Thailand
Violence in Thailand’s Deep South continued to rise in 2025, with soft targets (civilians) bearing the brunt of the protracted conflict. Among the most emotionally charged incidents was a series of attacks targeting religious communities and vulnerable groups. Violence also intensified during Ramadan 2025, as the government and the Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front (BRN) failed to reach an agreement on a pre-talk ceasefire. Explosive incidents surpassed those of 2024, with insurgents unsuccessfully attempting to expand their operations beyond the traditional conflict zone. The increased use of ambush-style operations and coordinated attacks suggests a notable advancement in the insurgents’ military capabilities. The peace dialogue remained suspended for over a year under the Paetongtarn Shinawatra government, amid criticism from hawkish elements in the government circles. Concerns remain that the current Anutin Charnvirakul administration’s potentially short tenure could further hinder progress.
State of the Conflict in Thailand’s Deep South
Increased and More Lethal Violence
Since the 2004 resurgence of a violent insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces, at least 7,764 people have been killed and 14,744 injured across 23,406 violent incidents, according to Deep South Watch data (as of September 2025).
[1] As the conflict’s dynamics gradually shifted from military confrontation to political negotiation following the launch of a peace dialogue in 2013, the Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani, or BRN) became increasingly cautious in its military operations. In particular, the group sought to avoid targeting unarmed civilians to enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Although the dialogue has not yielded tangible results, it helped to reduce violence from 1,540 incidents in 2013 to 277 in 2020. However, the trend reversed thereafter, with casualties rising from 303 in 2021 to 486 in 2024 amid the dialogue’s continued dormancy.[2]
In the first nine months of 2025, 478 incidents were recorded, resulting in 447 casualties – 88 deaths and 359 injuries – with signs that the violence may continue to rise. While the number of incidents rose only slightly, total casualties during this period were nearly equivalent to those recorded for the whole of 2024 (486 casualties).[3] This represents a notable escalation in human impact amid the stalled peace dialogue.
Soft targets (unarmed civilians) continued to bear the brunt of the protracted conflict. Compared to 2024, civilian casualties remained slightly higher than those among hard targets (armed combatants). Both women and children under the age of 18 remained vulnerable to attacks during this period. Women accounted for eight deaths and 41 injuries, while children accounted for four deaths and 34 injuries.[4]
Among the most emotionally charged incidents was a series of attacks against people of faith and vulnerable groups, such as women and children, which occurred shortly after the killing of Abdulroning Lateh, an alleged senior leader of the BRN’s military wing, on April 18, 2025. Two days later, a bomb hidden in a motorcycle sidecar exploded near a police residence’s fence in Muang district, Narathiwat province, injuring 10 people, including nine Muslim children who were passing by.[5] On April 22, assailants opened fire on a police pickup truck escorting monks on their alms round in Saba Yoi district, Songkhla province, resulting in the death of a 16-year-old monk.[6]
Other notable incidents occurred on May 2, when a 76-year-old blind woman was shot dead in Chanae district, Narathiwat province, and her son seriously injured while they were returning home from the hospital on a motorcycle. Later that same evening, gunmen fired on a house in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat province, killing three people and injuring one. Among the dead was a nine-year-old girl.[7]
By ethno-religious affiliation, casualties among Thai Buddhists totalled 183 in the first nine months of 2025, while Malay-Muslim casualties numbered 261. Although the number of Thai Buddhist casualties was lower in absolute terms, as Thai Buddhists comprise only about 20 percent of the population in the three southernmost provinces, they remained at a higher risk of being targeted by insurgent violence.[8]
During the holy month of Ramadan in 2025 (February 28 to March 29), the level of violence rose sharply compared with the previous year. A total of 71 incidents were recorded, resulting in 14 deaths and 74 injuries, whereas during Ramadan in 2024 (March 11 to April 9), 87 incidents were recorded, but with only nine deaths and 27 injuries.[9] This indicates that although the frequency of attacks declined slightly, their severity and lethality increased.
Among the major incidents was a coordinated assault on the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat on March 8, when heavily armed insurgents stormed the compound, threw grenades, opened fire with assault rifles and detonated a car bomb. The attack killed two defence volunteers and injured eight others, including three passing civilians.[10] The scale and coordination of the attack suggests that the perpetrators possessed advanced combat training, reflecting a sustained level of military capability within the insurgent group.
