Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Malaysia in a Post-Pandemic Environment

by Thomas Koruth Samuel, By Rueben Ananthan Santhana Dass

Malaysia has experienced a drop in terrorism-related incidents since the COVID-19 pandemic. While the country still remains a possible target for terrorist groups, the security services believe that threat groups possess limited capabilities to stage an attack. This is due to the combined factors of the killing of influential Malaysian terrorist leaders, the dismantling of terrorist cells and the effects of the pandemic that has hampered terrorist movement. Nevertheless, Malaysian authorities have remained vigilant and proactive in counter terrorism and preventive actions in the event of heightened terrorist activity in times to come.

Introduction

Malaysia has experienced a drop in terrorism-related activities in recent years since 2019. This decline can be attributed to two possible factors: the physical degradation of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) in conflict theatres such as the Middle East and southern Philippines; and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

At any rate, the Malaysian authorities, in particular the Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), have remained vigilant throughout. As the effect of the pandemic has eased, the potential for terrorist activities to pick up again in the region remains ever present. This study provides an analysis of the current terrorist landscape in the country and the efforts that have been taken by the RMP to mitigate the threat in a post-pandemic environment. An overview of new rehabilitation and reintegration efforts is also highlighted.

Threat Level in Malaysia

History of Jihadist Threat in Malaysia

The history of jihadist militancy in Malaysia can be broadly divided into two spheres: pro-AQ-related and pro-IS-related activities. With respect to the former, Malaysia was believed to have been the birthplace of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a pro-AQ  group that remains active, primarily in Indonesia. Malaysia functioned as a recruitment point, financing hub and safe haven for JI.[1]

JI was indirectly associated with Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), a local violent Islamist group that operated in the mid-1990s.[2] KMM allegedly masterminded a number of terrorist plots, including the bombing of a Hindu temple in Kuala Lumpur in October 2000 and the targeting of US Navy personnel in the country. Notable KMM leaders include Lotfi Ariffin, Zainuri Kamaruddin, Murad Halimuddin and Marwan.[3]

Following the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war in the early 2010s, several former members of KMM, under the leadership of Lotfi Ariffin, were part of the first wave of Malaysians who travelled to Syria to fight alongside the Syrian rebel group Ajnad Al-Sham (AAS).[4] After the death of Lotfi in September 2014, most of the fighters in Syria who remained alive joined IS.[5]

The second wave of Malaysian jihadists who travelled to Syria to join IS comprised the ‘new guard’: those seemingly younger in age, with little to no prior militant connections or hardline Islamist education, and who were primarily influenced by social media.[6] This group comprised notable Malaysian militants such as Akel Zainal, Fudhail Omar and Muhammad Wanndy Mohd Jedi.[7]

Unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia has never had an official IS-affiliated group.[8] The former two countries had well-established militant networks (JI, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group, among others). Different factions of these militant groups later evolved into local IS cells, while active conflict theatres such as Mindanao (southern Philippines) and Poso and Ambon (Indonesia) served as breeding grounds for militant activity. Due to the absence of both established groups/networks and conflict theatres, Malaysian fighter networks have remained largely decentralised and grouped around influential leaders after the dismantling of KMM, which may be a reason for the absence of a local IS group. However, the authorities have in the past detected smaller, decentralised cells influenced by IS, namely, Kumpulan Briged Khalid al-Walid (KBKW), Daulah Islam Malizia (DIM), Kumpulan Gagak Hitam and Kumpulan Fisabilillah (KF).[9]

In this regard, the terrorist landscape in Malaysia has primarily been a personality-driven phenomenon. Jihadist recruitment in Malaysia has generally revolved around charismatic leaders, who have acted as key nodal points or ‘network hubs’ attracting and influencing a wide range of people.[10] Examples of these leaders include Lotfi Ariffin, Akel Zainal and Muhammad Wanndy. With the death of such individuals as of 2019, the threat landscape in the country has eased temporarily.

Data on Militant Arrests in Malaysia

The most recent data[11] indicates that between 2013 and January 2023, as many as 562 individuals were arrested in Malaysia for terrorism offences. The high number of arrests between 2014 and 2019 coincides with the height of IS activity in the Middle East. Arrest numbers waned post-2019 as IS in the Middle East was defeated and weakened by counter terrorism operations.

