Syria: Lessons for Returning to the Fold
In December 2024, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was a watershed moment for jihadist movements globally, marking the end of a bloody civil war that drew fighters from all over the world and, in turn, the intervention of global powers like the United States (US), Russia, Israel and Iran. Since taking power, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former branch of Al-Qaeda (AQ), has taken steps to assure those stakeholders it is making a clean break from its radical past. For the time being, major world powers are optimistic that Syria is no longer a security concern that needs to be managed. However, the long-term impact of the HTS takeover on global jihadist movements is yet to be worked out. Several local armed groups have welcomed the news, even agreeing to submit to the new government’s authority. while some of those outside the region are watching the developments in Syria as a model for their own respective situations. But other groups look at HTS with great distrust on how quickly it has mended ties with major powers, seeing the success of the new Syrian government as proof of its abandonment of jihadist ideology.
A Historic Rise and Fall
Ten years ago, Syria was home to perhaps the largest and best equipped global jihadist group seen in modern times. The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group ruled over some 12 million people in Syria and Iraq[1] It drew to its ranks at least 40,000 foreign fighters from more than 110 countries.[2] It had police and courts that kept meticulous records. It taxed its subjects and sold oil from vast reserves in northeast Syria and northwest Iraq, operating on a US$2 billion annual budget.[3]
At the height of its power, IS perhaps surpassed previous successes seen by militant groups like the Afghan Taliban or Al-Shabaab, and, certainly unlike those groups, its impact went well beyond its base in Iraq and Syria. Its extensive propaganda efforts drew not only revulsion and condemnation from governments, but also jihadist admirers who founded new affiliate groups from West Africa to East Asia.
IS’s own operatives carried out attacks both at the regional and global level, sparking an international security crisis. Governments put in place strict border controls and increased counter terrorism cooperation to thwart attacks at home. In this process, Syria became the battleground for a global war, one that pitted proxy groups as well as actual forces from the United States (US), Turkey, Russia, Iran and Israel against one another.
However, the lesson other jihadist groups will draw from IS is not just in its short-lived success, but in what led to its decline in Syria and Iraq.
It took the anti-IS coalition, which not only involved conventional state forces, but other jihadist groups like HTS, which toppled Assad’s regime in December 2024, more than five years to significantly diminish IS’s presence. The prospect of Syria again becoming a launching pad for global jihadist movements is shaping global policy towards the new government in Damascus,[4] and the HTS government, notwithstanding its jihadist past, is reassuring the world that it is ready to rejoin the ranks of responsible states.
The public relations campaign by HTS reached a peak this May, when US President Donald Trump extended his support to Ahmad al-Sharaa, the new head of the HTS-led Syrian government. al-Sharaa, after having split with Al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2016,[5] had shed as much of that past as he could, transforming his public persona into a suit-and-tie-wearing pragmatic leader.
Trump had said that Syria deserved “a chance at greatness” when he met al-Sharaa in Riyadh and discussed the handful of demands Washington was looking for from the new Syrian leader: the departure of “foreign terrorists” from Syria, including Palestinian militants, and cooperation in the US’s efforts to prevent the resurgence of IS. al-Sharaa, according to Trump, even agreed to consider joining the Abraham Accords, a controversial and tenuous truce between several Arab nations and Israel.[6]
In the case of AQ, there are indications that at least some of the group is not happy with the pragmatic stance HTS has taken. One publication by Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) called the capture of Damascus by HTS a product of a “Zionist-Crusader arrangement”.[7] In the case of IS, its publication al-Naba called al-Sharaa and his group “jihadists turned politicians”, and said they had been “tested, contained and domesticated” by global powers.[8]
For Iran-backed militant groups like Hezbollah, the fall of Assad was a major setback. Palestinian groups operating in Gaza and the West Bank had relied for years on the land corridor from Iran via Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to supply them with weapons and fighters.[9] The most lasting impact of the HTS takeover in Damascus is the loss of this route to Palestinian groups.
For years, rebels in Syria had fought against a regime backed by Iran, not just through weapons and fighters, but also through a Shiite ideology that drummed up support for their side using religious themes. Hezbollah, which is not only a Lebanese group but also an openly Shiite group aligned with Iran, as a result has not fared well, dealing with the loss of Syria as an operating ground and major losses from Israel’s campaign against it in recent years.