In the first nine months of 2025, a total of 116 explosions were recorded, surpassing the 103 bombings documented throughout the previous year. This indicates an increase in the frequency of indiscriminate attacks.[11] Notably, a series of explosions took place in late June in tourist provinces in the Upper South, possibly linked to the conflict-affected region. This development suggests that insurgents may once again be attempting to expand their theatre of operations beyond the traditional conflict zone.
Two Pattani residents – 29-year-old Muhama and 27-year-old Sulaiman – were arrested on June 24 in Phang Nga, about 430 kilometres from the Deep South, for allegedly planting several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at four tourist sites in Phuket, including one at the Phuket International Airport, three in Krabi and one in a car in Phang Nga. The coordinated plots were apparently not intended to cause fatalities but seemed instead to be a calculated attempt to pressure Bangkok amid the stalled peace dialogue. All of the small bombs were detected in time and safely defused. Fourth Army Commander Lt Gen Phaisan Nusang stated that the suspects confessed to acting under orders from an organisation believed to be the BRN, with the aim of causing economic disruption in tourist areas.[12]
This was not the first instance of southern insurgents conducting attacks beyond the conflict zone. In August 2016, a wave of 10 bombings and six arson attacks struck seven provinces in the Upper South, leaving four people dead and 37 others injured, including 11 foreign nationals. Most casualties occurred in Hua Hin, a popular seaside resort town in Prachuap Khiri Khan.[13]
Last year also saw insurgents demonstrate enhanced attack capabilities through ambush-styled operations targeting military personnel. On May 28, 2025, a police officer was killed and two others seriously injured in an attack on a police station in Chanae district, Narathiwat province, which the Bangkok Post described as a “sniper” attack. Forensic investigators later found that the bullets had been fired from a concealed position, with the trajectory indicating a calculated and premeditated assault.[14]
Another incident occurred on July 5, when a traffic police officer was shot dead by a gunman firing from a concealed position as he left a convenience store in Krong Pinang district, Yala province. In an apparent attempt to downplay the situation, Phaisan stated that the shooter had fired from a distance of about 50 metres – insufficient to be considered a sniper attack.[15] Nevertheless, the increasing frequency of such incidents has led security forces to enhance self-protection measures, including the regular use of metal body armour while on duty.
Continued Enforcement of Security Laws
For over two decades, Thailand’s southernmost provinces have remained under a prolonged state of exception, maintained through the enforcement of several security laws, notably martial law and the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations. Martial law permits the military to detain suspects for up to seven days without a court warrant, while the Emergency Decree allows detention for an additional 30 days without formal charges. In practice, these laws enable authorities to hold suspects for up to 37 days, often without adequate legal safeguards. In January 2025, the government lifted the state of emergency in one more district – Yaha district in Yala – leaving the Decree in force in 17 out of 33 districts across Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.[16]
First imposed in 2005 and renewed every three months since, the Emergency Decree reached its 82nd extension in October 2025. Meanwhile, martial law has remained continuously enforced across the three southernmost provinces since the 2006 coup, raising questions about the effectiveness and necessity of these extraordinary security measures.[17]
A 35-member ad hoc committee, established by the House of Representatives in October 2023 to explore ways of enhancing the peace process and peace-building in southern Thailand, finalised its policy report in August 2025. Comprising members of parliament, academics and civil society organisations, the committee proposed several recommendations to improve peace-building efforts and strengthen the dialogue process. The political will of national leaders was identified as key to achieving a sustainable resolution to the conflict. If approved by the House of Representatives, the report and its recommendations will be forwarded to the government and relevant agencies. This mechanism enables the legislature to play a more active role in supporting the peace process.[18]
Peace Dialogue Resumes After One-Year Suspension
The dynamics of the southern conflict have ebbed and flowed over the decades, shifting considerably since the initiation of the formal peace dialogue in 2013. During Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s government (August 2024 to August 2025), the peace dialogue was suspended while relevant government agencies were instructed to review existing strategies for resolving the conflict. Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai assumed responsibility for security affairs – a move initially expected to bring some measure of progress. Under the previous Srettha Thavisin administration, no specific deputy prime minister had overseen security affairs. However, Phumtham was reportedly influenced by hawkish advisors, including security experts and former generals with experience in the Deep South.
