Southeast Asia’s Threat Environment in 2024
In September 2024, the decades-long struggle to contain and manage the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia is showing encouraging results.[i] Southeast Asia counter terrorism police, government agencies, community groups and civil society actors have together achieved a remarkable level of effective containment of a resilient and dynamic threat.[ii] Insurgent violence in Thailand’s Deep South and in the southern Philippines is sharply down, and Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s major affiliate network in the region, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),[iii] has just announced that it is renouncing terrorism and disbanding.[iv]
The Context
In the 2000s, Southeast Asia bore the brunt of some of the most serious Al-Qaeda (AQ)-inspired terrorist operations worldwide. The enormity of the problem was brought home by the shocking bombings in Bali on October 12, 2002, which killed 202 people.[v] But, in hindsight, this was only the most devastating in a series of enigmatic incidents that were not then understood to be connected terrorism attacks. In Indonesia and the Philippines, bombers linked to either Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or its Philippines ally, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), contributed to deadly attacks throughout the early 2000s.[vi]
Careful post-blast forensics work after the 2002 bombings in Bali, jointly conducted by the Indonesian National Police (Polri) and the Australian Federal Police, led to the members of a JI bomb cell being arrested.[vii] This saw the launch of an intensive counter terrorism response[viii] that led to the formation of the Detachment 88 (Densus 88) counter terrorism unit within Polri.[ix] But, despite a sharply increased level of surveillance across Indonesia, JI-linked bombers were still able to conduct a series of attacks throughout the remainder of the decade.[x]
In August 2003, JI bombers detonated a powerful vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the forecourt of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12 and injuring 150 people. A follow-up VBIED bombing saw a box truck detonated outside the Australian Embassy in September 2004.[xi] Fortunately, hardening of the embassy in the wake of the October 2002 Bali bombings, in which 88 Australians were killed, with blast walls and reinforced windows, kept the death toll to nine people.[xii] In October 2005, JI-linked bombers also launched two pedestrian suicide bomb attacks and a VBIED attack in Bali.[xiii] Four years later, in 2009, the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta was targeted by JI-linked suicide bombers a second time, together with the adjoining Ritz-Carlton Hotel, killing seven and injuring 15.[xiv]
In addition to these high-profile attacks, JI was also active between 1999 and 2002 in communal conflict violence in Ambon, Maluku; in Poso and Palu, Central Sulawesi; and in eastern Indonesia via the jihadist militia, Laskar Jundullah, led by JI fighters trained in AQ camps in Afghanistan.[xv]
Finally, in February 2010, a terrorist training camp was uncovered in Aceh linked to key figures formerly associated with JI, in particular, JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir[xvi] and the ASG-linked Dulmatin, the bomb-maker behind many of the JI attacks since 2000. The camp was detected shortly after it was established in order to train a wide range of militants across the Indonesian extremist scene. And whilst this period marked the end of terror attacks associated with elements of the JI network, the social network remained extensive and resilient.[xvii] Even after decades of arrests that saw 346 members arrested between 2019 and 2023,[xviii] the JI network remained persistent, with around 6,000 members and thousands more associated with its community of supporters, and over 16,000 students in the 42 pesantren, or residential madrassas, formally affiliated with JI.[xix]
Consequently, the video announcement by 16 of JI’s most senior leaders on June 30, 2024, that the group was disbanding as a militant network and pivoting to focus solely on non-violent religious education, represents a major breakthrough.[xx] Whilst the terror attacks of the past decade in Indonesia have almost entirely been the work of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the major Islamic State (IS) affiliate in Indonesia, rather than the AQ-aligned JI, the level of extremism inherent within JI’s social activities, the fact that many of its members had travelled to Syria to train with and learn from jihadist militant groups in the struggle against the Bashar al-Assad regime,[xxi] and its latent potential for returning to a campaign of terror, meant that JI absorbed a substantial commitment in resources from Detachment 88.
JI’s 2024 Disbandment
The announcement by the core leadership of JI on June 30 that the organisation was turning its back on terrorism came as a shock to most. Even after it was followed by a succession of similar statements renouncing terrorism by other JI leaders and branches, many were left doubting the group’s motives.[xxii] It was hard to understand why a resilient network that had remained steadfastly committed to violent jihad, in principle if not in practice, for more than 30 years should suddenly renounce it.
