Staying Alive: The Indonesian Pro-IS Community’s Online Resilience and the ‘Lone Actor’ Threat in 2025
Indonesian Islamic State (IS) supporters’ small but stubbornly resilient online presence is evolving and underpinning new terrorist plots. Despite years of counter terrorism pressure, IS supporters are back on mainstream platforms, like Facebook, and embedding themselves in broader local, national and international conversations online. Pro-IS redoubts online, coupled with the growing use of emerging technologies, like cryptocurrencies, digital marketplaces and generative artificial intelligence (AI), will help incubate more IS ‘self-radicalised’ or ‘inspired’ plots in the future. Counter terrorism authorities will have difficult decisions to make about how to best mitigate this threat as they juggle priorities in the face of budget cuts over the coming years.
Introduction
The internet and social media are playing an increasingly important role in Indonesian extremist networks. In December 2024, the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT)’s annual Outlook document noted that around half of all terrorists arrested between 2013 and 2022 had at least been partly radicalised by activities and materials on the internet.[1] The report also highlighted that terrorists continue to push out hundreds of thousands of pieces of social media content every year,[2] which risks drawing more budding extremists into the fold.
Recent arrests of Indonesian Islamic State (IS) supporters have also highlighted that the internet is not just a part of extremist networks, but, in some cases, has also become central to the formation of cells and plotting of attacks. In 2024, police counter terrorism unit Special Detachment 88 (D88) arrested three young IS supporters who had been radicalised almost exclusively online.[3] The authorities also rounded up several other extremists accused of posting online incitement to conduct attacks ahead of Pope Francis’ visit to Indonesia in September of the same year.[4]
This spate of internet-driven plots and incitement is underpinned by a complex and resilient pro-IS community online.[5] IS supporters, despite being pushed into ‘survival mode’[6] by arrests offline and takedowns online in recent years, are proving difficult to eradicate. They are back on mainstream platforms and embedding themselves in online conversations on local, national and global grievances, increasing the likelihood they will draw in handfuls of new recruits. Though a resurgence of plotting on the scale of IS’ peak in the mid-2010s still seems unlikely, the pro-IS community online will likely seed more self-radicalised ‘lone actors’ in the years to come.
Resilient Online Community
IS supporters online, including in Indonesia, have been battered in recent years. The Global Coalition’s military campaign against IS in Syria and Iraq all but wiped out the group’s top propagandists and media producers, dramatically reducing the quantity and quality of official IS releases online.[7] Meanwhile, Europol’s virtual takedown operations[8] targeted IS supporters on their app of choice, Telegram, resulting in bans on thousands of pro-IS channels and accounts. Counter terrorism arrests also constrained local Indonesian IS supporters, taking out nascent pro-IS media outfits, like An Najiyah Media.[9]
To some extent, these efforts weakened IS supporters’ reach online. Indonesian supporters have been reduced to an anaemic presence on Telegram. Only a handful of hardcore pro-IS chat groups and channels remain from what was once a catalogue of dozens updated daily with hundreds of messages.[10] Where pro-IS groups were once hives of activity and discussion, most have been reduced to reposting old propaganda and religious advice. Many other chat group participants lie dormant, their access to the platform revoked or their accounts abandoned.[11]
But there is evidence to suggest IS supporters are – to quote the group’s slogan – ‘remaining and expanding’ elsewhere online. They are certainly experiencing a renaissance on Facebook, with hundreds of accounts posting pro-IS news, updates and memes daily.[12] Arrests in recent years suggest WhatsApp has also displaced Telegram as the app of choice for private communications between IS supporters.[13] Recent research even indicates some have set up accounts on TikTok and are deftly harnessing the platform’s algorithm to push propaganda.[14] Some supporters are also dabbling in other mainstream platforms, like Instagram and YouTube,[15] while a handful maintain a presence on more obscure platforms, like Rocket.Chat and Element.[16]
Four key pillars of Indonesian pro-IS networks online have been central to their resilience and modest expansion, particularly on Facebook. Propagandists, like Tamkin Indonesia, have played a critical role in ensuring local IS supporters remain connected with their global counterparts[17] by translating attack claims and major audio statements from IS leaders. Memelords, meanwhile, have kept Indonesian IS supporters interacting with one another online by pumping out simple, emotive and shareable memes, videos and stories.[18] Pro-IS Indonesian women in Kurdish-run refugee camps in Syria[19] regularly provide updates on daily life in the camps,[20] serving as symbols of resilience and adherence to IS’ ideology during difficult times.[21] Pro-IS charities like Muhzatul Ummah and Gubuk Sedekah Amal Umat (GSAU)[22] leverage their social media presence to attract hundreds of dollars in donations from supporters every month,[23] enabling them to provide support for the families and children of IS-linked terrorist inmates.
These pillars have breathed new life into moribund Indonesian pro-IS networks on social media and revived their sense of community.[24] Friend networks buzz with activity as memelords share posts from IS propagandists,[25] pro-IS women in refugee camps trade prayers and well wishes with supporters back home,[26] and released terrorist detainees link up with fellow inmates in the comments sections of meme posts.[27] Indonesian IS supporters still face bans on social media[28] and arrests offline,[29] but they have rebuilt a small, resilient, busy community online.