Hezbollah officials have called the fall of the regime a “major, dangerous and new transformation.”[10] This will have a similar impact on a host of Iran-backed militias and jihadist groups in the region, like the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades, groups of mostly Afghan and Pakistani Shia recruits who participated in the Syrian civil war under the belief they were engaged in a religiously obligated war to safeguard sacred sites there. Since the fall of Assad, these groups, composed of thousands of fighters, have been relocated to Iraq.[11]
No doubt many other jihadist groups who see the Palestinian struggle as of paramount importance will also be sceptical of the HTS example, deeming it a betrayal of a core cause for their movements. Despite decades of brutal authoritarian rule in Syria, the Assad family had continued to enjoy the support of some jihadists, including Sunni groups in the region, simply because they refused to normalise relations with Israel and provided a degree of tacit support for Palestinian armed factions.[12]
But other groups which do not see the Palestine issue as paramount, have taken the opportunity to acknowledge the model HTS may be developing for their own struggles. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, for instance, issued a statement saying it “congratulates the leadership of the movement and the people of Syria on the recent developments, which have resulted in the removal of key factors contributing to conflict & instability.”[13]
The statement echoed congratulations HTS had issued in 2021, when the Taliban took over Afghanistan. Back then, HTS said it “drew inspiration” from the long jihad waged in that country.[14]
These reactions underscore two opposing jihadist views on the HTS victory in Syria: some see it as proof that an Islamically-inspired violent struggle can lead to success, while others are sceptical of the concessions and compromises needed to reach such a point on the world stage. One group has effectively overlooked the geopolitical forces that may have played a role in the success of HTS to embrace the situation as a sign that their own aspirations for waging and winning a long jihad could also bear fruit one day. The other group instead is wary of the long-term implications of what al-Sharaa and HTS have done. To them, it is a sign that victory will mean having to give up long-held aspirations like enforcing strict Islamic law, imposing sectarian supremacy, or building a base for transnational jihad against Israel and other Western powers.
A Long Battle to Consolidate Control
Jihadist groups often do not operate on their own: in several ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and further afield, there are competing groups with competing ideologies. Thus, another lesson jihadist groups will take from Syria is the way HTS consolidated power in recent years and built a stable base in Idlib that allowed it to practise governance and prepare for taking the rest of the country.
For more than a decade Ahmad al-Sharaa has been known by another name, Abu Muhammad al Julani. The son of a Syrian economist, al-Sharaa went to Iraq after the US invasion and joined other AQ insurgents there. He was imprisoned by US-led forces from 2006 to 2011, and, upon his release, he left for Syria to take part in the expanding rebel uprising there. In 2012, he led a new AQ-backed group, Jabhat al-Nusra, which made significant gains in the northwest of the country and fought with IS. In 2016, al-Nusra publicly split with AQ, then rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. It went on to establish HTS as an umbrella group for several factions,[15] and through alliances and violence, it not only sidelined IS, but also other rival groups like Ahrar al-Sham.[16]
In 2020, HTS was given breathing room in Idlib after Turkey brokered a ceasefire with Russia and regime forces, effectively acting as a buffer force between the rebel-held stronghold and the rest of the country.[17] Under HTS and its umbrella authority, dubbed the “Salvation Government”, Idlib emerged as a relatively safe part of what was otherwise a war-torn Syria. Millions of people moved there from other parts of the country. They took advantage of a relatively stable life under HTS, one that was free of regime and Russian airstrikes, and one that provided reliable electricity, functioning hospitals, ambulances and emergency services, and even universities.[18]
Meanwhile, HTS continued to take measures against AQ, including its local affiliate Hurras al-Din, and IS in its sphere of influence.[19] In 2019, US forces killed IS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in Idlib. In 2022, his successor was also killed by US forces in Idlib, on the heels of years-long raids by HTS against the group’s operatives in the area.