Table1: Arrested Individuals in Malaysia since 2013[12]

Slightly older data (May 2022) reveals that, since 2013, a total of 559 individuals were arrested for terrorism.[13] Out of these numbers, 506 (90.52 percent) were males and 53 (9.48 percent) were females.[14] Within the Malaysian context, when considering the number of arrests, males clearly played a more active and dominant role. With regards to IS, Malaysian females were mostly involved in supportive roles (many through marriages with IS fighters in the Middle East) such as facilitation and fund-raising, except for one woman believed to be a lone actor who had planned to carry out attacks during the 2018 General Election in Kuala Lumpur.[15] While the number of arrested women has been significantly smaller when compared to men, the direct involvement of women in terrorism in Malaysia is something that needs further research, as the drivers and triggers for their participation has been relatively under-studied and under-appreciated.

Table 2: Arrested Individuals in Malaysia Since 2013[16]

Since 2013, out of the 559 individuals arrested for terrorism, around 362 (64.76%) were Malaysians and 197 (35.24%) were non-Malaysians.[17] The majority of the non-Malaysians arrested in Malaysia were not focusing on conducting acts of terrorism in Malaysia, but were rather using Malaysia as a transit point.

Table 3: Arrested Malaysians and Non-Malaysians for Terrorism Since 2013[18]

The RMP has highlighted that since 2013, 256 individuals were charged for terrorism in Malaysia and out of this number, 231 were convicted.[19]

Table 4: Charged and Convicted Individuals for Terrorism-Related Issues Since 2013[20]

As for the Malaysians who had left for Syria and Iraq in an attempt to join IS between 2013 and 2018, the RMP estimates that around 54 Malaysians remain there.[21]

Table 5: Estimated Malaysians Linked to Terrorism Remaining in Syria and Iraq[22]

Most of these Malaysians transited in a few countries before reaching Syria via Istanbul, Turkey. Approximately 90 percent of these Malaysian jihadists joined IS, while the remaining radicals joined other groups like Jabhat Al-Nusra and AAS.[23] The Malaysian security services revealed that 17 Malaysians linked to terrorism have since returned from Syria and Iraq to Malaysia.[24]

Table 6: Estimated Malaysian Returnees Linked to Terrorism in Syria and Iraq[25]

The factors that led to the Malaysians returning home include: (i) the perception that they were unfairly treated; (ii) the feeling that they were only given menial work such as domestic and sentry duties; (iii) the aim of achieving martyrdom, or syahid, was no longer achievable; (iv) family issues and problems; and (v) injury or health problems.[26]

It is significant to note that several Malaysian Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) returning from conflict areas may have engaged in violence and thus have experience in and knowledge of various aspects of combat. Hence, there is the possibility of them playing a role in the violent extremist landscape in areas such as: (i) using their status and credibility to radicalise and recruit new fighters both within the prisons and in the community; (ii) reinforcing and strengthening current terrorist organisations in Malaysia or neighbouring countries; (iii) creating new terrorist groups or splinter organisations; (iv) planning and directing terrorist attacks; and (v) conducting terrorist attacks.[27] In July 2022, Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) noted the possibility of a Malaysian IS fighter acting as a deputy to an Indonesian IS fighter, Saifullah, based in Afghanistan.[28] The purported Afghanistan-based cell led by Saifullah threatened attacks against a number of Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.[29]

The RMP noted that between 2013 and May 2022, a total of 493 individuals linked to IS were arrested in Malaysia.[30] Out of the total arrested individuals, 445 individuals (90.26 percent) were males, while the remaining individuals (9.74 percent) were females. While the number of Malaysian women being radicalised remains relatively small and their involvement in extremism has been largely due to familial ties, there have been cases of Malaysian women playing an active and distinct role in the online sphere, as in the case of Sham, a Malaysian female who had been active on social media propagating IS content and who had travelled to Syria on her own.[31]

Table 7: Arrested Individuals in Malaysia Linked to IS Since 2013[32]

Out of the 493 individuals arrested, 342 (69.37 percent) were Malaysians, while the remaining individuals (30.63 percent) were non-Malaysians.[33] Furthermore, 226 individuals were charged for IS-related activities, out of which 213 individuals (94.25 percent) were convicted.[34]

Table 8: Malaysian and Non-Malaysian Individuals Linked to IS and Subsequently Arrested Since 2013[35]

Table 9: Charged and Convicted Individuals for Terrorism-Related Issues Linked to IS in Malaysia Since 2013[36]

To date, the RMP has successfully foiled 25 attempts by IS elements to conduct attacks in Malaysia between 2013 and 2019.[37] The success of the Malaysian authorities can be attributed to efficient intelligence gathering and proactive interventions on the part of the MSB on the one hand, and a lack of experience and training on the part of the cells on the other, as most were homegrown cells without much battlefield experience. Most of the attacks were planned to take place in the Klang Valley and were directed by Malaysian IS leaders both within Malaysia and in Syria. In total, 12 IS cells were dismantled and taken into custody. The only successful IS-related attack to have taken place was the Movida Club attack in Puchong, Selangor, on June 28, 2016.[38]