Grievance Merchants
The pro-IS community’s pillars are playing a key role in promoting the group’s narratives online. This includes calling for the restoration of IS’ caliphate as the remedy for the Muslim world’s political disunity and social and cultural malaise. Secularism, democracy, mainstream Muslim groups,[30] Shia Islam, Iran and Western countries continue to be framed as key adversaries.[31] IS supporters also vehemently oppose rival jihadist organisations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),[32] Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS),[33] dismissing them as ineffective or compromised. Ultimately, violence remains central to IS’ worldview, with the overthrow of these opposing regimes and rivals seen as the only way to achieve its goal of global Islamic government.[34]
But the loss of IS’ territorial caliphate and the decimation of its propaganda machinery have reshaped how the pro-IS community engages with audiences online. IS propaganda focused on its proto-state and attacks by militants, which was once supporters’ stock-in-trade online, now makes up a small portion of the community’s content.[35] Many IS supporters’ social media feeds now consist of more general religious content[36] and materials derived from other sources on issues which have little to do with IS’ immediate goals. So, while IS supporters are back on mainstream platforms, they are less immediately visible than they were before.
This content shift is partly a strategy to avoid crackdowns on overtly pro-IS content online,[37] but it also enables the Indonesian pro-IS community to position themselves as grievance merchants[38] for trending, emotive issues online. For example, some Indonesian IS supporters are tapping into long-standing anti-Chinese sentiment by reposting videos criticising the controversial Pantai Indah Kapuk (PIK) housing development in Jakarta,[39] and suggesting its (mostly) ethnic Chinese residents are ‘foreign invaders’ and therefore legitimate targets for robberies or killings.[40] They are also borrowing memes and videos from anti-vaxxers in the West[41] to rail against government health programmes and push conspiracy theories about Jewish/American/Communist agents presiding over a secret global authoritarian ‘new world order’.
IS supporters have attempted to channel broader national and international grievances in a similar manner. In late 2024, IS supporters approvingly reposted photos of anti-government demonstrations featuring mock executions of then President Joko Widodo,[42] fanning calls for violence and a national revolution ‘like in Bangladesh’.[43] IS supporters have also attempted to tap into sympathy for Gaza, borrowing memes from other conservative Muslim groups highlighting the suffering of Palestinians[44] as well as memes presenting the Israeli forces as malevolent cowards.[45] By organically adopting the language and themes of other Indonesians and Muslims, IS supporters are embedding themselves in these broader local, national and global conversations online, albeit in ways that still enable them to project IS’ calls for violence and global Islamic government.
However, there are limits to the Indonesian IS community’s adoption of these grievances, thus restricting supporters’ ability to capitalise on them for recruitment. IS supporters’ unwavering commitment to a global caliphate has undercut efforts to ride on anti-government protests, as they see opposition forces and the proto-authoritarian rulers they are trying to oust as two sides of the same secularist coin.[46] Even free hits on global Muslim grievances are often turned into big misses. For example, IS supporters’ hatred for Iran-backed Hamas[47] places them at odds with many Indonesian Muslims, who view the group as a legitimate resistance movement.
Still, even IS supporters’ qualified engagement with these grievances helps lower the bar for exposure to the group. Rather than being cloistered on platforms like Telegram and only sharing IS missives, tracts and propaganda videos, IS supporters are making themselves more accessible to other Muslims by embedding themselves in hot topic conversations about Chinese Indonesians, vaccines, anti-government protests and Palestine. Most Indonesians would likely be turned off by the more IS-themed content on these interlopers’ feeds.[48] But some may be disaffected enough to take interest and fall into deeper IS holes online, replenishing the pro-IS community’s beleaguered ranks.
Self-Radicalisation and ‘Lone Actors’
The resilient pro-IS online community, paired with a highly charged, grievance-filled environment, risks producing more cases of self-radicalised, ‘lone actor’ terrorism. Lone actors may conduct attacks on their own, but they are rarely truly ‘alone’.[49] Instead, many are products of online communities in which they are deeply enmeshed. A plethora of studies has highlighted the dangers of online echo chambers[50] and algorithmic filter bubbles.[51] The January 2025 truck attack in New Orleans also showed that individual personal and psychological issues can make people more vulnerable to these kinds of radicalising messages.[52]
Online communities, like the pro-IS community, help provide ‘needs, networks, narratives’,[53] which individuals adopt as their own identity and personal struggle.[54] This kind of environment online does not necessarily attract large numbers of supporters or even generate highly capable terrorist cells. But it does provide a venue for vulnerable individuals to be convinced that violence is the only answer for their and the world’s ills.
In Indonesia, there have been several cases of self-radicalisation and lone-actor attacks over the past decade. In 2017, a 28-year-old IS supporter, Mulyadi, stabbed several police officers after regularly watching IS propaganda videos at home.[55] In 2021, a 21-year-old pro-IS woman, Zakia Aini, who had been radicalised online, attacked the National Police Headquarters on her own, armed with a pistol.[56] Meanwhile, in 2024, police arrested three suspected IS supporters who had largely been radicalised in pro-IS chat groups. These included Hamzah Omar Khaled, a 19-year-old IS supporter who had ordered bomb-making materials online for a planned attack on police in Malang, East Java.[57]
Regional trends suggest plots like these will become more common in Indonesia. As countries become more effective at shutting down extremists’ ability to gather and plot offline, the internet emerges as a last refuge for many would-be terrorists. Singapore – with arguably the most robust counter terrorism legislation and most proactive approach to arrests in Southeast Asia – has recently seen a spike in cases of self-radicalisation, in large part motivated by ongoing outrage over the conflict in Gaza.[58] Malaysia, which is also home to a strong counter terrorism regime, has likewise seen an uptick in online radicalisation.[59] In a similar fashion, the Indonesian authorities’ successful suppression of terrorist networks offline could, ironically, drive more IS supporters to radicalising and forging plots entirely online.