Gen Shinnawat Maendet, former deputy commander of the Fourth Army Command, was believed to have had significant influence over the Pheu Thai Party’s thinking on the southern conflict. Shinnawat was among the army officers from the Special Forces Command dispatched to the Deep South after the 2004 resurgence of violence. This group sought to dismantle the BRN’s operational networks and curb the spread of its ideology among the younger generations.[19] Another influential hardliner, Surachat Bamrungsuk, a veteran security expert, has consistently criticised the peace dialogue and opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP) framework.[20] He has described the National Security Council (NSC) as “amateurish” and “directionless”, accusing it of conceding too much to the BRN and claiming that the JCPP would disadvantage Thailand.[21]
In January 2025, Phumtham directed relevant agencies to reassess the strategies employed over the past two decades and instructed the NSC and relevant agencies to develop new strategies to extinguish the southern conflict. He also announced that the government would not appoint a new head of the peace dialogue panel at that time.[22]
In February, Phumtham and Chatchai Bangchuad, the newly appointed NSC secretary-general, proposed adopting a reintegration model inspired by the 66/23 policy implemented by the Thai government in 1980 during its campaign against communist insurgents.[23] The 66/23 policy regarded members of the communist movement as individuals with differing political ideologies and promoted the principle of “politics leads the military” as its core strategy. It allowed those who had joined the communists to reintegrate into society without prosecution.
Observers of the southern conflict argue that the context and nature of the insurgency in the Deep South is fundamentally different, and applying the 66/23 approach may not yield the same result.[24] Reviving this policy before reaching a peace agreement risks being perceived as a counterinsurgency operation aimed at weakening the Patani liberation movement rather than fostering peace, and is unlikely to bring structural change. Malay Muslims are expected to continue demanding recognition of their distinct ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity as well as greater self-governance. Therefore, the 66/23 policy alone is unlikely to bring about sustainable peace in the Deep South.[25]
As the government remained reluctant to resume the peace dialogue – questioning its direction and the BRN’s command and control – violence escalated during Ramadan and in the following months. In response to public outrage over the attacks against civilians, particularly children, the elderly and people of faith, the BRN issued a statement on May 5, 2025, affirming that it had no policy to attack civilians and reiterating its commitment to international humanitarian law. However, this cannot be taken as a denial, as the group has never publicly admitted or rejected responsibility for specific attacks.[26] Human Rights Watch stated: “A pledge is not enough. The BRN needs to stop committing war crimes.”[27]
The Thai government and the BRN traded blame over the surge in violence during Ramadan and the months that followed. In early May, Phumtham told the media that the government had proposed to the BRN that if it could maintain peace throughout Ramadan, the government would resume peace talks and discuss alternative forms of governance, provided these remained within the framework of the Thai Constitution.[28] Around the same time, the BRN released an internal document dated February 27, 2025, claiming it had been sent to the Thai government before Ramadan but had received no response. The document proposed that the government appoint a new head of the peace dialogue panel, negotiate a 15-day bilateral ceasefire and establish a monitoring mechanism as a confidence-building measure.[29] Both sides were caught in a “chicken and egg” dispute – whether to appoint a new dialogue chief or stop the violence first – while those bearing the consequences were residents of the southernmost region.
