The Iran War: Regime Resilience and the Threat of Violent Terrorism in the Middle East and Beyond
An emboldened Iranian regime continues to leverage its network of regional proxies and their sleeper cells amid its ongoing conflict with the United States (US) and Israel. The US–Israel joint military operation, dubbed “Epic Fury”,[1] culminated in the killing[2] of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026.[3] In the aftermath, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), long defined by its deep animosity towards the US, Israel and their allies, has signalled an uncompromising resolve to “fight to the end”. This escalation has reinvigorated the so-called Axis of Resistance and its extensive network of sleeper cells and heightened the risk of regional instability. Regardless of the war’s outcome, these regional security concerns will continue to simmer in the Middle East, with implications globally.
A Fragile Truce: Conflicting Ceasefire Plans
The Iran war is presently in a more volatile phase following a series of surprise airstrikes that targeted senior Iranian leadership beginning in late February 2026.[4] These strikes triggered an immediate Iranian counteroffensive and have contributed to widespread disruption to global energy flows, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz. In the period since, escalating military exchanges, heightened regional alert levels and concerns over proxy mobilisation have underscored the risk of a wider conflict. A temporary truce–brokered by Pakistan and framed by both Tehran[5] and Washington[6] as a strategic success–has sought to stabilise the situation and facilitate the reopening of critical maritime routes.
However, prospects for sustained de-escalation remain uncertain, as Washington and Tehran continue to advance fundamentally incompatible frameworks. The United States (US) has prioritised a framework[7] centred on constraining Iran’s nuclear programme, including by limiting its stockpile of enriched uranium, alongside efforts to curb Iran-aligned militias. It has also pushed for expanded international oversight over key maritime routes, especially the Strait of Hormuz. In contrast, Iran has advanced a phased plan[8] that emphasises immediate de-escalation measures – such as sanctions relief, a ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz–while seeking to formalise a new governance framework which would transform the Strait into a quasi-sovereign, Iranian-administered passage.[9] Tehran’s latest proposal, which has received a lukewarm response from US officials, also incorporates broader regional elements, including an end to the hostilities in Lebanon and reductions in American military presence. Nuclear negotiations, however, are strikingly deferred to a later stage.
More recently, the US facilitated a temporary extension of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. But the fragility of the broader US–Iran truce has become increasingly evident, as reports of stalled or collapsing negotiations[10] point to a deteriorating diplomatic environment.[11] This has been accompanied by indications of expanded military posturing and stricter enforcement of maritime control in the Gulf.[12] Taken together, these developments suggest that while diplomatic channels remain open, skirmishes could resume at any time.[13]
An Empowered Iranian Regime
In recent months, Iran’s leadership has attempted to consolidate its grip on power following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death. His passing has not diminished the power and influence of the clerical establishment within the theocratic system of Velayat-e Faqih[14] (the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which remains the foundational pillar of the Iranian state. This is even as a growing number of young Iranians are distancing themselves from this clerical regime, which they perceive as ideologically rigid and increasingly disconnected with their aspirations.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)–designated a terrorist group[15] by several countries,[16] including the US[17]–is now Iran’s definitive ruling body despite Mojtaba,[18] the son of Khamenei, being appointed as the new supreme leader of Iran. The group remains the primary guarantor of the regime’s longevity, ensuring its ideology persists even as the country undergoes a power shift.
While the IRGC’s dominance over and mishandling of the economy and security have fuelled public resentment and demonstrations, it has effectively exploited the US–Israel–Iran conflict. The war has brought many Iranians together,[19] which, ironically, has allowed the IRGC to rebrand itself as a national hero.
IRGC Hardliners Preserve the Ideals of the Islamic Revolution
President Donald Trump has publicly made reference[20] to a “seriously fractured Iran”, indicating divisions in the Iranian regime and its decision-making. There have also been recent reports that Masoud Pezeshkian, the president of Iran, is dissatisfied the IRGC’s strategy for handling the conflict with the US.[21] Iranian officials have stressed, however, that the country’s state bodies move within a unified framework under the leadership of Mojtaba. They continue to steadfastly deny the presence of internal divisions at a time when the country is exposed to simultaneous military and diplomatic pressures. Moreover, sources inside Iran have observed that Ahmed Vahidi,[22] the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, who was appointed on March 1, 2026, seems to be the de facto leader of Iran.[23] Vahidi is a known hardliner compared to his predecessor, Mohamed Pakpour, who was assassinated on February 28 in the same Israeli attacks that killed Khamenei. Vahidi appears opposed to the ceasefire talks with the US.
