Syria After Assad: Fragile Stability and the Transnational Realignment of the Islamic State (IS)
This article examines developments in Syria from 2024–2026, focusing on the persistence, adaptation and renewed activity of the Islamic State (IS) and analogous jihadist movements. It situates these dynamics within the broader United States (US)–Israel–Iran regional conflict, and analyses how local, national and transnational actors interact within this volatile landscape. Under the presidency of Ahmed al-Sharaa,[1] the transitional government faces a dual crisis of legitimacy: managing internal dissent among ruling elites while addressing the broader risk of renewed radical jihadism. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024,[2] Syria entered a highly unstable transitional phase. Since the integration agreement between the Damascus government and Kurdish-led forces in early 2026,[3] Syria has experienced a flimsy state of stability. Former opposition armed groups have sought to transform into governing actors while, concurrently, jihadist organisations, such as IS, have adapted their strategies to exploit residual governance gaps, the uneven reach of security forces and the economic vulnerabilities of war-torn communities. This article argues that Syria’s transitional trajectory is intimately linked to the strategic adaptation of IS, making the management of insurgent networks, detainees and regional security dynamics, central to understanding both national stabilisation and the broader transnational jihadist landscape.
Introduction
The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in late 2024 inaugurated a new chapter in Syrian political history, characterised by uncertainty, fragmentation and the rise of new power brokers. Ahmed al-Sharaa[4] has emerged as the central figure in this transitional order. Sharaa’s trajectory—from leadership in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)[5] to the presidency of a nascent governing authority—encapsulates the paradoxes of Syria’s post-insurgent state-building project. His administration represents both continuity with Syria’s insurgent past and a deliberate attempt to transform the former militant network into a technocratic, centralised apparatus of governance.[6]
Sharaa’s rebranding effort emphasises civil order, institutional consolidation and pragmatic engagement with domestic and external actors. Ideologically, it signals a decisive pivot from transnational jihadist ambitions towards a distinctly Syrian variant of Salafi nationalism, emphasising sovereignty, territorial governance and localised authority.[7] This ideological recalibration has practical implications: it frames state-building not as a simple replication of previous jihadist governance models, but as a complex balancing act between ideological loyalty, pragmatic administration and international legitimacy. [8]
Central to this transformation is a systematic effort to dissolve autonomous militias and integrate disparate armed factions into a unified national defence structure under civilian oversight. Public discourse from Sharaa’s administration emphasises commitments to protecting religious minorities, rejecting transnational jihadist ambitions and reasserting Syrian sovereignty on the international stage. Nevertheless, this project of moderation and institutionalisation is deeply contested. Hardline cadres within the former HTS accuse the leadership of ideological betrayal, while pragmatic elites argue that moderation is indispensable for securing international legitimacy, attracting reconstruction aid and stabilising the war-torn economy.[9]
The domestic struggle unfolds alongside the enduring presence of the Islamic State (IS). While Sharaa seeks to consolidate a localised nationalist project, IS exploits the structural vulnerabilities created by the collapse of Assad’s intelligence apparatus, the uneven territorial reach of transitional military institutions and the widespread civilian distrust of governmental authorities. From the Syrian Badia and Middle Euphrates River Valley, to urban pockets in Hasakah and Raqqa, IS maintains semi-autonomous cells capable of coordinated attacks, assassinations and extortion operations.[10] The juxtaposition of Sharaa’s nationalist experiment and IS’s transnational insurgency underscores the fragility of Syria’s post-conflict order: internal consolidation and external containment are deeply interdependent, and progress in one domain often hinges upon success in the other.
The post-Assad administration faces two interrelated challenges. First, it must maintain internal cohesion by reconciling competing visions of Islamist identity, governance and military authority. Second, it must neutralise IS’s persistent insurgency, the latter of whose attacks and propaganda portray Sharaa’s nationalist turn as ideological apostasy and betrayal. The management of IS detainees, the securitisation of porous borders and the dismantling of sleeper cells, constitute not merely tactical counter terrorism measures, but existential tests of Syria’s ability to achieve the minimum stability required to prevent its territory from remaining a perpetual incubator of global jihad.[11]
This article examines these dynamics in depth. The analysis is organised into four main sections: 1) the post-Assad transition and internal consolidation under Sharaa; 2) the position of IS within the broader United States (US)–Israel–Iran regional struggle; 3) the operational, organisational and transnational dynamics of IS in Syria; and 4) the management of detainees and implications for regional security. By integrating these perspectives, the study provides a comprehensive framework for understanding Syria’s fragile security and political trajectory in the post-Assad era.[12]
Navigating the Post-Assad Transition: Consolidation under Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Risk of Internal Fragmentation
Disagreements within the ruling coalition represent one of the most serious risks to Syria’s fragile stability.[13] These divisions are primarily ideological rather than tribal or regional, reflecting competing conceptions of Islamist governance, pragmatism and nationalist loyalty. On one side are pragmatic Islamists and technocratic administrators, who advocate normalisation, reconstruction and institutional consolidation. On the other are hardline factions, many of whom regard compromise as betrayal and remain committed to a transnational ideological agenda.