On June 6, the BRN issued another statement asserting that the Thai government’s delay in appointing a new head of the peace dialogue panel had stalled negotiations. It claimed that the escalation of violence resulted from the absence of formal talks and noted that the BRN had previously declared unilateral ceasefires to demonstrate its sincerity and commitment to peace. The statement reaffirmed that its representatives hold legitimate authority to engage in the peace process and that the BRN is prepared to use the JCPP framework to advance dialogue.[30]
In a media interview on August 14, Phumtham stated that a new head of the peace dialogue panel was expected to be appointed by the end of 2025. The government has maintained communication with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on this matter. In July 2024, Anwar appointed Mohd Rabin Basir, former director-general of Malaysia’s National Security Council, as the new facilitator – just a month before the peace dialogue was suspended. As ASEAN chair, Kuala Lumpur has actively supported both Bangkok and the BRN in pursuing a negotiated settlement. Phumtham added that he had already prepared a “model” to resolve the southern conflict and compiled a list of expected members of the Thai peace dialogue panel.[31]
About two weeks later, on August 29, Thailand’s Constitutional Court dismissed Paetongtarn from office for ethical violations related to a leaked phone call with Cambodia’s former leader, Hun Sen.[32] Following her dismissal, Anutin, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, secured a majority vote in the Lower House with the backing of the People’s Party and assumed the premiership in September 2025.[33]
In early October, the Anutin government appointed Gen Somsak Rungsita, former NSC chief, to head the delegation for peace talks.[34] Although this move reopened the stalled talks, the direction of the dialogue is uncertain. It is yet to be seen whether the JCPP will continue as the negotiation framework amid persistent hardline opposition. Somsak has said he will review the JCPP, noting that while the overall framework is likely to remain, its name may change if deemed too contentious.[35] The BRN expressed cautious optimism about the resumption of peace talks, emphasising its desire to see genuine political will from Thai leaders to address the conflict’s root causes rather than another “political play”.[36]
Outlook
Thailand’s southern conflict remains a low-intensity one which receives limited attention both nationally and internationally. Violence continued to rise gradually in 2025, as the peace process stagnated during a one-year suspension under the Paetongtarn government. However, given that the conflict continues to claim lives, deprive people in this resource-rich region of economic opportunities and pose a security risk to the wider Southeast Asian region, it warrants greater attention.
The political will of national leaders is crucial to advancing a negotiated settlement and achieving sustainable peace. Anutin endorsed the appointment of a new head of the peace dialogue within days of taking office, reflecting how decisive leadership can drive the process forward. However, it remains to be seen how far and in what direction his government, expected to last until at least January 2026, can sustain the momentum. After a long suspension, rebuilding trust and confidence between the dialogue parties will take time, and the government’s potentially short tenure may limit its progress. Nonetheless, if this effort lays essential groundwork, it could be carried forward by the next government after the general election.
The lack of policy coherence and continuity has long hindered peace-building in Thailand’s Deep South. The growing influence of hardliners has significantly derailed the peace process in recent years. Moving forward, Thailand will require determined leadership that upholds civilian supremacy, supported by a dedicated long-term institutional mechanism – possibly modelled after the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (OPAPRU) in the Philippines – to strengthen coordination and ensure policy continuity across successive administrations.
About the Authors
Assistant Professor Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat (PhD) is a lecturer at the Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University (Hat Yai Campus), Thailand. She obtained a PhD from the Australian National University. Her areas of research interest and expertise include Thailand’s southern insurgency, ethnic conflicts, peace processes, religion and conflict in Southeast Asia. Dhiramedhist Lueng Ubon is an MA student at the Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University.
Thumbnail photo by Florian Wehde on Unsplash
Citations
[1] This paper employed qualitative research based on document analysis, drawing on a variety of sources, including statistics of violence, official letters, official documents, public statements, media reports and commentaries.
[2] Data obtained from Deep South Watch, October 21, 2025.
[3] Ibid. In 2024, there were a total of 582 incidents, resulting in 129 deaths and 357 injuries.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Later that evening, suspected insurgents opened fire at a group of Buddhist villagers in Waeng district, Narathiwat province, leaving six injured. “Thithae ‘Choley Bomb’ Thalom Rua Flaet to Ro Khokkhian Klum Dek Rian Hafiz Rap Khro! [‘Choley Bomb’ Hits Police Flat’s Fence in Khokkhian – Hafiz Students Caught in the Blast!],” Isra News Agency, April 21, 2025, https://www.isranews.org/article/south-news/other-news/137376-bombkhokkhian-s.htm.
[6] “Novice Monk Killed as Gunmen Open Fire on Police Vehicle in Songkhla,” The Nation, April 22, 2025. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40049081.
[7] “Gunmen Kill 4 in Two Attacks in Narathiwat on Same Day,” The Nation, May 3, 2025. https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/general/40049526.
[8] Data obtained from Deep South Watch, October 21, 2025.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “Bomb Attacks Rock Narathiwat and Pattani, Killing Five,” Thai PBS World, March 09, 2025, https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/bomb-attacks-rock-narathiwat-and-pattani-killing-five/56773; “Thailand: Insurgents Bomb District Office in Deep South,” Human Rights Watch, March 10, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/10/thailand-insurgents-bomb-district-office-deep-south.
