The Reshaped Terrorist Threat in the Middle East in 2025
The year 2025 was marked by significant violent events which have shaped security challenges the Middle East will face in 2026. Since the Gaza war following the October 2023 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and the subsequent capture and killing of Israeli civilians and military personnel, the Middle East[1] has undergone a profound and potentially irreversible transformation.[2] Israel has emerged as a dominant military force, expanding its war to neighbouring countries and fighting on several fronts to crack down on terrorism. However, despite its successes, these conflicts have fostered violent extremism, as extremist groups have exploited these conflicts to further their agendas. This situation has been exacerbated by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which has triggered global protests demanding an end to the conflict and increased humanitarian aid. Against this backdrop, this study assesses the critical events that have shaped the current terrorism landscape in the Middle East.
Regional Conflicts Have Emboldened Israel
Since Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack, Israel has emerged as a dominant military force.[3] Its retaliation to Hamas’ attack has expanded to other neighbouring countries in the region, with Israel fighting on several fronts. These range from Gaza,[4] where it is uprooting Hamas,[5] to Lebanon, where it has cracked down on Hezbollah[6] through pager explosions and assassinations of leaders. It has also intervened in Syria[7] to eliminate Hezbollah remnants and still maintains a presence there. It also engaged Iran[8] in a 12-day war, which occurred from June 13 to June 25, 2025, while continuing its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen. As a result, Iran suffered the loss of key military figures, including Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),[9] and several prominent nuclear scientists. Additionally, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure suffered damage, with some partially destroyed. While these outcomes represent a notable achievement for Israel in degrading Iran’s capabilities, they have exacerbated regional instability and increased the potential for further escalation of conflicts. Concurrently, Israel has maintained its offensive operations against the Houthis as part of its continued efforts to dismantle Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”.
Through these attacks, Israel’s military has significantly curtailed Iran’s proxies, effectively undermining Iran’s long-standing forward defence strategy. Escalation continued when, in September, Israel struck Hamas leaders in Qatar,[10] an action that sent shockwaves throughout the Gulf Arab states. These events collectively suggest a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics, with Israel asserting a more pronounced military hegemony and directly challenging established alliances.
Gaza War: A Turning Point for Hamas
Hamas has demonstrated significant resilience over the past two years, even in the face of sustained Israeli military operations. This resilience stems from its ability to adapt its tactics and leverage its extensive tunnel networks and underground infrastructure. Despite suffering substantial losses in terms of personnel, weaponry and infrastructure, it has consistently managed to regroup and continue its operations. However, with United States (US) President Donald Trump’s plan[11] to end the conflict in Gaza, which was proposed on September 23, 2025, the group was left with a stark choice: surrender or face intensified conflict at the expense of continued Palestinian suffering.[12]
Despite initial doubts about its feasibility,[13] Trump’s plan officially took effect on October 10, 2025, following Hamas’s agreement to the terms on October 3, 2025,[14] reportedly to avert direct confrontation with the US. Hamas emphasised the importance of Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as part of this agreement. However, the truce has repeatedly been undermined by allegations of violations from both sides, leading to renewed military action and an increasing death toll. While Hamas successfully facilitated the release of living hostages, efforts to retrieve the remains of deceased hostages have proven challenging, thereby complicating progress on subsequent phases of the ceasefire, which involve more complex issues like the disarmament of Hamas and the future governance of the territory.
Gazans Under Hamas’s Increased Extremism
Recent weeks have seen a significant escalation of terror within Gaza, beyond the widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis. Reports[15] indicate that Hamas has intensified its crackdown on individuals and groups suspected of collaborating with external entities, including Israel, marked by public executions of these individuals.[16] This internal repression, coupled with a statement attributed to President Trump regarding the temporary authorisation for Hamas to police the Strip, has exacerbated fear and suffering among the Gazan population, who are caught between the ongoing conflict with Israel and the internal power struggles orchestrated by Hamas. These actions appear to be a systematic effort by Hamas to enforce stricter ideological and political control, leading to increased extremism and distrust among Gazans.
Palestinian Talks in Cairo: A New Path for Gaza’s Future?
