The Ideological Transformation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI): Using Religious Reasoning to Deconstruct Extremism
This article examines the ideological transformation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a transnational terrorist organisation in Southeast Asia. JI’s disbandment in mid-2024 resulted from a process of internal ijtihad[1] and theological reflection. Drawing on JI’s own doctrinal reassessments—particularly Para Wijayanto’s leadership (2009-2019)—the study argues that JI’s transformation marks a turning point in the discourse of Islamist militancy. By analysing key documents such as At Tathorruf, Advice 642 and 42 Shar’ia Considerations, this article highlights how religious reasoning can deconstruct extremism from within. It concludes that JI’s case offers valuable lessons for counter terrorism and deradicalisation policies.
Introduction
The evolution of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) represents a critical shift in the dynamics of militant Islamism in Southeast Asia. The transformation is driven by JI’s move away from violent, confrontational jihad in mid-2024, to a dakwah (proselytisation)-based approach that emphasises ideological persuasion and social responsibility to maintain relevance.
Historically, JI was deeply involved in transnational jihadist movements, including those in Afghanistan,[2] the Philippines[3] and Syria.[4] However, in a remarkable turn, JI announced its disbandment on June 30, 2024, following a period of introspection grounded in shariah (Islamic law) reasoning. This decision to disband is a significant milestone in JI’s deradicalisation as both a militant group and a terrorist organisation.[5]
Unlike other extremist group dissolutions which occurred through either state intervention or defeat—as in the cases of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Darul Islam (DI), respectively—JI’s dissolution was internally driven and supported by scriptural arguments.[6] This deliberation made the ideological transformation credible and sustainable. But analysts have noted some lingering concerns. Among these are the potential emergence of dissenting splinter groups,[7] possible strategic deception[8] and the ideological influence of JI-affiliated pesantrens (traditional Islamic boarding schools) on the wider community.[9]
By examining JI’s arguments for the reinterpretation of its earlier understanding of the daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state), Islam kaffah (comprehensive Islam), taghut (tyrannical Muslim rulers), jihad and other related ideologies, this article demonstrates how religious re-evaluation challenges the ideological foundation of violent Islamist extremism. Understanding this process offers valuable insights into how Islamic scholarship and ijtihad (independent, expert reasoning) can benefit deradicalisation, moderation and the reintegration of former militants into national life.
The Split from DI and JI’s Formation
The split from DI in the early 1990s marked an important milestone in JI’s trajectory towards extremism and violence. It transformed JI from being a part of the DI movement—which went underground and became fragmented after its founder S.M. Kartosuwiryo was executed in 1962[10]—into a consolidated entity with international ties[11] and affiliations with Al-Qaeda.[12]
Notably, in 1985, JI leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir successfully sent the first batch of DI members under their command to Afghanistan for military training at mujahideen camps run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf—a proponent of strict Salafi Islam with extremely close links to Saudi Arabia.[13]
Sungkar and Ba’asyir were staunch Salafis, whereas Ajengan Masduki, DI’s interim imam, was Sufi.[14] The dispute intensified when Masduki instructed the Afghan-trained members under Sungkar to return to their respective territorial command posts. Sungkar disagreed, and as the conflict shifted to his handling of funds for sending fighters to Afghanistan, he decided to break away from DI in 1993. The incident marked a watershed in JI’s formation.[15]
After the split, the Qiyadah Markaziyah (Central Executive Council) was established in the early 1990s. It consisted of several senior leaders who preferred Sungkar to Masduki. The General Guide for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah (PUPJI) was formulated and formalised in 1996, outlining JI’s plans to pursue its struggle independently of DI.
JI’s Worldview in the PUPJI
The PUPJI contains JI’s vision and primary mission, and begins with the formation of an Islamic group to establish an Islamic state and caliphate. The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 was cited as the raison d’être for JI’s existence. Without the Ottoman Caliphate, modernity and secular governance were culpable for the Muslim community’s moral decadence. To correct this, JI strove to re-establish the Islamic caliphate.[16]
The PUPJI highlights that Prophets were sent to establish the religion, or iqomatid dien.[17] For JI, this means establishing a way of life grounded in the unity of God (tawhid), which relates to establishing Islam in all its aspects, including the aqidah (Islamic creed), ibadah (acts of worship) and manhajul-hayah (way of life)—integrating both the physical and spiritual dimensions of existence in total submission to the worship of God. However, most important for JI was the Muslim ummah (community) retaining a separate polity.
