Youths in the Digital Crossfire: Vulnerability to Violent Extremism and Policy Responses in Indonesia
Driven by a surge in digitally facilitated recruitment in recent years, extremist actors are increasingly exploiting youth-oriented platforms, including social media and online games, to normalise violent ideologies and influence young audiences. This article analyses youth vulnerability to violent extremist indoctrination within Indonesia’s digital landscape and evaluates corresponding policy responses. While the Indonesian authorities have emphasised content moderation and digital restrictions, this article argues that such measures are insufficient. Instead, it highlights the need to complement regulatory approaches and move beyond digital censorship towards building youth resilience through the development of critical thinking and media information literacy skills to help reject extremist narratives.
Introduction
The landscape of terrorist threats in Indonesia may have declined, with the significant weakening of extremist groups (including Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups and the disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 2024)[1] and a “zero attack” record from 2023 to 2025.[2] However, the threat remains persistent and adaptive. Law enforcement thwarted 27 planned attacks during the same period, primarily involving IS networks, such as Anshor Daulah and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah.[3] As sustained surveillance has fragmented these groups, extremist activities have increasingly shifted to online spaces.[4] This evolution became particularly evident in late 2025, when the authorities uncovered a sharp escalation in youth indoctrination, exemplified by an IS-linked network targeting 110 children across 23 provinces.[5] This is significantly higher than the 17 children recruited between 2011 and 2017.[6] Moving away from traditional face-to-face methods, extremists now utilise social media and online gaming platforms as a “digital funnel”[7] to mask extremist ideas within religious narratives.[8] Such trends highlight a more covert, organised and strategic effort to influence the next generation through digital platforms.[9]
This trend of online recruitment and indoctrination is not limited to religiously motivated extremism. On January 7, 2026, Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) released a press statement revealing that approximately 70 children were involved in True Crime Community (TCC) groups.[10] These minors were exposed to violent extremist ideas associated with neo-Nazism and white supremacy.[11] Often, these were packaged in seemingly harmless media like memes, funny videos, animations and music.[12] While Indonesian law enforcement has traditionally focused on religiously motivated extremism,[13] this development reflects a broader global pattern. Densus 88 reported a global spike in the online spread of neo-Nazism following the COVID-19 pandemic.[14] Rising far-right extremism is not only a concern in Europe and North America. Around Asia, South Korea, India, Singapore and the Philippines have also reported similar trends, often facilitated by the misuse of social media.[15] Far-right actors exploit these platforms by funnelling young users from mainstream social media websites towards decentralised, gaming-adjacent platforms, where the sheer volume and nature of the content make effective regulation more difficult.[16]
Ultimately, these developments underscore a shared pattern in the tactics of both religious and far-right extremists: the deliberate targeting of youth through digital media. This trend highlights the growing challenge of online indoctrination, where extremist narratives are embedded within youth-oriented content that appears harmless, reflecting a long-term strategy to cultivate future operatives before full ideological commitment is formed.[17]
Why Are Young People Vulnerable?
The youth’s susceptibility to violent extremism is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a single factor. It emerges from a complex combination of social, neurobiological and psychological factors. Young people are deliberately targeted by extremist groups because they are perceived as valuable “resources”, offering advantages such as amplifying propaganda, providing tactical or economic benefits, and being more easily influenced or controlled.[18] By exploiting the youth’s search for identity and purpose, extremist actors effectively hijack these needs and aspirations, transforming a young person’s quest for purpose into a pathway of indoctrination that can lead to involvement in extremist activities.[19]
A popular argument for why young people are vulnerable is that they are still on a journey to “find themselves”.[20] This might be true to some extent, particularly when young individuals experience a profound sense of not belonging.[21] Such feelings can be exacerbated by low self-esteem as well as experiences of bullying or discrimination, all of which result in a sense of isolation and can make youth more vulnerable to extremist propaganda.[22] Marginalisation acts as a powerful catalyst for extremism by cutting individuals off from their societal connections.[23] This lack of connection in the community has been recognised as a critical “push factor”,[24] making them more susceptible to extremist narratives that offer the “safe haven” they lack elsewhere.[25]
From a neurobiological perspective, the maturation of adolescent brains, which shape their cognitive, social and emotional capacities, continues well into their early twenties and should not be equated with adult maturity.[26] Although adolescents generally possess the ability to exercise agency, its scope is also shaped by their developmental stage and surrounding environments.[27] These factors make them more susceptible to social influence, more inclined towards risk-taking behaviours and less capable of accurately anticipating the long-term consequences of their actions.[28] These developmental dynamics intensify the search for identity, making the need for belonging, recognition and a sense of significance particularly powerful drivers during adolescence.[29] However, due to limited experience in navigating complex social environments,[30] young people’s desire for novelty and excitement can be hijacked by extremist narratives that frame their radical activities as an “adventure”[31] or a pathway to “belonging”.[32]
Consequently, as illustrated by these various factors, the term “indoctrination” becomes more accurate than “radicalisation” in this context, as it better captures the power and agency disparities between extremist actors and vulnerable young people.[33] Framing youth as perpetrators in response to this issue may result in inaccurate policy responses and produce counterproductive results that encourage youth to embrace violent extremism and resist questioning these ideas.
