Taliban’s Re-Takeover of Afghanistan and Implications for Southeast Asia: The Need to Calibrate Politics and Violence?
In the 1980s and 1990s, Afghanistan played a critical role in the evolution and morphing of Southeast Asian terrorist groups. The importance of Afghanistan’s prominence as the nerve centre of jihadist militarism and the continued role of the Afghan ‘alumni’[1] are relevant for the region even today, particularly following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In many ways, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (AQ) had developed close ties with Southeast Asian jihadists during the Russia-Afghan War (1979-1988) and had maintained close ties. The experience and network ties established during the anti-Soviet jihad between Southeast Asian and Afghan Mujahidin groups played a key role in influencing Southeast Asian jihadists’ outlook and struggle. However, the magnitude of close ties has varied across time, with the most intense period being from the 1980s to the late 1990s. This article looks at the implications of the Taliban’s return to power for Southeast Asia, and how the region is trying to navigate the new power realities in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, Taliban and Southeast Asia
Primarily due to the Afghan War by the Afghan Mujahidins against the Soviet Union, largely backed by the US and Saudi Arabia, several Southeast Asian jihadist groups, including individuals and factions from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, made their way to Afghanistan through Pakistan.[2] Many of these individuals and groups eventually morphed into Southeast Asia’s strongest inter-connected terrorist group, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and several others.[3]
Following the establishment of JI in 1993, many of these groups either became part of the region-wide JI or collaborated with it ideologically and operationally. One of the means of collaboration was through the establishment of the Rabitatul Mujahidin (RM), or the Coalition of Mujahadins, in 1999. Three key meetings of RM were held in Malaysia and at the first meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1999, there was a region-wide representation. This included the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia from Malaysia, Laskar Jundullah, Darul Islam, a Free Aceh Movement faction (MP-GAM) and Republik Islam Aceh from Indonesia; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front from the Philippines; the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and the Arakanese Rohingya Nationalist Organisation from Myanmar; and the Patani United Liberation Organisation from Thailand.[4]
Following the Taliban’s 1996 rise to power in Afghanistan, the belief that the Mujahidins’ mission had been accomplished and in the face of the difficulties of operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan, most of the Southeast Asian jihadists came back to their home countries to undertake jihadi activities.
Under these circumstances, the Southeast Asian jihadists’ challenge was to structure their relations with the AQ and the Taliban, both of which were closely interlinked through ideology, joint operations and close personal ties. They also shared a history of collaboration and being hunted by the West and even the Pakistanis, who were alleged to have given them sanctuaries following the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. The fact that most of the Taliban were believed to have been raised in the refugee camps in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region made the understanding of the AQ-Taliban nexus critical in analysing the Southeast Asian approach to the Taliban during this period.
Due to AQ’s degradation since 2001, including of its franchises such as JI, there was a general sense that the ‘war against terror’ was being won.[5] However, following the rise of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in June 2014, this sense of triumphalism changed significantly. The increasing IS attacks in the West took the focus away from AQ and the Taliban, and in some states such as Indonesia, the former pro-AQ and JI members were mobilised to counter the IS’ propaganda and ideological war. IS’ decline started in 2018, especially following former leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi’s killing in October 2019.[6]
The Taliban’s Return to Power in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia
After the US and its allies’ failure to capture and control the bulk of Afghanistan since 2001, and the persistence and resilience of the Taliban, it was only a matter of time before the Taliban would return to power. Following the then Trump administration’s decision to deal with the Taliban that culminated in the Doha Agreement 2020[7] between the US and the Taliban, the US withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021. The Taliban takeover not just changed the power equation in Afghanistan but their ties with various terrorist and extremist groups, including in Southeast Asia, as well. In this regard, how Southeast Asia, be it the governments or the terrorist and extremist groups, responded to the re-emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is important to unpack.
In Southeast Asia, since August 2021, Indonesia and Malaysia have established working relations with the Taliban’s de facto regime in Afghanistan, without diplomatically recognising it. In this regard, as the largest Muslim state in the world, Indonesia has played a leading role in engaging the Taliban, even prior to the latter’s re-capture of power.