This worldview reflects a concretist orientation, characterised by a preference for fixed, solution-oriented frameworks to contend with social and political change.[18] It entails religious fundamentalism, which reduces complex historical and moral challenges to a singular religious solution grounded in an idealised past.
JI’s Ideological Building Blocks
Consequently, the Ushulul-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid-Dien (UMALID, or the Principles for the Methodology to Establish the Religion) was designated as JI’s ushul (foundation) principles or roots. The UMALID distinguished itself from the other three components of the PUPJI,[19] because it served as the building blocks of JI’s ideology.[20]
Hence, all the other components must be based on the abovementioned principles.[21] The UMALID binds the individual, the family and the jamaah (group) into a cohesive entity immersed in JI’s desired Islamic values, and entrenches a deep commitment to its struggle to establish an Islamic state and caliphate.
Based on an analysis of the UMALID, JI considered itself as part of the Salafiyah Jihadiyah movement,[22] based on the Sunni faith according to the way of the salaf[23]—but deeply entrenched in armed jihad.
Islam, as a universal religion, known to JI members as “Islam kaffah”,[24] cannot exist effectively without a potent central leadership in religion, politics and the military. Only the re-establishment of the daulah Islamiyah as an ideological state based on holistic Islamic teachings would ensure the unity between religion and state, thereby correcting the polarity caused by the dichotomy between the profane and the sacred in secular ideologies.
The UMALID asserts that Muslims are obligated to be members of a jamaah—like JI—by giving the al-bai’ah (pledge of allegiance). The pledge compels JI members to listen to (al-sam’u) and obey (al-ta’ah) the emir as the leader of the group, and other appointed leaders on matters that do not constitute a sin to God.[25]
The milestones towards the establishment of an Islamic state are iman (belief), hijrah (emigration in the way of Allah), i’dad (preparation for armed struggle in the way of Allah) and jihad (armed struggle in the way of Allah). JI believed these stages mirror the Prophet Muhammad’s path to establishing Islam.[26]
Central to JI’s Islamic creed (aqidah) is the concept of al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) as a manifestation of tawhid. It emphasises the disavowal of taghut: any authority that exceeds its limit by claiming powers exclusive to God, such as the absolute right to legislate. This requires active participation in Islamist movements to establish a society governed by divine principles.[27]
Ijtihad and Theological Reflection Leading to JI’s Disbandment
The shift from ideological absolutism to pragmatism more recently for JI involves making concessions and accommodations. It entails giving up on the fundamentals outlined in the PUPJI, which is tantamount to rejecting the essence that made JI an Islamist terrorist group.
Among the most significant documents which form the basis for the revisions to JI’s ideological absolutism are At Tathorruf (Extremism), Nasihat 642 (Advice 642) and 42 Shar‘ia Considerations. These texts systematically reassess JI’s foundational assumptions about loyalty and disavowal (al-wala’ wal-bara’), the obligation of organisational allegiance (bai‘ah) and the legitimacy of armed struggle (jihad) within Indonesia’s socio-political context. Rather than abandoning religious reasoning, JI’s leadership has sought to recalibrate its ideological framework by prioritising broader Islamic legal objectives (maqāṣid al-shariah), contextual jurisprudence (fiqh al-wāqi‘) and the prevention of harm (daf’ al-mafāsid).