Any would-be self-radicalised or lone-actor extremists will have access to more resources to support their plotting online than previous generations of jihadists. The pro-IS community online has already lowered the bar for capability to undertake attacks, with ‘how-to’ guides by extremists like the now-deceased Indonesian foreign fighter Bahrun Naim still ubiquitous online.[60] Despite the technical deficiencies of these guides,[61] they nonetheless provide opportunities for less capable terrorists to attempt to construct potentially devastating devices.[62] Other guides provide even simpler advice on knife or vehicular attacks,[63] which are even more accessible for the average extremist.
Emerging technologies will also provide further opportunities for IS supporters to enhance their capabilities. Some IS supporters have used digital marketplaces to acquire bomb-making materials[64] and even to purchase firearms.[65] Others have dabbled in cryptocurrencies to transfer thousands of dollars to Indonesian IS women in Syrian refugee camps.[66] Some supporters are utilising automated tools to produce quick translations of foreign language materials,[67] and similar generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools could also be used to communicate with militants overseas and to help plan attacks.[68] Cases of these more creative uses of the internet are still few and far between, but will bear watching as more extremists conduct more of their planning online.
Fired-up Indonesian IS supporters online could present an attractive opportunity for IS’ increasingly externally focused structure. Since the loss of its territorial state in Syria and Iraq, IS has reshaped itself into a more nebulous ‘pan-provincial’ organisation, pooling planning, resources and personnel from different regions to mount attacks outside its traditional Middle East heartlands.[69] Indonesia (or Southeast Asia for that matter) has not yet been incorporated into this new structure. But local supporters’ ongoing links with global IS media peers provide potential entry points for IS to seek recruits or support for operations at home or overseas.[70]
All of the above is not to say that self-radicalised, lone-actor or externally directed attacks will become the norm or the predominant form of terrorism in Indonesia, as they have seemingly become in other countries. Offline cells and networking still play a significant role in Indonesian extremist networks, as evidenced by large-scale roundups ahead of last year’s elections.[71] But the longer the Indonesian pro-IS community is allowed to fester online, the more likely we will see it seeding new plots and attacks – either ‘directed’ or ‘inspired’ – that could slip past the authorities.
Prioritising Counter Terrorism Resources
The persistent challenge posed by online radicalisation comes at a time when counter terrorism efforts are likely to face fiscal constraints moving forward. As part of a government-wide efficiency drive, BNPT is set to have its budget reduced[72] and even D88’s funds could be in the firing line.[73] Lone actors and online radicalisation will almost certainly figure further down the list of counter terrorism priorities than issues like the repatriation of Indonesians in Syrian refugee camps[74] and the rehabilitation of former JI members.[75]
Still, the stubborn resilience and modest expansion of the pro-IS community online highlights the need for at least maintaining existing capabilities. D88’s cyberteam has performed admirably in tracking down and interdicting threats online, including lone actors.[76] Continuing to monitor key pillars of the pro-IS community online will be key to detecting would-be attackers and restricting the group’s reach. Support for officers to understand how new technologies like generative AI, cryptocurrencies and 3D-printing can be used by extremists will also be critical to staying on top of the pro-IS community’s capabilities and any lone actors it might spawn.
Authorities will also need to stay closely engaged with social media tech giants[77] to ensure they do not reopen space for IS supporters to recruit and radicalise online. Facebook’s recent announcement that it will essentially be scaling back some of its content moderation efforts,[78] is likely to primarily apply to polarising issues in Western countries[79] rather than opening the floodgates for jihadist propaganda. But the overall setting of fewer and less focused resources for content moderation may nonetheless provide a little more breathing space for extremists.[80]
Offline interventions will still be important but need to evolve. Prioritising family or community interventions ahead of formal arrests in the case of IS supporters in the initial phases of online radicalisation could help relieve some of the burden on the law enforcement, intelligence, judicial and corrections systems.[81] The framework for this kind of cooperation can build on BNPT’s current push for a ‘whole-of-society’ approach[82] to prevent violent extremism by engaging community and civil society groups to provide post-intervention support.
Support for broader efforts to promote tolerance and pluralism are likely to suffer the most under any cuts to preventing violent extremism (PVE) programmes.[83] Counternarratives and public awareness programmes, while well-meaning and having value far beyond their role in counter terrorism,[84] have diminishing returns the further one reaches into active extremist networks.[85] At any rate, the past decade of PVE programmes has already produced hundreds of education modules, training aids, booklets, pamphlets, videos and games.[86] Enterprising civil society groups can (and will likely have to) draw on these existing resources and develop more independent sources of funding[87] to continue promoting positive messages, in the hope of turning at least some vulnerable people away from the path of self-radicalisation.
Even though the pro-IS community online is still well below its peak of the mid-2010s, it has picked itself up off the canvas and is threatening to once again seed new plots. The Indonesian authorities and the Indonesian public will need to maintain vigilance to prevent violent extremists from using social media to recruit, radicalise and mobilise a new generation of jihadists.
About the Author
Jordan Newton is a former Australian Government counter terrorism analyst and has worked as a consultant on CVE programmes under the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) and USAID Harmoni.
Thumbnail photo by Dole 777 on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), i-KHub BNPT: Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook 2024 (Jakarta: i-KHub BNPT, 2024), https://ikhub.id/produk/outlook/i-k-hub-bnpt-counter-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-outlook-2024-97541133.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Jihan Ristyanti, “Densus 88 Tangkap 2 Terduga Teroris di Jakarta Selatan, Terpapar Paham ISIS Melalui Media Sosial,” Tempo, August 7, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/hukum/densus-88-tangkap-2-terduga-teroris-di-jakarta-selatan-terpapar-paham-isis-melalui-media-sosial-29078.
[4] Kiki Safitri and Dani Prabowo, “Densus 88 Beberkan Peran 7 Penebar Teror Kedatangan Paus Fransiskus di Medsos,” Kompas, September 6, 2024, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/09/06/22115211/densus-88-beberkan-peran-7-penebar-teror-kedatangan-paus-fransiskus-di?page=all.
