The Impact of Middle East’s Geopolitical Tensions on Regional Militancy
Against the backdrop of Israel’s ongoing conflicts with Palestine, Iran and Lebanon, as well as the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, this study examines the status of Iranian proxies in the Middle East and the changing balance of power. Spanning three sections, its first part examines Israel’s strategy to weaken Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as its manoeuvres to influence Syria’s new ruler, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Meanwhile, the second section details the 12-day Iran-Israel war and its aftermath for the region’s turbulent geopolitics. The final section discusses the potential repercussions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial announcement of the “Greater Israel” plan, which has been emphatically condemned by Western and Arab powers, and the opportunities it may create for violent extremist groups in the region.
Introduction
The Middle East’s political landscape has once again become highly fluid due to the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict and the 12-day Iran-Israel war in which the United States (US) briefly participated.[1] As a result, the regional balance of power has shifted dramatically. The Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” has weakened considerably, while Israel and its global ally, the US, have secured strategic gains.[2] Nonetheless, the regional situation remains volatile and the prospects for another round of Israel-Iran hostility remain high.[3] The environment continues to allow violent extremist groups to remain active in the region and beyond.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had long sought to strengthen and expand Israel’s regional security and supremacy, cultivate conditions for a favourable regional order and secure his own political longevity through a prism of conflict rather than peace.[4] Since the mid-1980s, he has regarded Iran’s Shia clerical regime as a formidable threat and a major obstacle to his agenda.
The moment for him to act decisively came with Hamas’s militant Islamist attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. The group’s actions emerged against the backdrop of Israel’s 17-year blockade of the Gaza Strip, the absence of any peace negotiations for an independent Palestinian state and sagging regional and global attention on this issue. In the Hamas offensives, some 1,200 Israeli and foreign nationals, including 379 defence personnel, were killed, though Israel’s former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant recently acknowledged that some of the victims were killed by Israeli forces using the Hannibal directive.[5] Hamas militants also took 251 hostages, both soldiers and civilians.[6] Netanyahu, along with hardline ministers – especially Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Yoel Smotrich – was presented with a rare opportunity to act in legitimate “self-defence” and declare a retaliatory war on Gaza, backed by the US and other allies. The plan of action he unveiled evolved into a three-phase strategy.
Phase 1
During the first phase, Israel’s aim was to destroy Hamas and free the hostages, disable Iran’s other affiliates designated as terrorist groups – especially Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, who actively backed Hamas – and weaken the Iran-allied and Russia-backed Bashar al-Assad dictatorship in Syria.
Hamas
Netanyahu had long supported Hamas as part of a policy of keeping the Palestinian nationalist movement divided, with Hamas running Gaza and the Palestinian Authority (PA) nominally governing the West Bank since Israel’s occupation of these territories in the 1967 Israeli-Arab war. However, while his predecessor Ariel Sharon withdrew from Gaza in 2005, Netanyahu rejected Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and placed Gaza under a strict blockade.[7]
In the Gaza war, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) used overwhelming force – killing, injuring and repeatedly displacing countless Gazans, as well as reducing the Strip to rubble. It also decapitated Hamas’s leadership, assassinating two of its leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, and killing many of the group’s fighters out of an estimated 20,000-30,000. The IDF’s campaign has been labelled by some as genocidal, involving the use of starvation as a weapon of war and ethnic cleansing.[8] Yet, it fell short of completely uprooting Hamas. According to former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, by early 2025, Hamas had managed to recruit as many fighters as it had lost in the war.[9]
Meanwhile, the IDF had freed no more than a dozen hostages through its operations. Most captives were released during three short Israel-Hamas ceasefires, including one which lasted two months in early 2025. By August 2025, despite dropping 100,000 tonnes of bombs on the tiny Strip, 50 hostages, including 26 reportedly still alive, remained in Hamas’s captivity. With no appropriate endgame in place, Netanyahu authorised a military reoccupation of the entire Gaza Strip in August 2025, once again forcing a million people from the Strip into a “humanitarian zone” in southern Gaza, which former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has described as a “concentration camp”.[10] The move further outraged the global community, prompting many of Israel’s traditional supporters in the Western alliance to break ranks with Israel and the US and announce their intention to recognise the state of Palestine. Netanyahu has denounced their actions as “shameful” and as rewarding Hamas.[11]