Yet, there were other jihadist groups that HTS sought out for alliances. One of the largest is the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur group that includes up to 5,000 fighters as well as around 15,000 civilians. In Idlib, the Uyghurs opened restaurants and bakeries, ran schools and sent their children to universities. Many came directly from China, but some, including the group’s leadership, had spent years in places like Afghanistan, outlasting the war on terror there to escape to Syria, where they fought alongside groups like HTS and lost at least 1,100 people during the civil war.[20]
After the fall of Assad, TIP leaders were among the rare foreign commanders to be handed leadership roles in the new HTS military structure. Abdulaziz Davud Hudaberdi, the TIP’s former head, dispatched more than a decade ago from Afghanistan by the movement’s AQ-affiliated head there, was made a brigadier general in the new Syrian military.[21] Two other Uyghurs were made colonels, among a half dozen or so foreign fighters given such official ranks in the new Syrian military. While other foreign groups still operate in Syria, the Uyghurs stand out as the largest contingent and perhaps the most likely to remain loyal to HTS and al-Sharaa, simply because they have few other places in the world left to build the kind of life they seek.[22]
The TIP’s own trajectory in Syria could also be a model for other jihadist groups: staying loyal to a more powerful organisation can be rewarded with some measure of legitimacy. The TIP has notably not reneged on its promise to take its fight to China one day, but, for now, its presence only seems to be a problem for Beijing and not for Syria’s new Western backers.[23]
Reassuring Global Powers
Another important lesson for other jihadist groups to take from Syria is how to reassure global powers that they are in fact in charge of the country.
Since coming to power, HTS has taken steps to assure outside powers that it has a plan for dealing with foreign jihadists in the country. First, it has sought to integrate groups directly under its control into a unified chain of command. By January 2025, not only had the TIP announced it was disbanding, but several other major jihadist groups had announced they would submit to a new unified command as well.[24] This includes the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, a coalition of rebel groups that made up the largest faction besides HTS in the country.
This strategy seems to have won the approval of the US as well, with Washington’s envoy Thomas Barrack saying it is better for Syria to include these fighters in a command structure than to abandon them.[25]
Though some other militant groups did not join HTS, they announced a closure to their activities. For instance, AQ’s fledgling affiliate in Syria, Hurras al-Din, announced its dissolution in January.[26]
That same month, HTS arrested a former fighter among its own ranks, the Egyptian Ahmed al-Mansour, after he began calling for a Syria-like overthrow of Egyptian ruler Abdel Fattah el-Sissi. al-Mansour, who had come to Syria after witnessing the Egyptian military coup that overthrew a Muslim Brotherhood government there in 2013, had begun posting messages through his large social media presence that openly threatened the Egyptian military ruler. In one video, he announced the formation of the “25 January Revolutionaries Movement”, seated at a table with two masked fighters and Egypt’s monarchy-era flag.[27]
al-Sharaa’s government has also taken steps to crack down on a decades-old presence of Palestinian militants in Syria, groups that were backed by Assad as well as Iran. In April, authorities arrested Khaled Khaled and Yasser Al Zufri, two leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a group that has worked alongside Hamas in places like Gaza.[28]
The mere presence of HTS in Syria has cut off the land route between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, making it very difficult for Iran to continue supplying groups like Hezbollah in the region. While this role should be drawing some praise from Israel, so far it has not, with Israeli ground forces occupying parts of Syria south of Damascus, and its air force regularly bombing HTS positions in the area.
Intransigent Challenges to Consolidation of HTS’s Power
The most pressing issue for HTS in consolidating power, though, is dealing with Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. Backed by the US, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there had spent years on the frontline against IS; it expected to retain some form of the autonomy they had gained in that region. The SDF is is paid to look after the al-Hol and al-Roj prisoner camps, where some 36,000 people, many of them fighters but mostly women and children, are being held for their affiliation with IS.[29]
The future of the SDF may well be dictated by Turkey and the US. After decades of conflict, Turkey has convinced the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to finally give up its armed struggle. While the PKK may be a different group in principle from the SDF, the two share many rank-and-file fighters, and Turkey has insisted the Kurds in Syria either disarm or integrate themselves into the new government based in Damascus. The failure of any deal between the SDF, Damascus and Turkey has the potential to once again spark a civil war in Syria.
It is also unclear how secure Syria under HTS will be in the short term from attacks by groups like IS. In June, a suicide attack on a church in Damascus killed 25 people. The Syrian government claimed the attackers were linked to IS prisoners held in Kurdish-run camps, but the Kurdish authorities in that region disputed the claim. Nevertheless, the threat from IS in Syria persists: the new government has claimed it has foiled several attempts by the group to attack churches and one attempt to bomb the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine, a major pilgrimage point for Shia Muslims. Furthermore, on June 10, the US carried out an airstrike in northwestern Syria, reportedly killing Rakhim Boev, an IS leader whom Washington claims oversaw the group’s external operations.