[5] For one of the most complete rundowns of Indonesian extremist use of the internet through to IS’ peak, see Institute for Policy Analysist of Conflict, “ONLINE ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE AMONG INDONESIAN EXTREMISTS,” IPAC Report, No. 24 (2015), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/Online-Activism-and-Social-Media-Usage-Among-Indonesian-Extremists.
[6] Jordan Newton, “Indonesian Pro-IS supporters on Social Media in 2022: Surviving Not Thriving,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2022), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/new-indonesian-pro-is-supporters-on-social-media-in-2022-surviving-not-thriving/.
[7] Henry Ridgwell, “Huge Decline in ISIS Propaganda Mirrors Losses on Battlefield,” VoA, December 1, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/isis-propaganda-declies-mirrors-losses-on-battlefield/4144838.html.
[8] “Major Takedown of Critical Online Infrastructure to Disrupt Terrorist Communications and Propaganda,” Europol, June 14, 2024, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/major-takedown-of-critical-online-infrastructure-to-disrupt-terrorist-communications-and-propaganda; and “EU Judicial and Law Enforcement Authorities Join Forces to Disrupt Terrorist Propaganda Online,” European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, November 25, 2019, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/eu-judicial-and-law-enforcement-authorities-join-forces-disrupt-terrorist-propaganda-online.
[9] Adhyasta Dirgantara, “Densus 88 Tangkap 5 Tersangka Teroris Penyebar Propaganda ISIS Via Medsos,” Detik News, March 24, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5998180/densus-88-tangkap-5-tersangka-teroris-penyebar-propaganda-isis-via-medsos.
[10] Telegram observations, February 2025. The most active pro-IS channels can post over 100 messages a day, though it is usually less than this and much of it is recycled material. In public-facing chat groups, there is rarely any chatter or commentary, except from admins or long-standing group members.
[11] Telegram observations, February 2025. When chat group participants’ accounts are removed, they still remain on chat groups but with their names listed as ‘account deleted’. That said, some IS supporters online sometimes rename their active accounts to ‘account deleted’ in order to conceal their presence.
[12] Facebook observations, February 2025. Also supported by BNPT’s December 2024 iKhub Outlook, which noted Facebook was the platform with the most detected content on “violent extremism tending towards terrorism”. See BNPT, i-KHub BNPT: Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook 2024.
[13] The 2023 disruption of a network led by serial recidivist terrorist Abu Omar alias Muhammad Ikhwan was one of the largest roundups of Indonesian IS supporters in recent years. The network was primarily driven by several offline groupings in different regions, but which were connected to one another via a WhatsApp chat group they had established, “Muslim United”. See Muhammad Faizal Armandika, “Lewat Grup WA Muslim United, 42 Teroris Sebar Materi ISIS Bahas Rencana Gagalkan Pemilu,” Jawa Pos, November 4, 2023, https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/013221405/lewat-grup-wa-muslim-united-42-teroris-sebar-materi-isis-bahas-rencana-gagalkan-pemilu. Also supported by data in the iKhub Outlook, which listed WhatsApp ahead of Telegram for most extremist content detected. See BNPT, i-KHub BNPT: Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook 2024.
[14] Jonathan Suseno Sarwono, “CaliphateTok: How Islamic State (IS) Leverages Social Media in Indonesia and the Power of Counter-Narratives,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, November 28, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/11/28/caliphatetok-how-islamic-state-is-leverages-social-media-in-indonesia-and-the-power-of-counter-narratives/.
[15] See BNPT, i-KHub BNPT: Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook 2024.
[16] Rocket.Chat and Element observations, February 2025. Indonesian pro-IS translation outfit Tamkin Media has a presence on both platforms, which are run off private servers by global IS supporters. Since late 2018, these platforms have been primarily used by IS supporters in countries outside Southeast Asia, with a heavy focus on networking elements of the pro-IS unofficial media landscape. See Peter King, “Analysis: Islamic State’s Experiments with the Decentralised Web,” BBC Monitoring, March 22, 2019, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200paga.
[17] At Tamkin Media Indonesia, Rocket.Chat, February 2025. For an excellent overview of global unofficial IS propaganda outlets’ resilience and expansion online, see Moustafa Ayad, “Teenage Terrorists and the Digital Ecosystem of the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 18, No, 2 (2025), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/teenage-terrorists-and-the-digital-ecosystem-of-the-islamic-state/. Ayad estimated this ecosystem contained more than 93 active or “partially defunct unofficial media outlets supporting the Islamic State across platforms, with some a part of alliances as large as 20 groups, and some being launched at the time of this article”. Many are redundant and could be considered third-rate propaganda purveyors, producing recycled content with rather poor graphic design or language. Others “command audiences of more than 20,000 on channels solely dedicated to their content”.
[18] See examples from TV on Facebook throughout December 2024 and January 2025, including videos of brawls between gangs in Bandung and Jakarta and fashion parades and concerts in Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that TV’s profile banner image is a riff on the Gen Z/Alpha “skibidi toilet” meme, but with a Salafi preacher’s head in place of the usual character in the meme. Another prominent memelord, RU/RI features a profile photo of an edited version of a famous meme of Leonardo DiCaprio from the film Django Unchained, but with a carton of Indomilk or Ultramilk in place of the shot glass. The profiles themselves then often adopt or become memes within themselves, adding humour and accessibility.
[19] Two prime examples are Winda Permatasari and Ummu Azzam Hurayrah. See Noor Huda Ismail, “Online Radicalisation of the Indonesian Diaspora,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2023), https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/online-radicalisation-of-the-indonesian-diaspora/. Both are still active on Facebook, although they have set up new accounts and are operating under pseudonyms.