[11] Data obtained from Deep South Watch, October 21, 2025.
[12] “Two Arrested Over Bomb Plot Aimed at Disrupting Andaman Tourism,” Thai PBS World, June 27, 2025.
https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/two-arrested-over-bomb-plot-aimed-at-disrupting-andaman-tourism/58013; Achadthaya Chuenniran, Assawin Pakkawan and Panumet Tanraksa, “Security Gets Boost after IEDs Found,” Bangkok Post, June 28, 2025, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3059556/security-gets-boost-after-ieds-found.
[13] “Neung Pi Raboet Phak Tai Ton Bon: Nang Hak Mum Thi Yang Mai Mi Ton Chop [One Year after the Upper Southern Bombings: A Plot Twist without an Ending],” BBC Thai, August 11, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-40903564.
[14] “Sniper Kills Police Officer in Narathiwat,” Bangkok Post, May 28, 2025, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3036520/sniper-kills-police-officer-in-narathiwat.
[15] “Sanai Poe – Sum Ying Rop Kap Phi Khong Ching Thi Chaidaen Tai [Sniper Ambush Targeting Security Officers in Thailand’s Deep South],” Isra News Agency, July 11, 2025, https://www.isranews.org/article/south-news/south-slide/139609-sniperkill.html.
[16] “State of Emergency to be Lifted in Yaha District of Yala Province,” Thai PBS World, January 6, 2025. https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/state-of-emergency-to-be-lifted-in-yaha-district-of-yala-province/56054.
[17] “Ratchakitcha Khayay Wela Prakat Sathanakan Chukchoen 3 Changwat Chaidaen Tai Ik 3 Duean [Royal Gazette Extends Emergency Decree in the Three Southern Border Provinces for Another Three Months],” Krungthep Thurakit, October 17, 2025, https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/news-update/1203636.
[18] The author serves as a commissioner on the ad hoc Committee for Considering, Studying and Proposing Guidelines to Promote the Peacebuilding Process for Resolving Security Conflicts in the Three Southern Border Provinces.
[19] Gen Shinnawat was later appointed as the chair of the advisory board on security affairs for Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai in July 2025. Shinnawat is a retired general with several years of experience working in the Deep South. He completed his PhD research at Thaksin University, focusing on the organisational structure of the BRN. A close associate of the Pheu Thai Party, Shinnawat ran in a parliamentary by-election in Kanchanaburi Province in October 2025 but was unsuccessful. “Bik Shin Ma Laeo Nang Thiprueksa Phumtham Chuai Ngan Chaidaen Tai – Mian Ma [‘Big Shin’ Appointed as Advisor to Phumtham to Oversee Southern Border and Myanmar Affairs],” Isra News Agency, July 29, 2025, https://www.isranews.org/article/south-slide/140108-advisordpm.html.
[20] The JCPP was proposed by the Thai government in 2023 and remains under discussion between the two parties. It outlines steps to reduce violence and conduct public consultations on a form of governance, identity, justice, education and development.
[21] “Rawang Reng Cheracha Dap Fai Tai Krachon Sai ‘Lumphrang’ BRN [Beware Rushing into Peace Talks to End the Southern Conflict – Jumping Into BRN’s ‘Trap’],” Isra News Agency, March 14, 2025, https://www.isranews.org/article/south-slide/136417-jcppbrntalk.html.
[22] “Phumtham Sang Rue Yutthasat Dap Fai Tai – Tang Khana Phutkhui – Sin Mokkarakhom Tong Chop [Phumtham Orders Overhaul of Southern Peace Strategy – Establishes New Dialogue Panel – Must Conclude by End of January],” Isra News Agency, January 6, 2025, https://www.isranews.org/article/south-news/south-slide/134720-policesaiburidied.html.
[23] “Pat Fun Khamsang 66/23 Wang Kae Panha Chaidaen Tai [Reviving Order 66/23 in Hope of Resolving the Southern Border Problem],” Thai PBS World, February 21, 2025, https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/349532.
[24] See, for example, “Kanmueang – Khosanoe Dap Fai Tai Kap Khamsang 66/23 [Politics – Proposal to Quell the Southern Conflict and Order 66/23],” Khao Sod, February 21, 2025, https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/349532.
