The Reactions of Militant Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Takeover of Syria
In December 2024, the takeover of Syria’s capital, Damascus, by a coalition of militants under the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) chief Abu Muhammad al-Julani, and the consequent termination of the Assad family’s five-decade rule following a protracted conflict, was an exceptional global development.[1] Similarly, HTS’ rise to power marked a major event for militant groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region who had been significantly inspired by the return of the Afghan Taliban to power in August 2021,[2] an event that reaffirmed their jihadist doctrine and the relevance of armed struggle in achieving strategic objectives.[3] The jihadist groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), increasingly believe that the creation of a “Syrian state” through persistence and perseverance is achievable. The militant groups from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region promptly issued statements in response to HTS’ resurgence in Syria after a 13-year-long, intense conflict – an issue examined in this article.
Introduction
Within the militant landscape of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, two categories of jihadist groups can be identified: local and global jihadist entities. The former includes the Afghan aliban the Pakistani Taliban, both of whom maintain agendas confined to their respective national contexts. The Afghan Taliban, following their return to power in August 2021, are undergoing a transformation from an insurgent group to a state actor. In contrast, the Pakistani Taliban comprise three principal factions: the TTP; Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwat-ul-Hind (TTG)[4] and Tehreek Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan (TLIP). Among global jihadist groups, the Islamic State (IS) holds particular significance through its regional affiliate, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), which operates in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, and the Islamic State Pakistan group (ISP), which is active in other parts of the country. Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s South Asian branch, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), is also composed largely of leadership and members based in Pakistan. Although it has remained operationally inactive in terms of attacks for over a decade, it continues to be a key actor in the region’s militant landscape due to its robust propaganda network. With the exception of ISK/ISP, all other groups – despite internal rivalries – maintain alliances with one another. ISK/ISP, however, consider these groups to be misguided and position themselves in direct opposition to them.
In this context, the reactions of regional branches of global jihadist networks – namely AQIS and ISK – are of particular significance, given the complex history of Julani’s relationship with them. Accordingly, the two groups responded differently to Julani’s takeover in Syria, a dynamic analysed in detail in this study. Similarly, the three major factions of the Pakistani Taliban – the TTP, TTG and TLIP – also expressed notable reactions to the HTS-led militants’ victory in Syria. The primary objective of these messages was to mobilise their supporters in Pakistan to intensify their armed struggle against state security forces by invoking the success of militants in Syria. However, this campaign also reflects internal rivalries within the Pakistani Taliban, a dimension that is likewise addressed in this analysis.
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
AQIS issued two statements in early December 2024, expressing support for HTS’ territorial gains against the Bashar al-Assad regime. These advances culminated in the militant takeover of the Syrian capital, Damascus, on December 8.
The first AQIS statement was released on December 2,[5] following a significant offensive by HTS, which broke a years-long stalemate with Assad’s forces.[6] AQIS expressed warm gratitude over the militants’ rapid seizure of significant territories and their swift advance towards Damascus. In this statement, AQIS accused Assad’s forces and their allied militias of the massacre of the Sunni population in Syria. It characterised HTS’ military gains as a liberation of Syrian Sunnis from the sectarian oppression imposed by Shia forces. Furthermore, AQIS called upon militants in Syria to maintain unity, continue their offensives against Assad’s forces to a decisive conclusion, and remain vigilant against external conspiracies that might threaten the future Islamist governance of Syria. AQIS also expressed the hope that the capture of Damascus would serve “to strengthen the armed struggle of Palestinian militants seeking the liberation of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) from the Israeli control”.[7]
A notable aspect of this statement was its distinct tone, marked by an explicit sectarian narrative – an uncommon departure from AQ’s typical rhetoric. Historically, AQ has framed its global struggle primarily in opposition to the United States (US), while avoiding overt engagement with the Sunni-Shia sectarian discourse.[8] In this instance, however, the group attributed the failures of the anti-Assad militants since 2011 to the support provided to the Assad regime by Shia foreign fighters. AQIS alleged that Shia militants from across the world had gathered in Syria to support Assad, resulting in what it described as the most brutal Shia-led genocide against Sunnis in history.
In a second statement released on December 9, 2025,[9] AQIS compared the capture of Damascus by HTS to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, characterising it as a second historic victory for Islamic militants. However, the statement emphasised that the establishment of a shariah-based governance system constituted the true objective of the jihadist movement. It reminded militants that, following their seizure of power, their primary responsibility was now the implementation of an Islamic government in Syria.