Indonesia
One of the leading voices calling for closer Indonesia-Taliban relations has been Jusuf Kalla, the former Vice President of Indonesia under Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2009) and the current President Jokowi Widodo (2014-2019). Kalla has had a long history of informally engaging with the Taliban leaders, including mediating peace talks between the former administration of Ashraf Ghani and the Taliban. Kalla’s mediation role in the Afghan conflict also led Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister and former chief of the Taliban’s Qatar political office, to visit Jakarta in July 2019, meeting among others the leaders of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Council of Ulemas.[8]
While Indonesia had minimal ties with the first Taliban administration, following its ouster in November 2001, the Indonesian establishment played an important role in peacemaking in Afghanistan. In 2007, the NU, though not part of the Indonesian government, was mobilised as part of the negotiation team that secured the release of a South Korean hostage held by the Taliban.[9] In 2010, the Indonesia Islamic Centre in Kabul was established during the presidency of Bambang Yudhoyono.[10] In 2014, Indonesia established a branch of the NU in Afghanistan. A key goal of NU’s engagement with the Taliban was to moderate the latter’s worldview on Islam with a view to making it more acceptable internationally, especially among fellow Islamists. While the Taliban’s bilateral ties with Indonesian non-government groups made some progress, there were limits in introducing the Indonesian model into Afghanistan, in part evident from the absence of Taliban-linked Ulemas from a 2018 trilateral conference involving Islamic scholars from Indonesia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[11]
However, following the Doha Agreement, the Indonesian government started engaging the Taliban. In February 2020, Indonesia, as one of the co-facilitators of the Doha Agreement, was invited to witness the signing of the US-Taliban peace agreement. Indonesia’s foreign minister, Retno Marsudi participated in the signing ceremony.[12] Following this, the Indonesian government believed that the international community should provide full support to Afghanistan, especially in ensuring peace among the various parties engaged in the Intra-Afghan Dialogue.[13] In this regard, Indonesia was particularly focused on two key aspects of the peace process: a) the role of the Ulemas and b) women’s empowerment. Following the Doha agreement, Retno flew to Kabul to launch the Indonesia-Afghan Women Solidarity Network with several Indonesian female leaders.[14]
A new era of Indonesia-Taliban ties dawned following the latter’s re-capture of power in Afghanistan. On 27 August 2021, Retno called on the Taliban to form an inclusive government with respect for women’s rights as a key pillar.[15] While in Qatar, Retno met Sher Mohammad Abas Stanikzai, the Deputy Director of the Taliban’s Political Office, for discussions to improve ties even though no diplomatic ties were established.
In December 2021, Indonesia reinstated its representative office in Kabul, the first Southeast Asian state to do so, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the country.[16] While this did not connote a recognition of the Taliban regime, it represented a halfway house of working with the de facto government in power in the country. In the same month, at the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Retno laid out the conditions that would pave the way for the improvement of diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Among others, the conditions “included the formation of an inclusive government, respect for human rights, including those of women, and ensuring the country would not become a breeding ground for terrorism”.[17] In September 2021, Indonesia promised to provide US$2.85 million humanitarian aid with about $150,000 to be used for humanitarian assistance in emergency situations.[18]
While the Indonesian government was cautiously moving forward towards establishing ties with the Taliban, political parties and civil society groups were either in support of or opposition to the Taliban. A leading Islamist party, the Prosperous Justice Party, called on the government to recognise the Taliban and establish formal diplomatic ties with them. However, other sectors of the Indonesian society, such as members from the two largest Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, called for a cautious approach.[19]
The key Indonesian concern with the Taliban has been due to its long relationship with AQ and its franchise in Southeast Asia, the JI, which has been seen as part of its tentacles for a global jihad. As was articulated by Nasir Abbas, a former JI leader who trained in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s victory could enhance JI’s new recruitment, persuade Islamists that the victory was a triumph for Islam, and draw on the affinity between Indonesian Muslims and their Afghan brothers in the faith.[20] Similarly, the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency has expressed its fear that the Taliban’s victory could inspire Islamist radicalism in the country, especially as many members of the Afghan alumni expressed their joy with the Taliban’s victory.[21] These leaders included Abu Tholut and Rohim Bashyir, with the latter, leader of the Jamaah Ansharu Syariah, describing the Taliban’s return to power as being “exemplary” and the success being due to “consistency in fighting on the path of Allah”.[22] However, pro-IS groups in Indonesia, such as the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah, being rivals, did not welcome the Taliban victory.