Hezbollah
After seriously weakening Hamas, Netanyahu decided to take on Hezbollah as another Iranian proxy, involved in cross-border firing since the start of the Gaza war. Israel invaded Lebanon on October 1, 2024, to disable Hezbollah – something it had failed to achieve in 2006.[12] Hezbollah was reputed to be a formidable political and paramilitary organisation in Lebanon. However, by using unprecedented means such as remote detonation of Hezbollah’s pagers and bunker busters, the IDF substantially weakened the group. It first killed Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah and then his successor Hashem Safieddine. It also claimed to have eliminated 3,800 of its militants in nearly two months of fighting,[13] while hitting hard the group’s hideouts and assets, including ammunition depots and infrastructural facilities, especially in Beirut and southern Lebanon. In some cases, it wiped out entire villages, displacing some one million Lebanese. The Lebanese government reported 2,720 of its citizens killed and many more injured.[14]
By the time Israel agreed to a conditional ceasefire, brokered by the US and France, which came into effect in late November 2024, Israel had markedly eroded Hezbollah’s resistance capability and pushed its forces back to the Litani River – 29 kilometres north of the Israeli border. It also took over five strategic points along the border inside Lebanon to be able to pound Hezbollah targets whenever deemed necessary – something that it has done regularly since then. It pledged to pull back its forces to the pre-war borders only when the Lebanese army took over positions currently manned by Hezbollah operatives and the latter has been disarmed.[15]
Under US pressure, reformist Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, appointed to his position in early February 2025, was keen to implement the ceasefire. His cabinet endorsed a US proposal in early August 2025 for “ensuring that the possession of weapons is restricted solely to the state”,[16] with the aim of disarming Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[17] Hezbollah vowed to ignore the government’s decision.[18] Its leader Sheikh Naim Qassem warned the government against giving in to Israeli and American demands, declaring that if Israel broadens its post-ceasefire attacks into another war, its “missiles would fall on [Israel]”.[19]
Nonetheless, Hezbollah was certainly weakened as one of Tehran’s most important pillars of influence in the Middle East. However, the group remains well-manned and equipped as well as popular among the Shias, who form the largest segment of the Lebanese population. The danger of an internal conflict or Israel’s escalation of its operations in Lebanon, thus persists.
Houthis
Meanwhile, Israel forcefully confronted the Iran-affiliated Houthis, or Ansar Allah, in Yemen, for their active solidarity with Hamas. Initially, the US and the United Kingdom (UK) deployed airpower against the group for targeting ships bound for Israel through the Red Sea, disrupting international sea transits and firing drones and missiles into Israel. The latter responded only occasionally during the US-UK operations. But the Houthis proved resilient, using a variety of weapons, including Iran-supplied advanced drones and supersonic missiles during their offensives.[20]
On May 6, 2025, President Donald Trump, who had for a while authorised intensified bombing of the Houthis, announced a ceasefire with them, claiming that the group had had enough. The two sides agreed not to target each other, including US vessels in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.[21] To the dismay of Netanyahu’s leadership, the agreement, brokered by the Sultanate of Oman, did not apply to Israel. The conflict between the two continued, with the Houthis firing missiles, targeting mainly Tel Aviv and its airport, while Israel bombed various targets, including Sanaa’s airport, the Port of Al Hudaydah and more recently the presidential palace.[22] The Houthis have vowed not to stop until there is a permanent ceasefire in Gaza as a condition for a lasting and just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[23] The Houthis still retain an offensive capability, but not to the extent as to pose a serious threat to Israel and its allies.
Syria
Israel’s operations, especially against Hezbollah, changed the regional texture of another of Iran’s allies, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. The regime had survived because of support from Iran, Hezbollah and Russia against popular domestic opposition since 2011, triggered by the so-called Arab Spring. However, with Hezbollah weakening, Iran becoming increasingly concerned about homeland defence in the face of Netanyahu’s belligerency and Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war, the Assad regime faced a crisis of sustainability.