The decision by the JI leadership to renounce violent terrorism did not come overnight.[xxiii] It would appear that decades of police counter terrorism surveillance, arrests and prosecutions, together with a remarkable level of sustained dialogue with the police and community groups, had finally persuaded the JI leaders there was little to gain by continuing on a path in which they had everything to lose.[xxiv]
The constant pressure of surveillance and arrests meant that JI was in very real danger of losing control of its precious pesantren. Although its long-held principled commitment to militant jihad was dear, this was trumped by the core purpose of the schools, which was dakwah, or religious education. The pesantren were felt to be essential to the JI community being able to continue to maintain intergenerational fidelity to JI’s conservative understanding of Islam. This remarkable dénouement to the terror network was only possible owing to years of dialogue with key counter terrorism police and other Islamic community leaders.
This does not preclude that in the future there will not be splinter elements and impatient young activists who will strike out on their own to return to violent jihad. That is indeed very much the history of JI over the past three decades. Virtually all of the terror attacks attributed to JI in the past were led by breakaway elements acting in small cells at arm’s length from the JI leadership. A handful of brilliant and charismatic figures, mostly trained in Afghanistan,[xxv] were behind these attacks. They include Indonesians Hambali, Imam Samudra and Dulmatin,[xxvi] and Malaysians Dr Azahari Husin[xxvii] and his protégé Noordin Top.[xxviii]
Even if the disbanding of JI cannot fully guarantee that future terrorist acts will not be attempted by individuals who have come out of the network, its full cooperation with the Indonesian police does lay the foundation for limiting that possibility. It both allows the police to redirect precious limited resources to other threats, for the most part those associated with IS and networks like JAD, and at the same time sends a message to radical Islamists that their activism can find expression in a non-violent future.
The Philippines and Thailand’s Peace Transitions
Just as this substantial development in Indonesia represents a product of a combination of effective hard measures of counter terrorism with soft measures of countering violent extremism, so too are the remarkable achievements in the southern Philippines through the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) peace process over the past five years. This follows the establishment of the BARMM region in 2019.[xxix] By May 2023, some 26,132 fighters from the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) militia had been decommissioned.[xxx]
At the same time, around 1,866 fighters from Dawlah Islamiyah Sulu, along with the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)’s forces, have also surrendered to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Significantly, this comes on the back of more than 800 IS-aligned fighters being killed in the five-month-long siege of Marawi in 2017, a dramatic development that saw many IS militants and groups defect. In addition to the BIFF fighters of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), many members of the ASG, a key element in the constellation of violent extremist groups that in 2014 rallied under the banner of IS, have individually surrendered to local authorities in substantial numbers. Years of pressure from counter terrorism forces and disillusionment with the groups’ leaders have seen hardened fighters turning away from a life of terrorism.
A similar process has been underway in the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, home to majority populations of ethnic Malay Muslims who identify as Patani Malays.[xxxi] There, the mechanism of a long-drawn peace process is more difficult to read.[xxxii] Significant elements have not been formalised through public agreements, involving erstwhile combatants who have organised themselves under flat structures of ‘leadership resistance’. Nevertheless, the decline in violent attacks and deaths is dramatic, and aligns with anecdotal accounts of militants being persuaded to turn away from violence, both because of the pressure they face from counter terrorism forces and powerful arguments that the path of violence is counterproductive to advancing the interests of their community.
Effective Counter Terrorism
In the 2024 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the Philippines is ranked 19th in the world in terms of nations impacted by terrorism. This represents a decline of just one ranking place over the previous 12 months. But, assessed over the previous five years, the situation in the Philippines has improved substantially, as the Philippines was for many years placed consistently in the top 15 of global countries impacted by terrorism. In the GTI 2024, Thailand also improved to a rank of 28, representing a movement of five places on the global ranking.[xxxiii] And Indonesia moved to a rank of 31, which represents a positive improvement by seven places. Meanwhile, Malaysia, where effective counter terrorism intelligence work had succeeded in detecting and disrupting virtually all terrorist plots, was ranked at 81 in the world, improving by five ranking places.