Reiterating this hardline position, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf,[24] who is the speaker of Iran’s Parliament and currently leading the negotiations with the US, stressed the importance of hardline rule in Iran to ensure complete obedience to the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. He added that all Iranians accept their role as revolutionaries.[25] This approach highlights the resilience of the Islamic revolution ideology despite changes in leadership.
Promoting the “Global Mujahid” Narrative
The IRGC has adopted a “call for jihad” narrative in the Shiite world to justify its dominance. In doing so, it has portrayed[26] Khamenei as a “global mujahid” (global warrior involved in a holy struggle), who resisted “Western imperialism” and “Zionism”. This is despite millions of secular Iranians and diaspora members, who suffered under his rigid and often repressive domestic policies, celebrating his death.
Whether or not Mojtaba[27] will form part of this narrative–and for how long–remains to be seen. Reports indicate that Khamenei’s choice of his son as successor has come under pressure[28] from the IRGC, as Mojtaba does not hold the rank of ayatollah and lacks his father’s charisma. Leaked reports have also indicated that he is currently receiving medical treatment in Qom to manage severe physical injuries after recent airstrikes.[29] There is ongoing speculation that Ayatollah Alireza Arafi,[30] a member of the interim leadership council who is known for his close ties to the IRGC, is the acting supreme leader for now. This situation indicates the vulnerability of the role of a supreme leader, which would likely become more symbolic under consolidated IRGC rule.
Regardless of the office’s future status, it could well still be exploited to promote a mujahid narrative and the idea of global jihad. For instance, a prominent IRGC supporter and influential Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi,[31] has issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the US and Israel for Khamenei’s assassination.
This narrative has arguably contributed to legitimising the IRGC on a global scale. The organisation has also signalled heightened aggression,[32] notably by raising[33] symbolic red flags[34] of revenge in Tehran over the Jamkaran Mosque, a move widely interpreted as an explicit warning and an indication of a potentially escalating threat to global security. The IRGC’s ongoing operations,[35] including launching missile and drone attacks against American military installations in Bahrain,[36] Qatar,[37] Saudi Arabia,[38] Kuwait[39] and the United Arab Emirates (UAE),[40] have fuelled geopolitical tensions in the region and beyond, further exacerbated by the US and Israel’s coordinated military campaign against Iran.
The mujahid narrative appears to have influenced how segments of the Shiite community worldwide are interpreting this conflict. On Shiite-orientated social media platforms, the late Khamenei and his regime are increasingly portrayed as the “true protectors” of Islam. At the same time, Arab nations are accused of allegedly facilitating Western military operations against Iran and Gaza. Such discourse, if left unchecked, risks deepening sectarian divisions by reinforcing an “us versus them” narrative within the Muslim world.
A Mosaic Defensive Structure
While exploiting the ongoing war to reshape Iran’s global image, the IRGC also appears to be learning from previous conflicts such as the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), where the loss of key commanders often led to temporary battlefield paralysis. To mitigate the impact of leadership losses since Ali Khamenei’s death, the IRGC has activated a mosaic defensive strategy[41]–a doctrine designed to ensure operational continuity during wartime. This approach decentralises command and control, empowering regional and field commanders to make independent battlefield decisions. It is specifically designed to counter asymmetric threats from the US and Israel, even in the event of disruptions to central leadership or communications.[42]
Under this strategy, Iran is divided into 31 distinct[43] military sectors, one for each province, allowing mid-level IRGC commanders to operate autonomously. With a standing force of over 600,000 active and reserve personnel as well as absolute control over Iran’s nuclear infrastructure through the Basij national militia, the IRGC commands a defence force in its own right. Through its Quds Force, it also coordinates proxy militias throughout the Middle East.
The IRGC and the Axis of Resistance: Challenging US Hegemony
The Houthis
The IRGC’s forward defensive strategy is anchored in Iran’s so called Axis of Resistance–a loose network of state and non-state actors, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran-backed Iraqi militias, which collectively project Iranian influence and challenge US and Israeli influence in the region. Recently, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the Houthi leader, characterised the fragile truce between Iran and the US as a strategic victory,[44] asserting that the ongoing confrontations with the US has effectively restored a sense of deterrence for Tehran. He added that Iran has demonstrated that the Axis of Resistance is now a formidable force[45] which can no longer be sidelined. He further called for the region to accept Iran as its key security guarantor, positioning the IRGC as the only credible protector of regional interests. In doing so, this narrative effectively challenges the long-standing perception of American military dominance, portraying Washington as increasingly ineffective in ensuring regional stability.
