The Evolution and Implications of Militant Drones’ Diffusion into Pakistan’s Threat Landscape
Between 2025 and 2026, two Pakistani terrorist groups Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Baloch Liberation Army, formally announced their drone units.[1] At the same time, Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, an alliance of Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, Lashkar-e-Islam and Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, has also been deploying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for terrorist attacks.[2] Against this backdrop, this study examines the shifting operational tactics of the Pakistani terrorist groups from mountain-based tribal warfare to tech-driven urban guerrilla warfare, the potential asymmetric advantages and implications of this development for Pakistan’s internal security.
Introduction
In the first half of 2026, according to police data, over 100 militant drone strikes have been recorded in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the country’s most affected region by terrorism.[3] The South Asia Terrorism Portal’s open-source database reveals that militant drone attacks in 2026 have killed at least 29 security personnel and wounded 89 others in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Notably, the low casualty figure points to the rudimentary, but improving, drone capability of Pakistani terrorist networks.[4] Terrorist groups’ drone attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are expanding from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to urban and civilian parts of the province.[5] Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s 40 districts, at least 13 have suffered terrorist drone attacks, mostly targeting police stations, military vehicle convoys, security check posts and residences of anti-Taliban militia members.[6]
The weaponisation of commercially available, off-the-shelf drones by Pakistani terrorist groups underscores a tactical, but significant and consequential shift, from mountain-based tribal guerrilla warfare to tech-driven urban conflict.[7] This evolution is potentially “eroding the positional dominance of the Pakistani security forces” which control the main highways through check posts and block terrorists’ entry into the main cities.[8] Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) allow terrorists to bypass traditional security controls of the Pakistani security forces and enter the cities from the sky.[9] At the same time, terrorist drone attacks drive up the security costs, compelling Pakistani law enforcement institutions to deploy anti-drone technologies while facing a dual threat both from the ground and the sky.[10] In the long-term, these technological transformations will have far-reaching impacts on terrorism and counterterrorism in Pakistan.[11]
Keeping this in view, it is essential to assess these shifting trends and their implications. To this end, the first part of this article outlines various drone units of Pakistani terrorist groups. The second and third sections respectively examine potential asymmetric advantages that drones offer to terrorist groups and situate the militant drone threat in Pakistan’s evolving security landscape. Finally, key implications of the militant drone threat to Pakistan are discussed.
Drone Units of Pakistani Terrorist Networks
Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan
Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), an alliance of Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG), Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) and Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP),[12] has pioneered the use of drones for attacks and reconnaissance in Pakistan. Though IMP started weaponising drones as early as 2024,[13] it officially started claiming such attacks only in mid-2025.[14] Reportedly, between July and September 2024, Pakistani security forces suffered six unclaimed UAV attacks in North Waziristan district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a stronghold of IMP’s main allied faction, Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group.[15] The drones used for these attacks were Chinese-made commercial Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) Mavic 3, Matrice Series,[16] and Air 2 drones.[17]
At any rate, the shift in IMP’s policy to officially own drone attacks in mid-2025 compelled Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—which was also carrying out drone strikes without taking credit—to claim responsibility so as not to concede space to IMP.[18] Until then, TTP deliberately avoided claiming drone attacks fearing public backlash and greater counterterrorism pressure from the Pakistani security institutions.[19] Surprisingly, unlike TTP and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), IMP has not officially announced or given a specific name to its drone unit.
