Weaponising Discontent: Islamist Extremist Narratives Amid 2025 Global Conflicts

By Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi, By Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan, By Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi

In 2025, the Gaza war, the Iran-Israel confrontation, geopolitical developments in Syria and heightened India-Pakistan tensions, provided fertile ground for Islamist extremist groups. Both the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) attempted to weaponise grievances around these conflict areas to call for jihad and martyrdom. These themes circulated online, spilling over into Southeast Asia through imported grievances and local discontent. Practitioners must assess these narratives not only as propaganda but also as ideological grooming, requiring calibrated responses that pair security actions with credible counternarratives.

Introduction

There were several hotspots of instability in Muslim-majority regions in 2025, which resulted in mass displacement and humanitarian crises, occupations, repressive security crackdowns, regime collapses and territorial vacuums. They included the Gaza crisis, the June 2025 outbreak of war between Iran and Israel, the protracted instability in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and the renewed friction along the India-Pakistan border. Taken together, these flashpoints have triggered overlapping emotional, political and religious upheavals across the Muslim world. For many, these crises are not merely geopolitical events but existential crises which challenge notions of justice, identity and global order.

Global militant groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), which seek to gain recruits, ideological legitimacy and operational advantage, have framed these developments through the lens of global Muslim victimhood, eschatological prophecy and theological obligation.[1] Their narratives are carefully crafted to persuade and transform discontent into conviction and action. Among other tactics, these groups weaponise the imagery of suffering and a rhetoric of betrayal to cultivate rage, justify takfir (excommunication) and inspire jihad.

The weaponisation of grievances is a familiar strategy for jihadist movements.[2] However, the convergence of multiple high-profile conflicts, the rapid amplification of narratives through digital platforms and a growing number of disillusioned individuals seeking a sense of purpose, brought renewed concerns for security agencies in 2025. This article examines how Islamist extremists are capitalising on the conflicts in Gaza, Iran, Syria and Kashmir. It identifies the converging themes in their messaging and assesses the implications of this evolving landscape for the Southeast Asian region.

Global Conflicts

The War in Gaza[3]

In 2025, major global jihadist perceptions of the war in Gaza continued to vary significantly between rival groups like AQ and IS. Despite these ideological differences, both major global jihadist groups have exploited the conflict to mobilise supporters, intensify anti-Western rhetoric and incite violence.[4]

AQ Central leadership[5] and its affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab, initially celebrated the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas in Israel, praising the militants involved.[6] They framed the war as a broader “Crusader-Zionist” conflict and exploited the protracted humanitarian crisis in Gaza to fuel anger toward Western powers and call for global attacks against Israeli, Jewish and Western targets.[7]

In January 2025, AQ Central issued a statement published in response to the widespread displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. In it, the group affirmed that “targeting the head of global disbelief is the most effective way to stand against these criminal policies of the axis of evil: America, the Zionist entity, and all the infidel Western countries.”[8]

This strategy is designed to capitalise on Muslim anger by portraying AQ as a champion of the Palestinian cause. Despite historical criticisms of Hamas’s nationalism and political processes, AQ remains muted in its ideological critiques to project an image of jihadist unity and capitalise on broad sympathy for the Palestinian people. This approach demonstrates AQ’s populist and adaptive messaging, allowing it to broaden its appeal and mobilise supporters by aligning its rhetoric with a cause that resonates deeply with many Muslim audiences globally.

In contrast, IS has faced an ideological dilemma due to its sectarian rivalry with Hamas, but has still managed to exploit the conflict for its own purposes. IS maintains its historical animosity towards Hamas, which it views as an apostate group due to the latter’s political ties with Shia Iran, its nationalistic agenda and its failure to implement IS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law.[9] After the October 7 attack, IS supporters criticised Hamas while still celebrating the attacks on Israel.