A noteworthy aspect of both AQIS statements was the complete absence of any direct acknowledgment of or praise for HTS or its leader Julani, in relation to the developments in Syria. Instead, AQIS attributed Assad’s downfall to the broader efforts of Syrian militants, without specifying particular actors. This omission is significant and was later underscored by AQIS’ subsequent five-month silence concerning Julani’s governance, during which supporters of AQIS voiced increasing criticism of his policies. This pattern of disengagement suggests a broader scepticism within AQIS towards HTS and its leadership.
The underlying causes of this scepticism likely dovetail with Julani’s formal disassociation from AQ in 2016, which engendered deep-seated mistrust between the former and the broader AQ network.[10] AQ’s indifference towards HTS stems from, among other factors, the expulsion, arrests and assassination of AQ-affiliated militants.[11] These developments collectively fuelled suspicions and strained relations between the two entities.
Criticism from supporters of AQIS against Julani emerged in the months following the capture of Damascus, when he broadened efforts[12] to establish diplomatic relations with the US, European nations and key regional powers in a bid to consolidate his authority. AQIS supporters strongly condemned Julani’s announcement regarding the formation of a democratic government in Syria as well as his efforts to engage with Western countries, framing these steps as a deviation from core Islamist objectives.[13] Notable expressions of discontent included criticism of Julani’s meeting with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in January 2025 and with French President Emmanuel Macron in April in Paris.[14]
Further criticism was directed at Julani’s attempts to rebrand himself as a moderate Islamist, which AQIS supporters viewed as an ideological betrayal. This disapproval intensified following a visit to Turkey, during which Julani’s wife appeared publicly with her face uncovered in her role as the “First Lady”, prompting accusations that Julani had transitioned from an Islamist stance to a secularist position.[15]
The abovementioned grievances and critiques of Julani began to surface on AQIS-affiliated social media platforms in early March 2025 and gradually intensified over the subsequent weeks. Despite this growing discontent, AQIS maintained official silence regarding its stance on the new Syrian government during this period. This silence was formally broken on May 22, 2025, when AQIS’ monthly Urdu-language flagship magazine, Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind (the Voice of the Battle of Hind), published a special feature on Julani’s government.[16] This piece described the capture of Damascus under Julani’s leadership as the result of a “Zionist-Crusader arrangement”.[17] This criticism was conveyed through an interview with an Arab jihadist figure, which was translated into Urdu and published on AQIS’ principal media outlet, thereby publicly articulating the group’s disapproval of Julani.
The interview contended that Julani’s takeover of Damascus did not constitute a genuine military victory by Islamists but was instead the product of covert agreements with the US, Europe and Israel. It stated:
The Mujahideen of Syria who are leading the governance in Damascus are under the influence of their compromise with the Zionist-Crusader, which enabled them to achieve this victory. And comparing the ruling leadership of Damascus to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is not only wrong but sheer deception.[18]
This publication represented a clear repudiation of AQIS’ earlier position as expressed in its congratulatory press release on December 8, 2024, which had declared the militants’ capture of Damascus a similar victory to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021.
Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)
On December 11, 2024, ISK launched a media campaign aimed at undermining HTS’ takeover of Damascus.[19] The campaign was specifically directed at ISK supporters in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, seeking to prevent them from being influenced by the rise to power of a rival group in the region of IS’ birth.
ISK’s first comprehensive response came through two episodes of the weekly Arzwana (Understanding) podcast, released by Mubarizeen Media on December 11 and December 18, 2024, both dedicated to developments in Syria.[20] In these 46-minute episodes, a prominent ISK figure, Abu Muhammad Khorasani, urged supporters not to be swayed by the ascension of Julani-led militants in Syria. According to Khorasani, the development did not constitute a jihadist victory but rather resulted from Julani’s compromise with the US. He reiterated accusations previously levelled against the Taliban following their August 2021 takeover of Kabul,[21] claiming that HTS had similarly abandoned its jihadist objectives in pursuit of power and had gained control of Damascus through a negotiated settlement with the US. Khorasani drew parallels between Qatar’s facilitation of the Taliban-US agreement and Julani’s alleged arrangement with the US through Turkey, positioning HTS as a regional militia allegedly serving the US’ interests.
To diminish the perceived historical significance of the Assad regime’s fall at the hands of HTS, ISK advanced a conspiracy theory suggesting that HTS’ rise to power was a consequence of the failure of the US and its allies to eliminate IS in Syria. This narrative was primarily intended to reassure ISK supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan that, despite HTS’ success, IS remained a viable actor in Syria, and that concern over IS’ future presence in the region was unwarranted. ISK’s propagation of such theories appears designed to insulate its support base from external developments and to maintain the image of IS as a parallel force capable of standing against all adversaries.