Indoctrination in Digital Youth Spaces
Platforms like social media and online gaming serve as primary gateways for youth exposure to violent extremism,[34] exacerbated by the increasing amount of time children spend online. Data retrieved from the Indonesian Ministry of Communications and Digital Affairs (Komdigi) indicates that children aged under 18 years old comprise 48 percent of the total 212 million internet users in Indonesia, with the average online time around eight hours per day.[35] Within this demographic, Instagram and TikTok remain the most used social media applications (excluding WhatsApp).[36]
It is not surprising that “algorithm-driven social media” (particularly TikTok and Instagram) has been the dominant platform for extremist narrative dissemination in Indonesia.[37] This algorithm process promotes content that can quickly grab users’ attention. As a result, when a user engages with this type of content or symbols in the form of liking a post, commenting or following an account, his or her feed would show similar content and act as an “echo chamber” that can further “radicalize, polarize, and spread racism and political instability”.[38]
Beyond social media, gaming platforms have become fertile ground for extremist indoctrination,[39] driven by limited moderation, broad user reach, social interaction features and extensive customisation options.[40] Extremists are active in popular games, such as Roblox and Minecraft, exploiting their interactive features to recruit and indoctrinate youth, even using these games to simulate past attacks.[41] Other than modifying existing games, these groups have evolved to develop new games to help promote their ideologies, use in-game communication channels for recruitment and grooming, and align gaming culture with propaganda to “gamify” real-world violence.[42] The severity of this threat is underscored by a 2024 survey, which revealed that 44 percent of Indonesian respondents had encountered extremist visual content, 36 percent had seen endorsements of violence against specific groups, 26 percent had reported direct recruitment attempts and 18 percent had witnessed donation requests linked to extremist groups within gaming ecosystems.[43]
Extremist activity in online environments is also related to their ability to easily disseminate memes, poses or symbols. Memes, in particular, act as a powerful tool for disseminating ideas[44] by packaging such extremist narratives into viral content that spreads quickly among like-minded users on social media.[45] Furthermore, the exploitation of gaming-related memes allows extremist actors to increase the range, influence and salience of their propaganda among younger generations.[46] By wrapping violent messages in these familiar formats, it tends to normalise the audience to violent narratives, making dangerous ideologies appear more socially acceptable.[47]
The aforementioned arrests by Densus 88 in late 2025 highlight this digital threat. Between December 2024 and November 2025, the authorities arrested five individuals for attempting to recruit 110 children via social media and online gaming platforms.[48] These arrests highlight the “indoctrination” aspect, which exposes a disparity in power and agency that is evident in their recruitment process, with initial engagement occurring on open platforms and online games to build emotional closeness through visual media, before moving potential targets to encrypted communication platforms.[49] This deliberate process confirms that what may appear as a youth’s “choice” is often a result of a highly unequal power hegemony designed to exploit his or her limited experience and innocence.
Contemporary extremists have also evolved their tactics, shifting focus from traditional doctrine towards the “aesthetics” of extremism in online spaces. Religious extremists utilise visual imagery, viral soundbites and mainstream culture references on platforms like TikTok to mythologise past extremist figures and “repackage” them in ways that make extremist narratives more appealing to young Indonesians.[50]
The November 2025 incident at SMAN 72 Jakarta further illustrates this shift. Young individuals may no longer engage in violence for purely ideological reasons and may instead acquire extremist understanding through “mimicry”, drawing from various online representations of prior attackers to imitate.[51] From inscribing his weapons with far-right rhetoric (“14 words”[52] and “For Agartha”[53]) and the names of notorious mass shooters (Brenton Tarrant[54] and Alexandre Bissonnette[55]), the suspect demonstrated a clear intent to emulate previous attackers.[56] His involvement in TCC groups[57] suggests that these online spaces are also able to “intoxicate” young people with white supremacist ideologies that are foreign to the Indonesian context.[58] This case demonstrates how digital ecosystems function as a ”catalyst” for far-right propaganda,[59] facilitating its global influence[60] and even winning the “hearts and minds” of non-white populations that have historically been the targets of such ideologies.
Furthermore, as internet usage increases, extremist groups may exploit generative artificial intelligence (AI) as a tool to spread extremist propaganda.[61] AI application models, such as generative AI and large language models (LLMs), have also been identified as potentially exploitable for spreading propaganda, such as by inserting commands that would bypass the models’ compliance with safety standards and policies aimed at preventing the dissemination of extremist, illegal or unethical content.[62] This misuse is already evident in Indonesia, where some groups have employed deepfake videos of notorious extremist figures, accompanied by AI-generated narrations to disseminate propaganda.[63]
Indonesia’s Policy Responses
To counteract this growing digital threat, the government has implemented “soft” approaches focused on counter-narratives. Guided by frameworks such as the Presidential Regulation No. 7/2021 on the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Violent Extremism (RAN PE) and Government Regulation No. 77/2019 on the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and the Protection of Law Enforcement Officers, the state collaborates with influencers and public figures to promote peaceful discourse online. A cornerstone of this strategy is the “Peace Ambassador” programme of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT),[64] which has mobilised approximately 1,200 youths across the country to actively challenge extremist ideologies within their peer groups.[65]
Beyond alternative measures, the state strategy relies heavily on content moderation, supported by relevant legislation (such as Law No. 5/2018 on Eradication of Terrorism and Law No. 19/2016 on Digital Information and Transactions) that allows the authorities to block platforms hosting extremist propaganda. In 2024, BNPT identified over 180,000 instances of extremist content linked to IS-affiliated groups.[66] Data shows that Instagram hosts the highest volume of such content (86,203), followed by Facebook (45,449) and TikTok (23,595).[67] In response to this threat, the Indonesian authorities took down 11,818 accounts that spread radical materials between 2024 and 2025.[68]
PP Tunas: The Enforcement Gap
The SMAN 72 attack, along with recent cases of minors being recruited into extremism through digital platforms, has prompted the Indonesian government to pursue stricter regulations for social media[69] and online games.[70] In response, the government introduced Government Regulation No. 17 of 2025 on the Governance of Electronic System Providers for Child Protection (PP Tunas), which aims to limit children’s exposure to harmful digital content, including violent extremism.[71] Unveiled in late March 2026,[72] this regulation mandates electronic system providers (PSEs)[73] to filter potentially harmful content, establish accessible reporting mechanisms and ensure a rapid remediation process.[74]
The regulation is expected to protect around 70 million children in Indonesia and initially applies to eight major digital platforms, including TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, Threads, YouTube, X, Bigo Live and Roblox.[75] Under this mandate, PSEs must prioritise child safety over commercial interests, restrict the profiling of minors’ data, enforce age verification and supervision, and prevent the commodification of children in digital spaces.[76] This regulation also introduces sanctions for non-compliance, ranging from temporary suspension to total termination of access.[77] However, despite robust legal mechanisms, the actual enforcement of such digital restrictions remains a formidable challenge, as demonstrated by the experiences of other countries.