Similar improvements in these Southeast Asian nations can be seen in the sister report to the GTI, the Global Peace Index, where Indonesia is ranked in the same ‘high’ level of peace band as Australia (with Malaysia being ‘very high’), and the Philippines and Thailand appearing in the middle band of ‘medium’ levels of peace.[xxxiv]
This speaks to the bigger picture that the GTI regularly illustrates – that of an inverse correlation between levels of positive peace and good governance and the impact of terrorism. For the countries at the top of the GTI ranking (respectively, Burkina Faso, Israel, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Myanmar, Niger and Iraq), terrorism represents an extreme threat, or even an existential one. By contrast, in Southeast Asia, terrorism has been successfully contained and managed. Nonetheless, it remains a resilient and demanding source of threat.
An Evolving Threat in the Philippines
Whilst these Southeast Asian nations have done well in countering the threat of terrorism, there are drivers of terrorism that operate at a global level beyond the immediate control of these nations. Before considering the reasons why countries in the region need to brace themselves for deteriorating global conditions, it is helpful to do a quick stock take of how their own capacity to manage the threat has developed.
In the Philippines, the BARMM peace process has yielded far-reaching dividends, with the vast majority of former armed combatants handing themselves over to the authorities and entering into the formal decommissioning process. Whether the mistakes made in the five-month-long siege of Marawi in 2017 have been fully internalised in terms of the way that the AFP uses kinetic hard power to respond to threat of terrorism, is not clear.[xxxv] But, fortunately, circumstances have changed, so this is not likely to be put to the test anytime soon.
Not only did the siege of Marawi, the largest Muslim city in the Philippines, continue for a disastrous five months, in which the vast majority of physical infrastructure was destroyed, eight years later few inhabitants have been able to return home. Notably, whilst government buildings have been replaced, residential neighbourhoods remain fields of rubble. It should be acknowledged, however, that relatively few non-combatants were killed even though the physical fabric of the city was destroyed, because the exodus of non-combatants to safe locations was relatively well managed.
The 2025 BARMM elections scheduled for next May are fast approaching, and levels of violence in places such as Cotabato, the BARMM administrative capital, have increased substantially. As ever in the southern Philippines, it is difficult to know how many of the deaths from ongoing drive-by shootings and other executions are due to inter-clan rivalry or criminal disputes, and how much relates to the political fortunes of BARMM leaders. What is clear, however, is that some people currently in power will lose political leverage as a result of the expected outcome of the MILF falling short of winning a majority of votes and having to form a government, should it be able to do so, through a coalition with other parties.[xxxvi] This suggests that the current high levels of violence will continue, if not increase, over the next year or so.
Some have argued that, for this reason, it would be best if the MILF was guaranteed control over the BARMM region for a further election cycle. Others, however, argue that this would do little to help the peace process and that the current turbulence need not derail the larger movement towards the negotiated ending of violence. The abundance of small arms, exacerbated by the slow decommissioning process and handing over of weapons, adds to the vulnerability to violence. In Southeast Asia, the BARMM region and surrounding districts of Mindanao remain at greatest risk from an escalation in terrorism off the current historically low base.
Adding to the woes facing communities in western Mindanao is the impact of climate change, resulting in severe drought, crop failure and periodic flooding. An environment of endemic poverty and historic clan rivalry expressed through clan violence, or rido,[xxxvii] in a region awash with small arms, means that in the Philippines there are rich opportunities, human resources, means, motivation and scope, for terrorist actors to engage with.[xxxviii]
Indonesia’s Conundrum
In Indonesia, notwithstanding the very significant achievements of taking the vast majority of the extensive JI network out of the immediate picture, the high numbers of detainees in Indonesian prisons, either on charges of terrorism or awaiting trial, and the relatively short sentences of those formally charged, mean that there is considerable churn in a system which has inadequate resources for parole and pre- and post-release management. More than 500 people are currently detained in Indonesian prisons on terrorism charges, spread across more than 100 locations,[xxxix] with around 3,000 people arrested for terrorism-related offences since 2000.[xl] And another 500 or so people are awaiting trial. There is little improvement in these numbers from year to year as hundreds are arrested and charged each year, replacing the hundreds who are released.
