a patrol unit tasked with monitoring behaviours deemed deviant, such as alcohol consumption and premarital sex. The hisbah team actively recruited individuals from troubled backgrounds, including drug users, habitual drinkers and those from broken homes. These recruits were then guided through ideological and physical training, with some later sent to Poso to join the terrorist group, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), led by Santoso.[25] These Poso connections further reinforced the network, particularly when some MIT members later moved to Penatoi during the arrest of key leaders to fill leadership gaps.
Apart from these regular activities, a splinter group also emerged under the leadership of Budi (pseudonym) and held separate religious discussions led by Ali (pseudonym), a former Santoso connection who later joined the group as a teacher. This splinter group consisted of 11 or 12 individuals.[26] From this group, four individuals took part in a terrorist attack in Bima in 2017 targeting the police.[27] In addition, another cell from this splinter group was involved in plotting an attack during the 2019 regional elections in Bima, targeting a polling station using Molotov bombs. However, the individuals involved in the plot, including AA’s son-in-law, were arrested before the attack could be carried out.[28]
Social Relations and Exit from Pro-IS Group
As the community expanded from 2009 to 2021, social relations functioned not only as facilitators of expansion, but also as mechanisms that reinforced conformity and limited exposure to alternative ideas outside the group. Once individuals become part of an insider network, social relations function as mechanisms of control and punishment, in which opposing voices are framed as betrayal.[29] This dynamic helps explain why only about 15 to 20 percent of members later decided to disengage from the group, while 80 percent remained.[30] Interviews indicate that those who chose to stay did so because of pride (gengsi), fear of ostracism and economic dependence on the group.
Those who remained also exercised various measures to prevent other members from taking the disengagement path. These included dismissing individuals from the school, barring them from teaching or preaching at Istiqomah Mosque, and pressuring female members to divorce their husbands.[31] In some cases, women remarried without formally finalising their divorces.[32] After individuals who pledged allegiance to the state (Ikhwan NKRI) were released from prison, group members refused to greet them in public, and physical altercations even occurred between Ikhwan NKRI and those who remained loyal to the ideology (Ikhwan Merah).[33] Those who pledged allegiance to the state (Ikhwan NKRI) were quickly labelled apostates (murtad) and infidels (kafir).
A small number of individuals, however, followed AQ’s path to denounce the ideology and leave the group. Based on the interviews, these individuals shared similar factors: they had personal relations with those who influenced their disengagement, marked by specific high-trust ties. As with any social relation, individuals within the group did not experience the same intensity of ties with every fellow member, having a mix of strong and weak ties. Stronger ties tended to have greater motivational force and were more likely to serve as sources of support in uncertain times.[34]
Trust is an important disengagement factor, as it precludes another individual from acting in ways that are beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to them.[35] In the cases of AQ’s wife and Sofyan, both chose to follow AQ’s path of disengagement despite being immediately ostracised by the group while he was in prison. During the interview, both said that, despite feeling anxious, they had chosen to trust AQ.[36] Both shared strong relations due to marriage and children, while Sofyan’s relationship with AQ extended beyond the teacher-student relationship, as explained in the previous section.
Equally important was the timing of the announcement of an individual’s decision to leave the group. Some individuals were given time to contact their wives or close family members before taking an oath of allegiance to the state. This occurred in the cases of AQ and Ali. Ali informed his wife of his decision, which she accepted despite opposition from his in-laws. He also contacted his brother, Galih (pseudonym), and encouraged him to follow the same path. The latter had also been part of Santoso’s connection and had moved to Penatoi to join the group.[37] By informing trusted relations before formally denouncing the ideology, the individuals who left created space for understanding and reduced the perception of betrayal that often arose when such decisions were learned indirectly from others.
In other cases, disengagement was facilitated when individuals were physically separated from the group, particularly during incarceration. Physical separation allowed individuals to engage in dialogues and to listen to different views. However, such dialogues needed to involve people they trusted and with whom they shared bonds. This is illustrated by AQ’s discussions with Ali and Putra while they were in prison. These one-to-one dialogues were facilitated by prison management and Detachment 88, the Indonesian counter terrorism task force. The dialogues were also accompanied by religious justifications through authoritative religious sources, which gave them stronger reasoning to leave the group. Some of the books mentioned by interviewees as particularly influential include Qawa’id fi al-Takfir, Buku Mudah Mengkafirkan, Salafi fatwas by Saudi scholars, Shahih Fiqh as-Sunnah by Abu Malik Kamal bin as-Sayyid Salim and classical tafsir (exegesis of the Quran) works, such as al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir.
Continued Commitment After Leadership Disengagement
While the disengagement of the key leaders of the pro-IS group in Penatoi marked a phase of decline and fragmentation, many pro-IS supporters still chose to remain committed to their ideology. Their continued commitment was exercised not only through social sanction mechanisms to prevent others from leaving the group, but also through several observable indicators.
First, they re-established religious learning spaces. Although the Abu Bakar As-Shiddiq School was taken over by the Indonesian government in 2024, they shifted their children’s education and religious discussions by establishing rumah Quran (Quranic study houses) in their own homes. Similarly, some pro-IS supporters continued their association with Istiqomah Mosque, including preaching activities, despite the mosque gradually coming under greater government supervision. The latter suggests that some members of the mosque’s committee remained accommodating towards them.