East Malaysia – Sabah

On the eastern front, the terrorist threat landscape remains dormant. This is largely because pro-IS groups in Mindanao, southern Philippines, have been degraded in terms of capability and territorial control, and have suffered from substantial surrenders.[39] Kidnapping-for-ransom activities that were previously carried out by the pro-IS Dawlah Islamiyah – Sulu (DI – Sulu) faction, led formerly by Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan, have largely ceased as the group has suffered from personnel surrenders.[40]

Still, Sabah remains a strategic transit point and a possible safe haven for militants from both Indonesia and the Mindanao region. For example, in September 2022, an Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) cell that had been operating in Beaufort for more than 10 years was dismantled by security forces.[41] Likewise, remnants of the Amin Baco-linked Darul Islam Sabah group and pro-IS DI groups remain operational in the region. Meanwhile militant activity in Sabah seems to be shifting from the coastal areas in the East such as Tawau, Kunak and Sandakan, to the interior and western regions such as Keningau and Beaufort, where militants are believed to be reorganising their networks.[42]

Current Threat Picture

Both AQ and IS in the Middle East have been continuously affected by Western counter terrorism efforts targeted at their leadership. This has weakened the external reach of the groups, including in Southeast Asia. In addition, the pandemic and the accompanying global lockdowns had affected the movement of individuals into and out of Malaysia, thus hampering terrorist activity temporarily.

The RMP assesses the threat level to be ‘possible’, i.e., while the country remains a possible target of terrorists, there is limited capability by groups to conduct an attack.[43] This assessment is due to three factors: (i) strong intentions by terrorist actors; (ii) exploitation of ideology; and (iii) easy access to materials enabling radicalisation.[44]

The biggest threat that Malaysia continues to face is attacks perpetrated by self-radicalised lone actors or decentralised cells, who are inspired as opposed to directed. In this regard, online pro-IS activity remains a cause for concern. In addition, the threat from returning FTFs from Syria and Iraq with militant capabilities as well as recidivists cannot be discounted.

Implications of External Developments

An external event that has garnered much interest in the security domain is the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and its implications for Southeast Asia. While there has been no conclusive evidence of Malaysians attempting to travel to Afghanistan to fight or engage in training since the Taliban’s takeover, vigilance in this respect is still necessary. Travel into Afghanistan is not as easy as it used to be during the early 1980s, as both the Taliban and Pakistani security services have increased border control measures at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, blocking most of the illegal entry points into Afghanistan.

Recent trends have shown that the epicentre of jihadi terrorism has somewhat shifted from the Middle East to Africa. Current data shows that 45 percent (913 out of 2026) of the total attacks claimed by IS in 2022 were in Africa,[45] with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) based in north-eastern Nigeria being the most active IS affiliate. In June 2022, ISWAP released a 39-minute propaganda video calling for Muslims around the world to undertake hijrah (migration) to Africa and join IS there.[46] The video was subsequently released in Bahasa Indonesia in an attempt to reach out to a wider audience.[47] Despite the call, however, there has been no known indication of interest among Malaysian radicals to travel to Africa to join IS. This may be due to the challenges associated with travelling to the region, unfamiliarity with the language and conditions there.

Nevertheless, in September 2021, reports emerged of the arrest of a Malaysian named Ahmad Mustakim Abdul Hamid in Somalia for assisting the Somali-based Al-Qaeda affiliate group, Al-Shabaab.[48] Mustakim was alleged to have travelled to Somalia to join the group in 2009 before attempting to desert the group in 2015.[49] Although caution has to be exercised in drawing conclusions from one case, with the increase of jihadist activity in Africa, this is certainly something to monitor in the future.

Rehabilitation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Monitoring

Besides actively engaging in the traditional aspect of countering terrorism, the MSB has ‘tweaked’ its operations to include a bigger role in the ‘prevention’ component of counter terrorism. While the emphasis from 2013 to 2019 was on counter terrorism, the MSB has now evolved to also focus on developing its ‘soft power’ to prevent cases from reaching the stage of violent extremism. Hence, in cases where an individual is at the very early stage of a possible radicalisation pathway, the MSB, upon detection of such cases, takes the proactive step of assessing, intervening, providing informal rehabilitation and reintegrating the said individual back into mainstream society. A case in point was in 2021, when MSB officers detected a youth in Sabah who was curious about violent extremist groups and was posting messages on Twitter that indicated support for such causes.[50] MSB officers both engaged and counselled the youth in question, who subsequently changed his views and behaviour.[51]