The main force behind IMP’s drone capabilities is Al-Qaeda which has imparted technological skills and knowledge to Pakistani jihadist groups as well as trained them in Afghanistan to repurpose commercially available quadcopters for spying and attacks.[20] Reportedly, financial patronage has been provided to them by the Taliban regime which continues to host and patronise Pakistan-focused terrorist groups in Afghanistan.[21] One of IMP’s three coalition partners, HIIP which was formed in March 2025,[22] comprises some Pakistani Al-Qaeda remnants, including the notorious 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri.[23] These Pakistani Al-Qaeda remnants came together to form HIIP and then forged an alliance with LeI and HGBG.[24]
On the supply side, Pakistani terrorist groups are purchasing low-cost (US$200-US$1,000), commercially available quadcopters, mostly manufactured by Chinese commercial drone companies, such as Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI).[25] Reportedly, IMP and TTP bypass the Pakistani government’s import bans by purchasing consumer electronics directly from local commercial hubs and online platforms.[26] For instance, in June 2026, Karachi’s Counter Terrorism Department arrested a man who “purchased drone motors, propellers, batteries, controller boards and other electronic items that could be used in the preparation of improvised explosive devices” for TTP from various markets in Karachi.[27] Meanwhile those hardware parts which are not commercially available are smuggled into Pakistan from Afghanistan’s unregulated markets.[28]
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s “Air Force” Unit
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) formally announced its drone unit calling it “Air Force” in December 2025.[29] However, it is noteworthy that TTP was carrying out drone attacks much before it officially declared its drone unit due to the ongoing competition with IMP.[30] At any rate, militant commander Saleem Haqqani has been appointed as the head of TTP’s drone unit while another militant named Qari Hamza is responsible for arranging electronics and technical workshops.[31] TTP’s ability to retrofit commercial quadcopters for terrorist purposes has been aided by the sanctuary afforded to it by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[32] Reportedly, the Taliban have been developing a clandestine kamikaze drone programme by “reverse engineering Western technology and repurposed US and NATO facilities in Afghanistan for production.”[33] TTP and IMP have benefited from the same technical expertise and facilities, a charge that the Taliban regime denies.[34] The Taliban regime has displayed its drone capability during the ongoing tensions with Pakistan where one-way drones flew as far afield as the capital Islamabad and Abbottabad, a military garrison town.[35]
Three underlying factors shaped TTP’s policy of not officially acknowledging drone attacks until IMP’s open responsibility claims forced them to follow suit.
First, TTP knew that soon after the official announcement of the drone unit and responsibility claims, Pakistani pressure on the Taliban regime will increase to defang its nascent drone capability.[36] At the same time, TTP anticipated that Pakistan would blame the Taliban regime for equipping TTP with drones.[37]
Second, TTP has been careful about civilian casualties in its violent operations. Publicly, TTP has announced that it only attacks Pakistani security institutions while doing its best to avoid non-combatant targets.[38] However, drone attacks can kill indiscriminately, carrying greater chances of civilian casualties. Since the Taliban’s return to power, TTP has been portraying itself as the self-appointed defender of the Pakistani Pashtun community in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.[39] In doing so, it is trying to win sympathies of the local population.[40] Against this backdrop, any attribution of drone attacks to TTP killing civilians would have dented that image.[41] At the same time, by not claiming drone attacks, it was easier for TTP to blame civilian fatalities on Pakistani security institutions and draw a wedge between them and the local population who are victims of such attacks.[42]
Third, any premature acknowledgement of drone capability would have set the alarm bells ringing in Pakistan’s security circles, prompting them to increase counterterrorism pressure and employ anti-drone technology to deny TTP any tactical advantage. Therefore, TTP took its time in disclosing its drone capability.[43]
TTP’s propaganda videos circulating on encrypted platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp and Rocket Chat reveal it is now experimenting with industrial and First Person View (FPV) drones.[44]
As and when TTP matures in the use of industrial and FPV drones, it would further enhance its lethal capabilities. However, their steep cost as opposed to commercial drones might limit their usage despite offering several advantages. For instance, industrial drones are more expensive than commercial quadcopters. Likewise, FPV drones’ specialised gear, modular nature and repair costs make them a less viable option in comparison to standard ready-to-fly commercial drone units.
Nevertheless, as opposed to commercial, off-the-shelf quadcopters, industrial drones would enable Pakistani terrorist groups to carry heavy cargo from 3 to 30 kilogrammes (in the case of delivery drones) [45] and specialised equipment like thermal sensors and LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) scanners, while braving extreme weather conditions like heavy winds, extreme temperatures and rains.[46] Likewise, the FPV drones would allow the terror groups to manoeuvre through mountainous terrain, successfully navigate hurdles coming in their flight path, fly under the radar and breach fortified targets and tight spaces.[47]
Baloch Liberation Army’s Qazi Aero Hive Ranger
BLA officially revealed its drone unit, the Qazi Aero Hive Ranger (QAHR), in February 2026 during Operation Herof 2.0.[48] BLA credited its slain commander Abdul Basit Zehri as the architect in BLA’s move to adopt modern technologies. Zehri was a senior BLA commander who became a central strategist after joining the group in 2006. He was instrumental to BLA’s evolution from rural to urban guerrilla warfare by embracing emerging technologies to compensate for the power asymmetry against the conventionally superior Pakistani military.[49]
In Pakistan’s competitive militant landscape, BLA is the latest entrant in the use of drones for attacks while it was already using them for surveillance and propaganda purposes.[50] In its official statements, BLA maintained that “modern asymmetric conflicts are no longer confined to the ground operations and have expanded into air and cyberspace. The formation of QAHR is BLA’s initial step to operate in these domains.” However, such claims must not be taken at face value given a huge gap that exists between professed claims and ground realities. In reality, BLA’s capabilities are rudimentary and it is overestimating its capabilities to gain publicity.[51] The formation of QAHR underscores institutional intent to expand into the technological sphere.[52] BLA does not possess industrial drones, and its approach remains rooted in commercially available drone technology where the primary utility remains spying and propaganda.[53]
Critically, the February 2026 report of the United Nations’ Monitoring Committee on Al-Qaeda and ISIL reveals that in weaponising drones, BLA has benefited from organisational learning, transfer of skills, information and knowledge sharing from TTP similar to suicide terrorism.[54] This transactional cooperation is driven by pragmatic needs rather than ideology and has taken place at the tactical level rather than official and organisational level.[55] It is driven by pragmatic considerations of cooperating against a common adversary in the Pakistani state.[56]
Asymmetric Battlefield Advantages Drones Offer to Pakistani Terrorist Networks
Pakistani terrorist networks are now trying to evolve into hybrid insurgent groups by integrating their traditional tactics of mountain-based guerrilla warfare, such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices and ambushes, with tech-driven urban guerrilla tactics. These include employing social media platforms and Generative Artificial Intelligence for propaganda warfare, and commercial UAVs for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and attacks.