Australia’s recent under-16 ban[78] serves as a cautionary example. Critics highlight the risk to minors’ freedom of expression,[79] while the ban itself is frequently bypassed via falsified birth dates, virtual private networks and even usage of parental credentials.[80] The primary risk of such a policy is “migration”, pushing young people away from moderated platforms and into non-mainstream and less-regulated platforms where extremist propaganda can circulate with minimal oversight or intervention.[81]
Similar hurdles are evident within the realm of online gaming. Despite China’s 2019 and 2021 regulations, which restricted minors to as little as one hour on weekends, digital evasion remains widespread.[82] Although some platforms have implemented mandatory identity registration and facial recognition software to enforce these regulations, many adolescents bypass these restrictions by registering accounts under the names of older relatives or purchasing pre-verified accounts on the black market.[83] Such workarounds not only undermine the law but also introduce secondary risks, leaving minors vulnerable to account scams.[84]
As illustrated above, these challenges could compromise the effectiveness of PP Tunas in countering online extremism and may present unintentional risks to youths. By focusing primarily on mainstream providers, the regulation risks pushing youths towards non-mainstream platforms where extremists already maintain a stronghold. Telegram, in particular, has been widely used by IS-affiliated networks since 2014 in Indonesia for ideological dissemination, recruitment and even the distribution of bomb-making tutorials, facilitated by its encryption, low cost and limited oversight.[85] Despite its stated commitment to collaborate with the Indonesian authorities in the fight against extremism on its platform, following its temporary ban in 2017,[86] Telegram’s compliance with takedown requests remains relatively low (under 50 percent).[87]
This case highlights a broader limitation of PP Tunas, as it is hampered by its heavy reliance on PSE self-assessment.[88] Prior to the regulation, several platforms demonstrated low responsiveness to government requests to remove harmful content.[89] For instance, Meta’s compliance rate in addressing harmful content was recorded at just 28.47 percent.[90] Although PP Tunas introduces self-assessment mechanisms and risk classifications,[91] platform companies may still exploit regulatory gaps, particularly when compliance threatens their business interests. Without strong government oversight, PSEs might continue to prioritise commercial considerations over child protection, a direct contradiction of the regulation’s primary mandate.[92]
Contemporary extremist recruitment tactics have also increasingly shifted towards the use of visual images, which employ sarcasm or humour to obscure ideological content[93] while enabling plausible deniability.[94] Both IS-affiliated[95] and far-right[96] groups in Indonesia utilise memes, whose malleable nature allows interpretations to vary depending on context and intent.[97] These visuals often have hidden meanings that are only known to niche online subcultures,[98] appearing harmless to standard moderation tools while delivering radical messages to their intended audience.[99] In Indonesia, extremist actors further evade detection through numeric codes (“1515” for IS) and time-bound content (Instagram or TikTok Stories) that disappear before they can be analysed.[100]
These evolving tactics pose major obstacles to PSE self-assessment mechanisms. Platform practitioners often lack the contextual and localised understanding required to identify extremist tactics, symbolism, coded narratives and subcultural references associated with such groups.[101] There is also limited information in Indonesia regarding the deployment and capabilities of local moderators on online platforms.[102] Although AI tools are also deployed to bridge this gap, they remain largely incapable of interpreting ambiguous or sarcastic narratives, as well as nuanced content like memes.[103]
From Restriction to Resilience
Protecting youth from online extremist indoctrination requires going beyond censorship, as restrictive measures alone are insufficient in complex digital environments. Instead, long-term resilience depends on strengthening media information literacy (MIL) and critical thinking, which enables young people to evaluate information, recognise manipulation and challenge extremist narratives.[104] This approach supports more informed decision-making and may reduce their vulnerability to harmful influences that exploit their desires for identity and belonging.
While Indonesia’s RAN PE 2020-2024 established a framework for integrating critical thinking into education (Prevention Pillar particularly),[105] its practical application remains limited. Existing initiatives, such as “Peace Schools” and “National Identity Campus”, primarily concentrate on promoting peace and tolerance;[106] however, they have not effectively incorporated critical thinking into mainstream education.[107] By comparison, the RAN PE 2026-2029 places greater emphasis on promoting inclusive education and tolerance, early identification of violent extremism and anti-extremism awareness in the education sector.[108] Nevertheless, unlike the previous framework, it does not explicitly emphasise the development of critical thinking skills within educational curricula as part of preventing violent extremism. The absence of this focus may weaken efforts to develop minors’ capacity to critically evaluate extremist narratives.
Addressing this gap requires stronger commitment from the education sector, where schools play a key role in shaping youth during their formative stages.[109] Rather than treating it as a standalone subject, critical thinking should be integrated across subjects (languages, sciences, religious studies and civic education)[110] to empower students to assess information, identify hidden assumptions and evaluate the reliability of evidence.[111] This approach encourages more objective thinking, moves youth away from emotional or impulsive reactions, and reduces their susceptibility to manipulative narratives.[112]
The increasing sophistication of digital persuasion in extremist messaging underscores the importance of MIL in protecting youth.[113] As young people encounter harmful content both intentionally and unintentionally,[114] it underscores the need to strengthen their capacity to critically assess how media and emerging technologies shape information environments and the potential risks they pose.[115] MIL equips individuals with the analytical and practical competencies necessary to engage with digital content and relevant technologies in an informed and ethical manner.[116] MIL also enables individuals to comprehend how media platforms function, their patterns of use, and the actors and intentions behind their use, thereby strengthening individuals’ ability to evaluate information credibility.[117]
In the Indonesian context, PP Tunas mandates PSEs to promote digital literacy through educational initiatives and supporting infrastructure.[118] This responsibility is also shared with the central government[119] and supported by relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and the Ministry of Religion,[120] which aim to strengthen digital literacy within formal and religious education settings. However, the application of this regulation remains unclear, as Komdigi has yet to issue detailed implementation guidelines[121] and derivative regulations offer no further explanation for the actual implementation.[122]
Prior to PP Tunas, the government introduced initiatives such as Komdigi’s Makin Cakap Digital programme,[123] which sought to improve digital literacy and enhance digital skills, ethics, culture and safety.[124] Despite these efforts, their impact has been limited, as reflected in the decline of Indonesia’s digital literacy index from 58.25 in 2024 to 49.28 in 2025, according to the Indonesian Digital Society Index.[125] Existing government interventions have primarily manifested as training sessions,[126] rather than being systematically integrated into the formal education curriculum. This challenge is consistent with global trends identified by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which indicate that many national education systems still lack the systemic incorporation of MIL.[127]
To address this gap, MIL should be embedded within formal education through structured and continuous learning modules. Such integration should enable youths to identify disinformation, critically assess online content, debunk radical narratives, and engage in fact-checking and online verification.[128] While these measures may not directly tackle the root causes of extremism, they play a crucial role in enhancing youth resilience by equipping them with the necessary competencies to navigate complex digital environments and reduce their vulnerability to manipulative or harmful narratives.[129]
About the Authors
Muhammad Dwibagus Lisandro is an independent researcher and practitioner in counter terrorism, based in Jakarta, Indonesia. He holds a master’s degree from Macquarie University, specialising in both Counter Terrorism and Public and Social Policy. He can be contacted at [email protected].