In Yemen, the IRGC’s Quds Force, which oversees Iran’s proxy militias, has significantly upgraded[46] the Houthis’ military arsenal. The latter declared its active participation[47] in the Iranian conflict by launching a series of ballistic missiles at southern Israel in late March. The group also threatened to target shipping[48] in the Bab al-Mandab Strait if the hostilities against Iran continue. This comes after Iran’s Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to the supreme leader, threatened[49] in early April to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait,[50] along with the Strait of Hormuz, if President Trump carried out his threats to attack Iran’s energy infrastructure. In response to this, and given the Houthis’ influence in the country,[51] Somalia announced a ban[52] on Israeli ships passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The closure of Bab al-Mandab, which is crucial[53] for around 12 percent of global oil shipments as well as other goods, would be yet another blow to economies relying on imports from the Middle East.
Hezbollah
Unlike the Houthis, Iran holds more pervasive control over Hezbollah–its frontrunner in the Axis of Resistance. Despite the elimination[54] of several senior leaders, including its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in the 2024 conflict with Israel, the group remains a potent and resilient actor within the pro-Iran militant alliance. The group has been adapting its tactics to survive with the assistance of IRGC advisors, who deployed 100 officers to Lebanon following the November 2024 ceasefire with Israel. The IRGC has helped the group to decentralise, allowing for small, isolated units with restricted operational awareness to bolster security against intelligence infiltration. The group now relies on manoeuvring and mobile defence instead of positioning itself on fixed lines, which reduces its losses and increases damage to attacking forces.[55] Recent attacks are indicative of this approach and are attributed[56] to Hezbollah’s Unit 910, which has mobilised its sleeper cells across Europe, Africa and the US as a deterrent against threats.
Iran-Backed Militias
In recent months, there has been a notable surge in public sentiment across neighbouring Iraq, particularly among the Shiite population. Many there increasingly view Iran’s military actions as a necessary defence of its national sovereignty. Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups[57] have adopted a retaliatory tone, declaring they would not remain neutral and would defend the current regime. The powerful militia Kataib Hezbollah[58] said it would attack US army bases after two of its fighters were killed in airstrikes in southern Iraq. The pro-Iran Shiite groups in Iraq also said they had launched dozens of drone strikes against “enemy bases in Iraq and the region including Saudi Arabia”, in retaliation for Khamenei’s assassination.
This shift is significant, as it includes Iraqis who had previously expressed strong opposition to Iranian influence over Baghdad’s domestic and foreign policy decisions. This solidarity has gained further traction as the conflict has intensified, with Iran demonstrating resilience against coordinated US–Israeli hostilities. Pro-Iranian factions in Iraq, bolstered by the endorsement of influential Shiite clerics, have established recruitment hubs[59] for volunteers seeking to join the defence of Iran. This development highlights a stark divergence from the official Iraqi state policy of neutrality, exposing the government’s limited capacity to constrain the operational autonomy of these paramilitary groups.
Simultaneously, the Iranian-backed Sayyid ul-Shuhada[60] Brigades issued a stern warning to the Al-Sabah leadership in Kuwait and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces that any facilitation of a ground offensive against Iran via Kuwait would be regarded as a fundamental breach of regional security. Similarly, any unauthorised foray by al-Sharaa’s forces into Lebanese territory would be treated as an act of aggression, the militia said. In either event, the Axis of Resistance would execute a reciprocal ground-based response, asserting that any American-led ground incursion into Iranian territory would escalate the current conflict into a total regional war, effectively dismantling existing national borders.
Implications of Activating Terrorist Sleeper Cell Networks
A New Lease of Life
Through its decentralised approach, the IRGC has reinvigorated a range of[61] sleeper cell networks in the region and beyond to counter American and Israeli attacks. Reports indicate that nine sleeper cells linked to Iran and its proxies, led by Hezbollah, in Qatar,[62] Bahrain,[63] Kuwait[64] and the UAE[65] were arrested within 27 days of the start of the ongoing conflict. Around 74 individuals of multiple nationalities were engaged in activities such as espionage, collecting funds and planning operations targeting key leaders and interests.
Most sleeper cells comprise both local citizens and individuals of diverse nationalities,[66] notably from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria and Tunisia. These cells reportedly operate within small, interconnected groups, which make them difficult to detect all at once. They also have links, whether through direct or indirect channels, with parties linked to Iran and its proxy Hezbollah; the latter often plays the role of mediator or operator in such operations. The members of these cells are engaged in a range of security work to commercial, economic and financial tasks. Hezbollah-linked groups have also reportedly played a role in transferring expertise, training personnel and managing some operations, particularly in Kuwait[67] and Bahrain,[68] on behalf of Iran. This clearly reflects the IRGC’s long-term strategy to consolidate its regional influence.