Fortunately, there have been good results in rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, particularly those led by Detachment 88, and a substantial growth in capacity and involvement by civil society organisations.[xli]
Both counter terrorism and countering violent extremism have never been as well executed as they are currently in Indonesia. The flip side of this, however, is that there are multiple ways in which the situation could deteriorate. The current immediate threat comes largely from IS actors, whether those formerly aligned with groups like JAD or those newly inspired to act in the name of IS. Over the past decade, the vast majority of JAD attacks have been focused on uniformed personnel, in particular, the police and police stations. Should this focus shift for some reason, influenced by messaging from IS globally urging different modes of attack and different targets, then it is easy to conceive that even lone actors could implement attacks that could have much larger death tolls.[xlii] This is especially if soft targets such as churches, shopping malls, and hospitality and tourism centres are targeted.
The ready availability of small arms,[xliii] particularly assault rifles, in the neighbouring region of the southern Philippines means that there exists considerable potential for high-death toll lone-actor attacks to occur if soft targets are chosen and the weapons can be procured without being detected.
Another development that may lead to unintended consequences is Indonesia’s looming change in government. After two five-year terms in power, the former small businessman cum regional administrator cum developmentalist, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), is being replaced by Prabowo Subianto, a retired general, former head of the Indonesian special forces (Kopassus) and former son-in-law of the late President Suharto. Although elected in a landslide victory at the polls early this year, due in large part to an endorsement by the extraordinarily popular current president, it is possible that the transition to Prabowo will mark the biggest change in Indonesian politics since the Suharto era. The once-in-a-decade political transition comes after a period of rising oligarchic power,[xliv] at the cost of sustained democratic regression[xlv] and a weakening of accountability mechanisms, both in government institutions and across civil society.[xlvi]
The cosmopolitan, polyglot incoming president may yet confound his critics and shepherd in positive changes informed by his globalised experience and strong desire for success. But there also exists the risk that the former general and current minister of defence will push for a greater role for the military in counter terrorism, and inadvertently compromise the effectiveness of Detachment 88.
Thailand and Malaysia’s Prospects
In Thailand, the only certainty in national politics over the past two decades has been turmoil and change.[xlvii] Fortunately, a series of recent upheavals in Bangkok have not yet had a significant impact on local negotiations for peace in the Deep South. But that might change if national political contestation should somehow spill over into provincial affairs, as it has in the past.
In Malaysia, for all the political turmoil of the past decade,[xlviii] the police-led counter terrorism programme and the work in rehabilitation and reintegration, has continued without interruption. This too could change, particularly if the current cohort of highly experienced police officers, who have led efforts in detection and disruption, are not replaced in sufficient numbers with equally competent counter terrorism practitioners.
Outlook
For Malaysia, as in Indonesia, the Philippines and also Singapore, the greatest danger comes from lone actors inspired,[xlix] and possibly assisted, by the global IS movement with its increased focus on external attacks. This is illustrated by the increased reach of the Afghanistan/Central Asia-based Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK),[l] but the threat goes well beyond a single branch of IS.[li] This is notwithstanding the association of ISK[lii] with the successful Moscow attack in March 2024 and the IS threat projection across Europe.[liii]
As the recently thwarted terror plot targeting the Taylor Swift concerts in Vienna,[liv] Austria, and the August 25 lone-actor attack by a 26-year-old Syrian extremist allegedly linked to IS in the German city of Solingen, which saw three people stabbed to death, remind us, IS is increasingly succeeding in mobilising teenagers and young men without a prior history of radicalism.