The outcome of the meeting held in Cairo on October 24, 2025, to forge a unified Palestinian vision for the next phase of the ceasefire and post-war governance among Palestinian factions,[17] remains to be seen. Representatives from both Hamas and Fatah, the latter representing the Palestinian Authority (PA), attended this meeting.[18] A significant point of agreement was the transfer of the Gaza Strip’s administration to a temporary Palestinian committee composed of independent “technocrats” from the region, rejecting international control proposals. However, it is still uncertain whether Hamas and other factions are willing to disarm and integrate under the PA. This uncertainty is compounded by the PA’s diminished standing among Palestinians,[19] attributed to its perceived ineffectiveness in addressing the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.
Without explicit approval from Hamas or legitimate Palestinian representatives, and with no mention of a future Palestinian state, the proposed plan directly challenges Hamas’s long-standing control over security in Gaza, a domain the group is unwilling to relinquish, even if it withdraws from the political scene. It is worth noting that despite Israel having weakened Hamas, the group still maintains some operational capability[20] and authority[21] within the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir[22] has indicated that Hamas’s military capabilities would not be fully eradicated, even after the planned ground invasion of Gaza City. Hamas remnants will likely continue to challenge[23] the IDF despite the latter’s advances throughout the Gaza Strip.
The Resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) in a Fragmented Syria
The Gaza conflict acted as a significant catalyst and accelerant for pre-existing vulnerabilities within the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which led to its collapse in December 2024 and the rise of a Sunni Islamist group formerly affiliated with Al-Qaeda (AQ), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, as a dominant force in Syria.[24] Although HTS has rebranded itself, it still faces critical challenges in consolidating power amid rebel group infighting, concerns around legitimacy and the country’s dire economic conditions. Despite the dissolution[25] of HTS, many members of the group continue to wield influence over key ministerial positions in governance and leadership structures. While this new phase initially offered hope for stability and a comprehensive national project, it has been overshadowed by escalating challenges, particularly the resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group.
IS has attempted to leverage the widespread anger in the Arab world over the Gaza conflict to its benefit. The group has actively called for terrorist operations within Arab nations, a strategy that is anticipated to escalate crises and security challenges.[26] The group has also re-established its presence in northern and eastern Syria, particularly in the rural areas spanning Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakah Governorates.
This expansion has been facilitated by a decrease in coordination within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),[27] the Kurdish-led armed group that controls the area. As a result, IS has been able to conduct more attacks on security checkpoints and supply lines, as it has capitalised on the political instability largely attributed to the interim government’s lack of control. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported a significant increase in IS operations in the Syrian desert in 2024,[28] which resulted in 646 fatalities from more than 227 terrorist attacks. Another 114 attacks were recorded since early 2025[29] in Deir ez-Zor alone, involving ambushes, detonations and armed assaults against SDF posts, checkpoints and vehicles. This marks a substantial escalation compared to IS’s previous resurgence in the territory in 2023. Moreover, recent reports[30] indicate that as many as 2,500 IS fighters[31] are still active in the Syrian desert,[32] primarily operating in sleeper cells.[33]
The group has explicitly encouraged and promoted lone wolves in its propaganda, given they are difficult to thwart with their small intelligence footprint. These perpetrators operate in isolation and do not rely on extensive networks or financial backing that can be tracked by law enforcement. This allows the group to project an image of continued strength and to inspire new recruits, even when its capacity for large-scale, coordinated operations is reduced. A notable example was the suicide attack[34] inside St Elias church near Damascus on June 22, 2025, which resulted in the deaths of at least 25 people and the dismantling[35] of a suspected IS cell in Idlib province, northwestern Syria, on August 7.
