Thailand
The level of violence in Thailand’s Deep South has been on a downward trend since the 2013 launch of a peace dialogue, although attacks against non-combatants remain a concern. In February 2023, a general framework known as the “Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace” was agreed upon between the Thai government and the separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front, or BRN), laying out a roadmap for the conduct of a ceasefire and public consultation expected to lead to political solutions. While the newly elected Thai government has pledged to resume the peace talks with Malay-Muslim insurgents fighting for independence, its commitment and vision remain unclear. Given that the military has dominated Thai politics for nearly a decade, regaining civilian control over government operations in the Deep South could significantly change the dynamics of the conflict. However, it is doubtful if the government will be bold enough to challenge the military and other conservative forces that have long dominated conflict management in the restive region.
State of the Conflict in Thailand’s Deep South
2023 marked the 20th year since the resurgence of the violent insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost region.[i] According to the Deep South Watch (DSW), there have been more than 22,100 violent incidents since 2004, with some 7,520 people killed and 13,900 others injured (as of August 2023).[ii]
Since the launch of a formal peace dialogue in 2013, the number of violent incidents and casualties has significantly declined. Over the past few years, the level of violence has largely held steady. From January to August 2023, there were 351 violent incidents in the Deep South, killing 89 people and wounding 157 others. The monthly average of violence and casualties was largely on par with 2022, during which 488 violent incidents took place, leaving 117 dead and 227 injured. Comparisons of victims classified as hard targets (armed combatants) and soft targets (unarmed civilians) from January to August 2023 showed that casualty figures were higher in the latter category, with 62 killed and 78 wounded. Twenty-seven hard targets were killed and 79 injured.[iii]
There are three main observations of the insurgents’ ongoing military operations in the Deep South. First, while the BRN’s military operations have focused more on combatants, indiscriminate attacks affecting civilians have also occurred. There were 69 bombings (as of August 2023) compared with 129 explosions in 2022.[iv] In one of the most catastrophic incidents in recent years, a vehicle-borne bomb exploded at a police flat compound in Narathiwat’s Muang district on November 22, 2022, killing a police officer and injuring 31 others – including 13 police staff and 18 civilians, of whom three were children.[v] The BRN has said that such bombings are used as “political communications” of its struggle for the “independence and self-governance of Patani”.[vi]
Second, cross-province coordinated attacks have persisted, which serve as a testament to the BRN’s military capability. These operations are intended as a display of military force rather than an attempt to maximise casualty numbers. For example, some 20 insurgents attacked a security outpost in Yala’s Muang district with pipe bombs, grenades and automatic rifles on April 9, 2023. There were no casualties among the security forces.[vii] On May 11, 2023, 23 locations across the three southernmost provinces were hit by arson attacks, targeting mobile phone antenna towers and electricity poles.[viii] Coordinated attacks have often been used to boost the morale of fighters and to demonstrate the presence of BRN fighters on the ground.
The conflict-ridden Deep South remains under a state of exception (characterised by the suspension of the normal regime of law), which, coupled with the enforcement of special laws (martial law and an emergency decree declared by the Thai government), allows security forces to operate with few judicial checks and balances. Since the 2006 coup, martial law has continuously been enforced in the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, allowing the military to arrest suspects without a court warrant and detain them for up to seven days.
In September 2023, the Srettha Thavisin government extended the imposition of the state of emergency in 22 out of 33 districts in the three southernmost provinces for one month instead of the usual three-month extension.[ix] The emergency decree enables security forces to detain suspects without charge for up to 30 days.[x] Security forces have often taken advantage of the two special laws and increased the period of detention for up to 37 days.[xi] A month later, the cabinet revoked the emergency decree in three districts (Krongpinang in Yala, Thungyangdaeng in Pattani and Yingo in Narathiwat), but reimposed the special law in the remote district of Srisakhon, Narathiwat.[xii]
While the government claimed that the extension of the state of emergency was based on feedback from various stakeholders, the survey conducted by the interior ministry required respondents to identify themselves, raising concerns over whether these were genuine opinions.[xiii]
The Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act, which came into effect on February 22, 2023, is expected to enhance the prevention of human rights violations and torture under state custody. The law obliges law enforcement officials to keep voice and video recordings of the arrest and release of a suspect (Section 22), and guarantees the right of relatives and lawyers to access information about the detained suspect (Section 24), among other things.[xiv] This Act may be a good countermeasure, even as the military still defends the need for special laws in the Deep South.