The threat of lone-actor attacks by young men radicalised online via virtual networks is a steadily growing global threat, and sophisticated, economically advanced nations such as Singapore or Australia are not immune. In the post-pandemic age, the threat has morphed to increasingly include those drawn into malign virtual relationships after falling down rabbit holes of conspiratorial thinking. This is resulting in individuals mixing extremist religious ideas, including Christian fundamentalism, with a deep distrust of government.[lv]
Instances of such radicalisation have already begun to appear in Singapore, including the case of a 16 year old who was detected by the police, resulting in him being placed under a restriction order in November 2023, before the matter escalated. Although of Chinese ethnicity, the boy was drawn to white supremacist extremism, evidently falling into this form of far-right extremism via distorted ideas about Christianity.[lvi]
In a somewhat similar earlier case, another 16-year-old Singaporean boy was arrested in December 2020 after the police became aware of his plans to attack two mosques near his home using a machete to fatally wound unsuspecting congregants. The youth, a Protestant Christian of Indian ethnicity, was inspired by the shocking attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, carried out by an Australian lone-actor terrorist on March 15, 2019, in which 49 worshippers were shot dead whilst at Friday prayers.[lvii]
Separately, a 15-year-old youth became the youngest person ever detained under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) in December 2022, having been ‘self-radicalised’ by IS propaganda.[lviii] Radicalisation, however, is a social process and rarely, if ever, occurs as the result of a solely individual journey. Rather, it is the friendships formed in chat groups and forums that are far more instrumental than the propaganda that sparks the conversations. As it turned out, this 15 year old had formed a friendship with a zealous 18-year-old Singaporean, Muhammad Irfan,[lix] after having been influenced by the Zimbabwean extremist preacher Ismail Menk. Irfan had also separately befriended another 16-year-old boy, who was also described as ‘self-radicalised’.[lx]
At the time of Irfan’s arrest, Singapore’s Home Affairs Minister K Shanmugam said that nine individuals under the age of 21 had been dealt with under the ISA since 2015. Fortunately, in all these cases, the police were able to detect and disrupt the process of radicalisation into violent extremism before any physical harm was done. By collaborating with community groups such as the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), most have since made good progress in their rehabilitation. Nevertheless, these cases serve as a reminder that the reach of malign social networks via social media, has the potential, at least on occasion, to exceed the capacity of police intelligence and government agencies to detect and disrupt.
Less evident at the moment, especially when it has just lost a substantial community of support in the form of JI, is the steady rebuilding of AQ. For observers on the continent of Africa, this rise of AQ, often in tandem with its rival IS, is well understood. But in Southeast Asia, it is easy to make the mistake of assuming that AQ is a spent force. The reality of developments in Afghanistan over the three years since the fall of Kabul should serve as a warning against complacency.[lxi] Neither AQ in Afghanistan nor its deeply linked host and partner the Taliban,[lxii] wish to draw attention to the longer-term external threat posed by developments in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
There is growing evidence that both IS and AQ are seeking to exploit passions and anger about the tragic war in Gaza. This was one factor, together with the burgeoning of far-right extremism and conspiracy theory fixations, which led the Australian authorities to recently raise the nation’s terrorism alert level from ‘possible’ to ‘probable’, returning it to the level set in September 2014 in the wake of the declaration of the IS caliphate.[lxiii] The destruction of Gaza has served to galvanise international attention, and AQ, for whom the Palestinian struggle is a foundational narrative, is determined to exploit this. The safe haven AQ has found in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan looks set to enable it to do this on a larger scale than ever.
Virtually all of Southeast Asia’s recent terrorist networks and actors can be linked to the flow of mujahideen via Pakistan to AQ’s training camps in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Current developments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan suggest that conditions are ripe for the cycle to be repeated.
About the Author
Professor Greg Barton is Chair in Global Islamic Politics at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.
Thumbnail photo by Salah Ait Mokhtar on Unsplash
Citations
[i] Julie Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism Trends in Southeast Asia,” The Soufan Center, July 18, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-july-18/.
[ii] Noor Huda Ismail, “The Evolving Threat Landscape in Southeast Asia After the Disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah,” RSIS Commentary, No. 122 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-evolving-threat-landscape-in-southeast-asia-after-the-disbandment-of-jamaah-islamiyah/.
[iii] Zam Yusa, “Disbanded Jemaah Islamiyah Surrendered Weapons, Explosives, Says Indonesian Counterterrorism Official,” SEA Militancy, August 16, 2024, https://seamilitancy.substack.com/p/disbanded-jemaah-islamiyah-surrendered.
[iv] Max Walden, “The Extremist Group Behind the Bali Bombings Says It Has Disbanded. Can It Be Believed?” ABC News, July 30, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-30/jemaah-islamiah-bali-bombing-terrorist-disbands/104125524.
[v] Nivell Rayda, “No Ordinary Criminals: Bali Bombings in 2002 a Wake Up Call for Indonesia’s Security Agencies,” Channel News Asia, October 11, 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-2002-bali-bombings-investigations-police-terror-networks-2968616.
[vi] In August 2000, JI-linked militants bombed the car of the Philippines ambassador in Jakarta, killing two people. Months later, the group claimed an attack involving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, which killed 15 people. On Christmas Eve in 2004, JI also executed simultaneous bomb blasts at 22 churches across Indonesia, killing 18 and injuring a further 118.