A core element of ISK’s response was the assertion that HTS, like the Assad regime, constituted an adversarial entity that had actively engaged in hostilities against IS since its inception in Syria. ISK reminded its audience that Julani had been a declared enemy of IS since his rebellion against IS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the subsequent establishment of a rival organisation in Syria. Julani was also accused of facilitating the deaths of both IS and AQ members on behalf of the US in the Idlib region.
ISK further argued that the policies initiated by Julani after capturing power confirmed long-standing claims by IS’ founding leadership, who had labelled him from the outset as a Western agent and a traitor acting against jihadist interests in Syria.
On January 5, 2025, the fifth issue of ISK’s Urdu-language flagship monthly magazine Nida-e-Khorasan (the Voice of Khorasan), which primarily targets audiences in Pakistan, published a written version of Khorasani’s podcast under the title “Pharaoh’s Regime Fell, But Samiri Became the Successor”.[22] However, this op-ed was presented as a standalone article without direct attribution to Khorasani.
Subsequently, on January 9, 2025, Mubarizeen Media released a second detailed article spanning 12 pages, directed against Julani’s administration in Syria.[23] Titled “The Current Situation in Syria Is the Second Part of the Afghanistan 2021 Drama”, the article reiterated claims that HTS, like the Taliban, served as an alleged US proxy. It included additional allegations to reframe Julani’s rapid diplomatic engagements following the Damascus takeover as part of a broader conspiracy rather than a political achievement. ISK asserted that Julani’s abrupt rise to power was indicative of a broader US strategy to install compliant rulers in Muslim-majority countries. According to this view, after empowering the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US concluded that empowering jihadist groups as proxies, rather than supporting democratic governments, was a more cost-effective method. Consequently, Julani was brought to power in Syria to replace Bashar al-Assad. However, ISK framed Julani as an even more entrenched Western proxy and a more significant adversary of IS than the Taliban.
Pakistani Taliban
The Pakistani Taliban expressed exceptional enthusiasm and issued formal congratulatory statements to HTS-led militants’ victories in Syria. These statements were disseminated separately by the TTP as well as by the two other key Pakistani Taliban factions – TTG and TLIP.
These declarations not only celebrated the successes of the militants in Syria but also encouraged them to remain united in their efforts to establish a Taliban-like Islamic system in Pakistan. However, the implicit purpose of these messages was to motivate domestic supporters within Pakistan, suggesting that perseverance and escalated resistance against security forces could potentially lead to a similar seizure of power in Pakistan.
In this regard, the first statement was issued by TTG on November 30 in Arabic, expressing joy over the capture of Idlib and congratulating Syrian militants.[24] The TTP released a similar message on December 6 in Urdu and Arabic languages, celebrating Syrian advances against Assad’s forces while simultaneously calling on the group’s Pakistani supporters to intensify their efforts.[25] Subsequently, on December 9, TLIP released a statement concerning the capture of Damascus by militants under Julani’s leadership.[26] On the same day, TTG and TTP also issued individual statements congratulating HTS on the seizure of Damascus and their assumption of political control.[27]
It is significant to note that TTG and TLIP are regional factions of the Pakistani Taliban active in the Khyber and North Waziristan areas of the Newly Merged Districts as well as in the Bannu Division. Typically, they refrain from issuing statements concerning foreign events, or even major internal political developments in Pakistan. For instance, despite their critical involvement in the Afghan Taliban’s insurgency, they issued no public statement following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021. Thus, their comments on Syria represent a notable departure from their usual conduct. A key factor behind this shift appears to be the internal competition among various Pakistani Taliban factions, wherein TTG and TLIP are engaged in a struggle for survival against the TTP. Since August 2021, following the end of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, dozens of groups have merged with the TTP, significantly expanding its operational scope and increasing the frequency of its attacks.[28] Militants, including key commanders from both TTG and TLIP, have also defected to the TTP.[29] One of the major limitations of TTG and TLIP, in contrast to the TTP, has been their inactivity in the media domain. Consequently, they have initiated efforts to strengthen their media presence, with these atypical statements on Syria forming part of that strategic endeavour.