Ellysa Zulfa Qonita is a counter terrorism practitioner based in Jakarta, Indonesia. She recently graduated from Leiden University’s Crisis and Security Management, specialising in Governance of Radicalism, Extremism, and Terrorism. She can be contacted at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Julie-Ricard on Unsplash
Citations
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[2] Rini Friastuti, “Kapolri: Indonesia Berhasil Pertahankan Zero Attack Terorisme 2023–2025,” Kumparan News, January 26, 2026, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/kapolri-indonesia-berhasil-pertahankan-zero-attack-terorisme-2023-2025- 26hv1AtTyL8/full.
[3] I-KHub BNPT: Indonesia Terrorism Threat Report 2023–2025 (National Counter Terrorism Agency, 2025), 14, https://ikhub.id/en/product/outlook/id-tren-terorisme-indonesia- tahun-2023-2025-4758150.
[4] Jordan Newton, “Staying Alive: The Indonesian Pro-IS Community’s Online Resilience and the ‘Lone Actor’ Threat in 2025,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 3 (2025): 1–3, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48820268; South China Morning Post, “ISIS-Linked Group Used Online Games.”
[5] “Indonesia Records Zero Terror Attacks Throughout 2025,” ANTARA News, December 30, 2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/398014/indonesia-records-zero-terror-attacks-throughout-2025.
[6] Naomi Lyandra, “Menghalau Anak dan Remaja dari Bidikan Jaringan Teroris,” KBR, December 1, 2025, https://kbr.id/articles/ragam/menghalau-anak-dan-remaja-dari-bidikan-jaringan-teroris.
[7] South China Morning Post, “ISIS-Linked Group Used Online Games.”
[8] Rumondang Naibaho, “Terbongkar Ratusan Anak Direkrut Jaringan Terorisme Lewat Game Online,” Detik News, November 18, 2025, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8217288/terbongkar-ratusan-anak-direkrut-jaringan-terorisme-lewat-game-online; South China Morning Post, “ISIS-Linked Group Used Online Games.”
[9] Noor Huda Ismail, “Children, Digital Risk, and the Future of Terrorism Prevention in Indonesia,” RSIS Commentary, no. 235 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/children-digital-risk-and-the-future-of-terrorism-prevention-in-indonesia/; Naibaho, “Terbongkar Ratusan Anak Direkrut Jaringan Terorisme Lewat Game Online.”
[10] Divisi Humas Polri, “Densus 88 AT Polri Temukan True Crime Community, Anak-Anak Rentan Terpapar Kekerasan Di Ruang Digital,” Website Resmi Polri, January 8, 2026, https://humas.polri.go.id/news/detail/2236816-densus-88-at-polri-temukan-true-crime- community-anak-anak-rentan-terpapar-kekerasan-di-ruang-digital.
[11] “Waspada! 70 Anak Terpapar Ideologi Ekstrem Lewat Komunitas True Crime,” CNN Indonesia, January 10, 2026, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20260110095755-20-1315494/waspada-70-anak-terpapar-ideologi- ekstrem-lewat-komunitas-true-crime.
[12] Divisi Humas Polri, “Densus 88 AT Polri Temukan True Crime Community.”
[13] Alif Satria, “Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 14, no. 5 (2022): 7–10, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter -terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-14-issue-05/.
[14] “Densus 88: Paham Neo Nazi-White Supremacy Meningkat Pasca Covid-19,” CNN Indonesia, January 7, 2026, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20260107211448-12-1314675/densus-88-paham-neo-nazi-white -supremacy-meningkat-pasca-covid-19.
[15] Julie Chernov Hwang, “The Online Radicalization of Youth Remains a Growing Problem Worldwide,” The Soufan Center, September 9, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-september-9/.
[16] Libby Brooks, “Far-Right Extremists Using Games Platforms to Radicalise Teenagers, Report Warns,” The Guardian, July 31, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jul/31/far-right-extremists-games-platforms-radicalise-teenagers-report.
[17] Ismail, “Children, Digital Risk, and the Future of Terrorism.”
[18] Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017), 10–1, https://www.unodc.org/documents/ justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf; Targeted by Terrorists: Child Recruitment, Exploitation and Reintegration in Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024), 124, https://www.un-ilibrary .org/content/books/9789219100374.
[19] Claudia Wallner, The Contested Relationship between Youth and Violent Extremism Assessing the Evidence Base in Relation to P/CVE Interventions (Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2021), 9, https://static.rusi. org/234_op_pcve_youth_web_version_0.pdf.
[20] Kautsar Widya Prabowo, “BNPT Ungkap Pergeseran Pola Terorisme, Remaja Jadi Target Di Ruang Digital,” Metro TV, December 31, 2025, https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/NgxCa5Wp-bnpt-ungkap-pergeseran-pola-terorisme-remaja-jadi-target- di-ruang-digital.
[21] “Signs of Radicalisation in a Teen: Do You Know the Indicators?” Action Counters Terrorism, October 11, 2021, https://actearly.uk/spot-the-signs-of-radicalisation/protecting-children-from-radicalisation/.
[22] “Drivers of Violent Extremism,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2018, https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-2/key-issues/drivers-of-violent-extremism.html; Carolyn Nash et al., Youth Led Guide on Prevention of Violent Extremism Through Education (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017), 91, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000260547.locale=en; Action Counters Terrorism, “Signs of Radicalisation.”
[23] UNODC, “Drivers of Violent Extremism.”
[24] Ibid.
[25] Nash et al., “Youth Led Guide on Prevention of Violent Extremism,” 91.
[26] UNODC, Targeted by Terrorists, 131
[27] Joana Cook and Lynn Schneider, “The Life of Children in Families Affiliated with Terrorism: An Ecological Systems Theory Approach,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 17, no. 2 (2024): 278–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024. 2322563.
[28] UNODC, Targeted by Terrorists, 131.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Daniel Romer. “Adolescent Risk Taking, Impulsivity, and Brain Development: Implications for Prevention,” Developmental Psychobiology 52, no. 3 (2010): 263–4, https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.20442.
[31] “How Is Extremism and Prevent Relevant to My School?” Educated Against Hate, 2026, https://www.educateagainsthate.com/why-is-extremism-relevant-to-my-school/.