[vii] “2002 Bali Bombings,” Australian Federal Police, June 6, 2024, https://www.afp.gov.au/about-us/history/unique-stories/2002-bali-bombings; “Looking for Clues: Episode 2, Operation Alliance: 2002 Bali Bombings,” Australian Federal Police, YouTube video, October 3, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqSgGiCtc7I.
[viii] Aisyah Lllewellyn, “How ‘War on Terror’ Was Fought and Won in Southeast Asia – For Now,” Al Jazeera, September 15, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/how-war-on-terror-was-fought-won-in-southeast-asia-for-now.
[ix] Greg Barton, “How Indonesia’s Counter-Terrorism Force Has Become a Model for the Region,” The Conversation, July 1, 2018, https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368.
[x] “Indonesia Has a History of Bombings,” CNN, July 17, 2009, https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/17/indonesia.explosion.timelines/index.html.
[xi] “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 92, February 22, 2005, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/recycling-militants-indonesia-darul-islam-and-australian-embassy-bombing.
[xii] “Massive Blast at Jakarta Embassy,” BBC News, September 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3639922.stm.
[xiii] Andrew Alderson, Colin Freeman and Nina Goswami, “Western Tourists Killed as Terrorists Return to Bomb Indonesian Holiday Island Again,” The Telegraph, October 2, 2005, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/1499731/Western-tourists-killed-as-terrorists-return-to-bomb-Indonesian-holiday-island-again.html.
[xiv] Justin McCurry, “Suicide Bombers Kill Eight and Injure At Least 50 in Attack on Jakarta Hotels,” The Guardian, July 17, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/17/suicide-bombers-attack-jakarta-hotels.
[xv] Dan Murphy, “How Al Qaeda Lit the Bali Fuse: Part Two,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 2003, https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0618/p10s01-woap.html; Fabio Scarpello, “Indonesia’s Jihadist Revival,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 5, 2007, https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0205/p07s02-woap.html.
[xvi] “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir: The Radical Indonesian Cleric Linked to Bali Bombings,” BBC News, January 8, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10912588.
[xvii] Nivell Rayda, “’Quietly Infiltrating Public Institutions’: 20 Years After Bali Bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah Threat Remains,” Channel News Asia, October 11, 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-bali-bombings-2002-jemaah-islamiyah-para-wijayanto-current-threat-2970101.
[xviii] Alif Satria, “Understanding Jemaah Islamiyah’s Organisational Resilience (2019-2022),” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, November 2, 2023, https://www.icct.nl/publication/understanding-jemaah-islamiyahs-organisational-resilience-2019-2022.
[xix] Aisyah Llewellyn, “Jemaah Islamiyah Says It Has Disbanded, But Retains Influence Through Its Schools,” Benar News, July 24, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-jemaah-islamiyah-disbands-07242024054840.html.
[xx] Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “JI’s Decision to Disband Is For Real,” Indonesia at Melbourne, July 31, 2024, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/jis-decision-to-disband-is-for-real/.
[xxi] Rayda, “’Quietly Infiltrating Public Institutions’.”
[xxii] Aisyah Llewellyn, “Jemaah Islamiyah Says It Has Disbanded. Should We Believe It?” The Diplomat, July 11, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/jemaah-islamiyah-says-it-has-disbanded-should-we-believe-it/.
[xxiii] Julie Chernov Hwang and Colin Clarke, “20 Years After the Bali Bombings, What Have We Learned?” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/bali-bombings-indonesia-20th-anniversary-terrorist-attack-jemaah-islamiyah/.
[xxiv] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), “Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah?” IPAC Report, No. 96 (2024), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report-96-is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah.
[xxv] Scott Atran, “To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,” The New York Times, December 12, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/opinion/13atran.html.
[xxvi] “Profile: Dulmatin, JI’s ‘Genius’,” BBC News, March 9, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4318666.stm.
[xxvii] “Bomb Maker Enjoyed Student Life in Australia,” The Age, September 11, 2004, https://www.theage.com.au/national/bomb-maker-enjoyed-student-life-in-australia-20040911-gdym6u.html.
[xxviii] “Indonesia Police Say Militant Noordin Top Is Dead,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 17, 2009, https://www.rferl.org/a/Indonesia_Police_Say_Militant_Noordin_Top_Is_Dead/1825223.html.