Concerning Trends of 2025
Foreign Fighters Remain a Threat
The number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) has become another challenge for security in “New Syria” and across the Middle East since 2024. IS has relied on the recruitment of FTFs, integrating them into its military structure. These individuals have been attracted by IS’s ideology and the vision of a so-called global Islamic caliphate, and they are crucial to its militant operations. IS continues to use advanced propaganda and social media tactics to recruit individuals worldwide. It is worth noting that the decision by Syria’s interim government under al-Sharaa to bestow military ranks upon FTFs[36] was a move that reportedly received approval from Washington. However, these fighters, especially those with Salafi-jihadist beliefs, pose an ongoing threat to Syrian security due to their potential disagreement with the more pragmatic approach of the interim government. As of 2024, the US Central Command estimated that approximately 2,500 IS fighters remain in Syria and Iraq.[37] Additionally, around 9,000 IS members are detained in over 20 facilities in northeastern and eastern Syria, guarded by the US-backed SDF. These detention centres also hold approximately 42,000 family members of IS fighters in various camps. The potential movements of these individuals, whether to their countries of origin or to other nations, present widespread security concerns.
Youth Radicalisation
Youth radicalisation has emerged as a significant and alarming global trend, with particularly acute manifestations in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, following the collapse of the Assad regime, IS managed to smuggle weapons[38] into the SDF-controlled al-Hol prison camp, where IS members, along with their families and children, are detained. These weapons were reportedly for training children within the camp, with the aim of turning them into future IS cadres. There have also been efforts by IS to smuggle children out of the camp to other areas for further radicalisation, utilising methods such as transport trucks and waterways.[39]
The possible release of these detained individuals could potentially spark a new cycle of violence. It will likely enhance the group’s recruitment efforts, especially among the young people[40] held there. These children, many of whom were born in the camp and have known no other life, are reportedly being recruited by IS to become the “cubs of the caliphate”.[41] Camp directors have consistently highlighted the critical lack of rehabilitation facilities and psychological support necessary to deradicalise these youth.[42] Over 60 percent of the al-Hol camp’s residents, or approximately 22,000 children, exhibit distrust towards outsiders and have engaged in aggressive behaviour, such as throwing stones at security forces and camp personnel. They have also attempted to damage equipment, like cameras, belonging to members of the press who used to visit the camp.[43]
Similarly, the Houthis, the Zaydi Shia group in Yemen, which rose as a political entity following the Arab Spring in 2011 and gained international prominence during their takeover of the Yemeni capital Sanaa in September 2014, have been widely documented for their extensive use of child soldiers. As of June 17, 2025, a United Nations (UN) report[44] indicated that the Houthis had recruited 182 boys and then deployed them to the frontlines, exposing them to extreme violence. Reintegration programmes which can benefit the rehabilitation of such radical youths, however, present an unprecedented challenge due to insufficient funding. There is a need for the Yemeni government to implement a comprehensive national plan for child protection, imposing severe penalties on individuals involved in child recruitment.
Concerning New Alliances
Having taken advantage of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Houthis have repositioned themselves as an anti-Western entity. This shift has allowed the group to establish itself as a collaborator with various regional and international players that oppose the US and its European allies, and thus broaden its network of smuggling and financing partners while solidifying military alliances. 2025 witnessed a series of alliances that have developed and solidified between the Houthis and other non-state actors. A notable example is the connection between the group and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[45] Both have an agreement that includes mutual non-aggression, prisoner exchanges and arms transfers.
In addition, since late 2024, there has been an increasing connection between the Houthis and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (or Al-Shabaab), the pro-AQ Salafist group in Somalia. Despite their ideological differences, both groups aim to establish themselves as cross-border entities. Reports[46] indicate that Al-Shabaab maintains connections with Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) and has sought weapons and training support from the Houthis. Both groups are keen on trading advanced systems,[47] such as surface-to-air missiles and attack drones, which are not commonly available from the Gulf of Aden’s smuggling network. Despite their sectarian differences, both groups are linked through Iran’s Axis of Resistance and connections to AQ, a collaboration aided by their shared anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments.
Concerning Use of Advanced Drones and Weaponry by Extremist Groups
2025 also witnessed a significant escalation in the use of emerging technologies, particularly drones and sophisticated weaponry, by extremist groups, including the Houthis, Hamas, IS, Hezbollah and AQAP, largely influenced by the ongoing conflict in Gaza. This trend represents a critical shift in asymmetric warfare.
Hamas[48] has been innovative in its military tactics by incorporating commercial drones in its weapons arsenal to expand its attack capabilities. The support provided by Hezbollah and Iran has been influential in facilitating military advancements, including its drone capabilities.