[32] Prevention of Violent Radicalisation in Schools and Educational Institutions (Finnish National Agency for Education, 2018), 5, https://www.oph.fi/sites/default/files/documents/prevention-of-violent- radicalisation-in-schools-and -educational-institutions.pdf.
[33] Kristy Campion and Emma Colvin, “Community, More than Conviction: Understanding Radicalisation Factors for Young People in Australia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2025): 13–4, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2025.2478957.
[34] South China Morning Post, “ISIS-Linked Group Used Online Games.”
[35] Alfin, “Komdigi: Anak Indonesia Habiskan 8 Jam Sehari Di Internet,” TVRI News, May 14, 2025, https://nasional.tvrinews.com/berita/tlw7eis-komdigi-anak-indonesia-habiskan-8-jam-sehari-di-internet.
[36] Agnes Z. Yonatan, Media Sosial Favorit Gen Z 2025 (GoodStats, 2025), https://data.goodstats.id/statistic /media-sosial-favorit-gen-z-2025-b2tXg.
[37] Farangiz Atamuradova, Galen Lamphere-Englund and Emma Allen, Understanding and Preventing Online Extremism & Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia: Indonesia Country Report (Hedayah, 2025), 18–9, https://hedayah.com/app/uploads /2025/12/Indonesia-Country-Report-in-English.pdf.
[38] Joe Burton, “Algorithmic Extremism? The Securitization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Its Impact on Radicalism, Polarization and Political Violence,” Technology in Society 75 (2023): 6, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102262; Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet: Risks of Digital Agitation and Radicalisation (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2025), 9, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/right-wing-extremism/2025-01-right-wing-extremism-on-the-internet.pdf.
[39] Iryanda Mardanuz, “Waspada Pola Rekrutmen Teroris Lewat Game Online Anak-Anak,” Deutsche Welle, January 23, 2026, https://www.dw.com/id/rekrutmen-teroris-game-online/a-75599685.
[40] Examining the Intersection Between Gaming and Violent Extremism (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2022), 10–1, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/en/Examining-the- Intersection-Between-Gaming-and-Violent%20Extremism.
[41] Pranav Baskar, “How Hate Groups and Terrorists Use Gaming Platforms to Recruit Young Children,” The New York Times, February 11, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/11/world/europe/online-extremism-gaming-children.html; Gagandeep, “Playing with Hate: How Far-Right Extremists to Use Minecraft to Gamify Radicalisation,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, July 2, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/07/02/playing-with-hate-how-far-right-extremists-use-minecraft- to-gamify-radicalisation/.
[42] Merle Verdegaal et al., Extremists’ Use of Video Gaming – Strategies and Narratives (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2020), https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-11/ran_cn_conclusion_paper_videogames_15-17092020 _en.pdf; Galen Lamphere-Englund, Protecting Children in Online Gaming: Mitigating Risks from Organized Violence (UNICEF Innocenti – Global Office of Research and Foresight, 2025), 11–2, https://www.unicef.org/innocenti/media/ 11836/file/UNICEF-Innocenti-Protecting-Children-Online-Gaming-Working-Paper-2025.pdf.
[43] Jessica White et al., Radicalisation Through Gaming: The Role of Gendered Social Identity (Royal United Services Institute, 2024), 22–9, https://static.rusi.org/radicalisation-through-gaming-role-of-gendered-social-identity-whr-december-2024.pdf.
[44] Memes as an Online Weapon: An Analysis into the Use of Memes by the Far Right (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, 2024), 9, https://english.nctv.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2024/08/01/ far-right-memes-undermining-and-far-from-recognizable/NCTV_Memes+as+an+online+weapon_English+version+May+2024.pdf.
[45] Use of Memes by Violent Extremists (Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, 2022), 1–2, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/128S_-_First_Responders_Toolbox_-_Use_of_Memes_by_Violent_Extremists.pdf.
[46] Lamphere-Englund, “Protecting Children in Online Gaming,” 11–2.
[47] National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, Memes as an Online Weapon, 30; Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross, “White Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the Internet,” Strategic Security Analysis, no. 11 (2020): 7–8, https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/white-crusade-how-prevent-right-wing-extremists-exploiting-internet; Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Use of Memes by Violent Extremists, 1; Blyth Crawford, Florence Keen and Guillermo Suarez de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence Within Chan Cultures,” Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, December 15, 2020, 5, https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/memetic -irony-and-the-promotion-of-violence-within-chan-cultures/.
[48] Norbertus Arya Dwiangga Martiar, “Jaringan Teroris Aktif Rekrut Anak-Anak Lewat Media Sosial Dan Gim Daring, Korban Ratusan,” Kompas, November 18, 2025, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/jaringan-teroris-aktif-rekrut-anak-anak-lewat-media-sosial- dan-gim-daring-ratusan-anak-jadi-korban.
[49] Mardanuz, “Waspada Pola Rekrutmen Teroris Lewat Game Online Anak-Anak”; Martiar, “Jaringan Teroris Aktif Rekrut Anak-Anak Lewat Media Sosial.”
[50] Atamuradova, Lamphere-Englund and Allen, Understanding and Preventing Online Extremism, 15.
[51] Chevy Atha, “The Jakarta Bombing: Youth Digital Radicalisation and the Urgent Need for Adaptive PCVE Responses,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, January 7, 2026, https://gnet-research.org/2026/01/07/the-jakarta-bombing-youth-digital-radicalisation-and-the-urgent-need-for-adaptive-pcve-responses/.
[52] The phrase “14 words” refers to a widely known slogan among white supremacists: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.” See “14 Words,” Anti-Defamation League, 2026, https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/14-words.
[53] The phrase “For Agartha” refers to a mythical kingdom that is sometimes believed to be located at the centre of the earth and is associated with Western esotericism, which includes various mythical beliefs known only to a select few. Agartha is often connected to the idea of the legendary Aryan homeland, Hyperborea, which is a common theme in esoteric Nazism. See “What is Agartha? Esoteric Nazism Spreading on Meta Platforms, Followers Harassing Teachers,” Global Project against Hate and Extremism, December 8, 2025, https://globalextremism.org/post/what-is-agartha/.
[54] Brenton Tarrant is responsible for the Christchurch mosque attack in New Zealand, which occurred on March 15, 2019, resulting in the deaths of 51 people and injuries to 40 others. See “Executive Summary,” Royal Commission of Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019, 2020, https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/the- report/executive-summary-2/executive-summary.