These tactical transformations would allow them to enhance their reach and efficacy, both from the ground and air. While they have dropped small explosive payloads, such as improvised explosive devices, GP-25 grenade launchers, and small calibre mortar rounds onto ground targets, such capabilities provide them with an element of surprise if used effectively in combination with other lethal tactics.
Commercial off-the-shelf drones are small, quiet, easy to carry, and retrofit and modify. They are also capable of low altitude flight, thus making them difficult to intercept with conventional radar systems.[57] Some of these drones are even equipped with thermal cameras, enabling nighttime surveillance and attacks.
In Pakistan, drones are helping terrorist groups to expand their violent operations from border areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to the main cities by overcoming ground barriers like security check posts.[58] Even if militant drones cause limited damage, their ability to strike a high-profile target in an urban centre constitutes a major security risk for Pakistan. Such instances will increase financial costs for the Pakistani security institutions to secure sensitive buildings and installations in the main cities.[59]
Finally, in the psychological realm, drones act as force multipliers for Pakistani terrorist networks.[60] They are effective propaganda tools, enabling terrorist networks to overhype their operational capabilities by portraying themselves as technologically sophisticated and advanced. They can mask the perception-reality gap to gain media attention, escalate security costs and drive a wedge between Pakistani state and local populations in areas affected by terrorism.
It is important to mention that Pakistani security institutions also use quadcopter drones for counterterrorism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The similar nature of these drones coupled with unclaimed attacks by TTP have created a grey area where terrorist groups get away with drone attacks where civilians become victims. The policy of not claiming such drone attacks not only allows groups to disown them but also blame them on the Pakistani state.[61] The May 2025 drone strikes in North Waziristan’s Mir Ali sub-district exemplify this: four children were killed and several others injured, resulting in public backlash.[62] Since no groups claimed it, the Pakistani military was blamed for the attack triggering a week-long protest with demands of accountability and transparency.[63] It compelled the Pakistan Army’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), to issue a clarification that the military was not involved in the attack. It instead blamed TTP.[64]
Contextualising the Militant Drone Threat in Pakistan’s Evolving Security Landscape
Accurately mapping the current threat that militant drones pose to Pakistan’s internal security is essential to avoid exaggeration or underestimation.
Though terrorist networks in the Middle East and Africa were quick to take advantage of commercially available drones, Pakistani terrorist groups took their time in embracing them. Several factors shaped their strategic and ideological calculi. At the strategic level, the most obvious factor was the ability of drones to advance ideological objectives of groups like TTP and BLA.[65] Other considerations included drones’ commercial availability in the open and black market; their costs and the technological skillset needed to weaponise them.[66] As the commercial availability of drones improved and prices dropped, Pakistani terrorist groups invested their energies in learning technological skills to innovate and adopt drones for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance as well as violent attacks.[67]
According to the technology-adoption curve, Pakistani terrorist groups’ ability to weaponise commercially available drones is located at different points of the curve’s continuum. The technology adoption curve has four points. The first point denotes early adoption when terrorist groups experiment with the technology signifying their intent.[68] The second point is iteration where they adopt the technology in the battlefield, but their rate of failure is higher than the success rate.[69] The third point represents a breakthrough where the rate of success improves and the rate of failure drops.[70] The final point is about competition where states and technology firms adopt countermeasures to deny terrorist groups the ability to abuse technologies and the latter adapt further to evade them.[71]
Keeping this in view, Pakistani jihadist groups are ahead of Baloch separatists in weaponising drones.[72] TTP and IMP’s capabilities, as per the technology-adoption curve, are located at the intersection of the breakthrough and competition phases. They have successfully employed drones in the battlefield with lethal effect and Pakistani security institutions’ anti-drone measures are compelling them to adapt further to evade them.[73]
BLA and other Baloch separatist groups, on the other hand, are situated at the intersection of the iteration and breakthrough phases of the technology-adoption curve.[74] Currently, they are employing drones for attacks and improving their success rate, but the rate of failure remains high.