On the other hand, the TTP’s initial silence regarding Syria can be attributed to its post-Doha Agreement strategy. Since the February 2020 agreement between the Afghan Taliban and the US, the TTP has sought to portray itself as a localised insurgency similar to the Afghan Taliban, seeking to communicate to the US, the international community and regional actors that their conflict is rooted in domestic grievances and not tied to external agendas.[30] Hence, the TTP usually refrains from commenting on international developments. It was likely in reaction to TTG’s unusual statement on Syria that the TTP first released an informal message on December 6. However, following HTS’ takeover of Damascus and subsequent celebratory statements by other religious factions in Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, the TTP joined TTG and TLIP in issuing a formal message. Nevertheless, after this series of declarations, the governance of HTS in Syria has since ceased to be a focal point in the media campaigns of these three Pakistani Taliban factions.
Conclusion
In summary, one of the primary objectives behind the reactions of AQIS, ISK and the three major factions of the Pakistani Taliban to Syria’s takeover by HTS was to address their local audiences, with the aim of promoting their interests in the region. Given that Julani has historically been a long-standing adversary of ISK, the group promptly launched an aggressive campaign following the success of such a major enemy in Syria, subsequent to the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. The purpose of this campaign was to present an alternative narrative to the widespread media coverage of this significant transformation in Syria, portraying Julani’s rise to power not as a military achievement but a result of an alleged compromise with the US, Israel and the international community. The intended message to supporters was that ISK alone was engaged in a genuine jihad for Islamic objectives, whereas Julani, similar to the Taliban, had deviated from Islamic goals and ascended to power in Syria as a proxy of the US.
Likewise, AQIS expressed strong support for the militants’ seizure of power in Syria, yet remained cautious about Julani. This caution was due to the distrust stemming from Julani’s 2016 separation from AQ to establish a separate group. However, after a prolonged silence of several weeks concerning Julani’s post-takeover policies, AQIS voiced its discontent, characterising Julani’s actions as a deviation from Islamist objectives. During this period, AQIS retracted its initial response in December 2024 and avoided framing Julani’s takeover as a second historic victory following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the group emphasised that comparing Julani’s government to that of the Taliban was not only inaccurate but also misleading.
In contrast, the response from the Pakistani Taliban factions was largely symbolic, with the aim of mobilising their supporters in Pakistan to intensify their fight against security forces. In this context, TTG and TLIP, in their efforts to lead the campaign, utilised it as a platform to compete with the TTP in media outreach, seeking to convey the message that they, too, were significant militant forces within Pakistan, akin to the TTP.
A key takeaway from the above analysis is that, within the militant landscape of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the primary objective of militant groups remains the pursuit of local goals, with minimal interest in developments beyond the region. This was clearly reflected in their reactions to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by militants led by Julani, where the emphasis was placed on reinforcing their narrative at the local level. This underscores the localised orientation of the jihadist landscape in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
About the Author
Abdul Sayed is an independent researcher on jihadism and the politics and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Sayed has a master’s degree in political science from Lund University, Sweden. He can be reached at X: @abdsayedd.
Thumbnail photo by Mahmoud Sulaiman on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “’New History Written’ Says HTS Leader al-Julani in Syria Victory Speech,” Al Jazeera, December 8, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/8/hts-leader-al-julani-arrives-in-syrias-capital-delivers-victory-speech.
[2] Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover,” CTC Sentinel 16, no. 5 (2023): 1-12.
[3] According to the jihadist conception, the ultimate objective of armed struggle is the establishment of Islamic supremacy across the globe. To this end, various groups engage in efforts to seize power within their respective regions and implement an Islamic system. They assert that this represents the final aim of the philosophy of armed jihad in Islam, which they claim is an obligation upon every Muslim. In this context, a notable work is Shamsheer Be Niyam (Naked Sword) by Al-Qaeda’s senior religious figure, Abu Yahya al-Libi, which advocates for armed jihad to seize power in Pakistan. For details, see Abu Yahya al-Libi, Shamsheer Be Niyam (in Urdu) (Hitten Publications, 2010).
[4] Also known as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group.
[5] Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, “Message of Congratulations on the Conquests in the Levant,” Statement: 00_125_AQS, press release, December 2, 2024.
[6] Fabrice Balanche, “Idlib May Become the Next Gaza Strip,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3288, March 5, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/idlib-may-become-next-gaza-strip.
[7] AQIS, “Message of Congratulations.”
[8] Cole Bunzel, Jihadism on Its Own Terms: Understanding a Movement (Hoover Institution, 2017), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/jihadism_on_its_own_terms_pdf.pdf.
[9] Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, ” And On That Day the Believers Will Rejoice on Allah’s Help to Victory! In Context of the Conquest of Syria,” Statement: 00_126_AQS, press release, December 9, 2024.