[55] Alexandre Bissonnette is responsible for the Quebec City mosque shooting in Canada, which occurred on January 29, 2017, resulting in the deaths of 6 people and injuries to 5 others. See Jonathan Montpetit, “Quebec City Mosque Shooting,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2019, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quebec-city-mosque-shooting.
[56] Trisya Frida, “Ada 3 Nama Di Senjata Saat Ledakan SMAN 72 Jakarta, Siapa Mereka?” VIVA.co.id, November 7, 2025, https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1859865-ada-3-nama-di-senjata-saat-ledakan-sman-72-jakarta-siapa-mereka.
[57] Annisa Febiola and Nabiila Azzahra, “Pelaku Ledakan Di SMAN 72 Jakarta Akses Grup Bernama True Crime Community,” Tempo, November 19, 2025, https://www.tempo.co/hukum/pelaku-ledakan-di-sman-72-jakarta-akses-grup- bernama-true-crime-community-2091148.
[58] “When Extremism Targets Children in Indonesia’s Digital Space,” ANTARA News, January 25, 2026, https://en.antaranews.com/news/401598/when-extremism-targets-children-in-indonesias-digital-space.
[59] Lisa Bogerts and Maik Fielitz, “’Do You Want Meme War?’: Understanding the Visual Memes of the German Far Right,” in Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: Online Actions and Offline Consequences in Europe and the US, eds. Maik Fielitz and Nick Thurston (Bielefeld, 2019), 138, https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/12380.
[60] Annelies Pauwels, Contemporary Manifestations of Violent Right-Wing Extremism in the EU: An Overview of P/CVE Practices (European Commission, 2021), 6–8, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-04/ran_adhoc_cont_manif_ vrwe_eu_overv_pcve_pract_2021_en.pdf.
[61] Miron Lakomy, “Artificial Intelligence as a Terrorism Enabler? Understanding the Potential Impact of Chatbots and Image Generators on Online Terrorist Activities,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 49, no. 5 (2023): 16, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1057610x.2023.2259195.
[62] Gabriel Weimann et al., “Generating Terror: The Risks of Generative AI Exploitation,” CTC Sentinel 17, no. 1 (2024): 17–23, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/generating-terror-the-risks-of-generative-ai-exploitation/.
[63] National Counter Terrorism Agency, I-KHub BNPT: Indonesia Terrorism Threat Report 2023–2025, 35; Atamuradova, Lamphere-Englund and Allen, Understanding and Preventing Online Extremism, 15.
[64] “BNPT: Program Duta Damai Mampu Berdayakan Generasi Muda Sebagai Agen Perubahan,” Tribrata News, January 10, 2025, https://tribratanews.polri.go.id/blog/nasional-3/bnpt-program-duta-damai-mampu- berdayakan-generasi-muda-sebagai-agen-perubahan-82865.
[65] Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme Republik Indonesia (@bnptri), “#SobatDamai kira-kira berapa yaaaa jumlah Duta Damai Dunia Maya di seluruh Indonesia?” Instagram, July 25, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/reel/DMjuehnSxZj/.
[66] Hidayat Salam, “Terorisme Di Jagat Maya Mengintai Remaja,” Kompas, May 25, 2025, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/terorisme-di-jagat-maya-mengintai-remaja.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Tim Redaksi, “Seberapa Masif Upaya Teroris Merekrut Anak-Anak Melalui Medsos Dan Gim Daring?” Kompas, November 20, 2025, https://www.kompas.id/artikel/seberapa-masif-upaya-teroris-merekrut-anak-anak-melalui -medsos-dan-gim-daring.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Resty Woro Yuniar, “Indonesia Targets Violent Video Games After Mosque Bombing – But Can a Ban Curb Extremism?” South China Morning Post, November 19, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3333280/indonesia- mulls-violent-video-game-ban-after-mosque-bombing-can-fight-extremism.
[71] Farhan Arda Nugraha, “Menkomdigi Sebut PP Tunas Lindungi Anak dari Kejahatan Dunia Maya,” ANTARA News, November 19, 2025, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/5253357/menkomdigi-sebut-pp-tunas-lindungi-anak-dari-kejahatan-dunia-maya; Keluarga Cerdas Digital: Panduan Orang Tua dan Anak Tumbuh Aman Dan Sehat di Ruang Digital (Komdigi, 2025), 16, https://tunasdigital.id/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Tunaspedia-Keluarga-Cerdas-Digital.pdf.
[72] “PP Tunas Berlaku, Platform Wajib Batasi Akses Anak,” Komdigi, March 28, 2026, https://www.komdigi.go.id/berita/siaran-pers/detail/pp-tunas-berlaku-platform-wajib-batasi-akses-anak.
[73] PSE in this regulation is defined as any person, state administrator, business entity and community that provides, manages and/or operates electronic systems, either individually or jointly, to users of electronic systems for their own needs and/or the needs of other parties. See Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.17 Tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola Penyelenggaraan Sistem Elektronik (PSE) dalam Pelindungan Anak, Article 1.
[74] “Indonesia Ambil Peran dalam Melindungi Anak di Ruang Digital,” Tunas Digital, 2025, https://tunasdigital.id/tentang-pp-tunas/.
[75] Antara, “Indonesia May Lead Global South in Limiting Children’s Social Media Use,” Tempo, April 1, 2026, https://en.tempo.co/read/2095826/indonesia-may-lead-global-south-in-limiting-childrens-social-media-use.
[76] Sekilas Tentang PP Tunas: Pelindungan Anak di Ruang Digital (Komdigi, 2025), 12, https://tunasdigital.id/ sekilas-tentang-pp-tunas/.
[77] Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.17 Tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE dalam Pelindungan Anak, Article 38.
[78] Helen Livingstone, “Australia Has Banned Social Media for Kids Under 16. How Does It Work?” BBC News, January 23, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyp9d3ddqyo.
[79] James Woodford, “How Australian Teens Are Planning to Get Around Their Social Media Ban,” New Scientist, December 5, 2025, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2507241-how-australian-teens-are-planning-to-get-around-their-social-media-ban/.
[80] Paul Smith, “’Shocked At How Easy It Is’: Snapchat Failing to Stop Teen Users,” Australian Financial Review, January 20, 2026, https://www.afr.com/technology/shocked-at-how-easy-it-is-snapchat-failing-to-stop-teen-users-20260120-p5nvdm; Woodford, “How Australian Teens.”