Malaysia
In many ways, Malaysia’s approach to the Taliban has been almost similar to Indonesia. Both government and non-government agencies have been engaging the de facto authorities in Kabul. Nevertheless, unlike Indonesia, Malaysia is yet to open a diplomatic office in Afghanistan. However, like Indonesia, Malaysian political leaders have been directly engaging the Taliban leaders, including Abdul Hadi Awang, Malaysia’s special envoy to the Middle East, and Malaysia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Ahmad Azam Ab Rahman, meeting Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi.[23] Both Malaysian envoys met the Taliban leaders with the approval of the Malaysian Cabinet. While Kuala Lumpur is yet to establish diplomatic ties with Kabul, it has been operating in Afghanistan through the office of the Global Peace Mission (Malaysia), a humanitarian organisation established by the Malaysian government.[24]
The Rest of Southeast Asia
For the rest of Southeast Asia, especially where Muslims are in the minority, the Taliban’s re-emergence brought about an essentially security-oriented response. This response was clearly visible in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines where in the past JI, linked in a complex way with the AQ and the Taliban, continued to have tentacles in Southeast Asia. As many of these Southeast Asian states were supportive of the US-led war efforts in Afghanistan since 2001, the Taliban’s victory in August 2021 represented somewhat of a foreign policy setback, even though nationally the Southeast Asian region was successful in neutralising the threat posed by JI and other pro-AQ groups.
As Zachary Abuza noted, the US$83 billion project of state building failed spectacularly and the annual military assistance of US$6 billion to the Afghan security forces evaporated in the face of the Taliban’s offensive.[25] For various Southeast Asian states, the Taliban’s victory must have come as a shock, including those, such as Singapore and Malaysia, that deployed their military forces in Afghanistan.[26] Fundamentally, what the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan brought about in Southeast Asia was the dawn of a ‘Second Vietnam’, raising questions about the US as a reliable and trustworthy security partner, especially with a rising China already on the horizon.
For most of the Southeast Asian states, the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan signalled several things. First is the concern that the Taliban’s victory could revitalise the various terrorist networks in the region that had been weakened over the last two decades.[27] This is especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, as the victory of the Taliban is seen by some as a victory for ‘jihadism’. Second, there is the need to deal with the rising sense of euphoria among the various jihadist groups in the region, believing that groups such as the Taliban won because they survived the counter-terrorist operations for 20 years and triumphed, and what’s more, the Taliban eventually defeated two superpowers, the Soviets and the Americans. For the Southeast Asian terrorist groups, this represents a powerful propaganda tool to continue their struggle, remain relevant and gain potential new recruits. As was stated by Muslimin Sema, chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front, it was “sheer determination, persistence and resoluteness of the Taliban that defeated hypocrisy and opportunism in Afghanistan”.[28]
The third is the issue of Afghanistan becoming a sanctuary for terrorist groups, as it was for AQ in the late 1990s.[29] While most of the Southeast Asian terror groups were dismantled and are on a recovery path since the September 2001 attacks, AQ never left Afghanistan but simply re-deployed itself with the Taliban in various parts of the Af-Pak border region. Hence, there remains the fear that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could play a role of providing sanctuaries to these groups, especially as a bargaining chip to lift sanctions and gain international recognition as a quid pro quo to counter these terrorist groups that may pose a danger to the interests of the West, be it in South or Southeast Asia and even beyond.
Southeast Asia and the Terrorist Threat After the Taliban’s Victory
The US and its allies failed to wipe out the Taliban and its allies, such as AQ and other violent groups like the Haqqani group that played a key role in the Taliban’s victory. While a déjà vu situation has re-emerged in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and its possible impact elsewhere, other factors have also played a part in the somewhat subdued terrorist threat in the Southeast Asian region. This includes the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic that affected every state in Southeast Asia. While there were no major terrorist attacks in the past two years, however, it did not mean the disappearance of the threat posed by various terrorist groups. First, groups linked with IS were systematically degraded before the onset of COVID-19, and this also played a part in the reduced terrorist threat in the region.