Backed by Ankara, which had laboured to see a favourable regime change in Damascus, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a blistering campaign from its controlled northwestern Syrian city of Idlib. Syrian forces rapidly disintegrated and Assad fled to Russia, enabling HTS to assume power on December 8, 2024. HTS essentially emerged as a reincarnation of the Al-Qaeda (AQ)-linked Jabhat al-Nusra (Front for the People of Levant), which changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Front for the Conquest of the Levant) to distance itself from AQ in 2016. Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Ahmed al-Jolani), had previously served as a commander in AQ and the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. Now in Western attire, he has promised inclusivity and political pluralism to generate national unity in Syria – a country that is made up of a Sunni Muslim majority and many ethno-sectarian minorities.[24]
Under his interim presidency, the HTS-dominant government has the backing of not only Türkiye but also the Arab League, especially Saudi Arabia, with a sense of satisfaction at seeing Syria return to the Arab fold away from Iran and Russia. The Saudi de facto ruler Prince Mohammad bin Salman persuaded President Trump during his June 2024 visit to the Kingdom to meet al-Sharaa, recognise his government and lift sanctions on Syria. This marked a stunning transformation of a formerly designated terrorist figure and organisation into a ruling party with a pro-Western reformist agenda.[25]
Netanyahu claimed credit for causing the fall of the Assad regime but was dismayed by an Islamist takeover of Syria. To try and change the equation, the IDF extensively bombed, during HTS’s takeover, Syria’s military assets and bases and expanded its footprint on the Syrian side of the occupied Golan Heights. Netanyahu has backed Syria’s Druze minority – an offshoot of Shia Islam – in their quest for autonomy against the Bedouin-armed groups and Damascus forces in the Syrian southern city of Sweida. The Druze form three percent of Syria’s estimated 40 million population and have sectarian ties to 150,000 counterparts in Israel.
In mid-July 2025, the Israeli air force bombed the ministry of defence and presidential palace in Damascus in support of the Druze, and Netanyahu demanded demilitarisation of Syria from Damascus to the occupied Golan Heights.[26] Türkiye and the Arab countries condemned Israeli actions. The United Nations (UN) Security Council and, more specifically, the US and its allies, called for a halt to Israeli attacks and withdrawal from Syria. Israeli actions placed the Netanyahu leadership at odds with the Trump administration and at risk of an Israel-Türkiye confrontation. Yet, nothing could divert Netanyahu from pursuing a policy of keeping Syria weak and vulnerable to Israel’s influences.
Phase 2
In the wake of these developments, Netanyahu finally found it opportune to move against the head of the “octopus”, the Iranian Islamic regime. Joe Biden’s administration had previously restrained him from igniting a regional war,[27] but with Trump in the White House, this became less of a constraint. Trump shared a common cause with Netanyahu over Iran’s disputed nuclear programme. Yet, contrary to Netanyahu’s advocacy of military action as the best means to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and cause a regime change in the country, Trump initially preferred to give diplomacy a chance.
In early March 2025, Trump sent a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calling for a new nuclear agreement within two months, but with a warning that if diplomacy failed, the use of force would be employed.[28] Khamenei initially rejected Trump’s gunboat diplomatic approach, as he deeply distrusted him. During his first presidency, Trump had condemned the Islamic regime as a destabiliser and supporter of terrorism in the region, denounced Barack Obama’s landmark multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) of July 2015 and withdrew from it in May 2018. Under the JCPOA, which Netanyahu opposed as “the worst deal of the century”, Tehran had agreed to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.7 percent for civilian use and to allow regular monitoring by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in return for the lifting of US-led sanctions.