It is important to mention that the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), despite issuing five drone manuals about their types and instructions to rig them with explosives, has not weaponised them due to a hostile operational environment and lack of a stable and secure sanctuary.[75] Unlike TTP, IMP and BLA, ISKP lacks safe havens which are critical to procure, experiment and successfully employ commercially available drones in the battlefield.[76]
Most of the drones employed by Pakistani terrorist groups are off-the-shelf, commercially available UAVs of Chinese origin.[77] Furthermore, they have dropped small payloads weighing between 400 and 700 grams, packed in plastic bottles onto the ground targets, mostly police stations, military compounds, security check posts and military convoys.[78] These explosives were mixed with nails and ball bearings to enhance the impact of the explosion. At the same time, grenades and mortars have also been dropped from drones on the intended targets.
Critically, Pakistani terrorist groups do not possess the technological sophistication and tactical prowess in the use of drones seen among Iranian militant proxies, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis. They also lack the sophistication exhibited by the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) through the swarm of drone attacks. Nevertheless, their existing capabilities mark a critical shift in Pakistan’s internal security landscape.
Implications
The foremost implication of drones’ weaponisation by Pakistani terrorist groups is the rising cost of security.[79] Pakistani security institutions are now acquiring anti-drone technologies, jammers and laser guns,[80] to counter militant drone attacks.[81] They are also manufacturing anti-drone guns locally. This has increased the cost of security, especially in conflict-hit areas where IMP and TTP are expanding from Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s main cities.[82] At least 13 districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have witnessed militant drone strikes.[83] Police stations, security check posts and military compounds have been targeted by militant drones.[84] It will take Pakistani security institutions some time to adapt to this evolving security environment and deny militants the element of surprise they enjoy currently despite limited capabilities.[85] Militants, on the other hand, are striving to increase the payload capacity, battery life, and flight range of drones while also trying to lower noise emissions to make drones more effective and lethal.[86]
The second implication relates to regulatory frameworks to ensure emerging technologies are not misused by terrorist networks in Pakistan.[87] In the future, easy accessibility, dropping prices and technological improvements in drones will make them lucrative low-hanging fruit for terrorist networks in Pakistan. Banning of such technologies by Pakistani regulatory institutes will not be effective due to their easy availability in the black market.[88] At the same time, unregulated flow will also be detrimental for the country’s internal security. Hence, the government will have to strike a fine balance; they cannot block the organic evolution of such technological advancements for society’s good but at the same time, they should also ensure that the requisite regulatory framework is in place to deny any potential advantages to terrorist networks. Traditionally, Pakistan’s main challenge has not been the dearth of regulatory frameworks but their implementation.[89]
The final implication will be the race between Pakistani terrorist networks to attract technicians and vulnerable youth with software engineering and Information Technology backgrounds into their folds.[90] Terrorist groups can lure vulnerable youths to assist them to navigate the evolving technology-adoption curve. The creation of specialised units within Pakistani terrorist networks already indicates a trend of professionalisation. Induction of people with technological backgrounds into terrorist networks will potentially accelerate the process of honing technological capabilities for offensive purposes.[91] In the process, the entry barriers will be lowered for willing individuals with the requisite technology backgrounds to join terrorist networks.[92]
Conclusion
In the age of hybrid warfare, the weaponisation of drones by Pakistani terrorist networks marks an inflection point in the country’s struggle against violent extremism. While their capabilities are rudimentary at this stage and can be tackled by inducting anti-drone technologies, it is a tactical shift which can have serious strategic consequences if not carefully dealt with. Keeping in view the growing use of drones both in terrorism and counterterrorism as well as their commercial diffusions and utilisation in several other sectors, drones are here to stay, and they will continuously reshape Pakistan’s security landscape.