[20] Winda Permatasari, Facebook, October 10, 2024. Winda posted a half-tongue-in-cheek outline of “the advantages of living in a tent”, which included “not having to pay electricity, easy to move, easy to repair if it gets ripped, and don’t have to pay rent”.
Winda Permatasari, Facebook, October 7, 2023. Winda posted a photo of a vegetable and flower garden run by camp residents.
Ummu Azzam Hurayroh, Facebook, August 30, 2023. Azzam posted a photo of a meal of bread with ketchup, mayonnaise and a sprinkling of vegetables, highlighting the simple food they had access to.
[21] Winda Permatasari, Facebook, November 11, 2024. Winda posted an update in the aftermath of the camps being raided by the Kurdish authorities, hoping that God would “one day repay their oppression with an even greater disaster”.
[22] For a comprehensive rundown on these extremist charities and others – both IS and anti-IS – see Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “EXTREMIST CHARITIES AND TERRORIST FUND-RAISING IN INDONESIA,” IPAC Report, No. 76 (2022), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/extremist-charities-and-terrorist-fund-raising-in-indonesia.
[23] Bangun Rumah Akhirat, Facebook, January 1, 2025, and Bazam Support, Telegram, December 2024. In December 2024, GSAU reported it had spent around AUD$2,600 on programmes for the month. Baitul Maal al Itizam (Bazam) reported receiving over AUD$1,000 in donations for a mosque renovation. Other charities like Muhzatul Ummah, Anfiqu Center and Baitul Mal As Sunnah also reported spending several hundred dollars each in donations and for in-kind support programmes that month.
[24] Amarnath Amarasingam, “What Twitter Really Means for Islamic State Supporters,” War on the Rocks, December 30, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/what-twitter-really-means-for-islamic-state-supporters/. Amarasingam’s comments about the pro-IS community on Twitter in 2015 still apply to the community today: “They also cared for each other, celebrated the birth of children, respected online boundaries of marriage and gender (“I’m married, no DMs from brothers please”), developed relationships and got married, expressed condolences at the loss of a fighter, shared news, and served as a support group for youth who are undergoing hardship thousands of miles away. Everything we do in our community, on and offline, they did as well.”
[25] Facebook observations of MR’s account, February 2025. Reposting or being tagged in posts by propagandists like EA, who frequently uploads IS releases on attacks and pages from the al-Naba editorial.
[26] Facebook observations of Winda Permatasari’s account, February 2025.
[27] AQ, Facebook, January 7, 2025. In a post about deceased pro-IS foreign fighters and social media propagandists, two purported former prison inmates, “BA” and “AH”, crossed paths and realised they had both served time in Gunung Sindur Prison in Bogor, West Java.
[28] AQ, Facebook, February 19, 2025. AQ complained that she was still unable to use Facebook’s livestreaming feature after being placed on restrictions by “Mark” (Zuckerberg].
[29] At least 19 IS supporters were arrested in 2024.
[30] TV, Facebook, February 1, 2025. TV posted a video presenting Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) members as “true idiots” for believing that a well in Indonesia was linked to the Zam-Zam wellspring in Saudi Arabia. These kinds of posts are common for TV and other IS supporters and often include criticism of NU leaders and its paramilitary organisation, Banser.
[31] Telegram observations, February 2025.
[32] Telegram, July 3, 2024. IS supporters lambasted JI members’ decision to disband the organisation in June 2024, saying that it was a result of members giving up on the struggle and failing to conduct attacks.
[33] UA, Facebook, December 29, 2024. Since December 2024, IS supporters have been particularly focused on attacking HTS and Syria’s de-facto leader Ahmad al Sharaa as “idolators” for failing to implement Islamic law and offering some protection to minority religious groups since seizing power in Damascus.
[34] TV, Facebook, October 28, 2024. TV posted a meme declaring that the Prophet Muhammad had ordered Muslims to kill and that “Islam is the religion of conquerors”.
[35] Facebook observations, February 2025. Telegram observations, 2025. There are few propagandist accounts on major public platforms, although their content can remain online for weeks after being initially posted. Memelords dominate on Facebook, and the vast majority of their content is not official.
[36] Facebook observations, February 2025. NB II presents a good example of this. This Facebook account largely posts religious content, including stories of the Prophet Muhammad from official Islamic sources and the importance of prayer. Occasionally, it does post more IS-leaning content about the importance of fighting against infidels and striving to implement Islamic law, or religious content with IS overtones, such as a post about the importance of providing children with an Islamic education as a bulwark against Western influence, featuring a still from an official IS propaganda video. The account also serves as a hub for various other accounts, such as RP, SDUT and SK, which tag NB II in their own posts, which are also mostly religious in character but with some IS overtones.
[37] Ali Abdullah Wibisono et al., “Indonesia’s Handling of Terrorists’ Cyber Activities: How Repressive Measures Still Fall Short,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2024), https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/H5ABQWTWUVNPXJCQ8DZH/full.
[38] Noor Huda Ismail, “The Grievance Hunters: Extremists Exploit Crises to Bolster Their Image,” RSIS Commentary, No. 57 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-grievance-hunters-extremists-exploit-crises-to-bolster-their-image/. Huda provides excellent examples of how extremists, including IS supporters, are also harnessing very local issues and responses to natural disasters in an attempt to gain public sympathy.
[39] MR, Facebook, January 24, 2025. Telegram, January 25, 2025.
[40] AQ, Facebook, January, 2025.