The US pull-out rendered the JCPOA defunct to the chagrin of other signatories – Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China – which believed that the deal had worked well and that Iran had fulfilled its end of the bargain. In retaliation, Tehran installed more advanced centrifuges and accelerated uranium enrichment. By the end of 2024, it had enriched uranium up to 60 percent purity, a little below a weapons-grade level and stockpiled 400 kilogrammes of it. Netanyahu now argued that Iran was only weeks away from producing nuclear bombs and demanded the total surrender of the Iranian nuclear programme along the lines of the 2003 Libyan model.[29] This was despite confirmation by the US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, in March 2025 that Iran did not possess a military nuclear programme, though she later revised her assessment under pressure from Trump.[30]
Khamenei nonetheless pragmatically endorsed indirect nuclear talks with the US, which commenced in mid-April 2025. Five rounds of talks took place in Muscat and Rome, but were inconclusive. The main sticking point was Trump shifting his position from no nuclear weapons to zero-uranium enrichment, which Tehran regarded as a red line. While the negotiators were focused on overcoming the impasse, Netanyahu decided on military action to scuttle the process. On June 13, 2025, Israel launched air assaults on Iranian military and nuclear facilities, starting what turned out to be a 12-day-long war.[31]
Netanyahu acted with the aim of demolishing Iran’s nuclear capability altogether.[32] He also wanted to boost his sagging domestic popularity and “to stay in office forever”,[33] so as to avoid imminent trial on charges of bribery and fraud. Israel had been accustomed to swift military victories in the past. Netanyahu and his strategists expected a similar accomplishment this time. Mossad had prepositioned cells of collaborators inside Iran, whose intelligence and frontline operations proved very valuable to the Israeli air force in the opening phase of the war.
In the first 24 hours, Israel decapitated the Iranian military, including killing the Chief of Staff of Armed Forces General Mohammad Bagheri as well as many nuclear scientists, rapidly degrading Iranian defences. Israeli airpower soon gained control over Tehran’s skies, hitting many military and related targets. While suffering from a colossal intelligence failure, Tehran announced in the final count a loss of 268 military personnel and 1,000 civilians, in addition to 3,400 wounded.[34]
However, Israel could not destroy the Iranian command and control centres and its retaliatory capability. Tehran was able to hit Israel with a barrage of some 1,000 drones and 550 supersonic and hypersonic missiles during the war. Many of the projectiles were shot down by Israeli, US, British and Jordanian forces, but some successfully hit their targets. The sites struck included the Israeli ministry of defence, Mossad headquarters, the Weizmann Institute of Science, the port of Haifa, related residential areas in Tel Aviv as well as four military bases, which Israel has since closed off. Israel officially listed one military and 28 civilian deaths, and some 3,500 civilians wounded.
Although Iran sustained higher rates of casualties largely due to a lack of safe bunkers in the country,[35] this was the first war in Israel’s history in which the country was subjected to an unprecedented proportion of damage. By the second week of the confrontation, it became evident that Israel was unable to end it successfully. Israel required a supply of more arms and America’s direct engagement. Caught between his deep commitment to Israel and his election promise not to start a war, Trump authorised a limited US intervention to do what the IDF could not achieve and thus end the war.
On June 22, 2025, the US air force and navy attacked three Iranian nuclear sites – the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre – the former two with bunker buster bombs and the latter with cruise missiles. Trump claimed to have obliterated these sites, but later reports indicated that those facilities were heavily damaged, setting back Iran’s nuclear programme by months.[36] As for the 400 kilogrammes of highly enriched uranium stockpile, the Iranians reportedly had moved it to a safer place prior to the bombings. Tehran’s promised retaliation turned out to be light and well telegraphed in advance. It targeted the US base in Qatar, causing damage to a radar station but no casualties, allowing Trump to dismiss it as nothing more than a face-saving measure.[37]
Meanwhile, Trump called for an immediate ceasefire. This was at odds with what Netanyahu wanted – a continuation of the war with direct US participation. His attempt to derail the ceasefire invited a rare public rebuke from Trump. The ceasefire came into effect on June 24, 2025, enabling Trump as well as the Israeli and Iranian leaders to claim victory of a kind.
