Will Jemaah Islamiyah’s Ideological Shift Lead to Wasatiyah (Moderation)?
The dissolution of Indonesia’s most dreaded terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) since June 2024, marks a significant milestone in counter terrorism research. This article delves into the implications of JI’s dissolution and the significance of its ideological shift from being violent jihadists to non-violent Islamists. While recognising the significance of JI’s ideological shift, its actual transformation into a wasatiyah (moderation) and mainstream actor will depend on its behaviour within the socio-political scene in Indonesia in the coming years.
Introduction
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—founded in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir—splintered from Darul Islam Indonesia (DI), which sought to establish an Islamic state post-independence. Listed as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, JI maintained links with Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant networks. It became Southeast Asia’s most dangerous terrorist group and was responsible for mass-casualty attacks, such as the 2002 Bali bombings.[1] The sudden announcement of JI’s disbandment and ideological revision in June 2024[2] therefore raises a crucial question: What lies ahead? Given its past lethality, operational sophistication and resilience against decades of counter terrorism measures, the announcement was met with cautious optimism.
Ostensibly, there are concrete signs that JI is abandoning its violent jihadist practices. The group’s disbandment declaration by its former emir Para Wijayanto included a formal apology from the leadership for past misdeeds, such as acts of terrorism and the propagation of a radical ideology that harmed both the Indonesian state and Islam’s broader interests. The apology was directed towards the government, the public and the victims of JI-associated attacks.[3] JI also outlined a series of corrective actions, which included revising its ideological framework, reviewing the curricula and education materials of its pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), surrendering its remaining weapons and urging wanted members to surrender. To underscore their pedagogical reformation, the leadership also announced the formation of a committee tasked with reforming its education curricula and materials.[4]
All indications point towards sincere cooperation with the authorities, who have not detected any major splinter groups stemming from this disbandment. Crucially, there have been no major attacks. The Indonesian authorities have received these developments positively.[5] The Indonesian authorities took two decades of intensive counter terrorism efforts to reach this crucial point. However, security practitioners remain cautiously optimistic, given the nascency of JI’s ideological shift from violent jihadism to non-violent Islamism.
From an ideological perspective, JI’s recognition of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, or the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) as a legitimate polity, its pledge to uphold the state constitution and its commitment to revising its ideology away from extremism, represent a seismic shift. JI’s original guiding document, PUPJI (Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah, or the General Guide for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah), outlined a radical vision of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia and designated NKRI as a taghut (worship of another besides God) entity, which must be brought down by militant jihad. That premise no longer holds. The leadership now affirms NKRI as a theologically legitimate polity for Muslims, given its historical and socio-political context. The new JI ideology argues that many elements of NKRI already align with the shariah principles, even if these are not explicitly labelled. There is an admission that JI’s violent acts irreparably tarnished its association with extremism and terrorism, rendering it a liability not only to its members, but also to the wider Indonesian Muslim community. The continuation of JI is therefore seen as constituting major darar (harm), which the shariah obliges Muslims to eliminate—grounded in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) maxims that require harm to be eliminated and prohibit causing harm to both oneself and others.[6]
Post-Disbandment Evolution
Established jihadist organisations like JI do not dissolve instantly. Rather, their structure and membership adapt to internal dynamics and external pressures. Thus, it is unlikely that JI will vanish or even fade away in the coming few years. JI’s deep roots in Indonesia can be traced to the anti-colonialist DI in the 1940s, before it broke away in the 1990s due to theological differences to become an independent organisation under the leadership of Ba’asyir and Sungkar.[7]
JI was also founded on multiple bonds of kinship, discipleship, friendship and membership, forged over the span of 30 years.[8] Although the bai’ah (oath of allegiance) to JI leadership may be nullified following disbandment,[9] this deep sense of bonding will continue to bind JI members together. This is evidenced by the post-disbandment meetings between leaders and members, held throughout Indonesia, to explain and socialise the theological shift and to pre-empt any negative reaction.[10]
Nevertheless, JI’s shift could reveal fluidity in allegiances since JI members are free to join any organisation that aligns with their values. There are three possible scenarios: 1) an exodus of disillusioned JI members could form new splinter groups to continue pursuing the old vision; 2) dissenting members could join existing hardline entities; and 3) the emergence of a brand new platform that provides the basis for a new JI.
The multiple and deep-rooted bonds that maintain JI’s network therefore represent a potential security threat, while also offering an opportunity to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives as well as post-radicalisation community building. This network enables the authorities to maintain engagement with former leaders and members, and to facilitate the dissemination of JI’s new ideological position—which ensures compliance and organisational alignment, and anticipates potential splinter trajectories. On this note, it would be prudent to continue a longitudinal analysis of JI’s network.