After successfully weaponising commercial quadcopters, Pakistani terrorist networks are now experimenting with FPV and industrial drones. In the future, the fusion of Artificial Intelligence (AI) with drone technology will further enhance their operational capabilities. Pakistan’s security apparatus needs to adapt to this rapidly changing operational environment driven by technological shifts to deny the first-mover advantage to terrorist networks. Any outcome, positive or negative, on this front will be shaped by Pakistan’s ability to tackle the challenge of the Taliban’s patronage of Pakistan-focused terrorist networks. Their safe havens in Afghanistan, proximity to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have enabled them to become technologically lethal.
About the Author
Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Jason-Mavrommatis on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Abid Hussain, “Air attacks on Kabul push Pakistan-Taliban crisis into uncharted territory,” Al-Jazeera, February 27, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/27/air-attacks-on-kabul-push-pakistan-taliban-crisis-into-uncharted-territory; “TKD MONITORING: BLA Announced First Drone Unit,” The Khorasan Diary, February 12, 2026, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2026/02/12/tkd-monitoring-bla-announced-first-drone-unit.
[2] Afghan Analyst (@AfghanAnalyst2), “IMP Claims Consecutive Drone Strikes on Pakistan Army Camps,” X, April 26, 2025, https://x.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1916096281274966052.
[3] Rahim Nasar, “Quadcopter Drones Reshaping Pakistan’s Militant Landscape (Part One),” Jamestown Foundation, March 13, 2026, https://jamestown.org/quadcopter-drones-reshaping-pakistans-militant-landscape-part-one/; “Forces foil 246 drone attacks in K-P,” Express Tribune, May 4, 2026, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2606209/forces-foil-246-drone-attacks-in-k-p.
[4] “Incidents of Drone Attacks, Pakistan: 2026,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed on June 23, 2026, https://www.satp.org/type-of-attack/Drone-Attacks/pakistan.
[5] In 2026, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security forces have foiled at least 246 drone attacks across the province.
[6] Fidel Rahmati, “Pakistan Records More Than 180 Drone Attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Since 2025,” The Khama Press, June 15, 2026, https://www.khaama.com/pakistan-records-more-than-180-drone-attacks-in-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-since-2025/.
[7] Abdul Basit, “Pakistan,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 1 (January 2025): 62–67, https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CTTA-Annual-2025.pdf.
[8] Sadia Sulaiman, “Introduction of Drones to Militants: Changing Tactics of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” Regional Security and Defense Institute, March 30, 2026, https://rsdi.ae/en/publications/introduction-of-drones-to-militants-changing-tactics-of-the-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-ttp.
[9] Faiza Abid, “The TTP’s Leap into Drone Warfare,” South Asia Times, last accessed June 22, 2026, https://southasiatimes.org/the-ttps-leap-into-drone-warfare/.
[10] “Pakistan Unveils “Safra” Anti-Drone Gun at Maritime Expo,” Aaj TV, November 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCe31lOx-as.
[11] Rahim Nasar, “Quadcopter Drones Reshaping Pakistan’s Militant Landscape (Part One).”.
[12] Ahmad Khan, “The IMP Network: Rise Of A Dangerous Militant Alliance and Its Global Threat,” Eurasia Review, July 22, 2025, https://www.eurasiareview.com/22072025-the-imp-network-rise-of-a-dangerous-militant-alliance-and-its-global-threat-oped/.
[13] Abdul Basit Khan, “Pakistan’s worsening threat landscape in 2025,” Arab News, December 28, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2627655/%7B%7B.
[14] Imtiaz Baloch and Esham Farooq, “Technologies Are Empowering Militants in a New Era of Coordinated Drone Warfare,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, January 23, 2026, https://gnet-research.org/2026/01/23/from-defence-to-offence-how-anti-drone-technologies-are-empowering-militants-in-a-new-era-of-coordinated-drone-warfare/.
[15] Iftikhar Firdaus, “TKD EXCLUSIVE: Pakistani Officials Believe Pakistani Taliban Have Developed ‘Nascent’ Drone Technology,” The Khorasan Diary, September 29, 2024, https://www.thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/09/25/tkd-exclusive-pakistani-officials-believe-pakistani-taliban-has-developed-%27nascent%27-drone-technology.
[16] Rahim Nasar, “Quadcopter Drones Reshaping Pakistan’s Militant Landscape (Part One),” Jamestown Foundation, March 13, 2026, https://jamestown.org/quadcopter-drones-reshaping-pakistans-militant-landscape-part-one/.
[17] “CTD arrests man for supplying devices to TTP for drone attacks,” Dawn, June 14, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/2007665.