IS’s rigid and uncompromising sectarianism still prevents it from offering unconditional support to Hamas. Instead, the group has adapted its propaganda to argue that attacks on its existing enemies – such as “apostate” Middle Eastern regimes – are a valid way to aid the Palestinian cause. This highlights IS’s hardline ideological framework, which forces it to adapt its messaging to fit its pre-existing global caliphate agenda, rather than fully aligning with a nationalist group like Hamas.[10]

The Iran-Israel 12-Day War[11]

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, which saw both sides exchange air and missile strikes, has significantly reshaped the Middle East’s security landscape.[12] As Sunni jihadist groups, IS and AQ viewed the Iran-Israel war as a valuable opportunity to advance their core narratives against the United States (US) and Israel as well as their regional rivals.

IS, for example, used its al-Naba editorial published in June 2025 to condemn both the Israeli and Iranian regimes, portraying them as enemies of Islam “conspiring to undermine Sunni political unity”.[13] In contrast, AQ leveraged the conflict to reiterate its long-standing anti-Zionist rhetoric.

IS’s focus on condemning both sides and constant emphasis on sectarian schisms were a strategic move to delegitimise the “near enemy” – the Arab governments it deems apostates – while AQ used the opportunity to emphasise the need to confront the “far enemy”, referring to Israel and its Western allies.

This exploitation of the conflict for propaganda purposes highlights the ideological competition between IS and AQ, which causes each group to frame the war differently to attract support. The regional instability also provides these groups with a platform to promote their agendas and recruit new followers.

The war created a situation ripe for exploitation by jihadist groups. To gain a rhetorical advantage, AQ focused on the “Crusader-Zionist” enemy, whereas to appeal to a more sectarian audience, IS criticised the perceived failures of Arab governments.

The conflict, occurring alongside the ongoing war in Gaza and regional changes like the fall of the Syrian regime, has the potential to reignite violent jihadism in the Middle East. The resulting regional instability and intensified ideological competition could lead to the emergence of a new generation of charismatic jihadist leaders who could capitalise on public anger, thereby altering the future trajectory of militant movements in the Middle East.

The Fall of Assad in Syria

Similarly, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus in late 2024 reignited jihadist aspirations in Syria, particularly among remnants of IS, which is attempting to reclaim the country both as a battleground and as a symbol of divine destiny. Central to IS’s narrative is the denunciation of Syria’s emerging leadership, particularly the country’s new leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, who is portrayed as having betrayed Islamic principles by seeking to normalise ties with Israel and courting international recognition.[14] IS paints Jolani as intoxicated by power and willing to sacrifice the Islamic faith for influence, warning that no ruler who collaborates with “Jewish neighbours” can ever claim legitimacy in Islam.[15]

Moreover, Syria holds eschatological significance in Islamic tradition as the epicentre of the prophesied end-times conflict. IS propaganda has rapidly capitalised on this[16] by drawing on the prophetic traditions which describe Syria as the place where believers will seek refuge during the appearance of the Dajjal (the antichrist), reinforcing IS‘s claim to religious authenticity and divine mission. Therefore, central to IS’s narrative is the claim that Syria’s emerging leadership should be committed to Islamic principles. In this regard, Jolani’s normalising of ties with Israel and courting of international recognition[17] render him illegitimate as leader as such actions are taken as clear evidence of apostasy and moral decay.[18]

IS’s rejection of the new Syrian government also extends to the latter’s pluralistic vision of national unity. Concepts such as minority rights and inclusive citizenship are dismissed as foreign, Western constructs which are incompatible with Islamic law. IS insists that Islam divides the world into only two categories, Muslims and non-Muslims, and condemns slogans like “Syria belongs to the Syrians” as placing national identity above religious allegiance.

In framing itself as the only uncompromising voice for Islamic governance, IS seeks to recast post-Assad Syria as fertile ground for renewed jihad, one that is theologically ordained and free from the perceived corruption of nationalistic politics.[19]

India-Pakistan Tensions[20]

In the South Asian context, jihadist groups such as IS and AQ connect geopolitical events like the long-running India-Pakistan tensions to a religious war against Muslims.[21] In this case, using the eschatological narrative of Ghazwatul Hind[22] as well as manipulating religious texts and interpretations, they attempt to radicalise and recruit followers. The narrative is framed as a struggle based on a religious prophecy rather than a political conflict.