Netanyahu’s two main objectives of total elimination of Iran’s nuclear programme and regime change remained unfulfilled, while Tehran promised to proceed with its nuclear programme for civilian use. The war advantaged politically the Islamic regime. Despite being unpopular, many Iranians rallied behind it in the face of foreign aggression, as they had done in the past. Netanyahu vowed to pursue his main goals with a willingness to strike Iran again. Iran’s supreme leader stood firm in not yielding to Israeli and American threats, with a resolve to proceed with its right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.[38]
Phase 3
In this phase, Netanyahu projected a desire to give reality to his vision of a “Greater Israel” from the “River to the Sea”, as enshrined in the charter of his Likud Party. In a recent interview, he finally and publicly stated that he was on a mission to achieve this goal.[39] His vision, rooted in the Biblical Kingdom of Israel, involves at least initially incorporating into Israel the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel’s recent territorial gains in southern Lebanon and Syria. Regional Arab governments, along with those of many Western and other countries, have strongly condemned this objective, and the Trump administration has not publicly endorsed it. But Netanyahu feels no threat from any sources of opposition. He has dismissed all criticisms under the guise of anti-Semitism, rather than acknowledging Zionism as the motivating ideological factor.
Netanyahu has shown a steely resolve not only to completely crush Hamas and reoccupy the entire Gaza Strip at all costs, but also to tighten Israel’s hold on the West Bank through continued settlement expansion and security operations. The hardline settlers are provided immunity for their offensives against the Palestinians and are defended by the IDF. Furthermore, he has given no indication that the IDF will withdraw from southern Lebanon and Syria anytime soon.
Meanwhile, he has made it clear that he is not finished with the Iranian regime. The IDF is reportedly preparing for another war with Iran, for which Trump appears to have given a green light. Since the 12-day war, Trump has repeatedly expressed a willingness to bomb Iran again, if it does not meet his three main demands: the surrender of all nuclear materials, zero uranium enrichment and full inspection access.[40] This means that another round of Israel-Iran confrontation, with or without US involvement, cannot be ruled out. If it occurs, it would be at Israel’s initiative and is most likely to be more severe and regionally risky than previously, given the parties’ preparedness for it.
Conclusion
The regional situation is highly precarious and explosive. If there were an expectation that, after the Israel-Iran war, the Middle East would be less violent and more stable, that has now been dashed by Netanyahu’s ambitions. The region currently has more fault lines for further conflict and bloodshed. The prospect for the realisation of a two-state solution to resolve the long-running Israel-Palestine conflict has never been dimmer, and yet more conducive to the resurgence of non-state violent actors. Hamas is devastated, but the other Iranian-backed groups – Hezbollah and the Houthis as well as the Iraqi Shia militias in particular – are not entirely defeated. Nor is the Iranian regime’s capability to defend itself. Wider space and fertile ground have become available not only for the existing violent extremist groups such as AQ and IS to widen their activities, but for new militant, nationalist Palestinian, Arab and Islamist groups to emerge in opposition to Israel and those states that have supported it or have done nothing to prevent it from committing genocidal acts. The Middle East’s strategic contours have changed indeed, but not necessarily for the better.
About the Author
Amin Saikal is Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies at the Australian National University (ANU), and Adjunct Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Western Australia (UWA), and author of the forthcoming book How to Lose a War: The Story of America’s Intervention in Afghanistan, published by Yale University Press. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Arman Taherian on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Lana Lam et al., “Israel–Iran: How Did Latest Conflict Start and Where Could It Lead?” BBC News, June 19, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdj9vj8glg2o.
[2] Vali Nasr, “The New Balance of Power in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, June 10, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/new-balance-power-middle-east-iran.
[3] Raz Zimmt, “The Israel–Iran War: Concluded But Not Resolved,” The Institute for National Security Studies, June 25, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-iran-war/.
[4] Yonatan Touval, “Netanyahu’s Endless Endgame,” TIME, August 22, 2025, https://time.com/7311536/netanyahus-endless-endgame/.
[5] “Ex Israel Army Chief Admits Using Hannibal Directive Against Own Soldiers,” NDTV World, February 9, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/yoav-gallant-admits-to-authorising-hannibal-directive-during-october-7-attack-7663931.
[6] For details, see Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and Israel, Detailed Findings on Attacks Carried Out On and After 7 October 2023 in Israel, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, June 10, 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-3.pdf.
[7] Ilana Feldman, “Gaza as an Open-Air Prison,” Middle East Report 275 (2015), https://merip.org/2015/06/gaza-as-an-open-air-prison/.