The transitional government employs a “phased inclusion” strategy to mitigate these tensions, appointing minority representatives to symbolic positions:[14] for instance, an Alawite minister of transportation, a Druze minister of agriculture[15] and a Kurd assistant defence minister.[16] While this approach signals inclusivity, these positions often lack real authority, reinforcing perceptions of hierarchical or superficial participation.
When co-optation fails, the state has resorted to violent repression, often framed as counterinsurgency operations. In March 2025, an arrest operation targeting “regime remnants” in coastal heartlands escalated into widespread massacres, resulting in over 1,400 civilian fatalities, predominantly Alawites, and displacing tens of thousands.[17] Similarly, the July 2025 Suwayda clashes began as tribal friction between Bedouin and Druze communities, but escalated into a government-led military intervention, which was condemned as sectarian by Druze leaders. The ensuing violence left more than 1,100 dead—including 828 in extrajudicial executions—and forced the internal migration of roughly 192,000 civilians.[18]
Crucial to this “fragile stability” is the state’s relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Following the failure of the March 2025 integration talks, the government launched a major offensive in January 2026 targeting Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in Aleppo, resulting in 1,000 combatant fatalities and the displacement of 148,000 people.[19] An 18-point ceasefire in late January 2026 compelled the SDF to cede Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor to government control, yet the absence of a clear administrative framework leaves disillusioned militants at risk of defection or collaboration with extremist organisations, such as IS. These patterns illustrate the dual challenge of consolidating a transitional state while containing insurgent threats.[20]
Fragmented Sovereignties and the Third Pole: IS within the Contemporary US–Israel–Iran Struggle in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon
The contemporary US–Israel–Iran conflict in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon reflects a multi-layered struggle over influence, ideology and strategic positioning. The US and Israel seek to constrain Iranian regional influence, while Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance—comprising state actors and proxy militias—is under strain in the post-Assad order.[21] Across these theatres, centralised authority has increasingly given way to fragmented sovereignties, shifting alliances and localised communal politics.[22]
In Syria, Sunni Arab leadership remains ideologically anti-Iranian but operationally cautious, wary of provoking renewed conflict with Tehran-backed militias. Alawite communities, previously dominant under the Baʿathist state, have largely receded into defensive postures. Kurdish forces maintain pragmatic alignment with the US,[23] particularly regarding security guarantees, while Druze communities pursue localised neutrality and prioritise the protection of their own populations.[24] In Iraq, fragmented sovereignty persists, balancing Iran-aligned militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, with Sunni and Kurdish groups cooperating with US security frameworks. Lebanon exhibits dual power structures: Hezbollah dominates Iranian-aligned networks, while a fragmented political field limits the authority of the state.[25]
Jihadist movements, particularly IS, constitute a distinct “third pole”.[26] Unlike state actors, IS operates with a fundamentally anti-systemic orientation, rejecting the legitimacy of existing regional and international authorities. Its ideology frames conflict not as a binary struggle between states, but as a confrontation among equally illegitimate entities. The organisation prioritises both the “far enemy”—principally the US—and the “near enemy”, including regional governments and Iran-aligned militias.[27] Anti-Shia violence remains a central strategic priority,[28] enabling IS to exploit sectarian fissures while pursuing its autonomous operational agenda.[29]
IS strategically positions itself in zones of limited state control, leveraging territorial gaps to sustain recruitment, logistics and media operations.[30] While its territorial caliphate no longer exists, IS retains ideological, financial and operational influence across multiple theatres, including Syria, Iraq and parts of Lebanon.[31] Its ability to maintain a decentralised yet coherent insurgent framework allows it to operate semi-independently, avoiding direct confrontation with stronger regional forces, while still shaping conflict dynamics in a manner disproportionate to its size.[32]
Assessing the Terrorist Threat and the Current Position of IS in Syria
Despite losing territorial control years ago, IS remains a persistent and adaptive threat across Syria. Since the collapse of the Assad regime, IS activity has increased in central and eastern Syria. The organisation operates through decentralised cells capable of assassinations, bombings and ambushes against government forces, Kurdish units and civilians.[33] By exploiting the security vacuum left by disintegrated regime intelligence networks and the ongoing reorganisation of the Syrian armed forces, IS has maintained operational relevance.