[18] Muhammad Amir Rana, “The drone challenge,” Dawn, August 10, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1929884. Both TTP and IMP are locked in a fierce turf battle for influence and dominance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. For details see, Muhammad Imad Abbas, “Fractures and Realignments Among Pakistan’s Jihadist Groups,” The Diplomat, October 30, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/fractures-and-realignments-among-pakistans-jihadist-groups/.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Farhan Zahid, “Al-Qaeda’s Evolution: Future Course and Key Implications for Peace and Security,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 18, no. 3 (May 2026): 19–25, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-18-issue-03/; Dawn, “CTD arrests man for supplying devices to TTP for drone attacks”.
[21] Islomkhon Gafarov and Saidakbar Shamsiev, “Why Is Afghanistan Developing a Drone Industry?” The Diplomat, March 5, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/why-is-afghanistan-developing-a-drone-industry/.; Rueben Dass and Abdul Basit, “Nascent Adoption: Emerging Tech Trends by Terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, June 15, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/06/18/nascent-adoption-emerging-tech-trends-by-terrorists-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/.
[22] Syed Moazzam Hashmi, “Rogue Selling Old Jihadist Wine In New Bottles,” The Friday Times, April 4, 2025, https://thefridaytimes.com/04-Apr-2025/rogue-selling-old-jihadist-wine-in-new-bottles.
[23] Levina, “New Jihadist Group IIP Declares Intent in Pakistan,” Resonant News, March 17, 2025, https://resonantnews.com/2025/03/17/new-jhadist-group-iip-declares-intent-in-pakistan/.
[24] “TKD MONITORING: Three Pakistani Taliban Factions announced Ittehadul Mujahideen,” The Khorasan Diary, April 12, 2025, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2025/04/12/tkd-monitoring-three-pakistani-taliban-factions-announced-ittehadul-mujahideen.
[25] Rahim Nasar, “Quadcopter Drones Reshaping Pakistan’s Militant Landscape (Part One).”
[26] Zia ur-Rehman, “Quietly, Pakistan Wages a Deadly Drone Campaign Inside Its Own Borders,” The New York Times, June 19, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/19/world/asia/pakistan-drones-militants.html.
[27] Dawn, “CTD arrests man for supplying devices to TTP for drone attacks.”
[28] Muhammad Shoaib and Hammad Waleed, “Quadcopters Have Become the Taliban’s New Weapon — and Pakistan Is Not Ready,” Small Wars Journal, March 9, 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/03/quadcopters-have-become-the-talibans-new-weapon-and-pakistan-is-not-ready/.
[29] Ritesh, “Pakistani Taliban behind Army attacks announces restructuring, ‘air force’ wing,” CNBC TV 18, December 26, 2025, https://www.cnbctv18.com/world/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp-announces-air-force-wing-plan-organisational-restructuring-afghanistan-conflict-ws-l-19803459.htm?utm_medium=social&utm_source=x&utm_campaign=regular-editorial.
[30] “Emergence of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan: A New Militant Alliance Challenges TTP’s Monopoly,” Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, April 18, 2025, https://www.picss.net/latest-reports/emergence-of-ittehad-ul-mujahideen-pakistan-a-new-militant-alliance-challenges-ttps-monopoly-weekly-report-11-17-april2025/; Harsh Behere, “Evolving Competitive Militant Landscape of Pakistan and its Implications,” Journal of Defence Studies 19, no. 4 (October–December 2025): 144–55.
[31] “TTP Forms Air Force Unit, Escalating Drone Threats in Pakistan,” DID Press, December 27, 2025, https://en.didpress.com/23592/; “TTP announce new administrative and operational structure for 2026,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, December 26, 2025, https://www.satp.org/terrorism-update/ttp-announce-new-administrative-and-operational-structure-for-2026.
[32] Rueben Dass and Abdul Basit, “Nascent Adoption: Emerging Tech Trends by Terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
[33] Fidel Rehmati, “Taliban employs advanced technology to build sophisticated drones,” The Khama Press, June 8, 2025, https://www.khaama.com/daily-mail-taliban-employs-advanced-technology-to-build-sophisticated-drones/; “From Rotor Drones to Kamikaze UAVs: Tracking the Taliban’s Five-Year Shift,” Afghanistan International, March 31, 2026, https://www.afintl.com/en/202603318730.
[34] Shoaib and Waleed, “Quadcopters Have Become the Taliban’s New Weapon”.
[35] Pearl Pandya, “Why is the Afghan Taliban launching drone strikes in Pakistan?” Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, June 19, 2026, https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/why-afghan-taliban-launching-drone-strikes-pakistan.