The Houthis[49] have demonstrated a remarkable evolution in their drone and missile programmes. Their unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Samad series and Qasef-2K, have been used for both reconnaissance and attack missions, including targeting oil facilities and international shipping. They have also deployed advanced anti-ship missiles, including variants of the Asef and other cruise missiles, which have proven effective in disrupting maritime trade routes. Since the onset of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have conducted more than 100 attacks[50] against shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden using missiles and drones. This has had a significant impact on maritime trade in the Middle East, affecting key shipping routes and ports. The Houthis’ attacks have significantly disrupted traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait,[51] with many shippers opting for longer maritime routes around the Cape of Good Hope,[52] resulting in increased freight costs. Although there was a slight recovery in 2025, traffic has not returned to normal levels, and the Red Sea remains a high-risk zone.[53]
Likewise, IS[54] has continued to innovate in its use of technology, especially the weaponisation of commercially available drones, modifying them to carry and drop small munitions and explosives due to their low-cost, high-impact capability to conduct targeted attacks. IS[55] has also been persistent in producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with increasing sophistication, often incorporating readily available electronic components.
AQAP, while perhaps not at the same technological level as some other terrorist groups, has also shown an interest in the use of drones. While their primary focus remains on IEDs, suicide attacks and small arms, reports indicate efforts to acquire and adapt UAV technology for surveillance and potentially for delivering small payloads.
Conclusion
The Middle East entered the latter half of 2025 deeply fractured yet fiercely interconnected by its overlapping crises. The Gaza conflict continues to shape the region’s political and security trajectory, fuelling militant recruitment, reshaping both interstate and militant alliances, and accelerating the distribution of advanced weaponry among non-state actors. Israel’s expanding military operations have altered the regional balance of power, but this assertiveness has also intensified resentment and radicalisation, exacerbating the instability it purportedly seeks to suppress.
There is a need for a comprehensive framework which includes clear provisions for Hamas to disarm and integrate its members into the Palestinian community under a unified and legitimate Palestinian government, a component notably absent from Trump’s 20-point plan.
At the same time, the resurgence of IS in Syria, the Houthis’ growing regional influence and the persistence of extremist networks across fragmented borders, reveal the limits of purely military responses. Without coordinated regional governance, humanitarian relief and credible political reconciliation, these extremist movements will continue to exploit vacuums of legitimacy and governance. The radicalisation of youth in detention camps and conflict zones underscores the urgency of rehabilitation and education initiatives capable of breaking the cycle of extremism.
The Middle East’s stability depends on regional and international actors moving beyond short-term military solutions to pursue inclusive governance and cooperation to address the root causes of extremism. Without such coordinated efforts, the region risks continuing its cycle of violence and instability into 2026 and beyond.
About the Author
Ghada Soliman is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She holds a PhD degree in linguistics from the National University of Singapore (NUS), focusing on the study of language in relation to Egypt’s political landscape and media in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. She has a diverse background combining extensive experience as a researcher at diplomatic entities in Singapore with prior work as a television journalist focused on Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for satellite news networks. She can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Galip Dalay and Sanam Vakil, “The Middle East That Israel Has Made, Why Washington Will Rue the Costs of Israeli Aggression,” Foreign Affairs, October 1, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/middle-east-israel-has-made.
[2] Ibid,
[3] Seth J. Frantzman, “Israel: Now the Dominant Military Power in the Middle East?” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 30, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/30/israel-now-the-dominant-military-power-in-the-middle-east/.
[4] Yossi Yehoshua, “Israel Achieves its Goals in Gaza Offensive, Now Must Decide What’s Next,” Ynet Global, July 29, 2025, https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/bknc0budgx.
[5] Ghada Soliman, “Israel’s Military Operation in Rafah: Security Implications of Palestinian Displacement,” RSIS Commentary, no. 79 (2024), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/CO24079.pdf.
[6] Ghada Soliman, “A Crippled Hezbollah Could Still Wreak Havoc on Israel, and the Region,” Middle East Institute, October 3, 2024, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/think_in/a-crippled-hezbollah-could-still-wreak-havoc-on-israel-and-the-region/.