First, JI now embraces NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, or the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), UUD 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, or the 1945 Constitution), Pancasila (the national ideology of Indonesia) and Indonesia’s national motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). For JI, these previously indicated that Indonesia was “un-Islamic” and that the government and its apparatus were taghut. After re-evaluating its earlier view of NKRI as an adversary, JI now accepts that this stance must change, because past Muslim scholars had agreed to the formation of NKRI.[28]
Additionally, JI’s fatwa committee has found that none of the principles in Pancasila contradict Islamic principles. In fact, all five principles can be integrated within the framework of shariah. For example, the first principle of Pancasila— “Belief in One Supreme God” —corresponds with the concept of hifz al-din (preservation of religion), one of the five core objectives of shariah. The principle also affirms monotheism.[29]
Second, JI defined Islam kaffah as establishing a daulah Islamiyah and implementing it through political power. Following re-evaluation, JI acknowledges that NKRI—although not an Islamic state—can maintain Muslims’ welfare and uphold Islamic religious values in the context of a modern state. Moreover, justice, security and freedom of religion are enshrined in Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution. Therefore, applying the shariah concept of akhaf al-dararayn (the lesser of two evils), JI accepts the continued existence of NKRI so as to avoid conflict and destruction.[30]
Third, JI’s voluntary dissolution automatically unbinds its members from bai’ah. By siyasah syar’iyyah (political policy based on shariah), JI’s leaders argue that the group’s dissolution is a form of muamalah (strategic political and social policy) and is therefore permissible. It is distinct from acts of worship or creed, and it allows the ummah to achieve greater benefit and to avoid greater harm, whether in the form of armed conflict or social instability, in Indonesia. Furthermore, the disbandment also serves to achieve al–maslahah al-mursalah (unrestricted public interest).[31]
Fourth, JI’s milestones of iman, hijrah, i’dad and jihad need to be better understood in the light of today’s changing circumstances. In the current Indonesian context, JI cannot find any shariah reason to justify armed jihad, since the government is legitimate and led by a Muslim president. Since Muslims form the majority of the country’s population, there is no reason to carry out jihad with the excuse of defending themselves.
Furthermore, according to Advice 642, the current socio-political context is inappropriate for jihad. Insisting on carrying out jihad under these circumstances will have broad social and political impacts which would not only relegate jihad to a mere tool of aggression and terror, but also risk causing unnecessary fitnah (chaos).[32]
Finally, JI acknowledges that “national stability and security are top priorities that must be safeguarded collectively”.[33] As proof, the group has been cooperating with the Indonesian security forces on wanted individuals, weapons and deradicalisation. JI not only wants to disavow its violent and rebellious past, but also seeks to transform itself into a more socially responsible entity.[34]
Deconstructing Extremism and Violence from Within
JI’s ideological evolution and dissolution demonstrate that violent extremists should not be understood solely as irrational or purely dogmatic actors. On the contrary, JI’s doctrinal reconsideration and disbandment evidence long-standing rationality and show it is capable of adapting its worldview when confronted with theological inconsistencies, strategic failures and changing socio-political realities.[35] This recognition is crucial, as it suggests that countering violent extremism need not rely exclusively on coercive or external measures.
JI’s case illustrates that extremist ideology can be deconstructed from within, by interrogating its doctrinal foundations through religious reasoning. Rather than dismissing jihadist narratives outright, this approach assesses the internal logic of extremist interpretations of Islam to expose contradictions, selective readings of scripture and failures to account for broader Islamic legal and ethical principles. JI’s doctrinal reassessment—evidenced by its re-evaluation of jihad, bai’ah, Islam kaffah and the concept of an Islamic state—reflects an engagement with fiqh al-wāqi‘ and a growing embrace of the maqāṣid al-shariah. These principles prioritise the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage and property, and advocate pragmatic consideration of context rather than rigid ideological absolutism.
Central to this transformation is JI’s shift away from a jihadist ideology grounded in confrontation and violence, towards a dakwah-oriented framework that emphasises engagement, persuasion and social responsibility. This reorientation aligns with the Islamic teaching of Islam as a mercy to all (rahmatan lil ‘alamin) and underscores the ultimate purpose of religious commitment as humanity’s collective welfare—rather than imposing belief through coercion. From this perspective, jihadist doctrines that rely on blind obedience, coercion and violence are also increasingly recognised as antithetical to Islamic ethics and jurisprudence.