Elsewhere, the Michigan synagogue attack,[69] assessed as a Hezbollah-inspired event, in the US on March 12, 2026, also demonstrates how the IRGC has evolved to become a transnational ideological and operational force. It also underscores the growing challenge of radicalised individuals acting independently. Another gunman bearing an Iranian symbol was arrested[70] in Texas after shooting two individuals and injuring 14 others, also in March. Additionally, a newly formed Shiite terrorist group linked to Iran, known as Ashab al-Yamin (HAYI),[71] has claimed responsibility for the stabbing of two Jewish men in north London as well as a series of attacks in Europe and the United Kingdom targeted at Jewish communities and US assets.[72] This new group first surfaced on pro-Iranian social media platforms one month after the outbreak of the war. HAYI is suspected to be a new front of the IRGC in Europe, given its use of Quranic terminology,[73] which mirrors the ideological branding used by the current regime. This is evident in its symbol, which features an arm clutching a rifle, resembling that of the IRGC and its proxy Hezbollah. HAYI also seems to operate in a leaderless structure, and utilises digital platforms for recruitment. Taken together, such developments are a major concern for the US and the international community, as these sleeper cells can undertake lone-wolf attacks or more sophisticated coordinated plots against US and Israeli assets worldwide.
The Islamic State (IS) Exploiting the Conflict
The Islamic State (IS), the terrorist Sunni group that sees itself as the guardian of Islam and operates through a decentralised global network of cells, has sought to exploit the current conflict to expand its global influence. In its March 2026 publication of al-Naba,[74] the group’s main publication, IS framed the war between the US, Israel and Iran as one between infidels, viewing the bloodshed as a favourable development for its own cause.
It has celebrated the death of Khamenei and has sought to exploit the regional instability created by the war with Iran to its own advantage. Through leveraging its decentralised cell network, IS has sought to expand its influence in vulnerable areas like Syria and Afghanistan, generate funding, and intensify its digital outreach through its media platform to actively recruit and radicalise individuals far beyond its traditional operational theatres.
Southeast Asia: A Call to Vigilance and Preparedness
The IRGC has threatened to attack US and Israeli installations around the world,[75] mainly via its proxies in the Middle East and Europe.[76] These threats have implications globally, including Southeast Asia. Singapore, for example, has long-standing strong ties with both the US and Israel. The IRGC has also been actively exporting its revolutionary ideology to Thailand through religious outreach, exemplified by the 2024 visit of high-level cleric Meysam Motiee to the country.[77] Central to this effort is Al-Mustafa University,[78] a Bangkok-based[79] institution sanctioned by the US for its role in enabling the IRGC’s Quds Force to recruit students for intelligence operations and militia support, mirroring similar activities in Indonesia[80] and Malaysia.[81]
With religious diversity a defining characteristic of its social fabric, Southeast Asia must carefully navigate external geopolitical tensions–particularly emanating from the Middle East–to safeguard internal stability, while promoting moderate religious discourse through community engagement. Regional security is particularly challenged by the emotional resonance of conflicts, such as the Israel–Gaza conflict and the Israel–US war against Iran, where prolonged exposure to graphic footage on social media can amplify public sentiment and societal tensions.
Such reactions risk being exploited by terrorist groups, who may seek to reframe these conflicts as broader struggles against perceived enemies of Islam, rather than as state-based confrontations. Consequently, religious leaders and community stakeholders across all faiths play a crucial role in shaping informed, measured public discourse to help ensure emotional responses do not evolve into radicalisation or violence.
Conclusion
The US–Israel–Iran conflict remains a protracted one. The recent truce appears less a pathway to peace than a strategic pause which has allowed all sides to consolidate their respective positions. Proposals such as a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, intended to guarantee freedom of navigation, risk heightening the chances of confrontation, while the growing militarisation of this vital transit corridor further destabilises the region. Such conditions create opportunities for extremist groups to exploit, increasing the likelihood of violent spillover and global terrorism. The conflict has also exposed the fragility of several Arab states, prompting renewed calls for a cohesive, integrated Arab defence framework capable of safeguarding regional stability and responding more effectively to external threats.
Despite the neutralisation of senior Iranian officials by US and Israeli forces, the Iranian regime remains resilient, leaving the Iranian people to confront an uncertain future. It remains unclear whether they can challenge the entrenched authority of the IRGC, rally behind a moderate leadership alternative, or face the possibility of a transition from theocracy to military rule.