[41] MR, Facebook, February 9, 2025. MR posted a video of a hearing on vaccines in the United States (US), where a woman provided testimony that vaccines were linked to autism. MR, Facebook, January 26, 2025. MR posted a video about a conspiracy theory suggesting vaccines were an attempt to rewire people’s DNA as part of a plot by global elites, including Donald Trump. In an interesting separate case, one IS supporter came across the pro-IS community on social media by way of discussions around the Flat Earth Society. See Arif Budi Setyawan, “Kisah Mahasiswa Mengalami Radikalisasi Online di Masa Pandemi (2-Habis)”, Ruangobrol.id, November 6, 2023, https://ruangobrol.id/2023/11/06/fenomena/kisah-mahasiswa-mengalami-radikalisasi-online-di-masa-pandemi-2-habis/.
[42] TV/TR, Facebook, August 22, 2024. A commenter on the post said, “This should be the right moment for the mujahidin to take advantage of the situation and overthrow the oppressors (thogut).”
[43] TV/TR, Facebook, August 22, 2024. “Jakarta is in Chaos! Hopefully it becomes like Bangladesh!” AQ, Facebook, February 19, 2025. As another example, AQ and her followers discussed student protests as part of the “Dark Indonesia” (Indonesia Gelap) movement in February demonstrating against government budget efficiency measures. Like the August 2024 protests, IS supporters hoped there would be “chaos” but also saw that both pro- and anti-government forces were essentially secular in their outlook.
[44] EA, Facebook, February 6, 2025. EA posted a video on Gazans returning to their destroyed homes.
[45] PAI reposted on AL, Facebook, January 26, 2025. Photo of a blindfolded Palestinian teenager surrounded by Israeli soldiers, with the accompanying message: “Oh lions of Tauhid in Palestine, weapons are weapons, show them the anger of the descendants of the Companions of the Prophet.”
[46] TV/TR, Facebook, August 22, 2024. A comment on the post: “Among the police and students there are provocateurs. We should just watch it all because they are both Pancasila lovers.”
[47] DS, Facebook, October 19, 2024. In a particularly vivid post, DS uploaded an image of former Hamas military commander Yahya Sinwar being “greeted” in the fiery pits of hell alongside other Hamas and Iranian figures.
[48] At least up until 2022, recruitment through purely online channels remained a rarity. See Wibisono et al., “Indonesia’s Handling of Terrorists’ Cyber Activities.”
[49] Munira Mustaffa, “The May 2024 Ulu Tiram Attack: Islamic State Extremism, Family Radicalization, Doomsday Beliefs, and Off-the-Grid Survivalism in Malaysia,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2025), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-may-2024-ulu-tiram-attack-islamic-state-extremism-family-radicalization-doomsday-beliefs-and-off-the-grid-survivalism-in-malaysia/. Mustaffa’s detailed account of Radin Luqman’s radicalisation serves as an example of how some lone-actor attacks are in fact heavily shaped by small, closed networks – in this case Luqman’s family circle. The internet also played a role in providing access to the thoughts of Indonesia’s pre-eminent pro-IS preacher Aman Abdurrahman, whose writings deeply influenced the family patriarch’s outlook.
[50] Ines von Behr et al., Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html.
[51] Alistair Reed et al., “Radical Filter Bubbles: Social Media Personalisation Algorithms and Extremist Content,” Royal United Services Institute, July 26, 2019, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/radical-filter-bubbles-social-media-personalisation-algorithms-and-extremist-content.
[52] Jaclyn Diaz, “The Attack in New Orleans Reveals ISIS’ Influence Lingers, Experts Say,” NPR, January 3, 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/01/03/nx-s1-5246002/isis-influence-new-orleans-attack.
[53] Arie W. Kruglanski et al., The Three Pillars of Radicalization: Needs, Narratives, and Networks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-three-pillars-of-radicalization-9780190851125?cc=id&lang=en&.
[54] Noor Huda Ismail, “Online Radicalisation: How Social Media, Global Conflicts, and Religious Content Create Distorted Narratives,” RSIS Commentary, No. 7 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/online-radicalisation-how-social-media-global-conflicts-and-religious-content-create-distorted-narratives/.
[55] “Mulyadi Terduga Teroris Penyerang Polisi Sering Nonton Video ISIS di Rumah Kos Temannya,” Tribun News, July 4, 2017, https://makassar.tribunnews.com/2017/07/04/mulyadi-terduga-teroris-penyerang-polisi-sering-nonton-video-isis-di-rumah-kos-temannya?page=all.
[56] A Dadan Muhanda, “Rangkuman 5 Fakta Zakiah Aini, Tidak Sendirian Menyerang Mabes Polri,” Ayo Cirebon, April 3, 2021, https://www.ayocirebon.com/explore/pr-94825673/Rangkuman-5-Fakta-Zakiah-Aini-Tidak-Sendirian-Menyerang-Mabes-Polri.
[57] “Anak Muda Rentan Terpapar Radikalisme dan Gerakan Terorisme,” Tempo, August 6, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/hukum/anak-muda-terorisme-radikalisme-408978.
[58] Internal Security Department, Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2024 (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2024), https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/press-releases/singapore-terrorism-threat-assessment-report-2024/. “In Singapore, the primary threat driver continues to be online self-radicalisation. 52 self-radicalised individuals (comprising 40 Singaporeans and 12 foreigners) have been dealt with under the Internal Security Act (ISA) since 2015. Youth radicalisation is a particular concern. 13 of the 52 were aged 20 or younger.”
[59] Rueben Dass, “The Continued Threat of Online Radicalization in Malaysia,” The Diplomat, February 11, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/the-continued-threat-of-online-radicalization-in-malaysia/.
[60] Telegram observations, February 2025.