Extremism within jihadist movements is often sustained by interlocking doctrines, particularly takfir (excommunication) and absolutist interpretations of al-wala’ wal-bara’. Rigid applications of these concepts legitimise exclusion, erode social cohesion and normalise violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims. JI’s ideological revision implicitly challenges these doctrines by reorienting loyalty and disavowal towards peaceful coexistence within a pluralistic nation-state, prioritising peace (al-salam) and security (al-amn) for all members of society. This reorientation is consistent with the Islamic legal concept of al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah, which allows for adaptive governance and policy choices in the absence of explicit scriptural prohibitions, so long as they serve the common good and prevent harm. Under this principle, JI’s leadership has reframed organisational dissolution not as an ideological defeat, but as a legitimate religious decision aimed at preventing greater societal harm.
Importantly, JI’s ideological revision and disbandment are not without precedent in the broader jihadist milieu. Similar processes of internal critique and doctrinal reassessment have occurred among prominent jihadist ideologues and movements. One notable example is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, long regarded as a key ideological influence within global jihadism, who publicly criticised Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and later the Islamic State (IS) for their excessive brutality, indiscriminate violence and abuse of takfīr.[36] Although al-Maqdisi did not abandon jihadism, his intervention demonstrated that religious authority and theological reasoning can be mobilised to delegitimise extreme violence from within the same ideological tradition.[37]
Within JI itself, ideological fracture preceded organisational dissolution. Figures such as Nasir Abas—a former senior JI member—have shed their allegiance to the group, citing religious reasons and personal disillusionment.[38] Abas’s departure was driven by his perception of internal leadership conflicts, moral inconsistencies and a growing misalignment between JI’s stated objectives and its actual practices.[39] His experience underscores how prolonged exposure to internal contradictions can catalyse ideological disengagement, particularly when religious ideals are perceived to be manipulated for organisational or strategic ends.
A parallel can also be drawn with the experience of Egypt’s al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyah, whose leaders comprehensively refuted their former jihadist doctrines and renounced violence. Unlike a tactical ceasefire, this revision was grounded in detailed theological critiques of their own past positions, including the misuse of jihad, rebellion against the state and legitimisation of violence against civilians.[40]
Beyond renouncing violence, al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyah went further to promote moderation actively—improving relations with the government and fostering constructive engagement with people of other faiths.[41] The group later pursued political participation through Hizb al-Bina’ wal-Tanmiyah (the Building and Development Party) following the 2011 Arab Spring, signalling a transition from armed struggle to democratic participation.[42]
Taken together, these cases reinforce the argument that religious reasoning—when grounded in credible scholarship, contextual awareness and ethical reflection—can serve as a powerful mechanism for deconstructing violent extremism from within. JI’s experience adds to a growing body of evidence that ideological transformation is possible when extremist groups are treated not merely as security threats but as doctrinal communities capable of reflection, revision and reintegration into peaceful social and political life.
Way Forward
JI’s ideological transformation highlights the importance of complementing security-led counter terrorism with approaches that recognise the role of religious reasoning and internal doctrinal evolution. It also demonstrates that deradicalisation frameworks can be strengthened by allowing space for internal ijtihad, theological debate and engagement with credible Islamic scholarship, rather than relying exclusively on coercive disruption or legal prohibition. Such an approach enhances the sustainability and legitimacy of disengagement processes, particularly for ideologically motivated groups.
Nevertheless, ideological revision does not render calibrated oversight redundant. The Indonesian authorities can help to consolidate JI’s transition through proportionate regulatory measures—including continued surveillance of former JI networks, periodic reporting on membership, activities and assets, and close monitoring of online spaces to prevent youth recruitment and organisational reconstitution. When framed as accountability and confidence-building measures rather than punitive controls, these mechanisms can reinforce state authority while demonstrating JI’s commitment to operating within the legal and political framework of NKRI.