About the Author
Ghada Soliman is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Aref Sarkosh on Pexels
Citations
[1] “U.S. Forces Launch Operation Epic Fury,” United States Central Command, February 28, 2026,
[2] Jackie Northam, James Hider and Peter Kenyan, “Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Is Killed in Israeli Strike, Ending 36-Year Iron Rule,” NPR, March 1, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/02/28/1123499337/iran-israel-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-killed.
[3] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Iran,” X, February 28, 2026, https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/2027651077865157033.
[4] “List of Iranian Officials Killed During the 2026 Iran War,” Wikipedia, last modified March 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Iranian_officials_killed_during_the_2026_Iran_war.
[5] Malika Soni, “’Enemy Begged for Ceasefire’: Tehran Declares Victory As US-Iran Truce Takes Hold,” News18, April 8, 2026, https://www.news18.com/world/iran-declares-victory-as-us-iran-ceasefire-takes-hold-talks-set-for-islamabad-on-april-10-ws-l-10020339.html.
[6] Ryan Mancini, “Trump: Iran Deal ‘Total and Complete Victory’ for US,” The Hill, April 8, 2026, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/trump-iran-deal-total-complete-123141565.html.
[7] “Trump’s (Alleged) 15-Point Iran Peace Plan: Dissected,” Newsweek, March 26, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/trumps-alleged-15-point-iran-peace-plan-dissected/ar-AA1ZrUP6.
[8] “Iran Has Proposed a 14-Point Plan to the US to End the War Within 30 Days,” Ukrainian National News, May 4, 2026, https://unn.ua/en/news/iran-has-proposed-a-14-point-plan-to-the-us-to-end-the-war-within-30-days.
[9] “Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei Says New Management of Strait of Hormuz ‘Will Bring Calm’,” Reuters, April 30, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/irans-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-says-new-management-of-strait-of-hormuz-will-bring-calm/ar-AA225LJy.
[10] “Trumps Says He Is Likely to Reject Peace Proposal as Iran Has ‘Not Yet Paid a Big Enough Price’,” Channel News Asia, May 3, 2026, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/us-trump-likely-reject-iran-peace-proposal-big-enough-price-6096976.
[11] “After Failed Islamabad Talks, Pakistan Renews Diplomatic Push with Iran Amid Fragile Calm,” Firstpost, May 4, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/world/after-failed-islamabad-talks-pakistan-renews-diplomatic-push-with-iran-amid-fragile-calm-14007305.html.
[12] Kade Winslow, “Three US Carrier Strike Groups Now Operating in the Middle East – First Time in More Than 20 Years,” Morning Overview, May 5, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/war-and-conflicts/military-organizations/three-us-carrier-strike-groups-now-operating-in-the-middle-east-first-time-in-more-than-20-years/ar-AA22novV.
[13] Swati Sakshi Mishra, “Iran Warns of Attacks on US Forces Amid Trump’s Move to Control the Hormuz Corridor,” MEAWW, May 5, 2026, https://news.meaww.com/iran-warns-of-attacks-on-us-forces-amid-trumps-move-to-control-the-hormuz-corridor; Ali Harb, “Hormuz Tensions Push Ceasefire to the Brink as Trump Threatens Iran,” Al Jazeera, May 4, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/4/hormuz-tensions-push-ceasefire-to-the-brink-as-trump-threatens-iran.
[14] Kasra Aarabi, “What Is Velayat-e Faqih?” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, March 20, 2019, https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/what-velayat-e-faqih.
[15] “Revolutionary Guard Corps: US Labels Iran Force as Terrorists,” BBC News, April 9, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47857140.
[16] “EU Terrorist List: Council Designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terrorist Organisation,” The Council of the European Union, February 19, 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/19/eu-terrorist-list-council-designates-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-as-a-terrorist-organisation/.
[17] BBC News, “Revolutionary Guard Corps,”
[18] “Who Is Mojtaba Khamenei, Frontrunner to Be Iran’s New Supreme Leader,” CNBC TV18, March 5, 2026, https://www.cnbctv18.com/world/mojtaba-khamenei-named-iran-new-supreme-leader-says-report-ws-l-19861757.htm.
[19] “Video: Iranians Form Human Chain to Shield Power Plants After Trump Threatens Attack,” India Today, April 8, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/video-iranians-form-human-chain-to-shield-power-plants-after-trump-threatens-attack/ar-AA20ldxJ.