The new Syrian government has serious sectarian tensions to deal with as well, which could easily escalate into a larger conflict involving the Sunni hardliners it has come to rely on. In recent months, largely Sunni tribal fighters have clashed with Druze militias in places like Suweida, and Alawite forces reportedly still loyal to Assad have attacked HTS and other groups in coastal areas like Latakia. In both cases, Damascus has struggled to control the response of the mélange of jihadist groups it wields power over: at least 1,500 Alawite civilians were killed, for instance, in the effort to reassert control over Latakia in March.[30] The HTS government’s own initial assessment indicated some 200,000 armed individuals had participated in the violence in Latakia, underscoring just how many fighters in the country may not be under its full control.[31]
A Model for Legitimacy?
al-Sharaa and his government’s efforts have been remarkably successful at convincing global powers of their intentions so far. A slew of Western governments, including the US, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), have removed the Syrian government from sanctions lists and reopened embassies in the country.[32] Damascus has secured international funding and agreements with foreign investors to build its electricity generation capacity.[33] This August, it announced some US$14 billion in foreign investments on projects like expanded international airports, housing and even a subway system for Damascus.[34]
Undoubtedly, jihadist groups across the world will look at Syria today and compare it to Afghanistan.
There, the Taliban similarly won power after a long and costly war but have since struggled to be seen as a legitimate power on the world stage given their insistence on extreme policies like banning girls’ education. The Taliban have not been able to secure anywhere near the level of foreign investment as HTS and have relied on cooperation with China for the most part to pursue development projects.[35]
HTS certainly includes hardliners among its ranks: Shadi al-Waisi, for instance, who served as justice minister in the months following the removal of Assad. He was formerly a judge under Jabhat al-Nusra and oversaw the public executions of several women accused of adultery.[36]
But, so far, the new leadership in Damascus has not been over obsessed with the usual jihadist goals of establishing shariah law. There are not, or at least not yet, restrictions on what women wear, the sale of alcohol or the practices of the country’s sizeable Christian, Alawite, Shia and other religious minorities, and an interim constitution has pledged to preserve minority rights.[37]
There is a question mark whether the global acceptance HTS has secured could be a model for other groups looking for an off-ramp from long jihadist wars. Jihadist groups will look to weigh the benefits of softening their stance in ways the new Syrian government has done.
In Afghanistan, for instance, there are prevailing mainstream narratives that make the situation quite different from Syria. HTS was seen as fighting a war against a regime that was globally ostracised and portrayed itself as a power seeking to return normalcy to a legitimate country. In Afghanistan, however, the Taliban were seen by global powers as doing the opposite – of overthrowing a democratic government to impose their own will on an unwilling population. Nevertheless, global powers have shown some flexibility when it comes to dealing with the Taliban, if the group makes important compromises on their style of governance.
In the weeks following the overthrow of Assad, then US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken openly called for the Taliban to learn from the HTS example. “The Taliban projected a more moderate face, or at least tried to, in taking over Afghanistan, and then its true colors came out,” he said in late 2024. “The result is it remains terribly isolated around the world.”[38]
Syria is certainly not the only conflict in the world where rivalries between jihadist groups have created the possibility of potentially acceptable jihadist forces to emerge. In West Africa, for instance, one particular AQ affiliate could undergo the same kind of restructuring that HTS did in Syria. Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) has for years fought against several states in the region, but it has also worked to forge alliances with some groups.
Like the war in Syria, the conflict in the Sahel region has been precipitated by a series of jihadist groups for more than a decade and has prompted the intervention of regional and global powers. Thousands of French troops were based in the region until 2024, and the mercenary Russian Wagner Group is still present there.[39] In recent months, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have asked Moscow to be more directly involved.[40] Like Syria, the war in West Africa could easily turn into a proxy conflict pitting global powers against one another.
Like HTS, JNIM, now the largest jihadist group in the region, was formed in 2017 out of alliances between organisations like Ansar al-Din, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun and Katibat Macina.[41] The group has carried out major attacks in Mali and also operates in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.[42] Since 2020, the group has also been engaged in a war with the Islammic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel), the regional IS affiliate.[43]
Since the fall of Assad in Syria, there have been indications[44] JNIM could seek to shed its AQ affiliation in the same way as HTS. In recent months, for instance, the group has no longer issued joint statements with AQIM, its sister organisation operating in North Africa.[45]
Could other jihadist groups see the benefit of taking a more pragmatic approach as HTS has done in Syria? Ground realities in their respective areas will dictate what might work, but already the story of the Syrian civil war is having practical and ideological impacts on the global jihadist movement.