[61] Bahrun Naim’s infamous handbook contains instructions on how to construct a hydrogen bomb at home.
[62] Triaceton Triperoxide (TATP) is increasingly featuring in local terrorist cells’ planning. See “Polisi: Terduga Teroris di Batu Malang Gunakan Bom Bahan TATP,” CNN, August 1, 2024, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240801125931-12-1128039/polisi-terduga-teroris-di-batu-malang-gunakan-bom-bahan-tatp. Materials are easy to obtain, though producing a stable explosive can be difficult for a novice bomb-maker. Still, successful use of TATP had devastating impacts in the Manchester (2017), Brussels (2016) and Paris (2015) attacks. See Ben Doherty, “Manchester Bomb Used Same Explosive as Paris and Brussels Attacks, Says US lawmaker,” The Guardian, May 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/25/manchester-bomb-same-explosive-paris-brussels-attacks-mike-mccaul.
[63] Sales of hunting knives and other related equipment are common on pro-IS social media accounts. Telegram observations, February 2025.
[64] Hamzah Omar Khaled purchased bomb-making materials online. See Rika Pangesti, “Ngeri! Pelajar di Malang Terduga Teroris Rakit Bom di Rumah dan Beli Bahan Peledak Lewat Online Pakai Uang Jajan Sendiri,” TV One News, August 4, 2024, https://www.tvonenews.com/berita/nasional/233610-ngeri-pelajar-di-malang-terduga-teroris-rakit-bom-di-rumah-dan-beli-bahan-peledak-lewat-online-pakai-uang-jajan-sendiri.
[65] IS supporter Dananjaya Erbening used popular online marketplaces Shopee and Tokopedia to source firearms. See Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Indonesian Police Uncover Illegal Sales of Firearms on Popular E-Commerce Platforms,” The Straits Times, November 15, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-police-uncover-illegal-sales-of-firearms-on-popular-e-commerce-platforms.
[66] Verdict of Nur Kholis Bin Sabar Alm alias Abu Yusha, East Jakarta District Court, 2024, No. 510/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Tim.
[67] AA, Facebook, September 16, 2025. AA used Google Lens to translate an English-language post criticising Al-Qaeda (AQ) over alleged hypocrisy in Somalia.
[68] Gabriel Weimann et al., “Generating Terror: The Risks of Generative AI Exploitation,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2024), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/generating-terror-the-risks-of-generative-ai-exploitation/.
[69] Aaron Zelin, “A Globally Integrated Islamic State,” War on the Rocks, July 15, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/a-globally-integrated-islamic-state/.
[70] Rocket.Chat observations, February 2025. Indonesian pro-IS translation house Tamkin Indonesia is operated out of the pro-IS Tech Haven server on Rocket.Chat, which also hosts other member organisations of the pro-IS Fursan al Tarjuma translation collective worldwide.
[71] Arlina Arshad, “Indonesian Police Nab Suspected Terrorists Plotting to Disrupt February 2024 Elections,” The Straits Times, November 14, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/indonesia-says-arrests-militants-suspected-of-plotting-to-disrupt-election. Court documents from members of the cell highlight that they were largely brought together and radicalised through offline study sessions and religious seminars. The cell leader, Abu Umar, had encouraged members of the network to stay off social media and other electronic communications for security purposes. Nonetheless, members created a WhatsApp chat group, “Muslim United”, to communicate with one another. See Verdict of ABDULLAH INDRA KUSUMA ALIAS MUHAMMAD ICHWAN ALIAS ABANG ALIAS ABU UMAR BIN ABDUL AZIS, East Jakarta District Court, 2024, No. 401/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Tim. There have been other instances of quite complex pro-IS cells forming primarily online and stretching across multiple provinces, such as the Muhajirin Anshor Tauhid (MAT) in 2020. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “THE DECLINE OF ISIS IN INDONESIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW CELLS,” IPAC Report, No. 69 (2021), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/The-Decline-of-ISIS-in-Indonesia-and-The-Emergence-of-New-Cells.
[72] After much back and forth, it appears BNPT and the People’s Representatives Council (DPR) have settled on a budget ceiling of IDR 472 billion for 2025, which is lower than the initially hoped-for budget ceiling of IDR 626 billion. See “BNPT Utamakan Pembentukan Satgas Dan Tim Untuk Siasati Efisiensi,” ANTARA News, March 6, 2025, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4693941/bnpt-utamakan-pembentukan-satgas-dan-tim-untuk-siasati-efisiensi.
[73] Public budget figures for D88 are difficult to obtain, but in 2022, D88 received a budget ceiling of IDR 1.5 trillion. See Yustinus Paat, “DPR Sepakati Anggaran Densus 88 Antiteror 2022 Rp 1,5 Triliun,” Investor.ID, March 21, 2022, https://investor.id/national/287616/dpr-sepakati-anggaran-densus-88-antiteror-2022-rp-15-triliun.
In February 2025, the government announced the Indonesian National Police’s overall budget would be reduced from around IDR 126 trillion to around IDR 100 trillion. See Tria Sutrisna and Dani Prabowo, “Anggaran Polri Dipangkas Rp 20,5 Triliun, tapi Belanja Pegawai Tak Berkurang,” Kompas, February 12, 2025, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/02/12/13404041/anggaran-polri-dipangkas-rp-205-triliun-tapi-belanja-pegawai-tak-berkurang.
[74] Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesia Prepares to Bring Ex-ISIS Families Home,” East Asia Forum, December 28, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/12/28/indonesia-prepares-to-bring-ex-isis-families-home/.