Apart from rehabilitation, the Malaysian government remains actively engaged in the repatriation of its citizens who had travelled to Syria to join IS. The repatriation process is a multi-agency one involving the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and officials from the intelligence agencies. It is divided into five phases: investigation, assessment, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration.[52] It is predicated on the results of assessments in three areas, namely, psychological, ideological and security evaluations.[53] The rehabilitation programme is tailored to the individual, and comprises modules on personal development, patriotism, religious knowledge, critical thinking and personal skills.[54] It emphasises the ‘soft’ approach and seeks to better understand the radicalisation pathway, drivers and triggers to violent extremism, personal and family background, as well as ideological and psychological motivation and exploitation.[55]

The challenges in rehabilitating Malaysian FTFs who have returned from Syria and Iraq are two-fold. First is the difficulty in detaching extremist and radical ideology from the hearts and minds of FTFs, as many of them are firm in their extremist beliefs.[56] Second, the foreign detainees are fully aware that after serving their sentence in prison, they will eventually be deported to their countries of origin.[57] Hence, there is little incentive for them to participate in the programme and cooperate with the government.

The RMP revealed that 226 Malaysians linked to IS and similar groups had undergone the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme as of 2022.[58]

 Table 10: Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation Programme for Malaysians Linked to IS and Similar Groups[59]

The RMP also reported that since 2013, 14 non-Malaysians linked to IS and other similar groups had undergone the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme.[61]

Table 11: Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation Programme for Non-Malaysians Linked to IS and Similar Groups[62]

Reintegration of former violent extremists into society remains a challenge in Malaysia due to the stigma that surrounds them, their families and especially their children. To mitigate this, the MOHA, the Welfare department, the Prisons Department and the MSB have been striving to assist former detainees. For example, the Welfare department has been providing limited financial assistance to the families, while the Prisons Department, through its community outreach programme and its work with local civil society organisations (CSOs), has been providing training and financial support to former detainees to start small-scale businesses.[63] These businesses include agricultural and sewing ventures.[64]

Conclusion

Despite the lull in terrorist activity in Malaysia and the wider region, the threat of an attack remains and the need for vigilance is crucial. The global jihadist threat has become even more decentralised in nature compared to the early 1990s. The terrorism threat in Malaysia remains present, with the biggest threat coming from self-radicalised lone actors or cells that are inspired by a particular violent extremist ideology as opposed to centrally directed attacks. The Malaysian security services have evolved in their approach to focus not only on ‘countering terrorism’, but also on ‘preventing terrorism’. The prisons department and the police have also remained proactive in deradicalisation and rehabilitation efforts during this period. ‘Softer’, long-term measures are essential to complement ‘harder’, short-term measures in the battle against terrorism that remains ever-present and ever-evolving.

About the Authors

Rueben Dass is a Senior Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].

Thomas Koruth Samuel is a researcher, writer and trainer focusing on P/CVE, radicalisation pathways, countering terrorist naratives and engaging youth on violent extremism. He is and has been a consultant on P/CVE for various UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). He can be reached at [email protected].    

Thumbnail photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Citations

[1] Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 69-72.

[2] Mohd Mizan Mohammad Aslam, “A Critical Study of Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, Its Wider Connections in the Region and the Implications of Radical Islam for the Stability of Southeast Asia” (PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2009), p. 121, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41339479.pdf.

[3] Aslam, pp. 121-131.

[4] Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate: Mapping Malaysian Foreign Fighter Networks in Iraq and Syria from 2012-2019,” Terrorism and Political Violence, May 20, 2022, pp. 5-12, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2059352.

[5] Ibid., p. 9.

[6] Ibid., p. 8.

[7] Akel Zainal, who was formerly a musician and a member of a local Malaysian rock band, was hugely popular with young men and women, owing to his perceived image as a rock star turned jihadist. He was a key recruiter among Malaysians. Meanwhile, Fudhail Omar was one of the younger Malaysians who went to Syria and joined IS. He was involved in teaching Quranic recitation to the children of members of the Malaysian and Indonesian IS brigade known as Katibah Nusantara, and was a key propagandist, recruiter and user of social media. Muhammad Wanndy would become one of the most high-profile Malaysian IS leaders operating out of Iraq and Syria, and the alleged mastermind of the 2016 Movida Club bombing in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysian police noted that at least a third of the 250 people arrested in Malaysia from 2013-2016 for IS-related activities were linked to Wanndy. For a more detailed analysis of Malaysian foreign fighters, see Dass and Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate.”