In May 2025, India launched missile strikes on Pakistan that targeted militant groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Following these developments, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)[23] declared war on India, framing the conflict as a religious obligation for Muslims in the subcontinent. Militant offshoots like the Kashmir Resistance have further exemplified this linkage through attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir, using these incidents to amplify the Ghazwatul Hind message.

By invoking Ghazwatul Hind, jihadist groups elevate a regional political issue into a global holy war, which serves multiple strategic purposes. These include portraying the Indian authorities as oppressors of Muslims and justifying violence as a divinely sanctioned duty. The promise of reward for martyrdom or victory provides a powerful recruitment tool, reorienting potential recruits’ motives from political grievances to religious destiny. This reframing helps groups like AQ appeal to a wider audience, extending their reach beyond the subcontinent.

Ultimately, the narrative of Ghazwatul Hind connects past grievances with a promised future victory, effectively transforming a geopolitical rivalry into an ideological, existential struggle.[24] In particular, Serat ul Haq magazine, a publication by Al-Jauhar Media, the unofficial propaganda outlet for IS followers in India, notably highlights this narrative across its production.[25] The reframing not only justifies violence and radicalisation within the subcontinent, but also elevates the local struggle to a cause of global jihad which could attract support and recruits from across the world. The aforementioned poses a significant challenge to counter-extremism efforts, even in distant regions like Southeast Asia.[26]

Converging Themes

As discussed, extremists find opportunity in grievances, drawing on common themes that transform frustration into powerful instruments of influence. Discontent is weaponised into calls for mobilisation, with both IS and AQ propaganda centering on the narrative of the ummah (Muslim community) under siege. Conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and across Africa are held up as proof of a global campaign against Islam, a narrative designed to foster solidarity through shared anger and despair. By positioning themselves as the only true defenders of the faith, each group reinforces its claim to establish shariah.

The open-ended struggle in Palestine, a sacred historical place for Muslims, further strengthens Islamists’ call for action, especially after the October 7 attack and the ensuing Hamas-Israel conflict. This is reinforced through the attribution of blame to identifiable adversaries. Both IS and AQ deploy derogatory labels and selective takfir, branding leaders as taghut (tyrants), Rafidah (a pejorative label for Shia) or murtaddin (apostates), to strip them of legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. At the same time, anti-Western, anti-Semitic and anti-Christian rhetoric sustains a polarising “us versus them” worldview, ensuring that every grievance is anchored in an existential struggle.

The idea of jihad is then framed as an individual obligation – fardhu ain. This subtle but powerful shift makes participation a personal religious responsibility and portrays inaction as sinful. Through this lens, violence becomes not just permissible but obligatory, lowering barriers to engagement for potential recruits.

Alongside this, the call to hijrah – migration in pursuit of faith and combat – has long been promoted as both a duty and a praiseworthy act. Whether urging travel to Syria, Afghanistan or parts of Africa, IS and AQ present such journeys as a way to separate the true believer from those “trapped” in lands of disbelief, while simultaneously feeding manpower into their causes.

These elements then converge in the glorification of martyrdom. The persistence of these converging themes is evident in their repeated use across IS and AQ’s central propaganda, as highlighted in the table below.

Table 1: Frequency of Key Themes in IS and AQ’s Central Propaganda

October 2024 – October 2025.[27]

Implications for Southeast Asia

IS and AQ’s central propaganda serves as a form of ideological grooming. They are widely circulated within online spaces. These narratives proliferate across multiple media platforms, where they are adopted and mobilised by staunch supporters, amplifying their reach and influence and making them decentralised.[30] When consumed repeatedly, they can lead disillusioned individuals to localise their own grievances, coating them with the veneer of extremist ideology. This dynamic makes the risk of radicalisation particularly high, even in relatively stable societies.