[10] Cole Bunzel, “From Jihadi to Islamist: Ahmad al-Sharaa and His Critics,” Jihadica, January 3, 2025, https://www.jihadica.com/from-jihadi-to-islamist/.
[11] Orwa Ajjoub, “HTS and al-Qaeda in Syria: Reconciling the Irreconcilable,” Middle East Institute, July 15, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/hts-and-al-qaeda-syria-reconciling-irreconcilable.
[12] Chantal Da Silva et al., “He Toppled a Dictator and Traded Fatigues for Suits – Syria’s New Leader Tries to Reassure the U.S.,” NBC News, December 20, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-sharaa-jolan-reassure-no-jihadi-rcna184478.
[13] Author’s monitoring of AQIS supportive channels on social media platforms from January to May 2025.
[14] Clare Richardson and Matthew Moore, “Germany’s FM Baerbock on Surprise Visit to Syria,” Deutsche Welle, March 1, 2025, video, 5 min., 37 sec., https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-fm-baerbock-on-surprise-visit-to-syria/video-71209257; “Syrian Leader al-Sharaa Arrives in Paris to Meet Macron on First European Visit,” France24, May 7, 2025, video, 3 min., https://www.france24.com/en/video/20250507-syrian-leader-al-sharaa-arrives-in-paris-to-meet-macron-on-first-european-visit.
[15] Star Gazetesi (@stargazete), “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın eşi Emine Erdoğan, Suriye Devlet Başkanı Ahmed el-Şaraa’nın eşi Latife el-Droubi’yi kabul etti [President Erdoğan’s wife Emine Erdoğan received Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s wife Latifa al-Droubi],” X, April 11, 2025, https://x.com/stargazete/status/1910733577265828106.
[16] Ustadh Abu Usama Abdul Aziz al-Hallaq, “The Future of Jihad in Syria,” Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind 18, no. 3 (2025): 96-102.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Abdul Sayed and Riccardo Valle, “How Did ISKP React to the HTS Victory in Syria?” The Diplomat, January 20, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/how-did-iskp-react-to-the-hts-victory-in-syria/.
[20] Ustad Abu Muhammad Khorasani, “The Recent Crisis in Syria (Political, Historical, and Religious Analysis), Part 1,” December 11, 2024, in Arzwanah (Understanding), by Mubarizeen Media, podcast, Pashto, 24 min.; Ustad Abu Muhammad Khorasani, “The Recent Crisis in Syria (Political, Historical, and Religious Analysis), Part 2,” December 18, 2024, in Arzwanah (Understanding), by Mubarizeen Media, podcast, Pashto, 22 min.
[21] Abdul Sayed et al., “Making Sense of the Islamic State’s War on the Afghan Taliban,” Hudson Institute, January 25, 2022, https://www.hudson.org/node/44711.
[22] “The Rule Became of Pharaoh, But the Successor Turned Out to be Samiri,” Niada-e-Khorasan 1, no. 6 (2025): 15-31. The Quran recounts the story of Samiri, a member of Prophet Moses’ community who led his followers astray. The apparent purpose of equating Abu Muhammad al-Julani to Samiri in the discourse of ISK is to draw a parallel: just as Pharaoh was a great oppressor for the people of Moses – represented here by Bashar al-Assad – his removal did not bring salvation, as Samiri (now symbolised by al-Julani) rose to power in Syria, misleading the people and leading them towards destruction. This comparison is used by ISK to portray both Bashar al-Assad and al-Julani as distinct but equally dangerous threats to their cause, framed as a warning to their followers.
[23] “The Current Situation in Syria Is the Second Part of the Drama of Afghanistan in 2021,” Mubarizeen Media, January 9, 2025.
[24] Al-Badr Waziristani (spokesperson for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Group), “Congratulations to the Mujahideen of Aleppo on the Victory,” November 30, 2024.
[25] Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, “A Message of Congratulations to the Syrian Brothers from the Pakistani Taliban,” December 7, 2024.
[26] Salahuddin Ayyubi (spokesperson for Lashkar-e-Islam Pakistan), “A Message of Congratulations to the People of Syria on the Occasion of the Great Victory,” December 9, 2024.
[27] Muhammad Khorasani, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Statement Regarding the Sacred Victory of Syria,” Umar Media, December 8, 2024.
[28] Sayed and Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover,” 1-12.
[29] Based on the author’s personal observations.
[30] Abdul Sayed and Amira Jadoon, “Understanding Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Unrelenting Posture,” Program on Extremism, George Washington University, August 16, 2022, https://extremism.gwu.edu/tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-posture.