An opinion survey on holding an independence referendum also sparked a strong reaction from the conservative forces and security agencies in Thailand. On June 7, 2023, Pelaja Bangsa, an umbrella organisation of student activists, conducted a survey during a seminar at the Prince of Songkla University in Pattani on “the right to self-determination”, asking dozens of participants whether the “Patani people should be entitled to have a lawful referendum on independence”. This campaign was perceived as a violation of the 2017 Constitution’s Section 1, which states that Thailand is an indivisible kingdom. The military-led Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) subsequently filed a lawsuit against three activists and one activist-turned-politician involved in the survey, charging them with treason and sedition.[xv] This controversy suggests that, in the view of Bangkok, independence will remain off limits when it comes to political solutions to the conflict.
Srettha Thavisin’s Government and the Peace Dialogue
Under the government of newly elected premier Srettha Thavisin, the peace dialogue has resumed; however, to what extent it can make substantial progress remains to be seen. Srettha, a real estate tycoon-turned-politician, became the 30th prime minister of Thailand after the Pheu Thai Party managed to form an 11-party coalition, which includes two pro-military parties affiliated with the 2014 coup leaders. In discussions with his Malaysian counterpart Anwar Ibrahim on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2023, Srettha pledged to continue the peace process in southern Thailand and welcomed the role of Malaysia as facilitator.[xvi]
The peace process was initiated by the civilian Pheu Thai-led government in 2013, but it has largely been undertaken by the military-dominated governments which ruled Thailand until 2023. The launch of the peace dialogue was an important milestone in the conflict. Notably, since its inception, the level of violence has sharply declined, while the BRN, a clandestine separatist organisation, began to publicly communicate with its constituencies and the public on various media channels, including YouTube. Following the 2014 coup, however, the BRN refused to take part in the peace talks led by the post-coup government, during which MARA Patani[xvii] – an umbrella organisation of separatists mainly based in Malaysia – took its place as the dialogue partner. After the 2019 general election that saw General Prayut Chan-ocha retaining power, the BRN decided to return to the dialogue table.
The decade-long peace dialogue has been a bumpy and slow journey. The biggest hurdle remains the fear of an internationalisation of the conflict and the involvement of international actors. The Thai peace dialogue panel has refused to ink any agreements with MARA Patani and the BRN, creating mistrust and doubt over the Thai government’s seriousness in finding a solution to the conflict. Bangkok fears that the BRN could use such signed agreements to wage international campaigns for secession.[xviii]
When the Thai peace dialogue panel reached an agreement with the BRN on the General Principles of the Peace Dialogue Process in March 2022, international observers were requested to sign the agreement instead.[xix] The General Principles, drawing upon the “Berlin Initiative” (backchannel talks facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2018-19), represents a significant breakthrough as it lays out a framework for the peace process, comprising three substantive matters: 1) reduction of violence/cessation of hostilities; 2) public consultation; and 3) political solutions.[xx] Previously, the peace talks had only focused on procedural matters and confidence-building measures.
When Anwar Ibrahim assumed the premiership in Malaysia in late 2022, General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, a former military chief, was appointed as the new facilitator for the peace process in southern Thailand. During the first meeting facilitated by Zulkifli in late February 2023, the Thai peace dialogue panel and the BRN agreed on the two-year-long “Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace” (JCPP). Drawing upon the General Principles, the JCPP contains two components: violence reduction and public consultation that would lead to political solutions.