About the Author
Umar Farooq is an investigative journalist and former foreign correspondent who has covered the war in Syria for several outlets, including The Los Angeles Times, Foreign Policy and Al Jazeera English. He can be reached on X: @UmarFarooq_.
Thumbnail photo by Mahmoud Sulaiman on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees,” The Soufan Center, October 31, 2017, https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf.
[2] Seth G. Jones, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman et al., Rolling Back the Islamic State (RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html.
[3] Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches (Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43980/R43980.4.pdf.
[4] Gram Slattery, Pesha Majid and Andrew Mills, “Trump Meets Syrian President, Urges Him to Establish Ties with Israel,” Reuters, May 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-meet-syrian-president-saudi-before-heading-qatar-2025-05-14/.
[5] “Al-Nusra Leader Jolani Announces Split from Al-Qaeda,” Al Jazeera, July 29, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/29/al-nusra-leader-jolani-announces-split-from-al-qaeda.
[6] Sergio Altuna and Rosa Cabus, Islamist Reactions to the Fall of the Assad Regime and the Role of HTS in Syria’s Post-Revolutionary Landscape (George Washington University, 2024), https://extremism.gwu.edu/islamist-reactions-fall-assad-regime-and-role-hts-syrias-post-revolutionary-landscape.
[7] Abdul Sayed, “The Reactions of Militant Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Takeover of Syria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 4 (2025): 1-7, https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/the-reactions-of-militant-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-to-hayat-tahrir-al-shams-takeover-of-syria/.
[8] Asiem El Difraoui, “Al-Sharaa and the Global Jihad,” Qantara.de, July 18, 2025, https://qantara.de/en/article/syria-after-assad-al-sharaa-and-global-jihad.
[9] “Hezbollah Loses Supply Route Through Syria, in Blow to It and Iran,” The New York Times, December 14, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/14/world/middleeast/hezbollah-supply-route-syria.html; “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Sees ‘Major, Dangerous’ Change in Syria,” Reuters, December 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-sees-major-dangerous-change-syria-2024-12-09/.
[10] Sary Mumayiz and Michael Knights, “Hundreds of Iran-Backed Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun Terrorists Warehoused at Iraqi Government Bases,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 29, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hundreds-iran-backed-fatemiyoun-and-zainabiyoun-terrorists-warehoused-iraqi.
[11] AFP and TOI staff, “Iran-Backed Palestinian Terror Groups Said to Leave Syria Under Pressure from Sharaa,” The Times of Israel, May 23, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-backed-palestinian-terror-groups-said-to-leave-syria-under-pressure-from-sharaa/.
[12] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Statement on Taliban Conquest,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s Blog, August 18, 2021, https://www.aymennjawad.org/2021/08/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-statement-on-taliban-conquest.
[13] “IEA-MoFA Statement Regarding the Recent Developments in Syria,” Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 8, 2024, https://mfa.gov.af/en/36730.
[14] “Who is Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Leader of HTS in Syria?” Al Jazeera, December 4, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/4/who-is-abu-mohamad-al-julani-the-leader-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-in-syria.
[15] Ibrahim Al-Assil, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate and Ahrar al-Sham Compete for Control in Idlib,” Middle East Institute, June 29, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/al-qaeda-affiliate-and-ahrar-al-sham-compete-control-idlib.
[16] “Containing Transnational Jihadists in Syria’s North West,” International Crisis Group, March 7, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/239-containing-transnational-jihadists-syrias.
[17] Author’s interviews with Idlib residents and the White Helmets, Damascus, Syria, February 2025.
[18] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hurras al-Din: The Rise, Fall, and Dissolution of al-Qa`ida’s Loyalist Group in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 18, no. 5 (2025): 18-23, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/hurras-al-din-the-rise-fall-and-dissolution-of-al-qaidas-loyalist-group-in-syria/.
[19] Umar Farooq, “What Are Uyghurs Doing in Syria?” Foreign Policy, April 4, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/04/uyghurs-tpd-syria-fighters/.
[20] Ibid.
[22] “After Merging Factions, Syrian Army Awaits New Structure,” Enab Baladi, May 27, 2025, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/05/after-merging-factions-syrian-army-awaits-new-structure/.
[23] Timour Azhari and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Exclusive: US Gives Nod to Syria to Bring Foreign Jihadist Ex-Rebels Into Army,” Reuters, June 2, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02/.
[25] “Syrian Al-Qaeda Affiliate, HTS Offshoot Hurras al-Din Dissolves: What We Know,” AL-Monitor, January 2025, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/01/syrian-al-qaeda-affiliate-hts-offshoot-hurras-al-din-dissolves-what-we-know.