A closer examination of IS ground activity reveals a geographically differentiated but strategically coherent insurgency. Its operational centre of gravity lies in the Syrian Badia—a vast desert triangle spanning eastern Homs, southern Raqqa and western Deir ez-Zor governorates. These sparsely governed regions provide ideal conditions for guerrilla warfare, allowing IS cells to leverage mobility, concealment and local tribal networks to sustain attacks.
In Deir ez-Zor, particularly along the western bank of the Euphrates River, IS intensifies operations through assassinations and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks targeting tribal leaders, local administrators and perceived collaborators. In SDF-controlled areas, including Raqqa and Hasakah, IS maintains clandestine urban networks responsible for targeted killings, recruitment and logistical coordination. Its strategy emphasises attrition over territorial conquest, aiming to erode confidence in emerging authorities, while positioning itself as a radical alternative for vulnerable populations. [34]
Recent attack patterns suggest a deliberate campaign of sustained low-intensity violence, including ambushes against military convoys, night-time assassinations and coordinated bombings of civilian infrastructure. While attack levels remain below those observed during the territorial “caliphate” period, the organisation maintains a steady operational tempo, with dozens of incidents recorded monthly and consistent casualties among both combatants and civilians.
Organisational Adaptation, Leadership and Transnational Relevance of IS in Syria
Since the collapse of its territorial caliphate, IS in Syria has undergone a profound organisational transformation. It now operates as a decentralised network of semi-autonomous cells under provincial (wilayat) frameworks. This hybrid model—strategic centralisation paired with tactical decentralisation—allows local commanders significant autonomy while adhering to strategic guidance transmitted via covert channels.[35] This structure ensures operational flexibility and complicates counter terrorism efforts, sustaining insurgent activity even under significant pressure.
Leadership attrition has further reinforced decentralisation. Despite repeated targeted killings of senior figures, IS maintains institutional continuity through well-established succession mechanisms, preserving cohesion after leadership decapitation. Current leadership emphasises secrecy, internal consolidation and long-term resilience over public propaganda, complicating intelligence and disruption efforts.
Intelligence reports suggest that IS employs a “delegated committee” model. Under this organisational framework, the Shura Council provides strategic guidance and ideological oversight, while local emirs retain autonomy in targeting and operations. Syria also functions as the ideological and financial hub for the global IS network. Coordination with affiliates in Africa (the Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP) and Central Asia (the Islamic State of Khorasan, or ISK) allows the Syrian leadership to maintain influence despite reduced territorial holdings, ensuring the Syrian “brand” remains central to global jihadist recruitment.[36]
The transnational dimension of IS’s resurgence is particularly evident in the “Syrian crucible” of global jihadism. Syria’s instability has decoupled ideological influence from territorial control, producing high-quality media portraying the collapse of the Assad regime not as a democratic victory, but as a validation of a long-term war of attrition. Syria continues to attract foreign fighters from Central Asia, the North Caucasus and other regions, exporting the “Syrian model”—resistance through state collapse—to affiliates in the Sahel and Afghanistan. Collectively, these adaptations allow IS to remain a potent insurgent force and maintain centrality in regional and global jihadist dynamics.