The public consultation is set to cover at least five key areas: 1) form of governance; 2) recognition of the Patani community, identity and culture; 3) human rights, justice and legal matters; 4) economic development; and 5) education.[xxi] While the JCPP appeared to be a positive step forward, the BRN decided not to turn up for the following meeting of the technical team in March 2023, claiming it desired to wait for the new Thai government to be in office before returning to negotiations. It also turned a cold shoulder to the offer of General Wanlop Rugsanaoh, the then head of the Thai peace dialogue panel, to sign the JCPP agreement, if completed.[xxii]
In the May 2023 general election, the Pheu Thai Party garnered 141 seats, the second highest after the Move Forward Party (MFP). Pheu Thai then struck a deal with the two pro-military parties to form a coalition, along with nine other parties.[xxiii] Srettha, who had joined politics only a few months before the elections, won sufficient votes from senators during the nomination process to elect the prime minister, most of whom were associated with former prime minister Prayut.[xxiv] But doubts have been raised if the governing coalition, which has few shared agendas, would be able to push through important policies. The new government has not shown strong leadership when it comes to conflict resolution in the Deep South. To the surprise of many, including some in the coalition parties, there was no direct mention of how the government would address the violent conflict in its policy statement – a common practice by its predecessors, including the Prayut and Yingluck Shinawatra governments.[xxv] No deputy prime minister has been assigned to take charge of security affairs either, raising further questions about the uniformity of policies.[xxvi] Srettha, also the finance minister, is supposed to take responsibility for the peace dialogue, but it is doubtful if he would have the time to pay attention to this task.[xxvii]
It is also unclear to what extent the government would take the lead in steering the direction of the peace process and challenging the military’s influence regarding the Deep South insurgency. Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong, who is the leader of the Prachachat Party, would be one of the most suitable persons to oversee the peace talks. He was a key person behind the launch of the peace dialogue in 2013 while serving as the chief of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). The military was initially not supportive of the peace talks. The tension between Thawee, who was then close to the Pheu Thai Party, and the military was so high that he was removed immediately after the 2014 coup.
Popular among Malay Muslims in the Deep South, Thawee, together with other veteran Malay-Muslim politicians, later formed the Prachachat Party, which is arguably the current strongest regional party that represents the interests of Malay Muslims at the national level. In the May 2023 general election, it won seven out of 13 constituencies and gained victory in the party-list vote in the three southernmost provinces. However, while the Prachachat Party is part of the coalition government, it remains to be seen to what extent the party with nine MPs can play a leading role in resolving the southern conflict.
Nonetheless, given his previous role and the fact that the Deep South is the main constituency of the Prachachat Party, Thawee should be capable of directing the government’s policies on the southern conflict. Yet, there is no indication (at the time of this update) that Thawee would be tasked to lead these efforts.
On the contrary, Srettha softened his stance towards the coup leaders and the military soon after assuming the premiership; for instance, he has said that rather than “military reform”, he would prefer to “jointly develop” the army.[xxviii] The prime minister’s gesture suggests he might seek to avoid any move that could offend the military and the conservative forces entrenched in Bangkok. Devolution of power and autonomy would be among the most contested issues.
For its part, the BRN has clearly shown its willingness to pursue peace talks with the new government.[xxix] There is a possibility that the BRN might change the head of its peace dialogue panel to improve its advocacy and diplomatic works. Dr Nikmatullah, a current member of the dialogue team who has been working on the diplomatic front, is among the top candidates for the position.[xxx] The BRN still insists on three key demands: 1) parliamentary endorsement of the peace process; 2) signing of documents agreed upon at the dialogue table; and 3) immunity for the BRN’s overseas-based representatives to enter Thailand for public consultation. There remains some tension between the BRN’s military and political wings, with the former holding a more hardline position. The military wing has raised doubts about holding talks “within the framework of the Thai constitution”, which de facto rules out the BRN’s ultimate goal of independence.[xxxi] In contrast, moderate BRN elements have argued for the strategy of incremental victory by making use of the dialogue process to advance its political agenda.
Outlook
The commitment and vision of the Srettha government regarding conflict resolution in the South as well as the trajectory of the peace process remain unclear. Given that the military has dominated Thai politics for nearly a decade, the re-establishment of a civilian-led government could have significant bearings on the southern conflict. It should be noted that Suthin Klangsang, an MP from Pheu Thai, is the first civilian to become defence minister without concurrently holding the premiership. However, doubts have been raised over the extent to which he can hold sway over the military. Given that the old hands involved in the peace process in its initial stage are still associated with the Srettha government in some capacity or another, the talks could potentially make considerable progress – provided there is political will.
There are at least three key challenges to address if the government seeks to push the peace process forward. The first and perhaps most significant would be to debunk the fear long held by government agencies over the internationalisation of the southern conflict and the engagement of international actors. If separatist conflicts elsewhere are any indication, the engagement of third parties, both nationally and internationally, could enhance the success of the peace process. International support has thus far been limited due to the Thai authorities’ misgivings over the engagement of foreign organisations.
Looking ahead, an independent mechanism for ceasefire monitoring would be necessary. Since the Thai government and the BRN are parties to the conflict, it would not be legitimate for them to carry out this task. Local third-party organisations, particularly civil society organisations, could fulfil this role, but they would require capacity building. Expertise from international organisations could empower them to work in a more professional, effective and transparent manner. Besides, when an important deal is reached at the dialogue table, signing the agreement would help to enhance confidence in the peace process. Concerns among relevant government agencies over inking agreements with the BRN has somewhat eased, as evidenced by the fact that Gen Wanlop was previously willing to sign the JCPP document. This positive gesture needs to be carried forward.