[81] Ali Abdullah Wibisono, Rachel Kumendong and Iwa Maulana, “Indonesia’s Handling of Terrorists’ Cyber Activities: How Repressive Measures Still Fall Short,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 12, no. 1 (2024): 18, https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241298764.
[82] Zen Soo, “China Keeping 1 Hour Daily Limit on Kids’ Online Games,” Associated Press, January 20, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/gaming-business-children-00db669defcc8e0ca1fc2dc54120a0b8.
[83] Tianyi Zhangshao, Ben Egliston and Marcus Carter, “China Restricted Young People from Video Games. But Kids Are Evading the Bans and Getting into Trouble,” The Conversation, December 9, 2024, https://theconversation.com/china-restricted-young-people-from-video-games-but-kids-are-evading-the-bans-and-getting-into-trouble-245264; Soo, “China Keeping 1 Hour Daily Limit.”
[84] Fan Yiying and Zhu Ruiying, “Minors Tricked into Scams Promising Gaming Curfew Workarounds,” Sixth Tone, December 29, 2021, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1009330.
[85] National Counter Terrorism Agency, I-KHub BNPT: Indonesia Terrorism Threat Report 2023–2025, 30–1; Atamuradova, Lamphere-Englund and Allen, Understanding and Preventing Online Extremism, 19–21; Nava Nuraniyah, “Online Extremism: The Advent of Encrypted Private Chat Groups,” in Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence, ed. Edwin Jurriens (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 2017), 170, https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814786003-016.
[86] Aditya Panji and Muhammad Fikrie, “Akhirnya, Kemkominfo Buka Blokir Telegram,” Kumparan.com, August 10, 2017, https://kumparan.com/kumparantech/akhirnya-kemkominfo-buka-blokir-telegram/full.
[87] Atamuradova, Lamphere-Englund and Allen, Understanding and Preventing Online Extremism, 21.
[88] PP No.17 Tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE dalam Pelindungan Anak, Article 5; Peraturan Menteri Komunikasi dan Digital Republik Indonesia (Permen Komdigi) No. 9 tahun 2026 tentang Peraturan Pelaksanaan PP No.17 Tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE dalam Pelindungan Anak, Article 4.
[89] Tabita Diela, “Telegram Must Open Local Office, Flag Suspicious Accounts to Avoid Government Shutdown,” Jakarta Globe, July 18, 2017, https://jakartaglobe.id/business/telegram-must-open-local-office-flag-suspicious-accounts-avoid-government- shutdown/; Jofie Yordan, “Menkominfo Belum Tahu Tumblr Diblokir Lagi,” Kumparan.com, March 6, 2018, https://kumparan.com/kumparantech/menkominfo-belum-tahu-tumblr-diblokir/full; “Indonesian Minister Confirms Elaelo ‘X Replacement’ Application Not Sanctioned by Govt,” Tempo, June 18, 2024, https://en.tempo.co/read /1881227/indonesian-minister-confirms-elaelo-x-replacement-application-not-sanctioned-by-govt; “Indonesia Urges TikTok, Meta to Act Against Harmful Online Content,” Reuters, August 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/ media-telecom/indonesia-urges-tiktok-meta-act-against-harmful-online-content-2025-08-27/.
[90] Maudey Khalisha, “Indonesia Confronts Meta Over Compliance,” The Jakarta Post, March 5, 2026, https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2026/03/05/govt-confronts-meta-over-compliance.html.
[91] Permen Komdigi No. 9 tahun 2026 tentang Peraturan Pelaksanaan PP No.17 tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE.
[92] PP No.17 Tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE dalam Pelindungan Anak, Article 8.
[93] Crawford, Keen and de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence,” 4; National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, Memes as an Online Weapon, 28–9.
[94] “Terrorist Use of Memes,” National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, February 23, 2023, https://www.unomaha.edu/ncite/_files/documents/ncite-presents-terrorist-use-of-memes-panel-transcript.pdf.
[95] Jonathan Suseno Sarwono, “CaliphateTok: How Islamic State (IS) Leverages Social Media in Indonesia and the Power of Counter-Narratives,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, November 28, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/11/28/ caliphatetok-how-islamic-state-is-leverages-social-media-in-indonesia-and-the-power-of-counter-narratives/; Newton, “Staying Alive.”
[96] Jonathan Suseno Sarwono, “‘Yup, Another Far-Right Classic’: The Propagation of Far-Right Content on TikTok in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, November 8, 2023 https://gnet-research.org /2023/11/08/yup-another-far-right-classic-the-propagation-of-far-right-content-on-tiktok-in-malaysia-indonesia-and-the-philippines/.
[97] Crawford, Keen and de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence,” 5.
[98] National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, Memes as an Online Weapon, 9.
[99] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet, 23; Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Use of Memes by Violent Extremists, 1–3; National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, Memes as an Online Weapon, 12.
[100] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesia and the Tech Giants vs ISIS Supporters: Combating Violent Extremism Online,” IPAC Report, no. 48 (2018): 12, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2018/07/IPAC_Report_48.pdf; Atamuradova, Lamphere-Englund and Allen, Understanding and Preventing Online Extremism, 23.
[101] Linda Schlegel, Countering the Misuse of Gaming-Related Content & Spaces: Inspiring Practices and Opportunities for Cooperation with Tech Companies (European Commission, 2022), 15–6, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f355fa6c-41f0-431c-96ac-948ba765b990_en; Verdegaal et al., Extremists’ Use of Video Gaming – Strategies and Narratives; Faiz Rahman et al., Regulating Harmful Content in Indonesia: Legal Frameworks, Trends, and Concerns (Center For Digital Society, 2022), 73, https://cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/sites/1423/2022/07/Final-Report-Unesco-Rev- 18062022-1.pdf; White et al., Radicalisation Through Gaming, 54–61.
[102] Rahman et al., Regulating Harmful Content in Indonesia, 73.
[103] Brooks, “Far-Right Extremists Using Games Platforms.”
[104] Preventing Violent Extremism Through Education: A Guide for Policy-Makers (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2017), 20–34, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000247764_eng.
[105] Particularly in Focus 3 of the Prevention Pillar, several of the actions clearly state the incorporation of materials aimed at preventing violent extremism that can lead to terrorism. This includes the improvement of critical thinking skills within the curriculum of primary, secondary, higher and religious education. The same focus also emphasises the necessity for capacity building among teachers and lecturers, both in formal and religious education contexts, concerning effective learning methods and resources to foster critical thinking skills. See Lampiran PP No.7 Tahun 2021 tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme (RAN PE) Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2020–2024.