Recent cases across the region illustrate how global narratives are adapted to local contexts. In 2024, the Malaysian authorities arrested eight individuals accused of plotting attacks against the King and government officials, driven by the belief that national leaders were taghut and that a caliphate must be established.^[31] That same year, the Indonesian police foiled plots ahead of Pope Francis’ visit, arresting suspects who had incited violence online and amplified religious animosity rooted in extremist rhetoric.^[32] In Singapore, since the Hamas attacks on Israel, six self-radicalised individuals have been arrested for planning to participate in armed violence related to the Israel-Palestine conflict.^[33]

In September 2025, a 14-year-old Singaporean was detained after exposure to pro-caliphate and anti-Semitic content online, underscoring the growing risks of youth radicalisation.[34] A similar 2021 case involved a 20 year old who had planned a synagogue attack, shaped by “ummah under siege” and martyrdom narratives. Despite no direct IS or AQ links, his worldview reflected recurring extremist narratives commonly promoted by global Islamist militants.[35] These cases highlight an increasing concern involving youths aged 20 or younger as a result of online self-radicalisation.^[36]

At the same time, Southeast Asian countries face the added challenge of imported grievances. Migrant communities sometimes carry with them the political and sectarian conflicts of their homelands, making them susceptible to online propaganda that resonates with pre-existing frustrations. Arrests of foreign nationals across the region for supporting extremist entities highlight how external geopolitical struggles can be transplanted into local contexts,^[37] complicating national security efforts.

These cases underscore the continuing importance of social media as a critical mode of extremist influence, particularly for susceptible individuals pursuing radical motivation. For practitioners, these trends signal the need to track not only the frequency of recurring extremist themes, but also how they resonate with local and imported grievances.

Policy Recommendations

A first priority must be to hold online platforms accountable. Digital monitoring cannot remain superficial; rather, it must be sharp enough to detect extremist content. As extremist messaging adapts fluidly to global events, practitioners – including content moderation technology employed by tech companies – must pay close attention to the cultural and linguistic nuances shaping these narratives, as well as to the techniques used to amplify them through slogans, hashtags, symbols and emojis. Alongside this, stronger cross-border cooperation in technology and intelligence sharing will be essential to staying ahead of these evolving tactics.

Equally vital is building resilience within communities and family institutions. Religious and community leaders must continue to play a significant role in facilitating secure environments for dialogue and inquiry. In addition, parents must foster pro-social mechanisms which prevent youth isolation and reduce exposure to harmful online content. Moreover, in matters of religious discourse, each family unit should have a credible point of reference, such as local clerics or trained counsellors, to mitigate the sway of extreme ideologies and anchor each individual in sound understanding.

Looking ahead, resilience should be understood not only as a defensive measure but also as a proactive means of shaping alternative visions of belonging and purpose. This can be done by offering credible counternarratives that dismantle the “ummah under siege” rhetoric and replace it with messages of empowerment and shared responsibility. Without such interventions, Southeast Asia will remain a key theatre of concern where global discontent continues to find dangerous local expression.

About the Authors

Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi is a Research Fellow, Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan is an Associate Research Fellow and Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi is a Senior Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected], respectively.

Citations

[1] Both IS and AQ have seized upon the various conflicts by framing them as part of a grand conspiracy against Islam and Muslims perpetrated by Western powers, Zionists, Shia heretics and apostate Muslim regimes. They have also attempted to glorify violence as a form of worship and a religious obligation by heightening urgency through apocalyptic and end-times narratives. The dual strategy allows these global militant groups to respond to current events and prepare their followers for future conflicts.

[2] Nelly Lahoud, “The Strengths and Weaknesses of Jihadist Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 10 (2010), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-strengths-and-weaknesses-of-jihadist-ideology/.

[3] For more information, see “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Center for Preventive Action, July 27, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict.

[4] Jerome Drevon, “Syrian Jihadis’ Reaction to the Gaza Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics 30 (2024): 416-426; Lucas Webber and Colin P. Clarke, “How the Islamic State Propaganda Machine Is Exploiting the Israel-Hamas Conflict,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, November 21, 2023, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/how-the-islamic-state-propaganda-machine-is-exploiting-the-israel-hamas-conflict/; Mina al-Lami, “Analysis: How Jihadists Are Seeking to Exploit Israel-Gaza War,” BBC Monitoring, October 17, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c204ogcm.