[36] Abid Hussain, “Do Taliban’s drone attacks expose a chink in Pakistan’s armour?” Al-Jazeera, March 18, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/18/do-talibans-drone-attacks-expose-a-chink-in-pakistans-armour; Muhammad Shoaib and Hammad Waleed, “Facing the TTP Drone Threat in Pakistan,” South Asian Voices, June 22, 2026, https://southasianvoices.org/sec-m-pk-r-ttp-drone-threat-06-22-2026/; “Taliban Drone Capabilities: A New Threat to Pakistan’s Airspace,” Review of Afghanistan Developments, March 8, 2026, https://afgreview.com/en/security/taliban-drone-capabilities/.
[37] Faisal Mahmud, “Pakistan says it neutralized Taliban drone, accuses Afghan government of patronising terror,” Anadolu Agency, June 19, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistan-says-it-neutralized-taliban-drone-accuses-afghan-government-of-patronizing-terror-/3971762
[38] Shahzad Akhatr and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Understanding the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 16, no. 3 (2023): 285 and 306, https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2023.2280924.
[39] Abdul Basit, “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Discursive Shift from Global Jihadist Rhetoric to Pashtun-Centric Narratives,” Jamestown Foundation, September 24, 2021, https://jamestown.org/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistans-discursive-shift-from-global-jihadist-rhetoric-to-pashtun-centric-narratives/.
[40] Ibid.
[41] It is important to mention that Afghanistan-Pakistan border region’s local population is exhausted from resurgence of terrorist violence despite the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and distances itself from TTP’s claims of representing them. While the global war on terror has ended and Afghanistan has witnessed peace, Pakistani Pashtun areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are still reeling from terrorism.
[42] Bantirani Patro, “Drones as a Force Multiplier in Pakistani Taliban Operations,” Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, March 11, 2026, https://capssindia.org/drones-as-a-force-multiplier-in-pakistani-taliban-operations/.
[43] Muhammad Amir Rana, “The drone challenge.”
[44] “How Militants Are Using AI & Drones in Pakistan | Emerging Threats Explained | Dawn News English,” August 8, 2025, by DawnNews English, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h0YaYWZ0omE.
[45] Kelley Sayler, “A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer,” Centre for New America Security, June 2015, https://drones.cnas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CNAS-World-of-Drones_052115.pdf.
[46] “Industrial drones for heavy lifting: Capabilities, Applications, and Key Selection Criteria,” Zoxion Intelligent, August 22, 2025, https://www.xtbattery.com/news/industrial-drones-for-heavy-lifting-capabilities-applications-and-key-selection-criteria/.
[47] DawnNews English, “How Militants Are Using AI & Drones in Pakistan.”
[48] “BLA Announces First Air and Drone Warfare Unit QAHR as Operational,” The Balochistan Post, February 12, 2026, https://thebalochistanpost.net/2026/02/bla-announces-first-air-and-drone-warfare-unit-qahr-as-operational/.
[49] “Senior BLA Commander Abdul Basit Zehri, known as Qazi, Passes Away After Prolonged Illness. BLA,” Zrumbesh, June 29, 2025, https://english.zrumbesh.com/5836; Imtiaz Baloch, “Qazi: Commander who Reconceived BLA’s Structure and Strategy,” Jamestown Foundation, January 22, 2026, https://jamestown.org/qazi-commander-who-reconceived-blas-structure-and-strategy/.
[50] Rahim Nasar, “Herof-2 Highlights Digital and Drone Advances in Baloch Insurgency (Part Two),” Jamestown Foundation, March 13, 2026, https://jamestown.org/herof-2-highlights-digital-and-drone-advances-in-baloch-insurgency-part-two/.
[51] Natasha Matloob and Yummna Hina Khan, “Drones, Deception, and Insurgency: Inside Balochistan Liberation Army’s Transformation,” Oxford Global Society, April 29, 2026, https://oxgs.org/2026/04/29/drones-deception-and-insurgency-inside-baloch-liberation-arms-transformation/.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] “Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations Security Council, February 4, 2026, 18, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/44.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Matloob and Khan, “Drones, Deception, and Insurgency.”
[57] Sulaiman, “Introduction of Drones to Militants.”
[58] “Asia-Pacific Overview: January 2026,” Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, January 12, 2026, https://acleddata.com/update/asia-pacific-overview-january-2026.
[59] Sulaiman, “Introduction of Drones to Militants.”
[60] Abdul Basit, “Growing Use of Drones by Militant Groups in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” The Diplomat, August 7, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/growing-use-of-drones-by-militant-groups-in-pakistans-khyber-pakhtunkhwa/.