[7] Ghada Soliman, “Sanctions Relief Buoys Syria, But Tougher Challenges Lie Ahead,” Middle East Institute, June 6, 2025, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/mei-perspectives-series-45-sanctions-relief-buoys-syria-but-tougher-challenges-lie-ahead/.
[8] Ghada Soliman, “Iran Holds a Weak Hand But Appears Resilient for Now,” Middle East Institute, July 2, 2025, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/iran-holds-a-weak-hand-but-appears-resilient-for-now/.
[9] Kelly Ng, “Hossein Salami, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Chief, Killed by Israel,” BBC News, June 13, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyg0yywr4no.
[10] Ghada Soliman, “After Strike on Qatar, What Next for Gaza Mediation Efforts?” Middle East Institute, September 19, 2025, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/think_in/after-strike-on-qatar-what-next-for-gaza-mediation-efforts/.
[11] Kylie Atwood, Kristen Holmes and Jennifer Hansler, “Trump Administration Presented Gaza Peace Plan to Arab Leaders,” MSN, September 29, 2025, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/trump-administration-presented-gaza-peace-plan-to-arab-leaders/ar-AA1NezxF.
[12] “Israel Warns Hamas to Surrender or Face ‘Annihilation’,” The Times of Israel, September 8, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/israel-warns-hamas-to-surrender-or-face-annihilation.
[13] Julie Norman, “Opinion: Trump’s 20-Point Plan for Gaza is Deeply Flawed but May be the Best Offer Hamas Can Expect,” University College London, September 30, 2025, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2025/sep/opinion-trumps-20-point-plan-gaza-deeply-flawed-may-be-best-offer-hamas-can-expect.
[14] “Hamas Delivers its Response… Israel: We Are Ready to Implement the First Phase of Trump’s Plan Regarding Gaza,” Al Nahar News, October 4, 2025.
[15] “Hamas Said to Kill Over 30 Gazans, Publicly Execute 7, As It Reasserts Its Grip on Strip,” The Times of Israel, October 14, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-said-to-kill-over-30-gazans-as-group-moves-to-reassert-its-grip-on-strip/.
[16] Ibid.
[17] “Egypt hosts Hamas, Fatah to Broker United Palestinian Response to Gaza’s Future,” The New Arab, October 24, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/egypt-brings-together-hamas-fatah-discuss-post-war-gaza.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Martin Kear, “The Palestinian Authority is Facing a Legitimacy Crisis. Can it be Reformed to Govern a Palestinian State?” The Conversation, October 1, 2025, https://theconversation.com/the-palestinian-authority-is-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis-can-it-be-reformed-to-govern-a-palestinian-state-263042.
[20] Nurit Yohanan, “Hamas Said to Recruit 30,000 Gaza Youths into its Military Wing,” The Times of Israel, April 20, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-said-to-recruit-30000-gaza-youths-into-its-military-wing/.
[21] “Haunting Video Shows Final Moments Before Hamas Executes 3 Accused Of Aiding Israel,” News 18, September 23, 2025, https://www.news18.com/world/haunting-video-shows-final-moments-before-hamas-executes-3-accused-of-aiding-israel-watch-ws-l-9591712.html.
[22] “Israeli Army Chief Calls for Long-Term Truce in Gaza Due to Inability to Defeat Hamas,” Middle East Monitor, July 23, 2025, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250723-israeli-army-chief-calls-for-long-term-truce-in-gaza-due-to-inability-to-defeat-hamas/.
[23] “IDF Combat Soldier Killed By Sniper Fire in Gaza City Fighting,” The Jerusalem Post, September 25, 2025, https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/idf-announces-name-soldier-killed-060703330.html.
[24] Ghada Soliman, “Syria on the Brink,” Middle East Institute, December 12, 2024, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/mei-perspectives-series-36-syria-on-the-brink-navigating-a-landscape-of-terror-and-division-in-the-aftermath-of-the-assad-regimes-collapse/.
[25] “Syria’s Baath Party Dissolved: What Happens Next?” Observer Diplomat, February 1, 2025, https://observerdiplomat.com/syrias-baath-party-dissolved-what-happens-next/.
[26] “ Al-Julani Between Two Walls,” al-Naba, no. 488 (2025), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ks71y6BNwd5B3xpbWyVVK0s4bQyglSis/view?usp=sharing.