JI’s Current Status Through the Lens of Political Islam
To supplement a longitudinal analysis, an exploration of the various shades of political Islam could be useful to gauge JI’s positioning within the broader typology of Islamic groups. Due to space constraints, only a brief overview of political Islam will be discussed. Muslim attitudes towards the relationship between Islam and politics can be broadly categorised into two main camps: 1) those who believe the two are inseparable; and 2) those who are secular, i.e., who believe religion and politics are separable.[11]
For the purposes of understanding JI’s attitudes, this article will cover the camp which views Islam and politics as inseparable. Interpretations on what this means in practice can vary widely. Some believe that Islam indeed permeates all matters, but do not regard an Islamic state as a necessity or a religious obligation, because there is no clear injunction to establish an Islamic state. Others are more pragmatic, arguing that an Islamic state is unfeasible and that a democratic, Westphalian nation-state is the best alternative for Muslims in today’s context. These are non-Islamist Muslims.[12]
The other group, known as Islamists, believe not only in the inseparability of Islam and politics, but also in a Muslim’s absolute duty to establish an Islamic state to achieve Islam as the complete way of life. However, this group is also diverse, and can be illustrated in a typology ranging from very mild to very strong, with at least five categories: 1) deferential passive; 2) deferential active; 3) Islamist democrat; 4) Islamist non-democrat; and 5) jihadist. These categories offer a helpful analytical structure, although individuals and movements are often more fluid within the spectrum, depending on changing contexts and ideological trajectories.[13]
Deferential Passive
Deferential passive Islamists are the mildest type of Islamists. They do believe that Islam commands the creation of an Islamic state. They refrain from promoting their beliefs in an activist or aggressive manner for practical reasons. Instead, they prioritise personal piety. In their view, if most Muslims are practising their religion, the establishment of an Islamic state would occur naturally. They may be politically quietist or even apologists for certain regimes. Two contrasting examples of deferential passive Islamism are the Tablighi Jamaat and segments of Saudi Salafi-Wahhabism. The former promotes personal piety while eschewing politics, enabling broad tolerance. The latter promotes political quietism and views obedience to a Muslim ruler, regardless of the shortcomings, as doctrinally obligatory, so long as Islamic practice is permitted.[14]
Deferential Active
This second category of Islamists typically operate in Muslim-minority countries. Deferential active Islamists do not advocate loyalty to rulers based on Islamic precepts, nor do they promote an immediate obligation to establish an Islamic state. They view an Islamic state as a theoretical ideal and a long-term principle, rather than a practical goal, in the present realities. While they value individual piety, their focus extends to pursuing social change within the legal and political frameworks of the countries they operate in. They do not call for a systemic overhaul, but instead engage the state as a civil society actor through advocacy, cooperation and, when necessary, pressure. A pertinent example is the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (Pergas). It promotes a resilient Muslim minority within a secular, multicultural state through credible religious leadership. In Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore, Pergas affirms that while an Islamic state is theologically ideal, it is neither obligatory nor feasible in Singapore. Instead, it prioritises safeguarding Muslim interests, moral integrity and constructive participation in secular democratic institutions. Although it is ideologically critical of secularism, Pergas accepts it as necessary to multiethnic coexistence and religious freedom, and advocates a moderate Islamic identity aligned with national harmony.[15]
Islamist Democrat
Islamist democrats promote Islam through non-violent means and embrace democracy as a means to their ends. Unlike deferential active Islamists, who engage as civil society actors without pursing political office, Islamist democrats actively contest elections, form or join political parties, and present their agendas to the electorate. This category of Islamists argues that democratic participation is permissible in Islam. They operate primarily in Muslim-majority countries, where their prospects of electoral success are more feasible. Prominent examples include Malaysia’s Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. These Islamist democrats justify political participation through Quranic accounts, such as that of Prophet Yusuf seeking office from the king of Egypt.[16]
Islamist Non-Democrat
For Islamist non-democrats, democracy is anathematic to Islam. They regard it as a flawed concept that entrusts governance to the fallible wisdom of the masses and that is easily manipulated by the media, corporate interests and powerful elites. Islamist non-democrats reject the concept of elections, as they were not practised by the Prophet and his immediate successors, and forbid partaking in the electoral process. While they typically do not explicitly advocate violence, Islamist non-democrats circumvent regular democratic norms to achieve their political agendas. These measures include mass mobilisation, inciting popular revolution and coup d’états—which can be violent. Hizb ut-Tahrir, founded in Jerusalem in 1953, is perhaps the most prominent example of Islamist non-democrats. The group is committed to re-establishing the caliphate via non-violent means—which it regards as obligatory for every Muslim.[17]
Jihadist
The most extreme minority in the typology are the jihadists, who believe that establishing an Islamic state is both necessary and obligatory, and consider violence both legitimate and imperative to their ends. They represent an overwhelming minority among Islamists. Jihadist groups may differ significantly in scope and ambition. Localised jihadist groups may forge tactical or logistical alliances with global networks to access training, funding or arms. However, their end goals typically remain rooted in local contexts and specific territorial claims. Other jihadist groups may hope for a global caliphate.[18]
Locating JI on the Islamist Spectrum
An understanding of where JI lies in this spectrum is valuable to inform suitable policy interventions. Post-dissolution, JI may straddle two Islamist typologies—Islamist democrat and deferential active Islamist.