The second challenge centres on the need to ensure inclusivity in the peace process. The BRN representatives who take part in public consultation should be granted immunity to return to Thailand. The peace process should also not only be a matter between the state and armed groups. A proper process and mechanisms need to be put in place to articulate the voices of people from different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. These include Thai Buddhist, Chinese and other minorities in the conflict area. International support would also be immensely helpful for the conduct of an inclusive public consultation process.
The final challenge is the need for a permanent agency with the necessary resources and manpower to work exclusively on the peace process – if this is to truly become a national agenda as the authorities have claimed. When the Philippine government was engaged in the peace process with Muslim rebels fighting for independence in the southern part of the country, its president issued an executive order to set up an Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to drive the peace process forward.[xxxii] The establishment of a similar permanent unit could serve to crystalise the Thai government’s commitment to peaceful conflict resolution in the southernmost region.
About the Author
Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat (PhD) is a lecturer at the Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University (Hat Yai Campus), Thailand. She obtained a PhD from the Australian National University. Her areas of research interest and expertise include Thailand’s southern insurgency, ethnic conflicts, peace processes, religion, and conflict in Southeast Asia.
[i] This paper employs qualitative research that relies on in-depth interviews and document analysis, including primary source materials, newsletters, and mainstream and social media reports.
[ii] Data obtained from Deep South Watch, October 4, 2023.
[iii] While attacks against soft targets have significantly reduced compared with the pre-peace talk period, violence against vulnerable groups remains a concern. Two children aged below 18 were killed and 16 were injured, while five women were killed and 14 wounded.
[iv] Data obtained from Deep South Watch, October 4, 2023.
[v] Waedao Harai et al., “Police Flats Car-Bombed, One Killed, 31 Injured,” Bangkok Post, November 22, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2443712/police-flats-car-bombed-one-killed-31-injured.
[vi] “Peta Rundingin Damai Patani dan Pilihan Raya Thailand 2023 Menyahut Cabaran Atau Memberikan Harapan Palsu [Plan on the Patani Peace Dialogue and Thailand’s 2023 Election: Responding to Challenges or Creating False Hope],” Surat No. 98 (May 2023), p. 7. Surat is an internal newsletter produced by the BRN’s Jabatan Penerangan dan Media (Department of Information and Media).
[vii] “Insurgents Attack a Government Outpost in Yala Province,” Thai PBS World, April 9, 2023, https://www.thaipbsworld.com/insurgents-attack-a-government-outpost-in-yala-province.
[viii] Abdullah Benjakat and Wassana Nanuam, “Arson Attacks Strike 23 Locations in Far South,” Bangkok Post, May 12, 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2569012.
[ix] “Emergency Decree in Restive South Extended for One Month,” Thai PBS World, September 19, 2023, https://www.thaipbsworld.com/emergency-decree-in-restive-south-extended-for-one-month.
[x] Apart from the three districts mentioned above, the districts where the state of emergency was revoked are Sungai Kolok, Waeng and Sukhirin in Narathiwat; Yaring, Mayo, Mai Kaen, Kapho and Maelan in Pattani; and Betong and Kabang in Yala. See “Emergency Decree in Restive South Extended for One Month,” Thai PBS World, September 19, 2023, https://www.thaipbsworld.com/emergency-decree-in-restive-south-extended-for-one-month/.
[xi] The third special law is the Internal Security Act (ISA), which has been enforced in 11 districts in the three southernmost provinces as well as four districts in Songkhla (Thepa, Chana, Na Thawi and Sabayoi) following the revocation of the emergency decree. The ISA enables the court to drop cases against security-related offenders.
[xii] “Khoromo To-Ayu Phoroko Chukchoen Chaidaen Tai Ik 3 Duean Ruam 20 Amphoe [Cabinet Extended Emergency Decree in 20 Districts for 3 Months],” Thansettakij, October 16, 2023. The state of emergency is currently imposed in 20 out of 33 districts in the three southernmost provinces.
[xiii] It would be more credible for such a survey to be conducted by a third party and the identities of respondents anonymised. Otherwise, the government agencies involved could mobilise, if not fabricate, public opinion to justify the prolongation of the emergency decree, which has been enforced in the Deep South since 2005. Romdon Panjor, a Move Forward Party MP, made this observation in a Facebook post on October 17, 2023.