[27] “A Glimmer of Peace in Syria’s North East,” International Crisis Group, March 28, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria-iraq-turkiye-united-states/glimmer-peace-syrias-north-east.
[28] “ISIS Resurgence in 2024,” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, December 29, 2024, https://www.syriahr.com/en/352568/.
[29] “114 Attacks Since Early 2025,” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 27, 2025, https://www.syriahr.com/en/366672/.
[30] “Defeat ISIS Mission in Iraq and Syria for January – June 2024,” United States Central Command, July 16, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3840981/defeat-isis-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-for-january-june-2024/.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh,” Security Council Report, February 7, 2025, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/02/counter-terrorism-briefing-on-the-secretary-generals-strategic-level-report-on-isil-daesh-8.php.
[33] Ahmad Othman, “ISIS Claims Deadly Attack on Asayish Patrol in NE Syria,” North Press Agency, June 2, 2025, https://npasyria.com/en/126323/.
[34] Abdulrahman Shaheen and Kareem Chehayeb, “Suicide Bomber Kills At Least 22 in Greek Orthodox Church in Syria During Divine Liturgy,” Associated Press, June 23, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/syria-church-attack-damascus-mass-da2ed505d6625fce1fc9de9e88c200a3.
[35] “Syria Dismantles Suspected ISIS Cell Accused of Killing Iraqis,” Rudaw, August 7, 2025, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/070820252.
[36] Timour Azhari and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “US Gives Nod to Syria to Bring Foreign Jihadist Ex-Rebels Into Army,” Reuters, June 3, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02/.
[37] “Defeat ISIS Mission in Iraq and Syria for January – June 2024,” United States Central Command.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] “ISIS Recruits Children and its Danger is Increasing in Al-Hawl Camp,” Al-Thawra, March 20, 2025, https://thawra.sy/?p=634763.
[41] Ibid.
[42] “Syria: 20,000 Children in Al-Hawl Camp Need Intellectual Rehabilitation,” Alhurra, February 10, 2025, 2 min., 58 sec., Bing Videos.
[43] Ibid.
[44] United Nations General Assembly Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict, A/79/878-S/2025/247, June 17, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247.
[45] “AQAP Reorganizing in Yemen While Maintaining ‘Opportunistic’ Ties with Houthis,” South 24, August 6, 2025, https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=4823.
[46] Ghada Soliman, “As Houthis Forge New Terror Alliance, Global Threat Grows,” Middle East Institute, April 30, 2025, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/as-houthis-forge-new-terror-alliance-global-threat-grows/.
[47] “Al-Shabaab Alliance with Houthis Continues to Grow,” Africa Defense Forum, June 24, 2025, https://adf-magazine.com/2025/06/al-shabaab-alliance-with-houthis-continues-to-grow/.
[48] David Hambling, “How Hamas Leveraged Cheap Rockets and Small Drones to Ambush Israel,” Forbes, October 12, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/10/09/how-hamas-leveraged-cheap-rockets-and-small-drones-to-ambush-israel/.
[49] Soliman, “As Houthis Forge.”
[50] Noam Raydan and Farzin Nadimi, “Houthi Shipping Attacks: Patterns and Expectations for 2025,” The Washington Institute, December 16, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-shipping-attacks-patterns-and-expectations-2025#.
[51] Shaher Al-Ahmad, “An Imminent Global Trade Crisis As America Ignites the War Against the Houthis in Bab al‑Mandab,” Al Jazeera, March 17, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2025/3/16/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%86%d8%af%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%81%d8%b7.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Justin Varghese, “Red Sea Shipping Risks Stay High As Houthis End Ceasefire,” Gulf News, October 3, 2025, https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/red-sea-shipping-risks-stay-high-as-houthis-end-ceasefire-1.500292468.
[54] “The Islamic State Is Pioneering a New Type of Drone Warfare,” VICE, February 2, 2017.
[55] Alyssa Cartee, “ISIS’ IED Supply Chain: 51 Companies, 20 Countries,” ArcGIS StoryMaps, May 4, 2021, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/080bb341d2f045a6906778965a85e5d5.