[75] Dini Suciatiningrum, “Kemensos Siap Rehab 8 Ribu Mantan Anggota Jamaah Islamiyah,” IDN Times, January 22, 2025, https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/dini-suciatiningrum/kemensos-siap-rehab-8-ribu-mantan-anggota-jamaah-islamiyah.
[76] See the arrests of RIJAL alias ABU MORGAN AL SOMALIA Bin MEMET and ANDRI MOHAMAD MAULANA alias ANDRI MAULANA alias ANTON bin RAHIM in 2024. Both were reported by the police’s social media monitors.
[77] Engagement has been ongoing since the mid-2010s. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “INDONESIA AND THE TECH GIANTS VS ISIS SUPPORTERS: COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM ONLINE,” IPAC Report, No. 48 (2018), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/Indonesia-and-the-Tech-Giants-vs-ISIS-Supporters.
[78] Joel Kaplan, “More Speech and Fewer Mistakes,” Meta, January 7, 2025, https://about.fb.com/news/2025/01/meta-more-speech-fewer-mistakes/.
[79] Liv McMahon et al., “Facebook and Instagram Get Rid of Fact Checkers,” BBC News, January 8, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly74mpy8klo.
[80] EA, Facebook, February 4, 2025. EA posted an update of an IS militant attack in Mozambique, including four photos. In the comments, she posted an additional photo. One commenter asked why “posts with the black flag” were not being banned like they were in 2017. EA said two other photos had been banned, but as of a week after the original post, five photos still remained, including at least two clearly depicting militants displaying IS’ flag and firing weapons.
[81] There is now plenty of precedent for authorities conducting interventions with members of terrorist networks without necessarily pressing charges against them, though much of this has been related to JI members, who likely pose less of an immediate risk of violence. See Arif Budi Setyawan, “Mengawal Proses Lepas Baiat Anggota Jamaah Islamiyah (2),” Ruangobrol.id, February 28, 2023, https://ruangobrol.id/2023/02/28/ulasan/mengawal-proses-lepas-baiat-anggota-jamaah-islamiyah-2/. Noor Huda Ismail’s suggestions for Singapore also apply in the Indonesian context. See Noor Huda Ismail, “Radicalisation in the Digital Age,” RSIS Commentary, No. 30 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/CO25030.pdf.
[82] Chaula Rininta Anindya, “An Indonesian Way of P/CVE and Interpreting the Whole-of-Society Approach: Lessons from Civil Society Organisations,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2024), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2024.2326439.
[83] Haris Fatwa, “Menelisik Penanggulangan Terorisme di Zaman Efisiensi,” Islami.co, February 23, 2025, https://islami.co/menelisik-penanggulangan-terorisme-di-zaman-efisiensi/. Besides BNPT’s cuts, the US government’s freeze on foreign aid will likely have an impact over time. USAID had previously funded large-scale programmes promoting tolerance, such as the Harmoni programme, which ran from 2019-2024. See Umelto Labetubun and Shashi Jayakumar, “US Aid Cut Will Undermine Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Efforts,” The Jakarta Post, February 28, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2025/02/28/us-aid-cut-will-undermine-indonesias-counterterrorism-efforts.html.
[84] Lydia Wilson, “Gone to Waste: The ‘CVE’ Industry After 9/11,” New Lines Magazine, September 10, 2021, https://newlinesmag.com/argument/understanding-the-lure-of-islamism-is-more-complex-than-the-experts-would-have-you-believe/. “I have quickly sketched what we know about the drivers of violent extremism, arguing that there’s nothing special about it; the very same factors of social marginalization and humiliation, a sense of grievance and injustice, and a lack of hope in the future all feed many other social and personal ills from petty crime to alcoholism to suicide. I suggested that we quit the disastrous CVE approach to focus on making our societies more inclusive and hopeful, thereby addressing many social problems at once, and simultaneously avoiding the stigma of accusing communities of potential terrorism.” Kate Grealy, “Challenges to Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia,” New Mandala, March 7, 2019,
https://www.newmandala.org/the-problems-of-countering-violent-extremism-in-indonesia/. “Another concern that I have found is around the CVE-isation of violence prevention, development and aid sectors. This is particularly a dilemma for CSO workers, who increasingly design and apply for CVE programs because there is more funding in CVE in international aid.”
[85] Alastair Reed, Andrew Glazzard and Samantha Treacy, “Do CVE Counter-Messaging Campaigns Work?” Vox, March 12, 2025, https://voxpol.eu/does-cve-counter-messaging-campaigns-work/; Eric Rosand and Emily Winterbotham, “Do Counter-Narratives Actually Reduce Violent Extremism?” The Brookings Institution, March 20, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/do-counter-narratives-actually-reduce-violent-extremism/.
[86] BNPT’s i-KHub (https://ikhub.id/) and the civil society organisation (CSO)-run Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Hub (https://khub.id) have a wealth of modules, booklets and videos for use by activists. Peace Generation (https://peacegen.id/en/program/default) has taken a particularly innovative approach to public awareness campaigns through the use of board games.
[87] There are already some pioneering actors in this space, particularly the youth-oriented PeaceGen led by Irfan Amalee, who for years has been pushing CSOs to develop “’social entrepreneurship” to ensure consistent funding streams without reliance on state or international donors. See Irfan Amali, ”Rethinking Civil Society Funding: Embracing the Long Tail Strategy,” LinkedIn, March 6, 2025, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/irfanamalee_rethinking-civil-society-funding-embracing-activity-7303190508934217729-xdRO. Some have also suggested mass organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah should take on some of the burden of funding PVE programmes. See Haris Fatwa, “Menelisik Penanggulangan Terorisme di Zaman Efisiensi,” Islami.co, February 23, 2025, https://islami.co/menelisik-penanggulangan-terorisme-di-zaman-efisiensi/.