JI as Islamist Democrat
JI was previously considered a violent jihadist Islamist group, belonging in the fifth category in the Islamist typology discussed above. Since the group’s dissolution, its stance can be categorised as Islamist democrat, i.e., the third category. Part of JI’s ideological shift included renouncing violence and accepting democratic norms, through its agreement to uphold, preserve and defend NKRI, Pancasila and the Constitution of Indonesia.[19]
One key departure from JI’s prior ideology following its dissolution is the assertion that democratic mechanisms and institutions are modern applications of syura (consultation). Pemilu (general elections), pilpres (presidential elections), pilkada (provincial elections) and the Majlis Perwakilan Rakyat (the People’s Representative Council, i.e., the Indonesian equivalent of Parliament), are now accepted as legitimate state institutions. This acceptance of democratic institutions suggests a possible desire for democratic electoral participation.[20]
The current JI ideology asserts that waging armed jihad against the Indonesian government to establish an Islamic state or to correct social vice is no longer permissible. JI provides three core justifications for this. First, the new JI vision recognises NKRI as a valid polity for Indonesian Muslims. Second, since Muslims constitute the majority of the population, Indonesia is considered a Muslim nation, and armed jihad cannot be waged against fellow Muslims. Third, such actions would constitute a forbidden rebellion against the authorities in the Sunni tradition, even against corrupt and unjust rulers. This is because the harms of such a rebellion outweigh the benefits.[21]
It remains unclear whether JI intends to reconstitute itself as a political party or to formally contest elections. Nevertheless, JI has always been ideologically political, seeking state transformation rather than merely pietistic social reform, thus making sustained political disengagement unlikely. Political participation is therefore plausible and consistent with its doctrinal trajectory. If its recent ideological revisions orient it towards the Islamist democrat position on the spectrum, engagement through constitutional and legal channels should be permitted, as exclusion would undermine both pluralism and democratic legitimacy. Moreover, marginalisation could provoke disgruntled members into resuming extreme, violent or illegal actions for political or ideological ends.
JI as Deferential Active Islamists
If JI chooses to refrain from politics and exclusively focuses on tarbiyah (education) and dakwah (proselytisation), it can be classified as deferential active Islamist. Although JI continues to reject secularism, it advocates a non-confrontational, non-militant and pragmatic approach. It has indicated a prioritisation of effective dakwah and public religious education over forceful change. This approach is closer to the Prophet’s way and to the Quranic injunction that prefers dakwah with “wisdom, kind advice, and debate in the best manner”.[22] In addressing the perceived shortcomings of Indonesian state policy—whether governmental or societal—JI members are limited to peaceful dakwah and non-violent social activism.
State intervention will not be necessary if JI becomes deferential active Islamist. Continued engagement and support within the civil society landscape would be the appropriate response.
Will This Shift Lead to Wasatiyah (Moderation)?
JI’s repositioning marks an unprecedented course correction. From the jihadist far right in the Islamist typology, the group has now shifted towards the centre. Viewed alongside other groups in a similar typology, JI is now ideologically closer to contemporary Islamist participants of the democratic process, such as Malaysia’s PAS, Indonesia’s PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Within the current Indonesian Islamic landscape, it appears remarkable that JI has chosen a more moderate position than Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), another Islamist organisation with a significant following in the country. Despite rejecting violence, HTI remains opposed to the nation-state framework, democratic processes and nationalism. HTI views these as incompatible Western constructs, purposely brought into the Muslim world to lead Muslims astray.[23]
While JI’s new direction is commendable, it would be prudent to give JI the benefit of time and support to institutionalise a new organisational behaviour in the socio-political realm. Today, JI’s leadership is touring Indonesia to meet with rank-and-file members to disseminate the group’s new agenda.[24] This mammoth task of internal self-critique and dialogue includes the correct conception of iman (faith), the misapplications of takfir (the act of declaring another Muslim as an infidel) and the practice of jihad. Intensive doctrinal remediation to return to traditional Sunni frameworks[25] and theological reformation require a great deal of effort—which may span generations.