[20] Dan Mangan and Kevin Breuninger, “Trump Extends Ceasefire in Iran, Citing ‘Seriously Fractured’ Iranian Government,” CNBC, April 22, 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/21/trump-iran-war-ceasefire.html.
[21] “Pezeshkian Is Angry at the Madness of the IRGC and Requests an Urgent Meeting with Mojtaba Khamenei to Stop the Attacks,” Iran International, May 5, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/ar/202605045674.
[22] “Divisions Within Iran. The Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Holds the Strings of the Decision,” Al Arabiya, April 23, 2026, https://www.alarabiya.net/iran/2026/04/23/انقسامات-داخل-ايران-قائد-الحرس-الثوري-يمسك-خيوط-الحكم.
[23] Ibid.
[24] “Pezeshkian and Qalibaf: We Are All Revolutionaries in Iran, and with the Unity of the Country and People and the Full Commitment to the Leader of the Revolution, We Will Make the Criminal Aggressor Regret It,” Elnashra News, April 23, 2026, https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/1776683/قاليباف-كلنا-ثوريون-إيران-وبوحدة-الدولة-والشعب-وال.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Michael D. Carroll and Gavin Quinn, “Iranian Linked Social Media Community Calls for ‘Jihad’ in NATO Power,” The Daily Express U.S., March 4, 2026, https://www.the-express.com/news/uk-news/201002/iran-revolutionary-guard-affiliate-uk-calls-jihad-prime-minister-questioned-ban.
[27] CNBC TV18, “Who Is Mojtaba Khamenei.”
[28] Gazi Abbas Shahid, “Mojtaba Khamenei ‘Elected’ Iran Supreme Leader Under IRGC Pressure, Report Claims,” News24, March 5, 2026, https://news24online.com/world/mojtaba-khamenei-elected-iran-supreme-leader-under-irgc-pressure-report-claims-ayatollah-khamenei-iran-israel-war/764677/.
[29] Eliana Silver, “Report: Iran’s Supreme Leader in Hiding as He Awaits a Prosthetic Leg,” MSN, April 24, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/report-iran-s-supreme-leader-in-hiding-as-he-awaits-a-prosthetic-leg/ar-AA21ze7U.
[30] “Who Is Ayatollah Alireza Arafi? Iran’s ‘Seasoned Cleric’ Now Appointed to Interim Council,” Firstpost, March 2, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/world/who-is-ayatollah-alireza-arafi-irans-seasoned-cleric-now-appointed-interim-supreme-leader-after-khamenei-13985114.html.
[31] “An Iranian Cleric Calls on Muslims to ‘Revenge’ for Khamenei’s Killing,” RT Arabic, March 1, 2026, https://www.rtarabic.com/world/1762591/.
[32] “UAE to Bahrain and Beyond: How Much Damage Has Iran Caused to Rich West Asian Neighbours?” Firstpost, March 9, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/iran-us-war-uae-bahrain-qatar-kuwait-saudi-arabia-fallout-impact-damage-13987630.html.
[33] “Iran Raises ‘Flag of Revenge’ at Jamkaran Mosque After Khamenei’s Killing – What It Means,” Financial Express, March 1, 2026, https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/iran-raises-flag-of-revenge-atnbspjamkaran-mosque-after-khameneis-killing-what-it-means/4159483/.
[34] Ibid.
[35] “IRGC Admits to Missile Attacks on US Bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and UAE, Vows More Strikes,” Network Bangladesh, March 1, 2026, https://networkbangladesh.com/irgc-admits-to-missile-attacks-on-us-bases-in-bahrain-qatar-and-uae-vows-more-strikes/.
[36] “US-Iran War: What’s Happening in Bahrain? All the Hits, US Base, Tanker Struck and More,” The Indian Express, March 2, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/us-news/bahrain-iran-missile-strikes-us-fifth-fleet-targeted-manama-damage-10561215/.
[37] “Qatar Attacked by 44 Missiles, 8 Drones as Iran Retaliates to US, Israel Strikes,” India Today, March 1, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/iran-attack-qatar-44-missiles-drones-operation-epic-fury-middle-east-conflict-2876034-2026-03-01.
[38] “US Embassy in Saudi Arabia Hit by Iranian Drones,” France 24, March 3, 2026, 1 min., 22 sec., https://www.france24.com/en/video/20260303-us-embassy-in-saudi-arabia-hit-by-iranian-drones.
[39] “Kuwait Warns Iran After Attack, Activates Right to Self-Defense,” Arab Times Kuwait News, February 28, 2026, https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-warns-iran-after-attack-activates-right-to-self-defense/.