[8] See the verdict of Israeli human rights group, B’Tselem. “Israeli Human Rights Group: Israel Is Committing Genocide in Gaza,” Al Jazeera, July 28, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/28/israeli-human-rights-group-israel-is-committing-genocide-in-gaza.
[9] Ronny Reyes, “Blinken Says Hamas Gained as Many New Fighters as It Lost Since Israel War Began Amid Ongoing Hostage, Cease-Fire Negotiations,” New York Post, January 14, 2025, https://nypost.com/2025/01/14/world-news/hamas-has-gained-as-many-new-fighters-as-it-has-lost-blinken/.
[10] Nicola Slawson, “First Thing: ‘Humanitarian City’ Would Be Concentration Camp for Palestinians, Says Former Israeli PM,” The Guardian, July 14, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/14/first-thing-humanitarian-city-concentration-camp-palestinians-former-israeli-pm-ehud-olmert.
[11] Angus Thompson, “’Shameful’: Netanyahu Attacks Australia Over Palestinian Recognition,” The Age, August 11, 2025, https://www.theage.com.au/world/middle-east/shameful-netanyahu-attacks-australia-over-palestinian-recognition-20250810-p5mlu7.html.
[12] “Israel Aims to Destroy Hezbollah,” ABC News, July 16, 2006, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-07-16/israel-aims-to-destroy-hezbollah/1802632.
[13] Emanuel Fabian, “3,800 Hezbollah Operatives Killed in Lebanon, Including 44 Since Ceasefire – IDF Estimate,” The Times of Israel, December 25, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/3800-hezbollah-operatives-killed-in-lebanon-including-44-since-ceasefire-idf-estimate/.
[14] Nawal al-Maghafi, “IDF Said Bombed Apartments Were Hezbollah Base – But Most Killed Were Civilians,” BBC News, January 24, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrn0nwn0eqo.
[15] Alexander Cornwell et al., “Israel Ties Pullback from South Lebanon to Hezbollah Disarmament, Group Repeats Refusal,” Reuters, August 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-ties-pullback-south-lebanon-hezbollah-disarmament-group-repeats-refusal-2025-08-25/.
[16] “Lebanese Cabinet Approves Objectives of US Plan to Disarm Hezbollah,” Al Jazeera, August 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/7/lebanese-cabinet-holds-more-talks-on-disarming-hezbollah-under-us-pressure.
[17] Kate Hairsine, “Lebanon Wants Army Plan to Disarm Hezbollah by End of Year,” Deutsche Welle, August 6, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/lebanon-wants-army-plan-to-disarm-hezbollah-by-end-of-year/a-73541699.
[18] “Hezbollah Rejects Lebanese Government’s Plans to Disarm the Group,” France 24, August 6, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250806-hezbollah-calls-lebanon-s-plan-to-disarm-it-a-grave-sin-vows-to-ignore-it.
[19] “Hezbollah Chief Says Missiles Will Fall on Israel If It Resumes War on Lebanon,” Reuters, August 6, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/hezbollah-chief-says-missiles-will-fall-israel-if-it-resumes-war-lebanon-2025-08-05/.
[20] Luca Nevola and Valentin d’Hauthuille, “Six Houthi Drone Warfare Strategies: How Innovation Is Shifting the Regional Balance of Power,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, August 6, 2024, https://acleddata.com/report/six-houthi-drone-warfare-strategies-how-innovation-shifting-regional-balance-power.
[21] “Trump Announces Deal to Stop Bombing Houthis, End Shipping Attacks,” ABC News, May 7, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-05-07/trump-says-us-to-stop-bombing-houthis-yemen-group-ends-attack/105261878.
[22] Paulin Kola, “Israel Hits Yemen’s Houthis After Reports Group Used Cluster Bomb,” BBC News, August 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kzy7r8pl1o.
[23] Scott Peterson, “Despite Deal with US, Yemen’s Houthis Have Lots of Fight Left,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 2025, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2025/0508/trump-yemen-houthis-ceasefire-israel-missile.
[24] Jennifer Holleis, “Syria’s Ethnic and Religious Groups Explained,” Deutsche Welle, December 18, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/syrias-ethnic-and-religious-groups-explained/a-71014065.