Conclusion
Omar Ashour’s study on collective deradicalisation finds that comprehensive change from radicalisation can only occur when it involves three aspects: 1) ideology; 2) organisation; and 3) social behaviour. Furthermore, to achieve a level of wasatiyah in the social and political spheres, the transformation must involve ideological change, whereby the relevant groups accept the principles of democracy—most importantly, pluralism and peaceful (i.e., non-violent) transfer of power—demonstrated through social and political behaviours via direct participation in the social and electoral political arenas.[26]
In the context of JI, the post-dissolution period is still in its nascency. While JI’s ideological shift is encouraging, its actual transformation into a wasatiyah and mainstream actor will depend on its socio-political behaviour in the coming years. This depends on whether JI will lean towards constructive engagement or towards confrontation; whether it will be inclusive and tolerant of diverse orientations or exclusive and self-righteous; whether it will seek cooperation with others or dominance over them; whether it will pursue persuasive dakwah or coercive action, etc. There remains considerable uncertainty for now. The picture may become clearer once the phase of ideological and internal reformation ends, and JI moves on to the social and political action phase.
About the Author
Muhammad Haniff Hassan is a Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be contacted at [email protected] and www.haniff.sg/en/.
Thumbnail photo by Rachid Ouchariaon on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Kumar Ramakrishna, Jemaah Islamiyah, ISIS and Beyond: Tracking the Evolving Challenge of Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia (2001-2025) (World Scientific, 2025), 11–31.
[2] Arlina Arsad, “Indonesia’s JI Terror Group Declares Dissolution, But Security Threat Remains, Say Analysts,” The Straits Times, July 4, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-s-ji-terror-group-declares-dissolution-but-security-threat-remains-say-analysts.
[3] “Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah?” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), July 4, 2024, 1–3, https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report-96-is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah; Aqil Hamzah and Wahyudi Soeriaadmatja, “Ex-JI Members in S-E Asia Should Abide by Dissolution, Says Terror Group’s Former Chief,” The Straits Times, October 30, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/former-ji-members-in-s-e-asia-should-abide-by-dissolution-former-chief-of-terror-group; Sentot Prasetyo, JI The Untold Story: Perjalanan Kisah Jemaah Islamiyah (Kompas-Gramedia, 2024), 371–8 and 405–10.
[4] IPAC, “Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah?” 1–3.
[5] Wahyudi Soeriaadmatja, “Defunct Terror Group JI on Nationwide Tour to Get Ex-Members to Surrender and Stand Down,” The Straits Times, September 9, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/defunct-terror-group-ji-on-nationwide-tour-to-get-ex-members-to-surrender-and-stand-down; Prasetyo, JI The Untold Story.
[6] See Al Muhandis Para Wijayanto, At Tathorruf (Ekstremisme, Terorisme, Radikalisme dan Kekerasan) Penyebab & Solusi, 138–42, 238–43, 248–50, 252–62, 288–96, 301–2, 307–12, 406–20, 528–37, 562–4, 606–10, 634–6, 643–51, 739–46, 780–5 and 831–4.
[7] “Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group, December 11, 2002, https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/asia-pacific/indonesia/043-indonesia-backgrounder-how-jemaah-islamiyah-terrorist-network-operates
[8] Ibid.; Noor Huda Ismail, “The Role of Kinship in Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 4, no.11 (2006), https://jamestown.org/the-role-of-kinship-in-indonesias-jemaah-islamiya/.
[9] Prasetyo, JI The Untold Story, 394–5.
[10] Sulastri Osman, “Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 2 (2010): 157–75.
[11] Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, “Shades of Islamism: A Critical Analysis,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 37 (2025): 105–29, https://www.hudson.org/current-trends-islamist-ideology-volume-37.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Wijayanto, At Tathorruf, chapters 4–6.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 557–60 and 802–7.
[23] Hassan and Abdullah, “Shades of Islamism.”
[24] Soeriaadmatja, “Defunct Terror Group JI.”
[25] Wijayanto, At Tathorruf, 70–4 and 102–4.
[26] Omar Ashour, “Votes and Violence: Islamists and the Processes of Transformation,” Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence (2009): 5–6, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Votes-and-Violence_-Islamists-and-The-Processes-of-Transformation.pdf; see also Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (Routledge, 2009).