[5] “Statement in Memory of the Brave Leader Yahya Sinwar – May God Have Mercy on Him,” Qaidah Al-Jihad – Al-Qiyadah Al-‘Ammah Ammah (The General Leadership of Al-Qaeda), Rabi’ al-Thani 1446/October 2024.

[6] Caleb Weiss, “Shabaab Celebrates Hamas-led Invasion of Israel, Calls People to Jihad,” FDD’s Long War Journal, October 11, 2023, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/10/shabaab-celebrates-hamas-led-invasion-of-israel-calls-people-to-jihad.php.

[7] Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Gaza War Has Jump-Started a Weakened Al-Qaeda,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 4, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-war-has-jump-started-weakened-al-qaeda.

[8] “Statement Regarding the Plan to Displace Our Dear People from Gaza,” Qaidah Al-Jihad – Al-Qiyadah Al-‘Ammah (The General Leadership of Al-Qaeda), Sya’ban 1446/January 2025.

[9] Diwan al-‘Ilam al-Markazi, “An Evil Path and An Evil Fate,” al-Naba, no. 462 (Rabi’ al-Awwal 1446/September 2024); Ilana Winter, “Islamic State’s Response to October 7,” Fikra Forum, February 9, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-states-response-october-7.

[10] Colin Rubenstein and Michael Shannon, “The Gaza War As Seen From Southeast Asia,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, January 2024, https://www.jstribune.com/rubenstein-shannon-the-gaza-war-as-seen-from-southeast-asia/; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “War with Israel: Comparing IS and Al-Qaeda,” Middle East Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2025).

[11] For more information, see Ephrat Livni, Cassandra Vinograd and Eve Sampson, “Timeline: A Recent History of the Israel-Iran Conflict,” The New York Times, June 24, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/12/world/middleeast/israel-iran-conflict-history.html.

[12] Michael Froman, “Israel’s Strikes on Iran Could Change the Middle East,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 13, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/israel–iran-strikes-change-middle-east.

[13] Diwan al-‘Ilam al-Markazi, “The State of Persia and the State of the Jews,“ al-Naba, no. 500 (Dhul-Hijjah 1446/June 2025); Giuliano Bifolchi, “Islamic State Narratives on the Israel-Iran Conflict in Issue No. 500 of Al-Naba,” Special Eurasia, June 22, 2025, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/06/22/isis-israel-iran-al-naba/.

[14] “Syria Leader Jolani Privately Promised to Normalise Ties with Israel by 2026, Ex-UK Diplomat Says,” Middle East Monitor, April 16, 2025, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250416-syria-leader-jolani-privately-promised-to-normalise-ties-with-israel-by-2026-ex-uk-diplomat-says/.

[15] Diwan al-‘Ilam al-Markazi, “On Trump’s Doorstep,” al-Naba, no. 495 (Dhul-Qa’dah 1446/May 2025); Giuliano Bifolchi, “Al-Naba 495: Islamic State’s Propaganda Against al-Sharaa and the Syrian-Israeli Normalisation Tracks,” Special Eurasia, May 18, 2025, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/05/18/al-naba-495-al-sharaa-jihad/.

[16] Mohamed Bin Ali, “‘Jihad’ in Syria: Fallacies of ISIS’ End-Time Prophecies,” RSIS Commentary, no. 149 (2014), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/jihad-in-syria-fallacies-of-isis-end-time-prophecies/.

[17] Middle East Monitor, “Syria Leader Jolani.”

[18] Diwan al-‘Ilam al-Markazi, “On Trump’s Doorstep.”

[19] Diwan al-‘Ilam al-Markazi, “Al-Jolani Between Two Walls!” al-Naba, no. 488 (Ramadan 1446/March 2025).

[20] For more information, see “Conflict Between India and Pakistan,” Center for Preventive Action, May 12, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan.

[21] Abdul Sayed, “Jihadist Narratives in the Aftermath of India’s Airstrikes on Pakistan,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 23, no. 3, (2025), https://jamestown.org/program/jihadist-narratives-in-the-aftermath-of-indias-airstrikes-on-pakistan/.