Second, with various lockdown measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, most terrorist groups adopted a low-profile, consolidation mode, largely explaining the lack of major attacks in the region.[30] While no major attacks took place, it did not mean a lack of danger in the region as there were still intermittent, low-scale attacks in the Philippines and Thailand. As the region enters a largely post-COVID-19 era, the danger of terrorism resurfacing cannot be discounted. At the same time, the presence of various terrorist groups in the online sphere did not dissipate, in part signalling that these groups were in what is described as the i’dad (preparation for jihad) mode and hence, the need to remain vigilant about them.
Conclusion
Afghanistan has played a critical role in shaping the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, especially in terms of groups linked with AQ and, to some extent, the Taliban. This was most clear in the threat posed by the region-wide JI since the mid-1980s. JI still remains relevant in Southeast Asia despite its focus being on Indonesia today.[31] What the Taliban victory in Afghanistan augurs for Southeast Asia is a clear message – that violence, ideology and increasingly, the importance of politics will shape the future trajectory of terrorism in the region.
While jihadist groups will continue to pose a threat to governments in the Southeast Asian region, what the Taliban has demonstrated is that through the astute interplay of politics, it was able to gain support and eventually edge out not just the US and its allies, but the US-backed Ashraf Ghani regime as well. As terrorist groups are some of the best learning organisations, what the Taliban has demonstrated is that while the use of violence is important, equally critical is gaining public sympathy, and through shrewd politics, it succeeded in capturing political power in Afghanistan. This is something that Muslim-majority states such as Indonesia and Malaysia should be extremely mindful of.
Fringe groups can capture political power, something that happened in Algeria and Egypt in the recent past and in Afghanistan today. Therein lies some of the important lessons for governments in the Southeast Asian region. This was also something Islamist ideologues such as Sheik Abu Musa al-Suri had long advised jihadist groups in the past, that is, it was not just important to be good in jihad but also in politics.[32]
About the Author
Associate Prof Bilveer Singh is the Deputy Head, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore and Adjunct Senior Fellow, RSIS, Nanyang Technological University.
Citations
[1] The ‘Afghan alumni’ refers to jihadists who collaborated and participated in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1988, who believed ideologically and operationally that they defeated the Soviet Superpower and its eventual dismemberment and would like to replicate their success in their home country or elsewhere. The Afghan alumni is steeped not just in ideological resilience but also military experience.
[2] Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the War on Terror to Islamist extremists, (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 43-99.
[3] Other groups include the Moro National Liberation Front and its offshoots, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, the Jemaah Negara Islam Indonesia, Darul Islam, Laskar Mujahidin, Mujahidin Kompak and Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia, the Patani United Liberation Organisation in Thailand, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and Arakan Rohingya National Organisation in Myanmar, and the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia from Malaysia; see Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the War on Terror to Islamist extremists, (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 43-99.
[4] Kumar Ramakrishna, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Ideological and Political Dimensions,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2004, p. 55.
[5] Jason Ryan, “The End of Al Qaeda? Top Counter-Terror Officials Envisioning Terror Group’s Demise,” ABC News, June 30, 2011, https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/counter-terror-officials-envision-demise-al-qaeda/story?id=13962012.
[6] “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: Is Leader ‘Dead after US Raid’ in Syria,” BBC News, October 28, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50200339.
[7] Mujib Mashal, “Taliban and U.S. Strike Deal to Withdraw American Troops from Afghanistan,” The New York Times, February 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/world/asia/us-taliban-deal.html.
[8] Almira Wang, “Taliban Leader Meets Indonesia’s Muslim Leaders, VP during Low-Profile Visit,” Benar News, October 11, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-afghanistan-07312019173950.html.
[9] “Korean Islamic Body Seeks Help from NU,” NU online, (article date not available) https://www.nu.or.id/amp/news/korean-islamic-body-seeks-help-from-nu-f8ZDB.
[10] “Indonesia and Taliban-Led Afghanistan: Treading with Caution,” FULCRUM, March 28, 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/indonesia-and-taliban-led-afghanistan-treading-with-caution/.