[xxix] International Alert, Conflict Alert 2020: Enduring Wars (London: International Alert, 2021), https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/07/Philippines-Conflict-Alert-2020-Enduring-Wars-EN-2021.pdf.
[xxx] The BIAF is the armed wing of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is the largest of the Moro Islamist forces that entered into the BARMM peace process. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), “Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections,” IPAC Report, No. 97 (2024), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report-97-Avoiding-a-Zero-Sum-Game-in-the-2025-BARMM-Elections.
[xxxi] Aqil Haziq Mahmud, “Political Islam: As Insurgency Drags On in Thailand’s Deep South, a New Generation is Swept Up in the Conflict,” Channel News Asia, April 2, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/thailand-insurgency-deep-south-separatist-political-islam-4214591.
[xxxii] “Thailand’s Deep South Conflict: Is There Hope for Peace?” CNA, YouTube video, April 3, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TM_rbVDb4NM.
[xxxiii] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024), https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf.
[xxxiv] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024), https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf.
[xxxv] Charles Knight and Katja Theodorakis, Special Report: The Marawi Crisis – Urban Conflict and Information Operations (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/marawi-crisis-urban-conflict-and-information-operations.
[xxxvi] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence Before the 2025 Elections in BARMM,” IPAC Report, No. 93 (2024), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report93-Philippines-Political-Jockeying-and-Violence-before-the-2025-Elections-in-BARMM.
[xxxvii] Rido refers to a culture of recurring feuds between families and kinship networks among some Muslim clans in southern Mindanao. These are primarily characterised by acts of retaliatory violence to right perceived injustices. See Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao, ed. Wilfredo Magno Torres III (Quezon City, Metro Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Rido-Clan-Feuding-and-Conflict-Management-in-Mindanao_Philippines.pdf.
[xxxviii] Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Atrocity Crimes Risk Assessment Series: The Philippines (St Lucia, Brisbane: The University of Queensland Australia, 2022), https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/8295/Risk_Assessment_philippines_vol20_april2022.pdf.
[xxxix] Cameron Sumpter, “Reintegration in Indonesia: Extremists, Start-Ups and Occasional Engagements,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, February 19, 2019, https://www.icct.nl/publication/reintegration-indonesia-extremists-start-ups-and-occasional-engagements.
[xl] William Frangia, “Has Indonesia’s Deradicalisation Program Done Enough to Combat Terrorism?” The Strategist, June 14, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/has-indonesias-deradicalisation-program-done-enough-to-combat-terrorism/.
[xli] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “An Indonesian Deradicalisation Program That Works,” IPAC Report, No. 92 (2024), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report92-An-Indonesian-Deradicalisation-Program-That-Works.
[xlii] Greg Barton, “The Return of Terrorism to Southeast Asia,” Asialink Insights, April 22, 2024, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/the-return-of-terrorism-to-southeast-asia.
[xliii] Chad de Guzman, “One Surprising Theory Why the Philippines Has Very Few Mass Shootings – Despite Easy Access to Lots of Guns,” TIME, June 15, 2022, https://time.com/6186982/philippines-guns-mass-shootings/; A. Trevor Thrall and Jordan Cohen, “Don’t Sell Arms to the Philippines,” Cato Institute, April 16, 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/dont-sell-arms-philippines.
[xliv] Ary Hermawan, “How Indonesia’s Cyberspace Entrenches Oligarchic Power,” Asialink Insights, June 19, 2024, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/how-indonesias-cyberspace-entrenches-oligarchic-power; “Indonesia’s New Oligarchs,” Asia Sentinel, February 11, 2022, https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/indonesia-new-oligarchs.
[xlv] Resty Woro Yuniar, “Indonesia Protests: Widodo Slammed for His Political Ambition, Family’s Lavish Lifestyle,” South China Morning Post, August 23, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3275710/indonesia-protests-widodo-slammed-his-political-ambition-familys-lavish-lifestyle.
[xlvi] Emil Salim, “Democracy in Indonesia Moving From Stagnation to Recession,” The Jakarta Post, September 28, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/09/28/democracy-in-indonesia-moving-from-stagnation-to-regression.html.