[40] Anmol Singla, “Dubai Airport, Iconic Palm Jumeirah Hit: How and Why the Emirate Is Facing Iran’s Wrath,” Firstpost, March1, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/how-dubai-facing-iran-retaliatory-strikes-gulf-conflict-explained-13984877.html.
[41] “Iran FM Says Airstrikes Will Not Weaken War Capability, Cites ‘Mosaic Defense’ Strategy,” Kurdistan 24, March 1, 2026, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/897242/iran-fm-says-airstrikes-will-not-weaken-war-capability-cites-mosaic-defense-strategy.
[42] Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi), “We’ve had two decades to study defeats of the U.S. military to our immediate east and west. We’ve incorporated lessons accordingly,” X, March 2, 2026, https://x.com/araghchi/status/2028171586365178103.
[43] Prakriti Parul, “Iran Activates Decentralized Mosaic Defense: IRGC Splits into 31 Independent Regiment for Guerrilla Hell, Provincial Commanders Get Free Rein — What Happens Next in Strait of Hormuz?” The Sunday Guardian, March 2, 2026, https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/iran-activates-decentralized-mosaic-defense-irgc-splits-into-31-independent-regiment-for-guerrilla-hell-provincial-commanders-get-free-rein-what-happens-next-in-strait-of-hormuz-173392/.
[44] Imad Fares, “Abdul Malik al-Houthi: Washington–Tehran Truce is ‘Great Victory’,” El Manshar, April 9, 2026, https://elmanshar.com/2026/04/09/عبد-الملك-الحوثي-هدنة-واشنطن-وطهران-ا/.
[45] Ibid.
[46] “Iranian IRGC Deployed in Yemen to Support Houthis,” Robert Lansing Institute, January 16, 2024, https://lansinginstitute.org/2024/01/16/iranian-irgc-deployed-in-yemen-to-support-houthis/.
[47] “Yemen’s Houthis Have Joined the Mid-East War – What Comes Next?” The Straits Times, March 29, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-join-mid-east-war-what-comes-next.
[48] “Houthis Threaten to Join Mideast War, Raising Specter of Renewed Red Sea Attacks,” The Times of Israel, March 26, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/houthis-threaten-to-join-mideast-war-raising-specter-of-renewed-red-sea-attacks/.
[49] “Following Trump’s Threats: Iran Threatens to Close Both Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz,” Al-Quds, April 5, 2026, https://www.alquds.co.uk/بعد-تهديدات-ترامب-إيران-تلوح-بإغلاق-ب/.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ashish Kumar, “Are the Houthis About to Shut the World’s Last Oil Exit? Inside the Bab al-Mandab Crisis,” The Fox Daily, April 1, 2026, https://thefoxdaily.com/world/bab-al-mandab-crisis-houthi-attacks-global-oil-supply-threat/6418/.
[52] “Somalia Closes Bab al-Mandab Strait to Israeli Shipping,” Mehr News Agency, April 23, 2026, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/243907/Somalia-closes-Bab-al-Mandab-Strait-to-Israeli-shipping.
[53] Kumar, “Are the Houthis About to Shut the World’s Last Oil Exit?”
[54] Amir Bohbot, “Inside Israel’s Operation: Step-By-Step Breakdown of How Nasrallah Was Eliminated,” The Jerusalem Post, September 28, 2024, https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-822219.
[55] “How Iran’s IRGC rebooted Lebanon’s Hezbollah to be ready for war,” Reuters, March 21, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-irgc-rebooted-lebanons-hezbollah-be-ready-war-2026-03-21/
[56] “What Is Hezbollah Unit 910 Which Is Tasked To ‘Avenge’ Nasrallah Assassination,” ETV Bharat, September 30, 2024, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!international/hezbollahs-unit-910-tasked-to-target-israeli-communities-worldwide-enn24093004366.
[57] Wessam Al Jurdi, “A Member of the Hezbollah Brigades was Killed in New Strikes in Iraq, and Missiles are Targeting Erbil Again,” Euronews, March 2, 2026, https://arabic.euronews.com/2026/03/02/a-member-of-kataib-hezbollah-was-killed-in-new-strikes-in-iraq-and-drones-targeted-erbil.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Adam Ali, “Iraqi Volunteer Centres Have Been Established to Support the Conflict in Iran, Amid Intensifying Clashes Between the Government, Local Factions, and American Forces,” The Iraqi Network for Investigative Journalism (NIRIJ), April 4, 2026, https://nirij.org/2026/04/04/مراكز-تطوع-عراقية-للقتال-في-إيران-خطوط/.