[22] The Ghazwatul Hind is a narrative employed by jihadist circles to denote a prophesied military expedition to India, as referenced in the Prophetic Traditions. While the narration is deemed weak, some Muslims anticipate its occurrence, akin to other prophecies of the Prophet. See Ahmad an-Nasa’i, “Kitab al-Jihad, 41 – Ghazwa al-Hind, no. 3175 – 3177,” in Sunan an-Nasa’i, eds. Zubair ‘Ali Za’i and Huda Khattab (Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 2007), 67-68.

[23] Soumya Awasthi, “Operation Sindoor and AQIS: What India’s Airstrikes Triggered in the Jihadist World,” Observer Research Foundation, May 9, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/operation-sindoor-and-aqis-what-india-s-airstrikes-triggered-in-the-jihadist-world; Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, “Indian Aggression on the Land of Pakistan,” As-Sahab Media, Dhul-Qa’dah 9, 1446/May 7, 2025.

[24] Iftekharul Bashar, “The Kashmir Attack Reignites Tensions in South Asia,” RSIS Commentary, no. 93 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CO25093.pdf.

[25] ICPVTR internal monitoring.

[26] Sunda Ramachandran, “‘Operation Sindoor’: Will India’s Military Strikes in Pakistan Curb Cross-Border Terrorism?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 4 (2025): 8-15.

[27] Data obtained from both IS Central and AQ Central’s communiqué, drawing from keywords and analyses of materials.

[28] A total of 54 editorial articles from IS’s al-Naba newsletter, issues 463 to 516.

[29] A total of 39 statements from Al-Qaeda Central Command (4), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (25) and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (10).

[30] Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi and Benjamin Mok, “Digital Vacuum: The Evolution of IS Central’s Media Outreach in Southeast Asia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 15, no. 4 (2023), https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/digital-vacuum-the-evolution-of-is-centrals-media-outreach-in-southeast-asia/.

[31] Austin Camoens, “Eight Arrested Over IS-Linked Threats Against King, PM,” New Straits Times, June 24, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2024/06/1067761/updated-eight-arrested-over-linked-threats-against-king-pm.

[32] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Indonesian Police Detain Seven in a Failed Plot to Attack Pope Francis,” The Straits Times, September 6, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-police-detain-seven-in-a-failed-plot-to-attack-pope-francis.

[33] Internal Security Department, Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2025 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2025), https://www.isd.gov.sg/news-and-resources/singapore-terrorism-threat-assessment-report-2025/.

[34] “Issuance of Restriction Orders Under the Internal Security Act (ISA) Against Two Singaporeans,” Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, September 9, 2025, https://www.mha.gov.sg/isd/stay-in-the-know/media-detail/issuance-of-restriction-orders-under-the-internal-security-act-(isa)-against-two-singaporeans/; Kumar Ramakrishna, “The ‘Salad Bar’ of Extremist Ideologies in Youth Radicalisation: A New Threat?” RSIS Commentary, no. 191 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-salad-bar-of-extremist-ideologies-in-youth-radicalisation-a-new-threat/.

[35] “Update on Cases Under the Internal Security Act – 10 March,” Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, March 10, 2021, https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/press-releases/update-on-cases-under-the-internal-security-act—10-march/.

[36] Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan and Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi, “Youth Radicalisation in Singapore: Factors and Solutions,” in Violent Extremism: What was Learnt, Where we Are, and What’s Next? eds. Ong Keng Yong and Damien D. Chong (World Scientific, 2025), 39-44.

[37] Jasminder Singh, “The Arrest of Suspected Bangladeshi Terrorists in Malaysia: Implications for Regional and Global Security,” The Diplomat, July 18, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/the-arrest-of-suspected-bangladeshi-terrorists-in-malaysia-implications-for-regional-and-global-security/; Mike Yeo, “Authorities Investigating Bangladeshi Preacher for Giving Illegal Sermon at Tuas Dormitory,” The Straits Times, August 21, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/authorities-investigating-bangladeshi-preacher-for-giving-illegal-sermon-at-tuas-dormitory.