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Conducting Bilateral Meetings with a Number of Countries in Doha, Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi Discusses the Peace Process in Afghanistan and Palestine,” February 29, 2020. See https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/1092/view/conducting-bilateral-meetings-with-a-number-of-countries-in-doha-minister-of-foreign-affairs-retno-marsudi-discusses-the-peace-process-in-afghanistan-and-palestine.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “Conducting Bilateral Meetings with a Number of Countries in Doha, Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi Discusses the Peace Process in Afghanistan and Palestine,” February 29, 2020, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/1092/view/conducting-bilateral-meetings-with-a-number-of-countries-in-doha-minister-of-foreign-affairs-retno-marsudi-discusses-the-peace-process-in-afghanistan-and-palestine.
[15] Ronna Nirmala, “In Talks with Taliban, Indonesia Calls for Inclusive Afghan Govt,” Benar News, September 7, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/taliban-afghanistan-indonesia-08272021155622.html.
[16] Dian Septiari, “Indonesia Reinstates Embassy in Kabul but Holds off Official Recognition of Taliban,” The Jakarta Post, January 16, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/01/16/indonesia-reinstates-embassy-in-kabul-but-holds-off-official-recognition-of-taliban.html.
[17] “Indonesia and Taliban-Led Afghanistan: Treading with Caution,” FULCRUM, March 28, 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/indonesia-and-taliban-led-afghanistan-treading-with-caution/.
[18] Devina Halim, “Indonesia announces $3M aid to Afghanistan,” AA, September 19, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesia-announces-3m-aid-to-afghanistan/2364280.
[19] “Indonesia and Taliban-Led Afghanistan: Treading with Caution,” FULCRUM, March 28, 2022, https://fulcrum.sg/indonesia-and-taliban-led-afghanistan-treading-with-caution/.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Subei Rai Bhandari,”Taliban Takeover Brings Cheers, Fears to SE Asia and Bangladesh”, Benar News, 19 August 2021.
[23] Ray Sherman and Suganya Lingan, “Analysts: Malaysia Must Clarify Whether Envoy’s Promise to Taliban Had Govt OK,” Benar News, February 8, 2022; Yiswaree Palansamy, “Foreign minister says Malaysia yet to recognise Taliban govt, no plans to open embassy in Afghanistan for now,” Yahoo News, February 22, 2022.
[24] The Global Peace Mission Malaysia was incorporated under the Trustee Act (Incorporation) 1952, Legal Affairs Division, Prime Minister Office (PMO) of Malaysia. It was established on 26 September 2001 and in early October 2001, it was mobilised for humanitarian and medical aid to assist the war victims of the country.
[25] Zachary Abuza, “Taliban Return May Revitalise Southeast Asian Terrorist Groups,” Benar News, August 16, 2021.
[26] Singapore’s Afghan deployment started in May 2007, and this ended in June 2013, with about 500 personnel being deployed. The only other Southeast Asian country to send a token military force was Malaysia: it sent 12 medical personnel in September 2010, with another 28 who joined later. See “Malaysia makes first military Afghanistan deployment,” The Hindu, July 15, 2010; “Singapore Armed Forces Concludes Deployment in Afghanistan,” Mindef News, June 25, 2013, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2013/june/2013jun25-news-releases-02057/.
[27] Raffaello Pantucci and Abdul Basit, “Post-Taliban Takeover: How the Global Jihadist Terror Threat May Evolve,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 13, No. 4 (2021), pp. 1–7. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48618776.
[28] Subel Rai Bhandari, “Taliban Takeover Brings Cheers, Fears to SE Asia and Bangladesh,” Benar News, 19 August 2021.
[29] Abigail Ng and Saheli Roy Choudhury, “Three Ways the Victory of the Taliban Might Reverberate around the World,” CNBC, August 24, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/24/taliban-in-afghanistan-fears-of-terrorism-refugees-and-instability.html.
[30] “Terror Threat in Asian Countries Declined in 2021, Singapore Think-Tank Reports,” Benar News, January 6, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/terror-threats-01062022161603.html.
[31] Bilveer Singh, “Jemaah Islamiyah: Still Southeast Asia’s Greatest Terrorist Threat,” The Diplomat, October 8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/jemaah-islamiyah-still-southeast-asias-greatest-terrorist-threat/.
[32] “Sheikh Abu Musa As-Suri: Kita Sukses Dalam Jihad, Gagal Dalam Politik,” VOA Islam Com., 1 December 2013, https://www.voa-islam.com/read/ulama/2013/12/01/27887/sheikh-abu-musa-assuri-kita-sukses-dalam-jihadgagal-politik/.