[61] Patro, “Drones as a Force Multiplier in Pakistani Taliban Operations.”
[62] “Four kids killed in North Waziristan strike,” Dawn, May 20, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1912113.
[63] Tahir Khan, “Mir Ali protest continues, locals say will march towards Islamabad if demands not met,” Dawn, May 25, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1913262.
[64] Naveed Akbar, “Pakistan military responds to claims of drone attack in North Wazirstan,” Aaj TV, May 21, 2025, https://english.aaj.tv/news/330416647/pakistan-military-responds-to-claims-of-drone-attack-in-north-wazirstan.
[65] Dass and Basit, “Nascent Adoption.”
[66] Ibid.
[67] Abdul Basit, “Emerging Technologies Are Reshaping Pakistan’s Militancy Landscape for the Worse,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute, September 17, 2025, https://ipripak.org/emerging-technologies-are-reshaping-pakistans-militancy-landscape-for-the-worse/.
[68] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Colin P. Clarke, and Matt Shear, Terrorists and Technological Innovation,” The Lawfare Blog, February 2, 2020, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/terrorists-and-technological-innovation.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Patro, “Drones as a Force Multiplier in Pakistani Taliban Operations.”
[73] Umer Farooq, “KP police set up country’s first dedicated UAV division,” Dawn, March 7, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/1979273; Mansoor Malik, “Anti-drone units to be set up in all districts,” Dawn, March 7, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/1979236.
[74] Basit, “Emerging Technologies Are Reshaping Pakistan’s Militancy Landscape for the Worse.”
[75] Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Abdul Sayed, “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s Survival under Afghanistan’s New Rulers,” CTC Sentinel 16, no. 8 (August 2023): 8–15, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CTC-SENTINEL-082023.pdf.
[76] Dass and Basit, “Nascent Adoption.”
[77] Waleed and Shoaib, “Quadcopters Have Become the Taliban’s New Weapon”.
[78] Firdaus, “TKD EXCLUSIVE.”
[79] Naimat Khan, “Look ahead or look up’: Pakistan’s police face new challenge as militants take to drone warfare,” Arab News, January 14, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2628766/pakistan.
[80] Raheel Salman, “Pakistan unveils anti-drone jamming gun to counter cross-border threats,” The News, International, November 5, 2025, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1355947-pakistan-unveils-anti-drone-jamming-gun-to-counter-cross-border-threats.
[81] “Pakistan Deploys Turkish “Drone Killer” as ASELSAN ŞAHİN Counter-UAS System Reshapes South Asia Air Defence Balance,” Defence Security Asia, June 16, 2026, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-turkish-drone-killer-aselsan-sahin-counter-uas-south-asia-air-defence/.
[82] “KP police get modern equipment to enhance nighttime surveillance,” Dawn, November 8, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1953742.
[83] Fidel Rahmati, “Pakistan Records More Than 180 Drone Attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Since 2025.”
[84] “Pakistani Islamist militants use drones to target security forces, officials say,” The Straits Times, July 21, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/pakistani-islamist-militants-use-drones-to-target-security-forces-officials-say.
[85] Hasaan Ali Khan, “Pakistan’s Punjab to establish anti-drone units in all districts for first time,” Arab News, March 6, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2635461/pakistan.
[86] Abdul Basit, “The Diffusion of Emerging Technologies into Pakistan’s Militant Landscape and Its Implications,” IPRI Journal 25, no. 2 (December 2025): 91 – 125, https://journal.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Article-6-IPRI-Journal-XXV-II-Abdul-Basit.pdf.
[87] Muhammad Ali Babakhel, “Countering drones,” Dawn, June 17, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/2008482.
[88] Basit, “The Diffusion of Emerging Technologies into Pakistan’s Militant Landscape and Its Implications.”
[89] “Balochistan slaps ban on drones over security concerns,” The News International, February 8, 2026, https://www.thenews.pk/print/1401890-balochistan-slaps-ban-on-drones-over-security-concerns.
[90] Iftikhar Firdaus and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, “TKD EXCLUSIVE: Creeping Ideology; The ‘Generation-Z’ Freelancers of the ISKP,” The Khorasan Diary, August 31, 2023, https://www.thekhorasandiary.com/en/2023/08/31/tkd-exclusive-creeping-ideology-the-generation-z-freelancers-of-the-iskp.
[91] Basit, “The Diffusion of Emerging Technologies into Pakistan’s Militant Landscape and Its Implications.”
[92] Matloob and Khan, “Drones, Deception, and Insurgency.”