Detainees, Camps and the Risk of Insurgent Regeneration
One of the most critical unresolved issues in post-Assad Syria concerns IS detainees and their families. Thousands of suspected fighters remain in detention facilities, while tens of thousands of women and children reside in camps such as al-Hol and al-Roj under deplorable conditions. These sites suffer from weak security, severe humanitarian conditions and ambiguous legal frameworks, creating long-term incubators for radicalisation and instability.[37]
Security complications have been exacerbated by the transfer of some IS detainees from northeastern Syria to Iraq. The Iraqi authorities acknowledge receiving both Iraqi nationals and foreign fighters, while calling on countries of origin to repatriate their citizens home. These measures reflect Baghdad’s attempt to share the burden of detention while asserting judicial authority.[38]
Reports of escape incidents, including breakouts from dozens of detention centres, have further highlighted vulnerabilities.[39] Any large-scale release of experienced militants could significantly enhance IS operational capacity, enabling network reconstitution and renewed attacks across Syria and Iraq. Historical experience underscores that prison breaks are recurring features of jihadist insurgencies, particularly during periods of state weakness.[40]
Fragmented International Response and the Global Trajectory of IS
The international response to IS detainees and insurgency has been uneven. Some countries—France, Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan—have repatriated their nationals, often prioritising women and children.[41] Others, including the United Kingdom, Belgium and several Middle Eastern states, have resisted or delayed repatriation due to legal and political constraints.[42]
This differentiated approach undermines efforts to establish a coherent framework for managing detainees and mitigating long-term risks.[43] IS’s threat in Syria can thus be characterised as high but fragmented: while smaller extremist groups contribute to localised instability, IS remains the most dangerous actor due to its organisational resilience, ideological cohesion and strategic capacity to exploit gaps in governance.[44]
Crucially, IS’s resilience in Syria must be understood within its broader global trajectory.[45] In early 2026, IS claimed responsibility for over 45 coordinated operations across central Syria, including a mid-March ambush near Al-Sukhnah, resulting in double-digit fatalities among local security forces. These attacks were strategically sequenced to exploit “security vacuums” left by the withdrawal or reorganisation of former regime remnants. Syria now functions as a strategic reservoir of experience, manpower and ideological legitimacy, with operational practices diffused to affiliates in Africa and Asia. The likelihood of a renewed, large-scale jihadist insurgency depends on the success of state-building efforts, the management of intra-elite rivalries, economic recovery and sustained international engagement. Failure across these areas risks reinforcing jihadist resilience.[46]
Conclusion
The post-Assad landscape in Syria is characterised less by a transition to peace than by the institutionalisation of instability. Under the presidency of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the emergent political order confronts a dual—and deeply interrelated—challenge: the reconstruction of a fragmented state alongside the containment of a resilient and adaptive insurgency. The analysis presented in this study demonstrates that IS has not merely survived its territorial defeat, but undergone a strategic transformation into a decentralised, clandestine and geographically embedded insurgent actor.
This transformation is most evident in the group’s operational geography and tactical evolution. From the Syrian Badia to the Middle Euphrates River Valley to northeastern urban centres, IS has entrenched itself within zones of limited governance, systematically exploiting terrain, tribal dynamics and institutional fragmentation. Its emphasis on attritional warfare—manifested through assassinations, ambushes and IEDs—reflects a deliberate strategy aimed not at immediate territorial control, but at the gradual erosion of state authority and public confidence. In this context, IS no longer competes as a proto-state, but instead operates as a persistent “shadow insurgency”, capable of regeneration under conditions of prolonged instability.
At the organisational level, the group’s shift towards decentralised command structures and a deliberately “invisible” leadership model has significantly enhanced its resilience. The diffusion of operational authority to local emirs, combined with strategic coordination from a low-profile central leadership, complicates counter terrorism efforts and reduces vulnerability to decapitation strategies. At the same time, Syria’s continued function as an ideological and operational hub underscores the enduring global relevance of IS. The Syrian theatre now serves not only as a site of insurgency, but also as a laboratory for tactical innovation and a critical node within a broader transnational jihadist network.
The unresolved issue of detainees and displacement camps further amplifies these risks. Facilities such as al-Hol and al-Roj represent not only humanitarian challenges, but also structural vulnerabilities within the post-conflict order. As demonstrated by recurring patterns of prison breaks and insurgent regeneration, any large-scale failure in detention management could rapidly translate into a resurgence of militant capacity. In this regard, the governance of detainees constitutes a critical test of both domestic institutional authority and international coordination.
These challenges are compounded by the fragmentation of the international response. Divergent policies on repatriation, prosecution and reintegration have produced an uneven and often contradictory framework, undermining collective efforts to address the long-term threat posed by IS. This lack of coherence not only prolongs the detainee crisis, but also reinforces the structural conditions under which extremist networks can persist, adapt and expand.