[60] “Iraq’s Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Harakat Al-Nujaba Join Iran in War Against US, Israel,” Shafaq News, February 28, 2026, https://shafaq.com/en/Security/Iraq-s-Kataib-Sayyid-Al-Shuhada-Harakat-Al-Nujaba-join-Iran-in-war-against-US-Israel.
[61] James Reinl, Natasha Anderson and Chris Melore, “Report: Iranian Sleeper Cells ‘Activated’ in US,” Daily Mail, March 14, 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-sg/news/other/report-iranian-sleeper-cells-activated-in-us/ar-AA1Xri1d.
[62] “Qatar Announces Arrest of Iran’s IRGC Sleeper Cells,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/qatar-announces-arrest-of-iranian-irgc-sleeper-cells.
[63] “The Bahraini Prosecution Has Completed Its Investigation, Confirming that the Cells Conspired with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),” Sky News Arabia, March 26, 2026, https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1860844-النيابة-البحرينية-أنهت-التحقيق-خلايا-تآمرت-الحرس-الثوري.
[64] “Kuwait has Thwarted a Terrorist Network Affiliated with Hezbollah that was Planning to Target State Leaders,” Al Arabiya, March 25, 2026, https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/gulf/2026/03/26/الكويت-الاطاحة-بشبكة-ارهابية-تتبع-حزب-الله-خططت-لاستهداف-قيادات-الدولة-.
[65] “UAE Announces Dismantling Terrorist Network Targeting National Economy,” Qatar News Agency, March 20, 2026, https://qna.org.qa/en/news/news-details?id=uae-announces-dismantling-terrorist-network-targeting-national-economy&date=20/03/2026.
[66] Ali Hussain, “Shi’ite Cells in Gulf States Are Cooperating with Iran, Leaking Data, Coordinates to IRGC,” The Jerusalem Post, March 14, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889884.
[67] Al Arabiya, “Kuwait has Thwarted a Terrorist Network.”
[68] Rasa Evrensel, “Bahrain Arrests 3 People for Forming ‘Terrorist Cell’ Linked to Hezbollah,” Anadolu Agency, March 31, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/bahrain-arrests-3-people-for-forming-terrorist-cell-linked-to-hezbollah/3885887.
[69] Aaron Glick, “Michigan Synagogue Shooter had Vehicle Full of Fireworks, Shot Himself During Attack, FBI Says,” The Jerusalem Post, March 14, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-889894.
[70] Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “Photo Shows Slain Texas Gunman with Iranian Symbol on His T-Shirt,” CBS News, March 2, 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-gunman-iranian-symbol-shirt/.
[71] Gavin Blackburn, “HAYI Group Claims Responsibility for Stabbing Two Jewish Men in North London,” Euronews, April 29, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/29/two-people-stabbed-in-north-london-area-of-golders-green-jewish-groups-say.
[72] Robert Wright et al., “The Shadowy Group Claiming Attacks Around Europe,” The Financial Times, April 4, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/adc3e954-5928-471b-b7f2-e4385bbca540.
[73] Ashab al-Yamin (HAYI) means “Companions of Truth”. This term seems to be adopted from various Quranic verses. In the Sunni description, it refers to the righteous individuals, and carries the same meaning in Shiite interpretations, albeit referring to Imam Ali’s followers.
[74] “The Struggle Between the Two Infidels,” al-Naba, no. 537 (2026), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1agGEfz3JO5vTWI9Q_aKDVaNfNtpjhNYq/view.
[75] Jon Gambrell, Sam Mednick and David Rising, “Iran Threatens to Target Tourism Sites Worldwide and Says It’s Still Building Missiles Nearly 3 Weeks Into War,” PBS News, March 20, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-threatens-to-target-tourism-sites-worldwide-and-says-its-still-building-missiles-nearly-3-weeks-into-war.
[76] Ibid.
[77] “Khamenei’s Preacher Travels to Thailand on Propaganda Mission,” Iran International, September 5, 2024, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202409044873.
[78] Florencia Montaruli, “Al-Mustafa University: Exporting the Islamic Revolution, One Scholarship at a Time,” IranWire, November 6, 2021, https://iranwire.com/en/features/70715/.
[79] “Al-Mustafa International University – Thailand,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/almustafathailand/.
[80] “Al-Mustafa Open University,” Al-Mustafa Open University, 2026, https://mouindonesia.com/.
[81] “Universiti Malaysia Pahang Al-Sultan Abdullah,” UMPSA – Universiti Malaysia Pahang Al-Sultan Abdullah, 2026, https://www.umpsa.edu.my/en.