[106] Sekretariat Bersama RAN PE, Laporan RAN PE 2024: Pencapaian dan Pembelajaran (I-Khub, 2025), 50–158, https://ikhub.id/produk/ kebijakan-nasional/laporan-ran-pe-tahun-2024-29642038.
[107] “BNPT: Kampus Garda Terdepan Cegah Radikalisme UNISA jadi Model Kampus Kebangsaan,” Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Sunan Ampel Surabaya, December 10, 2025, https://uinsa.ac.id/bnpt-kampus-garda-terdepan-cegah-radikalisme-uinsa -jadi-model-kampus-kebangsaan; Agatha Olivia Victoria, “BNPT: Sekolah Damai Upaya Bentengi Pendidikan dari Ideologi Kekerasan,” ANTARA News, November 6 ,2025, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/5224493/bnpt-sekolah-damai-upaya-bentengi- pendidikan-dari-ideologi-kekerasan.
[108] Particularly within Theme 3, the framework focuses on enhancing both access to and quality of education, while also strengthening inclusive education as part of broader efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. The measures outlined include the provision of programmes and supporting infrastructure for extremism prevention in educational environments, the development of training modules on the early detection of extremism, capacity building initiatives for educators, and the strengthening of guidance and supervisory mechanisms within educational institutions. In addition, the theme highlights the formulation of tolerance education guidelines and the provision of inclusive educational facilities and learning materials aimed at instilling values of diversity and tolerance among minors. See PP No.8 Tahun 2026 tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2026–2029.
[109] Strengthening Young People’s Resilience to Extremism in NSW (New South Wales Government, 2022), 6, https://www.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-08/NSW-DPC-Youth-Resilience-Report.pdf.
[110] Thomas K Samuel, “At the Crossroads: Rethinking the Role of Education in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” in Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, ed. Alex P. Schmid (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2021), 184, https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/Handbook_Schmid_2020.pdf.
[111] Aaron A Larson, M Anne Britt and Christopher A Kurby, “Improving Students’ Evaluation of Informal Arguments,” Journal of Experimental Education 77, no. 4: 1–13, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2823078/; Finnish National Agency for Education, Prevention of Violent Radicalisation in Schools, 10.
[112] UNESCO, Preventing Violent Extremism Through Education, 32–3.
[113] Ibid., 33–4.
[114] Alton Grizzle and Jose Manuel Perez Tornero, “Media and Information Literacy against Online Hate, Radical and Extremist Content,” in Media and Information Literacy: Reinforcing Human Rights, Countering Radicalization and Extremism (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2016), p. 197, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246371.
[115] Alton Grizzle, “Introduction,” in Media and Information Literacy: Reinforcing Human Rights, Countering Radicalization and Extremism, eds. Paulette Kerr and Esther Hamburger (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2016), 14–5, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246371.
[116] Ibid, 6.
[117] Tessa Jolls and Carolyn Wilson, “Youth Radicalization in Cyberspace: Enlisting Media and Information Literacy in the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” in Media and Information Literacy: Reinforcing Human Rights, Countering Radicalization and Extremism,” eds. Paulette Kerr and Esther Hamburger (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2016), 168, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246371.
[118] PP No.17 Tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE dalam Pelindungan Anak, Article 12.
[119] Komdigi, Sekilas Tentang PP Tunas, 15.
[120] Hana Dwi Kinarina Kaban, “Mendikdasmen Ingatkan Guru Perkuat Literasi Digital dukung PP Tunas,” ANTARA News, March 28, 2026, https://sulteng.antaranews.com/berita/379590/mendikdasmen-ingatkan-guru-perkuat-literasi-digital-dukung-pp-tunas; Afissha H. O., “PP Tunas Berlaku, Kemenag Perkuat Literasi Digital bagi Siswa dan Santri,” Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, March 28, 2026, https://kemenag.go.id/pers-rilis/pp-tunas-berlaku-kemenag-perkuat-literasi-digital-bagi-siswa-dan- santri-p4jPS.
[121] Farhan Arda Nugraha, “Kemkomdigi: PP Tunas Jadi Literasi Digital Penggunaan Medsos Oleh Anak,” ANTARA News, June 20, 2025, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4913129/kemkomdigi-pp-tunas-jadi-literasi-digital-penggunaan-medsos-oleh-anak.
[122] Permen Komdigi No. 9 tahun 2026 tentang Peraturan Pelaksanaan PP No.17 tahun 2025 tentang Tata Kelola PSE.
[123] “Luncurkan Program Literasi Digital Nasional, Presiden: Dorong Masyarakat Makin Cakap Digital,” Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, May 20, 2021, https://setkab.go.id/luncurkan-program-literasi-digital-nasional-presiden-dorong-masyarakat-makin-cakap-digital/.
[124] “Program Literasi Digital Nasional ‘Indonesia Makin Cakap Digital’ Merupakan Inisiasi Penguatan Keterampilan Digital Dasar (Literasi Digital) Masyarakat Indonesia,” Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital Republik Indonesia, 2023, https://literasidigital.id/profil.
[125] “Apa Itu IMDI?” Indeks Masyarakat Digital Indonesia, accessed March 15, 2026, https://imdi.sdmdigital.id.
[126] “2025 Pengembangan Literasi Digital Recap,” Literasi Digital Komdigi, February 4, 2026, YouTube, 7 min., 52 sec., https://www.youtube.com /watch?v=EH4 giFTHuLk; Lukman, “Pelajar SMK Diperkuat Kesiapan Hadapi Ancaman Siber Lewat Pelatihan Basic Cyber Security,” Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital Republik Indonesia, July 28, 2025, https://bpsdm.komdigi.go.id/berita-pelajar-smk-diperkuat-kesiapan-hadapi-ancaman-siber- lewat-pelatihan-basic-c-45-2258.
[127] Media and Information Literacy for All: Closing the Gaps: Global Analysis of the Current State of Play of Media and Information Literacy (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2025), 1, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000396030.
[128] Séraphin Alava, Divina Frau-Meigs and Ghayda Hassan, Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media: Mapping the Research (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2017), 40–1, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000260382.
[129] Grizzle and Tornero, “Media and Information Literacy Against Online Hate, Radical and Extremist Content,” 187–97; Alava, Frau-Meigs and Hassan, Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media, 40–1.