At the domestic level, the position of the Sharaa administration remains inherently precarious. While the coalition of actors that facilitated its rise has thus far maintained a degree of outward cohesion, the absence of a clearly articulated policy regarding foreign fighters introduces a significant faultline. The potential incompatibility between a centralising, ostensibly nationalist state-building project and transnational jihadist actors raises the prospect of intra-coalition fragmentation. Should the administration seek to marginalise or exclude these elements, disaffected factions may pursue tactical convergence with IS remnants, thereby intensifying insurgent activity and further destabilising the security environment.
Ultimately, Syria’s trajectory will depend on the interaction of several structural variables: the effectiveness of security sector reform, the inclusivity and legitimacy of political institutions, the management of detainees and displaced populations, and the consistency of international engagement. Failure across these domains would not merely risk localised instability, but could facilitate the reconstitution of Syria as a central node within the global jihadist ecosystem.
In this context, the resurgence of transnational jihadist activity should be understood not as a hypothetical scenario, but as a plausible outcome grounded in observable trends. IS, while territorially constrained, remains operationally persistent and strategically adaptive. The Syrian case thus underscores a broader lesson for post-conflict environments: the defeat of a territorial entity does not equate to the dismantling of the movement it represents. Without sustained and coordinated efforts to address the underlying political, security and socioeconomic drivers of instability, the conditions that enabled the rise of IS are likely to endure—if not intensify—in the years ahead.
About the Author
Mekki ULUDAĞ is Assistant Professor of history at Dr. Dicle University, Faculty of Literature, Diyarbakir, Türkiye. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Serra Nur Kaynak on Pexels
Citations
[1] Al Jazeera, أحمد الشرع.. من جبهات القتال إلى رئاسة سوريا “Ahmed al-Sharaa: From the battlefronts to the presidency of Syria”, https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2015/7/26/ أبو-محمد-الجولاني (Accessed February 21, 2026). See also Adrian Shtuni, “From Insurgency to Statecraft: Al-Sharaa and Syria’s Foreign Fighters Test,” CTC Sentinel 19, no. 2 (2026): 1–9, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-insurgency-to-statecraft-al-sharaa-and-syrias-foreign-fighters-test/
[2] For further information about the sociology of Syria, its ethnicity and religious structure, see Hanna Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics (Princeton University Press, 1999).
[3] For further information about the integration of the Kurds, see: Ayman Al-Desouki, “دمج الشمال السوري في منظومة الحوكمة للدولة السورية مسار ودروس (Integrating Northern Syria into the Syrian State’s Governance System: A Process and Lessons Learned),” Omran Center for Strategic Studies, August 14, 2025, https://www.omrandirasat.org/الإصدارات/الأبحاث/أوراق-بحثية/دمج-الشمال-السوري-في-منظومة-الحوكمة-للدولة-السورية-مسار-ودروس.html.
[4] Also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, Sharaa is known to be the son of a Syrian family from Golan Heights, on the border of Syria and Israel.
[5] “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS): TNT Terrorism Backgrounder,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/warfare-irregular-threats-and-terrorism-program-archives/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir.
[6] In this interview, Ahmed al-Shaara discusses the future of Syria and his vision for the country.
“أحمد الشرع من قصر الأسد يتحدث عن خططه من أجل مستقبل سوريا وارتباطه السابق بتنظيم القاعدة (Ahmed al-Sharaa, from the Assad Palace, Speaks About His Plans for the Future of Syria and His Past Association with Al-Qaeda),” BBC News, December 20, 2024, YouTube, 31 min., 3 sec., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lfnP9H9ojM.
[7] “Syrian Interim Leader Signs Agreement with SDF to Integrate Institutions, Restore State Authority,” China Daily, January 19, 2026, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202601/19/WS696d0f00a310d6866eb345be.html.
[8] Itai Melchior and Nir Boms, “Why al‑Sharaa’s Success in Syria Is Good for Israel and the US,” Atlantic Council, July 2, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/why-al-sharaas-success-in-syria-is-good-for-israel/.
[9] “Syria’s President Says New Authorities Can’t Satisfy Everyone,” Al‑Monitor, March 31, 2025, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/03/syria-president-says-new-authorities-cant-satisfy-everyone.
[10] “Authorities Warn of Growing ISIS Activities in Western Iraq,” Rudaw, February 7, 2026, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/070220261.