Second, the group still has figures who could potentially rise to leadership positions or at least become senior figures to whom others turn for direction, such as AQ’s brother-in-law, who is currently in prison. Similar to AQ, he is known for his ideological commitment and is respected in the community. In addition, the potential for resurgence remains, particularly because individuals released from prison often gain social status in Penatoi and are seen as figures who have “sacrificed” for their beliefs.[38] There is concern that once imprisoned members are released, the movement could regain some momentum. Former members also note that those who adhere to the takfir ideology rarely shift perspective, given their fixed and literalist interpretations of religious texts.[39] Although their capacity for organised action has declined, the continued presence of committed families and sympathisers indicates that the ideological commitment has not entirely diminished.
Lastly, disengagement pathways within the group have been highly individualised and largely limited to those who share strong personal bonds with trusted figures. While those who have disengaged appear to be on a promising path by building a new community, re-enrolling in school, reinterpreting doctrine and maintaining religious gatherings, disengagement remains localised and individualised, shaped by close and high-trust relations.
Conclusion
Ikhwan Merah, despite diminished visibility and fractured leadership, continue to adhere to their radical ideological stance and sustain their presence through quiet yet cohesive networks. Thus, while the emergence of Ikhwan NKRI offers hope for change, this trajectory cannot be assumed to extend across the wider community. In contexts characterised by dense and overlapping social ties, disengagement is unlikely to diffuse organically. Without broader structural reforms and sustained community reintegration efforts, disengagement will remain the exception rather than the norm.
About The Author
Unaesah Rahmah is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) and part of the Terrorism and Political Violence research group at Leiden University. She was formerly an analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR).
Thumbnail photo by Thomas Tucker on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Donatella della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139043144; Sulastri Osman, “Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 2 (2010): 157–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341002900205; Julie Chernov-Hwang, Becoming Jihadis: Radicalization and Commitment in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2023); Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
[2] Matteo Vergani et al., “Beyond Social Relationships: Investigating Positive and Negative Attitudes Towards Violent Protest Within the Same Social Movement,” Journal of Sociology 53, no. 2 (2017): 445–60, https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783316688344.
[3] Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks; della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence.
[4] della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence; Mary Beth Altier et al., “Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts,” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (2017): 305–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280307; Julie Chernov-Hwang, Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists (Cornell University Press, 2018).
[5] Adrian Cherney and Daniel Koehler, “What Does Sustained Desistance from Violent Extremism Entail: A Proposed Theory of Change and Policy Implications,” Terrorism and Political Violence 36, no. 7 (2024): 871–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2215348; Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism (Taylor & Francis, 2016).
[6] “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), no. 69 (2021), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28849; Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Dyah Ayu Kartika, “Violent Extremism in Bima, Indonesia: Radical Milieu and Peacebuilding Efforts,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2023): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2296240; Muhammad Adlin Sila and Greg Fealy, “Counterterrorism, Civil Society Organisations and Peacebuilding: The Role of Non-State Actors in Deradicalisation in Bima, Indonesia,” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 23, no. 1 (2022): 97–117, https://doi.org/10.1080/14442213.2022.2041076.
[7] Ihsan Ali-Fauzi et al., “Rejecting Elections: Warning Signs of a Dangerous Trend in Bima,” Indonesia at Melbourne, April 16, 2019, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/rejecting-elections-warning-signs-of-a-dangerous-trend-in-bima/.
[8] Ali-Fauzi and Kartika, “Violent Extremism in Bima, Indonesia”; IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells”; Sila and Fealy, “Counterterrorism, Civil Society Organisations and Peacebuilding.”
[9] Author’s interview with a local government staff in Bima, March 14, 2025.
[10] Ihsan Ali-Fauzi et al., Ekstremisme Kekerasan di Bima, Nusa Tenggara Barat: Lingkungan Radikal dan Upaya-Upaya Binadamai (PUSAD Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2019).
[11] Author’s interview with AQ, January 27, 2025.
[12] Umar bin Khattab School is an Islamic boarding school which was first affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), as some of its teachers were members of JI, but it later also adopted the takfir ideology of Aman Abdurrahman. For further reading, see IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells.”
[13] Author’s interview with Sofyan, March 14, 2025.
[14] Author’s interview with a local government staff in Bima.
[15] Author’s interview with AA, March 11, 2025.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Author’s interview with a local government staff in Bima.
[18] “Ratusan Warga Bima Dibaiat Dukung ISIS,” Tempo, August 12, 2014, https://www.tempo.co/politik/ratusan-warga-bima-dibaiat-dukung-isis-1509922.
[19] Author’s interview with AQ’s wife, March 16, 2025.
[20] “Jenazah Teroris Bima Ditolak Warga,” Tempo, January 16, 2013, https://www.tempo.co/arsip/jenazah-teroris-bima-ditolak-warga-nbsp–1633877.
[21] Author’s interview with AA.
[22] Author’s interview with Putra, March 16, 2025.
[23] Author’s interview with Sofyan; Author’s interview with AA.
[24] Author’s interview with Putra.
[25] Author’s interview with AA.
[26] Author’s interview with Putra.
[27] Audrey Santoso, “Polres Bima Bekuk 4 Penembak yang Serang 2 Anggotanya,” Detik News, September 11, 2017, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3638200/polres-bima-bekuk-4-penembak-yang-serang-2-anggotanya.
[28] Author’s interview with AA.
[29] della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence; Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139136877.
[30] Author’s interview with Sofyan.
[31] Author’s interview with AQ’s wife.
[32] Ali-Fauzi and Kartika, “Violent Extremism in Bima, Indonesia.”
[33] Author’s interview with Putra.
[34] Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks.
[35] Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (B. Blackwell, 1988).
[36] Author’s interview with AQ’s wife; Author’s interview with Sofyan.
[37] Author’s interview with Ali and Galih, March 12, 2025.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Author’s interview with Sofyan; Author’s interview with Putra.