Beyond the Indonesian context, JI’s transformation offers regional policy lessons for Southeast Asia, where ideologically driven movements often operate transnationally despite being rooted in local grievances. Security agencies and policymakers may recognise the value of engaging former militant networks as sources of insight into ideological evolution, recruitment pathways and narrative shifts within extremist milieus. Carefully managed engagement, without legitimising past violence, can strengthen early warning capabilities and counter-narrative efforts, especially in online and informal religious spaces. Institutionalising channels for post-disengagement monitoring and dialogue may help prevent splintering, reduce the appeal of successor groups, and translate individual or organisational disengagement into broader ecosystem-level impacts. JI’s ideological transformation underlines that the challenge of Islamist militancy is not solely a problem of security enforcement, but also one of ideas, interpretations and authority. JI’s case demonstrates that when extremist doctrines are subjected to sustained internal scrutiny, their claims to religious inevitability can be meaningfully dismantled. While vigilance remains necessary, JI’s disbandment reinforces the strategic value of integrating theological engagement into counter terrorism policy, offering a pathway through which ideological exit, rather than perpetual confrontation, can become a viable and durable outcome.
About the Authors
Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi is a Research Fellow, Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan is an Associate Research Fellow and Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi is a Senior Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Malik Shibly on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Ijtihad means “to struggle, to exercise personal judgment in legal matters”. See Aisha Bewley, Glossary of Islamic Terms (Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., 1998), 10. Here, however, it denotes an attempt to contemporise JI’s ideology from being stagnant by embracing the objectives of shariah.
[2] As’ad Said Ali, Al-Qaeda: Tinjauan Sosial-Politik, Ideologi dan Speak Terjangnya (LP3ES, 2020), 150 –5.
[3] Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Grafindo, 2003), 139 –67.
[4] “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Military Training Programs,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), November 2, 2022, https://understandingconflict.org/id/publications/JImilitary.
[5] Aqil Hamzah and Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Ex-JI Members in S-E Asia Should Abide by Dissolution, Says Terror Group’s Former Chief,” The Straits Times, September 30, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/former-ji-members-in-s-e-asia-should-abide-by-dissolution-former-chief-of-terror-group.
[6] Chaula Rininta Anindya, “Revisiting the Disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah: What Indonesia Can Learn From Japan,” The Diplomat, June 5, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/revisiting-the-disbandment-of-jemaah-islamiyah-what-indonesia-can-learn-from-japan/.
[7] Alif Satria and Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesia Annual Threat Assessment,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no.13 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/indonesia-annual-threat-assessment/.
[8] Kumar Ramakrishna, “The Dissolution of Jemaah Islamiyah: Genuine Change or Tactical Switch,” RSIS Commentary, no. 105 (2024), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-dissolution-of-jemaah-islamiyah-genuine-change-or-tactical-switch/.
[9] Noor Huda Ismail, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Affiliated Pesantrens: Legacy and Influence After Its Dissolution,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 3, (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-17-issue-03/.
[10] C. Van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Kartosoewirjo: Mimpi Negara Islam (Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2016).
[11] Ali, Al-Qaeda: Tinjauan Sosial-Politik, 179–85.
[12] “Jemaah Islamiyah,” United Nations Security Council, accessed January 26, 2026, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jemaah-islamiyah.
[13] Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Ridge Books, 2005), 55.
[14] Irfan Zakariah, “Abdullah Sungkar dan Masuknya Pemahaman Salafi di Darul Islam,” Historica Islamica: Journal of Islamic History and Civilization 1, no. 1 (2022), https://ejournal.iain-manado.ac.id/historia/article/view/514.
[15] Sentot Prasetyo, JI The Untold Story: History and Destiny of Jemaah Islamiyah, trans. Khoirul Anam (PT Elex Media Komputindo, 2025), 44–7.
[16] Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah (1996), 3–4 and 14. Also known as PUPJI for short. See also Maftuh Abegebriel, A. Yani Abeveiro and SR-Ins Team, Negara Tuhan: The Thematic Encyclopaedia (SR-Ins Publishing, 2004), 833.
[17] The term “iqomatid dien” is based on JI’s interpretation of “an aqimud dien” in Qur’an 42:13. See also Munir Muhammad Al-Ghadban, Al-Manhaj Al-Haraki Li As-Sirah An-Nabawiyyah (Maktabah Al-Manar,1990); Vikri Muhammad Rizki, Mohamad Mualim and Jaka Ghianovan, “A Comparative Analysis of Kartosuwiryo’s Thoughts on Faith, Hijrah, and Jihad through the Lens of Tafsir Al-Azhar,” Tafser: Journal of Qur’anic Studies 9, no. 1 (2024), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1f6b/bdde6595cea5d3222bdeb5f982a964772e26.pdf.