[26] “Syria Detains Egyptian After Videos Threatening Egypt’s Sisi,” Reuters, January 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/syria-detains-egyptian-after-videos-threatening-egypts-government-2025-01-15/.
[27] “Syria Detains Two Leaders of Palestinian ‘Jihad’,” Asharq Al Awsat, April 23, 2025, https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5135348-syria-detains-two-leaders-palestinian-‘jihad’.
[28] “EU Agrees to Lift Economic Sanctions on Syria, Kallas Says,” Reuters, May 21, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kallas-hopes-eu-ministers-agree-lift-syria-economic-sanctions-2025-05-20/.
[29] “Syria to Sign Deal to Potentially Double Electricity Supply with Qatar’s UCC, Others,” Reuters, May 28, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/four-firms-including-qatars-ucc-expand-syrian-power-grid-2025-05-28/.
[30] “Syria Signs $14 Billion in Investment Deals, Including $4 Billion Airport Expansion,” Associated Press, August 6, 2025, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/syria-signs-14-billion-investment-195042052.html.
[31] Ammar Cheikh Omar and Charlene Gubash, “He Oversaw the Public Executions of Two Women. Now He’s Syria’s New Justice Minister,” NBC News, January 19, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-justice-minister-execution-video-adultery-assad-regime-rcna186523.
[32] “Blinken Says Syria’s HTS Should Learn from Taliban Isolation,” France 24, December 19, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241219-blinken-says-syria-s-hts-should-learn-from-taliban-isolation.
[33] “Russia Vows Military Backing for Sahel Juntas’ Joint Force,” Reuters, April 4, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russia-vows-military-backing-sahel-juntas-joint-force-2025-04-04/.
[34] Andrew Lebovich, “Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel,” European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping.
[35] Joe Cash, “China to Offer Taliban Tariff-Free Trade as It Inches Closer to Isolated Resource-Rich Regime,” Reuters, October 25, 2024 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-offer-taliban-tariff-free-trade-inches-closer-isolated-resource-rich-2024-10-25/.
[36] Priya Sippy and Jacob Boswall, “How an Al-Qaeda Offshoot Became One of Africa’s Deadliest Militant Groups,” BBC News, July 6, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4r5wylwq6o.
[37] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic,” Aymenn’s Monstrous Publications, March 14, 2025, https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/the-constitutional-declaration-of.
[38] Lina Raafat, “The Schism of Jihadism in the Sahel: How Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are Battling for Legitimacy in the Sahelian Context,” Middle East Institute, October 13, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/schism-jihadism-sahel-how-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state-are-battling-legitimacy-sahelian.
[39] Portia Crowe, “Report Spotlights Tensions in Mali Military over Wagner Mercenaries,” Reuters, August 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/report-spotlights-tensions-mali-military-over-wagner-mercenaries-2025-08-27/.
[40] “Briefing: Al-Qaeda Supporters Discuss Possible Split with Sahel Branch, JNIM,” BBC Monitoring, February 4, 2025, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003a0y.
[41] Paul Cruickshank, “Answers from the Sahel: Wassim Nasr, Journalist, France24, on His Interview with Deputy JNIM Leader Mohamed (Amadou) Koufa,” CTC Sentinel 18, no. 1 (2025): 18-21, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/answers-from-the-sahel-wassim-nasr-journalist-france24-on-his-interview-with-deputy-jnim-leader-mohamed-amadou-koufa/.
[42] See, for instance, the United Nations (UN)’s compilation of concerns from member states. United Nations Security Council, Thirty-Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2734 (2024) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2025/482, July 24, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482.
[43] Maggie Michael, “Syrian Forces Massacred 1,500 Alawites. The Chain of Command Led to Damascus,” Reuters, June 30, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/investigations/syrian-forces-massacred-1500-alawites-chain-command-led-damascus-2025-06-30/.
[44] Euan Ward, “Syrian Inquiry Says Military Leaders Did Not Order Sectarian Killings in March,” The New York Times, July 22, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/22/world/middleeast/syria-military-killings-human-rights.html.
[45] Letta M. Tayler, “ISIS Suspects Held in Syria: Repatriation Reset Under New US, Syrian Leaders?” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, March 18, 2025, https://icct.nl/publication/isis-suspects-held-syria-repatriation-reset-under-new-us-syrian-leaders.