[25] Neil Quilliam, “The Meeting of al-Sharaa and Trump Has Shifted the Balance of Power in the Middle East,” Chatham House, May 16, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/meeting-al-sharaa-and-trump-has-shifted-balance-power-middle-east.
[26] Sebastian Usher, “Israel Demands Complete Demilitarisation of Southern Syria,” BBC News, February 25, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgenz02lp8o.
[27] Julian Borger and Patrick Wintour, “Biden Says US ‘Discussing’ Possible Israeli Plans to Attack Iran’s Oil Industry,” The Guardian, October 3, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/03/biden-says-us-discussing-possible-israeli-plans-to-attack-irans-oil-industry.
[28] “Trump Wrote to Iran’s Leader About That Country’s Nuclear Program and Expects Results Very Soon,” AP News, March 7, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-letter-khamenei-f78aeb869d146978b6d377184e236ef9.
[29] For details, see Yaseen Rashed, “From Tripoli to Tehran: Lessons from Libya in US-Iran nuclear talks,” The Atlantic Council, April 30, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/from-tripoli-to-tehran-lessons-from-libya-in-us-iran-nuclear-talks/.
[30] For details, see Amin Saikal, “Few Believe Iran Has Nuclear Weapons. We Can’t Afford to Repeat the Iraq War Lie,” The Age, June 19, 2025, https://www.theage.com.au/world/middle-east/on-the-verge-of-repeating-the-iraq-war-lie-netanyahu-has-trump-where-he-wants-him-20250618-p5m8jj.html.
[31] Ted Regencia et al., “Iran Hits Israel with Air Strikes after Nuclear Site Attacks,” Al Jazeera, June 13, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/6/13/live-explosions-reported-in-iran-amid-israel-tensions.
[32] Saikal, “Few Believe Iran Has Nuclear Weapons.”
[33] See former US President Bill Clinton’s statement in “Netanyahu Using Iran War to Stay in Power ‘Forever’: Former US President Clinton,” Arab News, June 21, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2605262/world.
[34] For details, see “Twelve Days Under Fire: A Comprehensive Report on the Iran-Israel War,” Human Rights Activists News Agency, June 28, 2025, https://www.en-hrana.org/twelve-days-under-fire-a-comprehensive-report-on-the-iran-israel-war/; “Iran’s Government Says At Least 1,060 People Were Killed in the War with Israel,” AP News, July 8, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-war-death-toll-569128effa8aafd9d9bd04efe5c0de75.
[35] See Emanuel Fabian, “The Israel-Iran War by the Numbers, after 12 Days of Fighting,” The Times of Israel, June 24, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-israel-iran-war-by-the-numbers-after-12-days-of-fighting/; Amy Spiro, “These Are the 28 Victims Killed in Iranian Missile Attacks During the 12-Day Conflict,” The Times of Israel, June 29, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/these-are-the-28-victims-killed-in-iranian-missile-attacks-during-the-12-day-conflict/.
[36] This was the assessment of the Head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse, whom Trump fired two months after the American attacks on the sites. For details, see “US General Whose Report on Iran nuclear Sites Angered Trump Fired,” Al Jazeera, August 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/23/us-general-whose-report-on-iran-nuclear-sites-damage-angered-trump-fired.
[37] Amy Lee, “US President Donald Trump Dismisses Iran Attack on US Base in Qatar As ‘Very Weak’,” The Nightly, June 24, 2025, https://thenightly.com.au/world/us-president-donald-trump-dismisses-iran-attack-as-very-weak-c-19132712.
[38] See assertions by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in “Iran’s FM Says Nuclear Enrichment Will Continue, But Open to Talks,” Al Jazeera, July 22, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/22/irans-fm-says-nuclear-enrichment-will-continue-but-open-to-talks.
[39] J.E. Rosenberg, “Netanyahu Spells Out Vision for ‘Greater Israel’,” People’s World, August 19, 2025, https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/netanyahu-spells-out-vision-for-greater-israel/.
[40] Fiona Nimoni, “Trump Says He Would ‘Absolutely’ Consider Bombing Iran Again,” BBC News, June 28, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgenq599kwo.