[xiv] The Prayut Chan-ocha government issued an executive decree to postpone the enforcement of Sections 22-25 of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act from February 22 to October 1, 2023, following a request from the police calling for a preparation period before the enforcement of this new law. The Constitutional Court, however, ruled in May 2023 that the order was unconstitutional, making the Act fully effective. “Delay Torture Law No More,” Bangkok Post, May 19, 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2573742/delay-torture-law-no-more.
[xv] “Poet Chue 5 Khon Raek don Ko-O-Ro-Mo-No Chaeng Damnoenkhadi Prachamati Ekkarat [Five Sued By ISOC for Independence referendum],” Isra News Agency, June 24, 2023.
[xvi] “Thailand, Malaysia Agree to Deepen Ties in Trade, investment, and Tourism,” Malay Mail, September 22, 2023, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/09/22/thailand-malaysia-agree-to-deepen-ties-in-trade-investment-and-tourism/92328.
[xvii] MARA Patani (Majlis Syura Patani, or Patani Consultative Council) comprises four separatist movements – Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (Patani Islamic Liberation Front, or BIPP), Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, or GMIP) and individual members of the BRN. The latter’s engagement in MARA Patani has not been endorsed by the BRN’s leadership.
[xviii] Bangkok has tried to keep the southern conflict an internal affair. Since 2020, the Thai peace dialogue panel led by General Wanlop Rugsanaoh has allowed international observers to witness the peace talks, but only “in their personal capacity”.
[xix] Interview with a senior member of the Thai peace dialogue panel, September 4, 2023.
[xx] Statement of the Thai peace dialogue panel, April 2, 2022.
[xxi] Statement of the Thai peace dialogue panel, February 22, 2023.
[xxii] “Pernyataan Khusus Jabatan Penerangan BRN Terkait Proses Perundingan Damai BRN-RTG [Special Statement of the BRN Information Department Related to the BRN-RTG Peace Negotiation Process],” Jabatan Penerangan BRN, YouTube video, May 4, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Jvlw9hrf0M; interview with a senior member of the Thai peace dialogue panel, September 4, 2023.
[xxiii] Although the Move Forward Party (MFP) gained electoral victory by winning 152 out of 500 seats, it was unable to form a coalition government as it failed to secure the more than 375 votes needed from a joint sitting of the House of Representatives and the military-appointed Senate. The conservative forces strongly opposed the formation of an MFP-led government due to the party’s perceived radical policies on the reform of the lèse-majesté law, the military and monopoly capitalism.
[xxiv] The 2017 Constitution, drafted by a military-appointed committee, allows senators to vote alongside the 500
members of the House of Representatives to appoint a prime minister within the first five years of the formation of the first parliament. Prime ministerial candidates need to gain the backing of more than half of the 700-member parliament to get parliamentary endorsement.
[xxv] Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, Justice Minister and leader of the Prachachat Party, also raised to the cabinet the question of why there was no mention of the conflict or peace-building in the Deep South in the policy statement. “Thawi Lan Nayobai Ratthaban Fuenfu Lak Nititham Chonotho Tong Mai Pai Yuen Fang Khon Tham Phit [Thawee Proposes Policy to Restore the Rule of Law, Officials Must Not Side With Wrongdoers],” Thai Rath, September 12, 2023.
[xxvi] Deputy Prime Minister Somsak Thepsuthin of the Pheu Thai Party oversees the SBPAC, the civilian agency in charge of development works in the Deep South, and chairs the Emergency Situation Administration Committee in charge of examining the enforcement of the Emergency Decree, which is due for renewal every three months. Under the Prayut government, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, another coup-maker, oversaw security affairs.
[xxvii] Interview with a National Security Council officer involved in the peace dialogue, October 2, 2023.
[xxviii] “Kao Klai Chuak Nayobai Kanmueang – Kongthap Khoromo Settha Pen Suan to Khayai Rabop Prayut [MFP Criticises Srettha Govt’s Political Policies, Army, Charging It is an Extension of Prayut regime],” BBC News Thailand, September 13, 2023.
[xxix] Jabatan Penerangan BRN, “Pernyataan Khusus Jabatan Penerangan BRN.”
[xxx] Interview with a senior BRN member, September 28, 2023.
[xxxi] Ibid.
[xxxii] For more information on the OPAPP, which later changed its name to the “Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace, Reconciliation and Unity”, see https://peace.gov.ph.