[8] Amira Jadoon et al., Risks, Recruits, and Plots: Understanding and Mitigating the Influence of the Islamic State in Malaysia (West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center, 2022), p. 14.

[9] Ahmad El-Muhammaddy, “Countering the Threats of Daesh in Malaysia,” in Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asian Responses, eds. Beatrice Gorawantschy et al. (Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung & S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2016), pp. 105-122, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=65367300-b620-23c7-4a7e-0c4c97f42188&groupId=252038.

[10] Dass and Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate.”

[11] DCP Normah Ishak, “Distinguished Lecture: Current & Emerging Threat of Terrorism in Malaysia” (presentation, Centinel Counter Terrorism Forum, Singapore, February 15, 2023).

[12] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in February 2023. Number of arrests are up to January 2023.

[13] Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia: Handbook for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), (Putrajaya: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2022), p. 6, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-03/%5BFA%5D%20UNDP%20PVE%20Publications_Handbook%20for%20CSOs_High%20Res_210323_0.pdf.

[14] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[15] “Housewife in Malaysia Gave ISIS the Polling Day Attack Plan: Source,” The Straits Times, June 4, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/housewife-in-malaysia-gave-isis-the-polling-day-attack-plan-source.

[16] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 6. Number of arrests up to May 2022.

[17] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[18] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 6. Number of arrests up to May 2022.

[19] Briefing by a senior RMP officer on October 30, 2019.

[20] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 7.

[21] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[22] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 8.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[25] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 8.

[26] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in April 2015; UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 8..

[27] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 8.

[28] Internal Security Department, Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2022 (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2022), https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/singapore-terrorism-threat-assessment-report-2022.pdf.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[31] “’We shall meet in Jannah’ – Malaysian Woman Reveals Married Life With ISIS Militant,” Astro AWANI, September 19, 2014, https://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/we-shall-meet-jannah-malaysian-woman-reveals-married-life-isis-militant-44247.

[32] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 10.

[33] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[34] Ibid.

[35] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 11.

[36] Ibid.

[37] “Police Say Stopped 25 Terrorist Strikes Planned across Malaysia since 2013,” Malay Mail, October 2, 2019, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/10/02/police-say-stopped-25-planned-terrorist-strikes-across-malaysia-since-2013/1796368.

[38] “Malaysian Police Confirm Nightclub Blast First Successful Attack by ISIS on Malaysian Soil,” The Straits Times, July 4, 2016, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-police-confirm-isis-elements-behind-nightclub-blast.

[39] Kenneth Yeo, “Annual Threat Assessment: Philippines,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2023), pp. 17-18, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/CTTA-January-2023.pdf.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Stefyanie Myla Micheal, “Sayyaf Cell in Sabah Went Unnoticed for over a Decade,” Daily Express, September 4, 2022, https://www.dailyexpress.com.my/read/4848/sayyaf-cell-in-sabah-went-unnoticed-for-over-a-decade/.

[42] Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Annual Threat Assessment: Malaysia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2023), p. 24, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/CTTA-January-2023.pdf.

[43] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in December 2022.

[44] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 6.

[45] Damien Ferré (@Jihad_Analytics), “10/ Key Findings,” Twitter, January 13, 2023, https://twitter.com/Jihad_Analytics/status/1613927054629826561.

[46] Jasminder Singh and Rueben Dass, “Islamic State’s Expansion in Africa and Its Implications for Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/islamic-states-expansion-in-africa-and-its-implications-for-southeast-asia/.

[47] Ibid.

[48] “Malaysian Man Sentenced to 15 Years’ Jail for Assisting Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group,” The Star, September 24, 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/09/24/malaysian-man-sentenced-to-15-years039-jail-for-assisting-al-shabaab-terrorist-group.

[49] Wong Chun Wai, “M’sian Terrorist Ahmad Mustakim Radicalised While at University in Yemen,” The Star, October 4, 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/10/04/msian-terrorist-ahmad-mustakim-radicalised-while-at-university-in-yemen.

[50] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in December 2022.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ahmad El-Muhammaddy, Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families: Malaysian Experience (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2023), pp. 7-10.

[53] Ibid., p. 8.

[54] Ibid., p. 10.

[55] Ibid., p. 10.

[56] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 19.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[59] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 19.

[60] All 226 Malaysians who joined the Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation Programme were arrested due to their involvement with IS. These included the 17 Malaysian returnees from Syria and Iraq.

[61] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in May 2022.

[62] UNDP, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Malaysia, p. 19.

[63] Communications with officials from the Malaysian Prisons Department in May 2023.

[64] Communications with the Malaysian Special Branch, Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in February 2023.