[xlvii] Koh Ewe, “Why Thailand’s Political Crisis Feels Familiar – and What’s Needed to Break the Cycle,” TIME, August 15, 2024, https://time.com/7011229/thailand-democracy-srettha-prime-minister-constitutional-court-progressive-movement-analysis/.
[xlviii] Amir Yusof, “Malaysia’s 4-Year Political Turmoil Could Have Been Avoided If Politicians Set Aside Differences: King,” Channel News Asia, February 13, 2023, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-political-turmoil-differences-king-parliament-opening-3274051.
[xlix] Nivell Rayda and Amir Yusof, “IN FOCUS: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Vow to Disband Not the End of Terror Attack Threats, Radicalisation in Southeast Asia,” Channel News Asia, July 20, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-malaysia-terrorism-radicalism-ji-jemaah-islamiyah-isis-4487861.
[l] Ellen Ioanes, “ISIS-K, the Group Linked to Moscow’s Terror Attack, Explained,” Vox, March 28, 2024, https://www.vox.com/world-politics/24113965/isis-khorasan-russia-attack-terror
[li] Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State’s External Operations Are More Than Just ISKP,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3904, July 26, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-states-external-operations-are-more-just-iskp.
[lii] Sadiq Amini, “The Taliban and IS-K May Not Be Opposed After All,” Foreign Policy, August 15, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/15/taliban-is-k-terrorism-afghanistan/.
[liii] Greg Barton, “Why Would Islamic State Attack Russia and What Does This Mean for the Terrorism Threat Globally?” The Conversation, March 23, 2024, https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464.
[liv] Marlene Lenthang and Doha Madani, “Taylor Swift Says Foiled Terrorist Plot That Canceled Vienna Shows Filled Her With Fear and ‘Tremendous Guilt’,” NBC News, August 22, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taylor-swift-fear-tremendous-guilt-foiled-terror-plot-targ-rcna165751.
[lv] Rarely does this result in violence, yet when it does it can emerge suddenly and with little warning, as was the case with the Wieambilla shootings in rural southern Queensland in December 2023, which saw six lives lost. See Elise Thomas, “Wieambilla Shooting: Analysis of Perpetrator’s Online Footprint,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, December 14, 2023, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/wieambilla-shooting-analysis-of-perpetrators-online-footprint/.
[lvi] Nisha Rahim, “Singaporean Teen Self-Radicalised and Identified as White Supremacist, Wanted to Conduct Mass Shooting in the US and ‘Fight for the Whites’,” Yahoo News Singapore, January 24, 2024, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/singaporean-teen-self-radicalised-and-identified-as-white-supremacist-wanted-to-conduct-mass-shooting-in-the-us-093737227.html.
[lvii] The teenager had imitated the Australian terrorist by preparing two manifesto documents that he intended to publish online at the time of his attacks. See “Singaporean, 16, Inspired by Christchurch Attacks Detained Under ISA for Planning Attacks on 2 Mosques,” Yahoo News Singapore, January 27, 2021, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/singaporean-16-inspired-by-christchurch-attacks-detained-under-isa-for-planning-attacks-on-2-mosques-090359458.html.
[lviii] Nisha Rahim, “2 Self-Radicalised Teens Given ISA Orders; 15-Year-Old Is Youngest-Ever Detainee,” Yahoo News Singapore, February 21, 2023, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/self-radicalised-teens-isa-orders-15-youngest-detainee-090529121.html.
[lix] Chia Han Keong, “Teen, 18, Detained Under ISA for Planning Violent Attacks on ‘Disbelievers’,” Yahoo News Singapore, February 1, 2023, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/teen-18-detained-under-isa-for-planning-violent-attacks-on-disbelievers-151345298.html.
[lx] Rahim, “2 Self-Radicalised Teens Given ISA Orders.”
[lxi] Greg Barton, “Remaining and Expanding: What the Taliban’s Return Will Mean for Jihadi Terrorism,” The Conversation, August 25, 2021, https://theconversation.com/remaining-and-expanding-what-the-talibans-return-will-mean-for-jihadi-terrorism-166488.
[lxii] Amini, “The Taliban and IS-K May Not Be Opposed After All.”
[lxiii] Jake Evans, “ASIO Lifts Terror Threat Level to ‘Probable’ Amid Heightened Tensions Over War in Gaza,” ABC News, August 5, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-05/asio-lifts-terror-threat-level-to-probable/104141650.