[11] “Northeast Syria: Camp Closures Leave Thousands Stranded,” Human Rights Watch, February 23, 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/23/northeast-syria-camp-closures-leave-thousands-stranded.
[12] “Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed April 2, 2026, https://www.unocha.org/syria/.
[13] Hala Hajj Ali, “حلا حاج علي: مؤشرات العنف الأهلي في سوريا.. مقاربة نفسية اجتماعية لبنية الصراع المحلي (Indicators of Civil Violence in Syria: A Psychosocial Approach to the Structure of Local Conflict,” Omran Center for Strategic Studies, June 22, 2025, https://www.omrandirasat.org/الإصدارات/الأبحاث/أوراق-بحثية/مؤشرات-العنف-الأهلي-في-سورية-مقاربة-نفسية-اجتماعية-لبنية-الصراع-المحلي.html.
[14] For further dicsussions and in-depth analysis about the future of Syria, see: “سوريا حرة إلى الأبد: مقالات وتحليلات (A Free Syria Forever: Articles and Analyses),” Al Safahat, July 11, 2025, https://www.alsafahat.net/2025/07/11/سوريا-حرة-إلى-الأبد-مقالات-وتحليلات-11-ت/.
[15] “Syrian President al-Sharaa Unveils Transitional Government,” Al Jazeera, March 30, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/30/syrian-president-unveils-transitional-government.
[16] “Syria Picks Kurdish Military Official as Assistant Defence Minister,” The New Arab, March 10, 2026, https://www.newarab.com/news/kurdish-military-official-picked-assistant-defence-minister.
[17] United Nations Human Rights Council, Violations Against Civilians in the Coastal and Western-Central Regions of the Syrian Arab Republic (January–March 2025), A/HRC/59/CRP.4, August 11, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/report-coi-syria-august2025.
[18] “Statement on the July 2025 Clashes and State Intervention,” Druze Council of Suwayda, July 15, 2025; “Syria: Suwayda Violence and Sectarian Targeting,” Human Rights Watch, January 15, 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/15/syria-accountability-lacking-for-sweida-abuses; Author’s interview with Hikmat al‑Hijri, Suwayda, October 2025.
[19] “Statement Issued by the General Command of the Syrian Democratic Forces Regarding the Attacks on Aleppo,” Syrian Democratic Forces Press Office, January 7, 2026, https://sdf-press.com/en/?p=19551.
“Operational Report: Aleppo Offensive, January 2026,” Syrian Democratic Forces Press Office, January 28, 2026; Aleppo’s Kurdish Neighborhoods and the Limits of Integration (International Crisis Group, March 2026), 14–9.
[20] “Terms of the Ceasefire and Integration Agreement Between Syria and SDF,” Syrian Arab News Agency, January 18, 2026, https://sana.sy/en/syria/2291194/; “March 2026 Monthly Forecast: Middle East: Syria,” United Nations Security Council Report, March 2, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-03/syria-89.php.
[21] Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019); “Iran’s Regional Armed Network,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 15, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/articles/irans-regional-armed-network.
[22] Dr Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, “State Fragmentation in the Middle East As a Global Threat,” Arab News, January 8, 2026 https://www.arabnews.com/node/2628667.
[23] Marsin Alshamary and Hamzeh Hadad, “Iraq’s Search for Security and Sovereignty After Assad’s Collapse,” Brookings, January 21, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraqs-search-for-security-and-sovereignty-after-assads-collapse/.
[24] “Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida,” International Crisis Group, November 26, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/middle-east-north-africa/syria/253-restoring-security-post-assad-syria-lessons-coast-and-suweida.
[25] David Wood, “Tensions Rise Between Hezbollah and Lebanon Over Disarmament,” International Crisis Group, August 8, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/alr/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/lebanon-israelpalestine/tensions-rise-between-hizbollah-lebanon-disarmament.
[26] Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS (Doubleday, 2015), 12–5; Charles Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Hurst Publishers, 2015), 190–95.
[27] “Arab Barometer Wave VIII: September 2023–July 2024,” Arab Barometer, 2024, https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-viii/; Steven Heydemann, “Economic Development, Governance, and Human Security After the Arab Uprisings,” Brookings, March 26, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/economic-development-governance-and-human-security-after-the-arab-uprisings/.