[25] Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, “Panha Kan Chai Kotmai Pen Khrueangmue Torong Kap Khwam Siang Khong Kan Thoi Klap [The Problem of Using Law as Bargaining Tool and the Risks of Backsliding],” Thai PBS World – Policy Watch, March 5, 2025, https://policywatch.thaipbs.or.th/article/government-141.
[26] “BRN Denies Targeting Civilians, Calls for Transparent Investigation into Deep South Violence,” The Nation, May 6, 2025, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40049634.
[27] “Thailand: New Insurgent Attacks on Civilians Despite Pledge,” Human Rights Watch, May 29, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/29/thailand-new-insurgent-attacks-civilians-despite-pledge.
[28] “Phumtham Siachai Het Mai Sa-Ngop Tai Sang Phoem Kamlang Khumkhrong Phrom Cheracha Tae Tong Yu Phaitai Ratthathammanun Mai Baengyaek Dindaen [Phumtham Regrets Southern Unrest, Orders Security Boost, Insists Talks Must Stay within Constitution, No Separatism],” Matichon, May 6, 2025, https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_5169699.
[29] The Reporters, “Yon Du Khosanoe Santiphap Chuakhrao Chak BRN, Kho Yut Ying 2 Fai Pen Wela 15 Wan Tae Phan Ma 3 Duean Mai Mi Siang Toprap [A Look Back at the Temporary Peace Proposal from BRN Requesting a 15-Day Bilateral Ceasefire – But After 3 Months, No Response],” Facebook, May 4, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/TheReportersTH/posts/pfbid0q5F2EBt9sJ7GYxqcu6XooRUSn1ooHkoFoJtMtkbXYQeByPVuLLkeoy28JNEqcPpKl.
[30] “Thotrahat Thalaengkan BRN Kap Thathi Santiphap Chaidaen Tai San To To Cheracha Phaitai Krop JCPP [Decoding BRN’s Statement and Its ‘Peace’ Stance in the Deep South – Continuing Negotiations Under the JCPP Framework],” Thai PBS World – The Active, June 6, 2025, https://theactive.thaipbs.or.th/news/politics-20250606.
[31] “Phumtham Phoei Triam Prap Phaen Kae Fai Tai Chue ‘Anwa’ Khayap Phro Wang Di [Phumtham Reveals Plan to Adjust Strategy to Resolve Southern Unrest – Believes Anwar’s Move Is Made with Good Intentions],” Nation TV, August 15, 2025, https://www.nationtv.tv/politic/378965499.
[32] Panarat Thepgumpanat and Chayut Setboonsarng, “Thai Prime Minister Removed by Court, Triggering Power Scramble,” Reuters, August 30, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-prime-minister-removed-by-court-triggering-power-scramble-2025-08-29/.
[33] The People’s Party, which remains in the opposition, agreed to support the Anutin government on the condition that it would dissolve parliament within four months, hold a referendum on constitutional amendments and continue to function as a minority government. See Kitiphong Thaichareon and Panu Wongcha-um, “Thailand’s Ruling Party Seeks Snap Election to Thwart Rival’s PM Bid,” Reuters, September 3, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailands-ruling-party-seeks-snap-election-thwart-rivals-pm-bid-2025-09-03/; “Making Sense of People’s Party’s Conditions for Anutin,” Thai PBS World, September 3, 2025, https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/making-sense-of-peoples-partys-conditions-for-anutin/58758.
[34] “Government’s Southern Peace Talks Chief Appointed,” Thai PBS World, October 10, 2025, https://world.thaipbs.or.th/detail/governments-southern-peace-talks-chief-appointed/59161.
[35] National Security Council, “The Peace Dialogue: From Past to Present and Toward the Future” (public seminar, Bangkok, Thailand, October 29, 2025).
[36] Shintaro Hara, “Deligasi Rundingan RTG/PEDP: Kesungguhan Atau Sekadar Deraman Politik? [RTG/PEDP Negotiation Delegation: Genuine Commitment or Just Political Rhetoric?]” The Motive, October 27, 2025. Originally published in the BRN’s newsletter, Surat 120 (September 2025). https://www.facebook.com/TheMotive2020/posts/pcb.390944803901554/390944640568237.