[18] Kumar Ramakrishna, Jemaah Islamiyah, ISIS and Beyond: Tracking the Evolving Challenge of Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia (2001–2025) (World Scientific, 2025), 73–7.
[19] They are the Al-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien (The Methodology to Establish the Religion), the Al-Manhaj Al-Amaliy (The Operational Methodology) and the Nidhom Asasiy (The Constitution).
[20] The UMALID resembles the Egyptian Islamic Group’s ideological treatise. See Naajeh Ibrahim, ‘Aasim ‘Abdul Maajid and ‘Esaam-ud-Deen Darbaalah, Mitsaq Al-Amal Al-Islamiy (Pustaka Al-Alaq:1984); A. Ibrahim, In Pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure, trans. Al-Arabi Ben Razzaq.
[21] See PUPJI, 3-4.
[22] Abd. Aziz Hussin and Wan Min Wan Mat, Memahami Ideologi Jemaah Islamiah (JI), dan Prinsip-Prinsip Pergerakannya (Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd, 2017), 76-80; Ibrahim, Maajid and Darbaalah, Mitsaq Al-Amal Al-Islamiy.
[23] Following the footsteps of the first three Muslim generations.
[24] See PUPJI, 13; “Pidato Amanah Amirul Mujahidin Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,” (read during the Mujahidin II Congress, August 10–12, 2003, published by Wihdah Press).
[25] See PUPJI, 18.
[26] JI cites several Quranic verses in support of the milestones, namely Qur’an 2:217, 8:72 and 75 and 9:20. See also Al-Ghadban, Al-Manhaj Al-Haraki.
[27] Said Hawwa, Jundullah Tsaqafah wa Akhlaqa (Dar ‘Ammar, 1988), 175–96; Muhammad Bin Saed Bin Salim Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ Fi Al-Islam (Dar Tayba, 1984), 42–7.
[28] This was M. Natsir’s answer to Abu Rusydan’s question on the syar’i reason for establishing NKRI. See Prasetyo, JI The Untold Story, 163–4 and 252.
[29] Ibid., 252–3.
[30] Prasetyo, “Para Wijayanto’s Explanation on the Relationship Between Islam and the State from His 42 Shar’ia Obligation to Support the Legitimacy of NKRI,” in JI The Untold Story, 27–9.
[31] Prasetyo, “The Tenth Consideration: Siyasah Syar’iyyah as Part of Mu’amalah (Social Interaction and Customs),” in JI The Untold Story, 278–9.
[32] Prasetyo, “The First Evaluation Concerning the Six Reasons Justifying the Execution of Jihad,” in JI The Untold Story, 245–7.
[33] Ibid., 256.
[34] Prasetyo, “The Final Two Points on Tanzim Asykari and Tanzim Sirri in Abu Rusydan’s Decision 642,” in JI The Untold Story, 254–7.
[35] V. Arianti and Unaesah Rahmah, “The Emergence of JI’s Political Front,” RSIS Commentary, no. 176 (2021), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/CO21176.pdf. See also Noor Huda Ismail, “How Jemaah Islamiyah Has Morphed Since Its Disbandment,” RSIS Commentary, no. 156 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/how-jemaah-islamiyah-has-morphed-since-its-disbandment/.
[36] Joas Wagemakers, “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Critique of Jihadi Practices,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 7 (2011): 523–39, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.578549. See also Abdullah bin Khaled al-Saud, “The Spiritual Teacher and His Truants: The Influence and Relevance of Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 9 (2018): 736–54, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2017.1338057.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Kritikan Dari Dalam Terhadap Ideologi Al-Qaeda (Criticism from Within of Al-Qaeda Ideology) (Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd, 2012).
[41] Zulkifli Mohamed Sultan, “Egypt’s Al-Gama’ah Al-Islamiyah: Prevailing Through Time,” RSIS Commentary, no. 82 (2012), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1744-egypts-al-gamaah-al-isla/.
[42] Ibid.