[28] Warrick, Black Flags, 178–82; Amna Nawaz and Zeba Warsi, “Doctoral Student Held Hostage for Years in Iraq Shares Her Harrowing Story After Release,” PBS News Hour, February 2, 2026, 9 min., 15 sec., https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/doctoral-student-held-hostage-for-years-in-iraq-shares-her-harrowing-story-after-release.
[29] Highlights of Security Council Practice: 2025 (United Nations, 2025), https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/default/files/2026/Highlights_of_Security_Council_Practice_2025_2.pdf; Richard Atwood, host, Nanar Hawach and Dareen Khalifa, Hold Your Fire! “What’s Next for Syria?” International Crisis Group, January 24, 2025, 51 min., https://www.crisisgroup.org/pod/middle-east-north-africa/syria/whats-next-syria.
[30] “Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State,” International Crisis Group, July 30, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/middle-east-north-africa/iraq/188-iraqs-paramilitary-groups-challenge-rebuilding-functioning-state; Patrick B. Johnston et al., Foundations of the Islamic State’s Insurgency in Iraq (RAND Corporation, 2017), 22–8.
[31] United Nations Security Council, Nineteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, S/2024/583, July 31, 2024, 7–12, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/583.
[32] Dr Erin Marie Saltman and Charlie Winter, Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism (Quilliam, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20141113214326/http:/www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changing-face-of-modern-jihadism.pdf.
[33] United Nations Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, S/2022/63, January 28, 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3957700?ln=es&v=pdf.
[34] Ali Saray, “Iraqi Justice Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: ISIS Prisoners Held at a Fortified Site, Escape Impossible,” Asharq Al-Awsat, February 25, 2025, https://english.aawsat.com/interviews/5244790-iraqi-justice-minister-asharq-al-awsat-isis-prisoners-held-fortified-site-escape.
[35] Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State Attacks the New Syrian Government,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 19, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-attacks-new-syrian-government
[36] Lazghine Ya’qoube, “Syria in the Crucible of Jihad,” The Kurdish Center for Studies, May 12, 2025, https://nlka.net/eng/syria-in-the-crucible-of-jihad/.
[37] “Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families,” Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/23/syria-dire-conditions-isis-suspects-families.
[38] “Regional States Willing to Repatriate ISIS Prisoners: Iraqi FM,” Rudaw, February 15, 2026, https://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/15022026.
[39] “Syria Confirms ‘Mass Escape’ from Camp Housing Relatives of ISIL Fighters,” Al Jazeera, February 26, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/26/syria-confirms-mass-escape-from-camp-housing-relatives-of-isil-fighters.
[40] Philip Loft and Louisa Brooke-Holland, Countering Islamic State/Daesh in Africa, Syria and Iraq 2025 (House of Commons Library, 2025), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9613/.
[41] “Containing Transnational Jihadists in Syria’s North West,” International Crisis Group, March 7, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/239-containing-transnational-jihadists-syrias; Alican Uludağ, “Türkiye Is Preparing to Take Back Turkish Citizens Who Are IS Members,” Deutsche Welle, February 13, 2026, https://www.dw.com/tr/ türkiye-türk-vatandaşı-işi̇dlileri-almaya-hazırlanıyor/a-75953862.
[42] “European Report Warns of the Consequences of ISIS Prison Breaks in Syria,” Welat TV, January 22, 2026, https://www.welattv.net/en/node/22827; “Northeast Syria: Camp Closures Leave Thousands Stranded,” Human Rights Watch, February 23, 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/23/northeast-syria-camp-closures-leave-thousands-stranded.
[43] “Iraq: Alleged ISIS Detainees Transferred from Syria at Risk of Abuse,” Human Rights Watch, February 17, 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/17/iraq-alleged-isis-detainees-transferred-from-syria-at-risk-of-abuse; Associated Press reporting on transfer figures.
[44] United Nations Security Council, ISIL (Da’esh) monitoring reports (2024–2025), https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/content/secretary-general’s-isil-reports.
[45] Special Eurasia “Iraq: Terrorist Threat and Security Risk Assessment”, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/02/01/iraq-security-terrorism-risk/#:~:text=The%20incremental%20withdrawal%20of%20United,danger%20to%20Mosul%20and%20Anbar
[46] Adrian Shtuni, “The Islamic State in 2025: An Evolving Threat Facing a Waning Global Response,” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, July 11, 2025, https://icct.nl/publication/islamic-state-2025-evolving-threat-facing-waning-global-response.
